El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo determinar los tipos de actividades de reformulación conversacional que aparecen en conversaciones en adultos mayores con diferentes niveles de desempeño cognitivo: normales y trastorno cognitivo leve, a partir de una tarea de construcción de un discurso narrativo-argumentativo. Desde una perspectiva de investigación cualitativa, se obtuvo un corpus de 4 entrevistas, que fue codificado con la ayuda del software ATLAS.ti lo que permitió la generación de conceptos y el desarrollo de explicaciones a partir de los (...) datos, los que fueron contrastados con el marco teórico disponible. Los resultados indicaron que los hablantes realizaron actividades de auto-reformulación auto-iniciada, auto-reformulación iniciada por otro y hetero-reformulación derivada del auto-inicio. Las dos primeras se redujeron en los hablantes identificados con trastorno cognitivo leve, mientras que el último tipo de actividad fue el más frecuente y dominante en la conversación. Los hablantes con trastorno cognitivo leve realizaron reformulaciones que no corregían o adecuaban el discurso, por lo que no cumplieron con la finalidad de la reparación. This study aimed to determine the types of activities of conversational reformulation that occur during oral dialogues with older adults who have varying levels of cognitive performance. Study participants, who ranged between normal cognitive function and mild cognitive impairment, were given the task of constructing a narrative-argumentative dialogue. For qualitative investigation purposes, a corpus of four interviews was obtained. Each series of interviews were encoded using ATLAS.ti software which generated linked concepts and explanations from the data. Findings were then compared with the available theoretical framework. The results indicated that participants exhibited three modes of reformulation technique: self-initiated self-reformulation activities; self-reformulation started by another person; and hetero-reformulation derived from self-start. The first two were reduced in speakers exhibiting mild cognitive impairment, while the latter was the most frequent and dominant mode in the conversation. Speakers with mild cognitive impairment executed reformulations that did not correct or enhance the speech, and as such did not meet the purpose of reformulation. (shrink)

"Hetero-reformulation as a negotiation of meaning strategy. Verbal interaction and argumentation in a televised debate on identity and integration issues. This paper approaches the question of interaction through the phenomenon of reformulation, or more specifically hetero-reformulation, in a televised debate involving issues of identity and integration. The analysis will show that in a reformulation, semantic equivalence between the source utterance and the reformulated utterance does not necessarily imply argumentative co-orientation; and that the paraphrastic reformulation may (...) also indicate a lack of commitment to the utterance. Reformulation enables speakers to negotiate not only the content of the utterances and the direction the debate will take, but also the types of interactions within which they unfold. Keywords: auto-/hetero-reformulation; paraphrastic/non paraphrastic reformulation; enunciative postures; media discourse; integration. ". (shrink)

The phenomenological reading of psychoanalysis undertook by Michel Henry is surprising in several ways. By inscribing Freud in the philosophical lineage and by affirming that his theses on the unconscious take over (resume), ignoring it, two opposite movements of western metaphysics, Henry intends to show that psychoanalysis has to overcome the primacy of representation in order to get rid of the contradictions that traverse it and that make it a prisoner of a philosophy of consciousness. Without fully rejecting the Freudian (...) theory, the author of the Genealogy of Psychoanalysis reformulates the meaning of the meta-psychological notions according to his theses on the cogito, subjectivity and the auto-affection of the living. In this article we retraced the stakes of this redefinition of drives, affect and the unconscious considering his reflexions on repression. (shrink)

This essay starts with the possibility of situating Derrida’s aporetic ethics in the domain of normative ethics and argues that Derrida’s reflection on ethics is enrooted in the specific way he conceives the phenomenological notion of auto-affection. In the second section, I analyze, in the early work, auto-affection with signs and show its centrality in Derrida’s first encounter with Levinas’s philosophy. Derrida refuses to substitute the hetero-affective relation to the Other for auto-affection as the source of universal (...) law and normativity. He does not sacrifice universality and tackles the problem of autonomous ethical decision-making even though he welcomes through affectivity the signification of the singular other, which is irreducible to conceptual, emotive, and normative self-relation. This background helps us understand the rootedness of ethical aporias in a reflection on auto-affection. (shrink)

Exposición de algunas teorías de la auto-organización en el paradigma de la orden a través del desorden. Se analizan las crisis y las catastrofes por su valor auto-organizador en la formación de comportamientos colectivos.

Exposición de algunas teorías de la auto-organización en el paradigma de la orden a través del desorden. Se analizan las crisis y las catastrofes por su valor auto-organizador en la formación de comportamientos colectivos.

