[paragraph 3 of the article] The goal of this article is to flesh out that initial understanding of incarnational immutability. The method I employ to attain this goal is to consider cases of predications from the texts of conciliar Christology. I show potential ontological truth conditions for those predications being true that do not require the truth conditions I propose for immutability to be unsatisfied. Put otherwise, I show ontological truth conditions for predications that imply Christ’s mutability and Incarnation (...) that are also consistent with the truth of “Christ is immutable.” Since the truth conditions for the incarnational texts do not require the falsity of the claim that “Christ is immutable,” the incarnational claims do not require the rejection of immutability. In other words, the Incarnation is no reason to deny divine immutability, and vice versa. (shrink)

In this article I canvas the options available to a proponent of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation against a charge of incoherence. In particular, I consider the charge of incoherence due to incompatible predications both being true of the same one person, the God-man Jesus Christ. For instance, one might think that any- thing divine has to have certain attributes – perhaps omnipotence, or impassibility. But, the charge continues, nothing human can be omnipotent or impassible. And so nothing can (...) be divine and human. So Christ is not both God and man, contrary to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. To do so, first, in Section II, I will present the problem as a deductively valid argument. I then, in that section, go on to show that the proponent of traditional Christology should grant all but one premise of the argument. In the remaining sections I will canvas possible solutions to the problem. In Section III I discuss three ways to deny Premise 3 of the forthcoming argument. These ways include a Kenotic response, qua-modification (in four versions), and finally a response that accepts the compatibility of the allegedly incompatible predicates. (shrink)

Given the interest in analytic theology circles about following “conciliar Christology,” this article describes three different patterns by which patristics scholars have interpreted the relations between the Ecumenical Councils in the past 150 years, patterns that I label as “pendulum swing,” “synthesis of emphases,” and “Cyrillian/traditional.” The article argues that whereas much analytic theology work on Christology belongs in the “synthesis of emphases” pattern, the ascendant paradigm in patristics scholarship is Cyrillian/traditional. It makes a case that the councils understood (...) themselves as moving in a straight line of development from one to another and as proclaiming a broadly Cyrillian Christology, in which the person of the Incarnate Logos is the subject of all actions and experiences of the incarnate Christ. Given the significance of this issue for analytic theology discussions of Christ’s human freedom (is it the freedom of the human nature to act independently of the Logos, or the human freedom of the Logos to accomplish his earthly mission?), analytic theologians would do well to be aware of these currents in patristics scholarship on the Ecumenical Councils. (shrink)

This work presents a historically informed, systematic exposition of the Christology of the first seven Ecumenical Councils of undivided Christendom, from the First Council of Nicaea in 325 AD to the Second Council of Nicaea in 787 AD. Assuming the truth of Conciliar Christology for the sake of argument, Timothy Pawl considers whether there are good philosophical arguments that show a contradiction or incoherence in that doctrine. He presents the definitions of important terms in the debate and a helpful (...) metaphysics for understanding the incarnation. -/- In Defense of Conciliar Christology discusses three types of philosophical objections to Conciliar Christology. Firstly, it highlights the fundamental philosophical problem facing Christology: how can one thing be both God and man, when anything deserving to be called "God" must have certain attributes, and yet it seems that nothing that can aptly be called "man" can have those same attributes? It then considers the argument that if the Second Person of the Holy Trinity were immutable or atemporal, as Conciliar Christology requires, then that Person could not become anything, and thus could not become man. Finally, Pawl addresses the objection that if there is a single Christ then there is a single nature or will in Christ. However, if that conditional is true, then Conciliar Christology is false, since it affirms the antecedent of the conditional to be true, but denies the truth of the consequent. Pawl defends Conciliar Christology against these charges, arguing that all three philosophical objections fail to show Conciliar Christology inconsistent or incoherent. (shrink)

This study considers the philosophical arguments against that Extended Conciliar Christology and argues that none of them succeed in showing the doctrine to be false, or incoherent, or inconsistent.

HaskerI argue that Scott M. Williams’s “Latin/Conciliar Social Trinity” is unable to give a coherent account of some undisputed divine actions. The reason for this lies in Williams’s failure to recognize the different senses in which the trinitarian Persons can be said to have “powers.”.