Basado en argumentos previos, propongo una [auto] etnografía civil, públicamente responsable, que aborde las temáticas centrales de self, raza, género, clase, sociedad y democracia. Comienzo con la pedagogía de la esperanza y la imaginación sociológica y etnográfica. Paso entonces al etnógrafo y los estudios culturales, revisando varios modelos de etnografía crítica. A continuación, examino la pedagogía performativa crítica, la política y la teoría racial crítica, concluyendo con una breve discusión sobre la práctica de una política cultural performativa.

In his examination of the concepts of evil and impermanence, entitled “Evil and the Problem of Impermanence in Medieval Japanese Philosophy”, Yujin Nagasawa addresses four responses to the problem of impermanence, arguing that the only satisfactory response to the problem leads to an implication about supernaturalism. As Nagasawa puts it, “the problem of impermanence can be construed as a partial argument for supernaturalism and against naturalism”. In response to Nagasawa, I will take up the challenge of naturalism by trying to (...) deconstruct the arguments against indifferentism in order to reformulate and thus strengthen Nagasawa’s response to the problem of impermanence. I will then turn to the radicalization of this thesis by drawing out implications through a comparison with Dōgen’s thought. (shrink)

Many scientific theories purport to describe empirically inaccessible aspects of the world. The agenda of foundational physics is more ambitious still: to characterize the world at the level of 'primitive ontology'. In this pursuit it often posits new and peculiar physical features, a proclivity aided by the abstract, mathematical way in which foundational theories are framed. But how do we decipher their physical content, and in particular the accounts of primitive ontology they offer, and why think that content is true? (...) This dissertation explores the relationship between these questions -- between the problem of ontological interpretation in foundational physics and the nature of scientific realism. I do not argue for a unified account. Rather, I examine three contexts in which their interactions are particularly interesting and philosophically significant. First, I consider the role scientific methodology plays in a prominent naturalistic defense of scientific realism: the no-miracles argument. The most sophisticated form of this argument rests on the broad claim that successful scientific methodology is irredeemably theory dependent. I examine the nature of this theory dependence within the context of Maxwell's development of electromagnetism, and argue that the presence of competing ontological interpretations undermines the realist's attempt to draw sweeping epistemic conclusions from methodological success. I next consider the concept of theoretical reformulation and how it applies to the claim that Lagrangian dynamics is a reformulation of (part of) Newtonian dynamics. How should this claim be understood in light of the fact that the world is non-classical? What can this tell us about the concept of theory reformulation itself, which plays a central role in arguments against scientific realism? I provide an analysis of theory reformulation in terms of counterfactual interpretative judgments, and then cast doubt on its justification in the classical case by developing a non-Newtonian interpretation of Lagrangian dynamics. Finally, I consider whether competing ontological interpretations raise underdetermination problems for realism about foundational physics. After first re-formulating the underdetermination argument to avoid recent objections that it fails to pose any distinctive threat, I suggest a formulation of realism that vitiates the underdetermination threats posed by competing ontological interpretations. (shrink)

El prefijo “auto” en autoorganización y autopoiesis se refiere a la existencia de una identidad o agencialidad implicada en el orden, organización o producción de un sistema que se corresponde con el sistema mismo, en contraste con el diseño o la influencia de carácter externo. La autoorganización (AO) estudia la manera en la que los procesos de un sistema alcanzan de forma espontánea un orden u organización complejo, bien como una estructura o patrón emergente, bien como algún tipo de (...) finalidad o identidad autoconstruida. En este trabajo nos ocupamos del concepto de AO en el contexto de la problemática sobre la naturaleza la vida y de los organismos vivientes. Este concepto se elabora en diferentes tradiciones científicas y filosóficas, a partir de su origen en la filosofía kantiana. La cibernética trata de emular la organización de los seres vivos y su teleología mediante la construcción de máquinas; desarrolla una perspectiva centrada en la regulación y en la causalidad mutua entre componentes del sistema. Estos trabajos, a veces complementados con la teoría de sistemas y la teoría de la información, son fundamentales para el desarrollo de la ciencia del siglo XX, especialmente las ciencias computacionales y la biología. Una segunda corriente surge desde la termodinámica de los procesos irreversibles alejados del equilibrio a partir, entre otros, de los trabajos de la escuela de Bruselas, en la que la AO se explora como la formación espontánea de estructuras de orden disipativo. Una tercera tradición, tal vez la más profundamente kantiana, se desarrolla en el contexto de la biología del desarrollo e integra a las dos mencionadas previamente, pues combina aspectos de las dos previas en el desarrollo ontogenético. Podemos decir que cada una de estas concepciones de la AO se relaciona con modelos paradigmáticos diferentes. La noción de autopoiesis (AP), por su parte, fue propuesta en los años 70 por los biólogos chilenos Humberto Maturana y Francisco Varela para explicar la organización individual de los seres vivos como un proceso dinámico que genera una identidad desde las operaciones del sistema (Maturana y Varela 1973). Puede decirse que hereda y reorganiza ideas de la tradición de la AO, especialmente la kantiana y la cibernética, para proponer una teoría biológica alternativa. El enfoque autopoiético concibe el fenómeno de la vida y a los seres vivos de forma muy diferente a la teoría de la evolución o la biología molecular que constituían las líneas de investigación predominantes en la biología de su tiempo. La teoría subraya como propiedad básica de un sistema viviente su autoconstitución dinámica como unidad dotada de identidad a partir de interacciones entre sus componentes. Sin embargo, aquellas propiedades de la vida consideradas primordiales en el enfoque darwiniano, como la reproducción o la evolución, se ven como secundarias, pues requieren de la existencia previa de sistemas autopoiéticos. El objetivo de esta voz es examinar diferentes aspectos que configuran las tradiciones autoorganizativa y autopoiética, en especial las tensiones conceptuales internas que permiten comprender los desafíos a los que se enfrentan ambas en el marco de la filosofía y la teoría de la biología, así como la forma en que sus posiciones e intuiciones contrastan con otras perspectivas en biología. (shrink)

Mill’s harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between self-regarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill’s own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill’s harm principle. The sphere of protected liberty includes not (...) only self-regarding conduct, but also actions that affect only consenting others. On the other hand, the occasional permissibility of interfering with self-regarding conduct can plausibly be explained by reference to the agent’s consent. Thus, the more important distinction appears to be that between consensual and non-consensual harm, rather than that between the self-regarding and non-self-regarding action. That is, interference can be justified in order to prevent non-consensual harms, but not to prevent consensual harms. It is argued that the harm principle, thus reformulated, both captures Mill’s intentions and is a substantively plausible position. (shrink)

Scholars are increasingly concerned about social biases in facial analysis systems, particularly with regard to the tangible consequences of misidentification of marginalized groups. However, few have examined how automated facial analysis technologies intersect with the historical genealogy of racialized gender—the gender binary and its classification as a highly racialized tool of colonial power and control. In this paper, we introduce the concept of auto-essentialization: the use of automated technologies to re-inscribe the essential notions of difference that were established under (...) colonial rule. We consider how the face has emerged as a legitimate site of gender classification, despite being historically tied to projects of racial domination. We examine the history of gendering the face and body, from colonial projects aimed at disciplining bodies which do not fit within the European gender binary, to sexology's role in normalizing that binary, to physiognomic practices that ascribed notions of inferiority to non-European groups and women. We argue that the contemporary auto-essentialization of gender via the face is both racialized and trans-exclusive: it asserts a fixed gender binary and it elevates the white face as the ultimate model of gender difference. We demonstrate that imperialist ideologies are reflected in modern automated facial analysis tools in computer vision through two case studies: commercial gender classification and the security of both small-scale and large-scale spaces. Thus, we posit a rethinking of ethical attention to these systems: not as immature and novel, but as mature instantiations of much older technologies. (shrink)

In the last years, a series of automated self-representational social media sites have emerged that shed light on the information ethics associated with participation in Web 2.0. Sites like Zoominfo.com, Pipl.com, 123People.com and Yasni.com not only continually mine and aggregate personal information and biographic data from the web and beyond to automatically represent the lives of people, but they also engage algorithmic networking logics to represent connections between them; capturing not only who people are, but whom they are connected to. (...) Indeed, these processes of 'auto-biography' are 'secret' ones that for the most part escape the user's attention. This article explores how these sites of auto-biography reveal the complexities of the political economy of Web 2.0, as well as implicate an ethics of exposure concerning how these processes at once participate in the erosion of privacy, and at the same time, in the reinforcement of commodification and surveillance regimes. (shrink)

This paper explores auto-photography as a form of research practice in the area of identity and self-esteem research. It allows researchers to capture and articulate the ways identity guides human action and thought. It involves the generation and examination of the static images that participants themselves believe best represent them. Auto-photography is an important tool for building bridges with marginalized groups in the research process, since it offers researchers a way to let participants speak for themselves. Furthermore, by (...) using this method researchers can avoid exclusive reliance on survey questionnaires and other such research instruments that may be culturally biased. I present two research projects using auto-photography: one involving adolescent Latina girls and one involving Indian women. Based on the experience of these projects, I discuss auto-photography's importance in identity and self-esteem research. Finally, I discuss some of the benefits and challenges of working with this method. (shrink)

Auto-operação manifesta uma co-presença de feminismos, a partir do eixo de pensamento que contrapõe a noção de sexo como biológico a ideia de gênero como construção sociocultural. Os trabalhos apresentados refletem tanto um tempo existencial, subjetivado, íntimo e interiorizado, quanto o âmbito comunicacional, maquínico e exteriorizado da produção sensível.