The purpose of this article is to express what I call a “conciliar concern” regarding Jc Beall’s recently proposed contradictory Christology. By “conciliar concern” I mean a concern that is likely to be shared by all Christians—be they Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant—who are committed to the early ecumenical councils. Formulated as an argument, the concern is this: if contradictory Christology is correct, then the early ecumenical councils were misguided. But (conciliar Christians should say that) the early ecumenical (...) councils were not misguided. Therefore, (conciliar Christians should say that) contradictory Christology is not correct. (shrink)

This article will examine Bellarmine’s first anti–conciliarist work, found in the Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, emphasizing his theological treatment of the pope’s authority relative to the authority of a council and his repudiation of conciliarism. Bellarmine sees the conciliarists as attacking the divinely instituted Petrine structure of the Church. He does not advocate for an absolute papal monarchy in which there are no ‘constitutional’ limitations on the papacy. For Bellarmine, Christ and his Word, as found (...) in Sacred Scripture and Apostolic Tradition, have supreme authority in the Church: one which the magisterium, whether papal or conciliar, must accept in humility and pass on unsullied. Only Christ has a true fullness of power; the pope has a fullness only relative to that of the bishops. Nevertheless, Christ immediately instituted the pope as the supreme head of the Church on earth, and as such, the pope has supreme ecclesiastical power over the whole Church on earth. Lastly, the article examines Bellarmine’s position on papal heresy. (shrink)

WilliamsThe disagreement between William Hasker and myself includes discussion of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theology, the relevance of Conciliar Trinitarianism for evaluating models of the Trinity, and the defensibility of my Latin Social model of the Trinity. I respond to Hasker’s recent objections regarding all three areas. I contest Hasker’s interpretation of Gregory and argue that Gregory is indeed a “one-power” theorist. I make historical connections between Gregory’s Trinitarian theology and Pope Agatho’s “one-power” statements that were endorsed by the (...) Sixth Ecumenical Council (680-681ce); and I make explicit the Sixth Ecumenical Council’s interest in the general issue of how “ousia” and “hypostasis” pertain to the Trinity and the Incarnation. Lastly, I defend and develop the Latin Social model in response to Hasker’s five objections. In light of my findings in the Sixth Council, I retire the name “Latin Social Trinity” for my model and replace it with a name more apt for my model, that is, the “Conciliar Social Trinity.”. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the persistence of conciliarist constitutionalism down into the seventeenth century, and on the particular way in which the Gallican author, Edmond Richer (1559-1631), framed it in his sweeping and influential critiques of the papalist ecclesiology. In the tradition established by his fifteenth- and sixteenth-century predecessors in the Parisian theology faculty, Richer's formulation of conciliar theory was essentially political in nature. As a result, it lent itself readily to use in the cause of constitutionalist aspiration by (...) such eighteenth-century critics of French monarchical policy as Nicolas Le Gros and Gabriel-Nicolas Maultrot. (shrink)

Francis Oakley has devoted much of his scholarly effort to elaborating three claims about the conciliar theory made early in the last century by John Neville Figgis: that it was rooted in secular precedents ; that it exercised a lasting influence on early modern European political thought ; and that conciliar thinkers transformed principles of medieval constitutionalism into political theory properly speaking . Thanks in large measure to Oakley's work, and in spite of whatever unanswered questions may remain, (...) the ‘road from Constance to 1688’ is now securely mapped across the landscape of early modern political thought. Voluntarism occupies a less prominent but more fundamental place in Oakley's writings, because it posed a challenge to the arguments with which conciliar theorists aimed to establish a constitution for the church. They met the challenge with the distinction between God's absolute and ordinary, or ordained, power. This distinction is fundamental to Oakley's work in a double sense: it clarifies a central issue in the history of European thought; but it also helps to understand the point of his investigations into that history. The point is not to trump papal absolutism with the ace of conciliar supremacy, but to trump all forms of dogmatism by asserting ‘the necessity of admitting, and with full candor, the historicity, the relativity, the reformability of all doctrinal pronouncements’. (shrink)

In Analyzing Doctrine: Toward a Systematic eology, Oliver Crisp infers from a general principle concerning God’s providential care for the church that it is implausible that God would allow substantial error on the central theological promulgations of an ecumenical council. is conclusion is then used specifically against contemporary neo-monothelites, who consciously contravene the dyothelite teachings of the third Council of Constantinople. In this paper, I raise several doubts about the inference utilized by Crisp against these neo-monothelites, and I seek to (...) point to a more promising manner of upholding the deliverances of the ecumenical councils. (shrink)

Os debates sobre a recepção do Concílio Vaticano II se adensaram nas últimas duas décadas. No âmbito da historiografia, a reflexão sobre o lugar desse concílio na história do catolicismo contemporâneo e a discussão sobre as fontes e formas de captar a sua recepção dão seus primeiros passos. Passa-se da preocupação de se construir uma história do concílio propriamente dita, para o momento posterior, ou seja, a sua recepção. Para além de uma preocupação hermenêutica ligada às preocupações teológicas, os historiadores (...) da recepção conciliar abrem novos caminhos teóricos de análise, mas também metodológicos, buscando novas formas de abordar o fenômeno. Dessa forma, se deparam com novas fontes que podem colaborar em sua compreensão. Esse artigo tem como objetivo central discutir a possibilidade teórica que toma o concílio como um objeto de leitura por parte de certos atores, desenvolvendo assim o que chamamos de cultura conciliar: representações sobre o evento construídas por certos grupos e que trazem suas características próprias. Desenvolvemos o conceito a partir de uma aproximação com a História Cultural, particularmente aquela desenvolvida por Roger Chartier e oferecemos, no final do texto, um breve exemplo de como essa perspectiva pode ser utilizada, qual seja, no estudo das revistas teológicas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:William Durant the Younger and Conciliar TheoryConstantin FasoltWilliam Durant the Younger (c. 1266–1330) had a sharp mind, deep familiarity with the law of his times, and the practical experience necessary to understand exactly what was wrong with what he, like others, called “the state of the church.”1 He also had the ability to argue from principles to conclusions and the courage to state his conclusions in public—at least (...) until his superiors taught him to proceed with greater caution. The results were some rather radical ideas which reverberated through the later Middle Ages and beyond. They are contained in a long treatise on the reform of the church (Tractatus Maior), which he submitted to the council of Vienne in 1311, and a shorter one (Tractatus Minor), which he wrote at the council of Vienne while it was still in session and after having had what appears to have been an unpleasant encounter with Pope Clement V. The purpose of this article is to focus on the underlying significance of his ideas for our understanding of the conciliar movement and its place in European history.The significance of Durant’s ideas ought not to be confused with their influence. Influence is the historian’s term for the efficient causality of ideas. Modern science, according to a wide-spread commonplace, has taught us to [End Page 385] focus our attention on efficient causality to the exclusion of all other possibilities. Merely to take the notion of formal or final causality seriously is likely to create bewilderment and misunderstanding. The great interest historians take in tracing influence thus is perhaps a measure of the tribute they pay to modern science, but it is clear neither that such tribute is deserved nor that modern science wants it. That is at least one good reason why it may be worthwhile to deflect attention from whatever efficient causality (influence) Durant’s ideas may have exercised and focus it on their formal and final causes instead—on the questions what they were and where they led.2What, then, were Durant’s ideas? The treatise that he submitted to the council of Vienne in 1311 bristles with all sorts of complexities. But most of these are superficial. At bottom, it was founded on a few straightforward premises. These premises can be stated and counted in different ways, depending on how closely you want to look, the order in which you want to proceed, and the case you want to argue. For the purposes of this article they are best summed up in three propositions.The first was that actions are right only if they conform to the law of the church. There are many questions that would need to be answered in order to make this a workable principle. For example, what, precisely, is the law of the church? Is it limited to the Bible? If so, all of the Bible, including the Mosaic Law, or only parts of the Bible? Does it perhaps include conciliar canons and papal decretals as well? If so, which canons and which decretals? Are such canons and decretals human law or divine law? What is the relation between human law and divine law in the first place? Who decides the meaning of the law in case of doubts or contradictions? What if someone is ignorant of the law? And perhaps most important: how do you verify that conduct does in fact conform to the law? Durant struggled with those questions and with others like them. But none of the practical and theoretical difficulties they raised ever shook his conviction that they could be answered and that the solution was contained in the holy books and the canonical writings transmitted from antiquity. His entire work rests on one simple idea: to act rightly means to act in conformity with the laws established and transmitted from antiquity.3 And to [End Page 386] judge rightly means to judge actions by those laws.4 Those laws were old, good, and true. They were the real authorities; the people who applied them were merely their servants.The second proposition consisted of Durant’s conviction that the world had fallen away from... (shrink)

La riforma liturgica conciliare e la sopravvivenza del Vaticano II: a proposito del “dialogo” coi lefebvriani (The Liturgical Reform of the Council and the Future of Vatican II: About the “Dialogue” with the Lefebvrites) Riassunto Gli ultimi anni hanno visto emergere una nostalgia per la liturgia pre-conciliare e il tentativo di reintegrare nella comunione con Roma i seguaci di Mons. Lefebvre, anche a spese della riforma liturgica conciliare. Ma la liturgia del Vaticano II è parte integrante del messaggio teologico del (...) Vaticano II; il contenuto teologico della riforma liturgica è essenziale per il contenuto principale del Vaticano II; la liturgia del Vaticano II è costituzionalmente necessaria per la sopravvivenza teologica del Vaticano II. Tornare indietro rispetto alla riforma liturgica del Vaticano II porta allo smantellamento della chiesa del Vaticano II: è per questo che è necessario comprendere le connessioni profonde tra la costituzione conciliare Sacrosanctum Concilium, la riforma liturgica e la teologia del Vaticano II nella sua interezza, e in particolare rispetto alle questioni del “ressourcement”, dell’ecclesiologia della riforma liturgica, e del “rapprochement” espresso dal concilio. Su questo ultimo punto del “rapprochement” in particolare la questione lefebvriana getta una luce sull’importanza della riforma liturgica conciliare e dei suoi rapporti col messaggio conciliare nella sua interezza e integrità. Parole chiave : Liturgy. Vatican II. Sacrosanctum Concilium. LefebvreIn recent years we have seen the emergence of a nostalgia for the pre-conciliar liturgy and the attempt to reintegrate into communion with Rome the followers of Archbishop Lefebvre, even at the expense of the liturgical reform of Vatican II. But the liturgy of Vatican II is an integral part of the theological message of Vatican II; the theological content of the liturgical reform is essential to the main content of Vatican II. The liturgy of Vatican II is essential for the survival of the theology of Vatican II. Going back to the pre-Vatican II liturgy means the dismantling of the church of Vatican II: that's why we need to understand the deep connection between the constitution Sacrosanctum Concilium, the liturgical reform of Vatican II and the theology of the council in its entirety, and particularly with respect to issues of "ressourcement" and "rapprochement" expressed by the council. Keywords : Liturgy. Vatican II. Sacrosanctum Concilium. Lefebvre. (shrink)

A análise dos cânones conciliares e das epístolas pontifícias mostra que os cristãos estiveram diretamente envolvidos com eventos espetaculares e, não obstante as reiteradas proibições por parte da hierarquia, a dança e a música permaneceram centrais seja na vida pública seja na privada, ingressando inclusive nos ritos e nos edifícios cristãos.

Este trabajo de investigación nace con motivo del 150 aniversario del nacimiento del canónigo doctor Juan Francisco Muñoz y Pabón, seminarista y posteriormente profesor. Ofrecemos una visión general del seminario conciliar de san Isidoro y san Francisco Javier de Sevilla desde su erección en 1831 en Sanlúcar de Barrameda hasta la creación de la universidad pontificia en 1897. La vida cotidiana —estudios y religiosidad— está muy presente en este artículo. La parte central del mismo está dedicada a nuestro biografiado (...) Muñoz y Pabón: seminarista, sacerdote, profesor y canónigo. Este trabajo finaliza con dos apéndices: el primero sobre el claustro de profesores del seminario y el segundo sobre el colegio de doctores de la facultad de teología de la universidad pontificia de Sevilla. (shrink)