This paper provides an introduction and overview of Michel Henry's work, with particular emphasis on his understanding of auto-affectivity. It concludes by pointing to some objections or questions sympathetic phenomenologists may have for his work.

Idipsum est une locution qu'Augustin utilise pour désigner Dieu. Elle signifie littéralement "cela même". Ce minimalisme sémantique ne laisse pas de la rendre mystérieuse. Faut-il y voir un emprunt à certains textes bibliques qui déjà en font usage? Dans ce cas, idipsum, tel un nom propre vide de toute signification, se bornerait à indiquer Dieu en tant qu'il échappe à toute définition rationnelle. Ou bien faut-il rattacher idipsum à la tradition platonicienne qui recourt à des locutions grecques similaires pour désigner (...) la réalité intelligible qui est " elle-même en elle-même "? Idipsum serait alors la trace d'un héritage philosophique conduisant Augustin à une définition métaphysique de Dieu comme Etre absolu. Cependant, cette alternative entre origine biblique et tradition platonicienne néglige la diversité des usages philosophiques des locutions formées sur auto puis ipsum: elles expriment d'abord l'identité et le fait d'être soi, puis la réflexivité, au croisement des champs dialectique, pratique et ontologique. Cet ouvrage explore la façon dont ces aspects de l'identité se sont construits, du autos grec à l'idipsum latin, à travers des études portant sur Homère, Platon, Aristote, le stoïcisme, le néoplatonisme grec puis latin, Augustin. (shrink)

Science and mathematics continually change in their tools, methods, and concepts. Many of these changes are not just modifications but progress---steps to be admired. But what constitutes progress? This dissertation addresses one central source of intellectual advancement in both disciplines: reformulating a problem-solving plan into a new, logically compatible one. For short, I call these cases of compatible problem-solving plans "reformulations." Two aspects of reformulations are puzzling. First, reformulating is often unnecessary. Given that we could already solve a problem using (...) an older formulation, what do we gain by reformulating? Second, some reformulations are genuinely trivial or insignificant. Merely replacing one symbol with another does not lead to intellectual progress. What distinguishes significant reformulations from trivial ones? According to what I call "conceptualism" (or "conceptual empiricism"), reformulations are intellectually significant when they provide a different plan for solving problems. Significant reformulations provide inferentially different routes to the same solution. In contrast, trivial reformulations provide exactly the same problem-solving plans, and hence they do not change our understanding. This answers the second question about what distinguishes trivial from significant reformulations. However, the first question remains: what makes a new way of solving an old problem valuable? Here, a bevy of practical considerations come to mind: one formulation might be faster, less complicated, or use more familiar concepts. According to "instrumentalism," these practical benefits are all there is to reformulating. Some reformulations are simply more instrumentally valuable for meeting the aims of science than others. At another extreme, "fundamentalism" contends that a reformulation is valuable when it provides a more fundamental description of reality. According to this view, some reformulations directly contribute to the metaphysical aim of carving reality at its joints. Conceptualism develops a middle ground between instrumentalism and fundamentalism, preserving their benefits without their costs. I argue that the epistemic value of significant reformulations does not reduce to either practical or metaphysical value. Reformulations are valuable because they are a constitutive part of problem-solving. Both science and mathematics aim at solving all possible problems within their respective domains. Meeting this aim requires being able to plan for any possible problem-solving context, and this requires reformulating. By reformulating, we clarify what we need to know to solve problems. Still, one might wonder whether the value of reformulations requires underlying differences in explanatory power. According to "explanationism," a reformulation is valuable only when it provides a better explanation. Explanationism stands as a rival middle ground position to my own. However, it faces numerous counterexamples. In many cases, two reformulations provide the same explanation while nonetheless providing different ways of understanding a phenomenon. Hence, reformulating can be valuable even when neither formulation is more explanatory. Methodologically, I draw on a variety of case studies to support my account of reformulation. These range from classical mechanics to quantum chemistry, along with examples from mathematics. Symmetry arguments provide a paradigmatic example: the mathematics of symmetry groups radically recasts quantum mechanics and quantum chemistry. Nevertheless, elementary approaches exist that eschew this additional mathematical apparatus, solving problems in a more tedious but less mathematically-demanding manner. Further examples include reformulations of quantum field theory, Arabic vs. Roman numerals, and Fermat's little theorem in number theory. In each case, my account identifies how reformulations change and improve our understanding of science and mathematics. (shrink)

Se propone una lectura de la interpretación que Heidegger hace del problema de la auto-afección en la primera Crítica kantiana. Si el tiempo y el yo pienso se unifican es gracias a la idea del tiempo como auto-afección pura que permite captar el movimiento de formación del sí-mismo sin subordinarlo a un enlace extratemporal. Intentaremos mostrar que esta comprensión considera el tiempo como un movimiento autorreferencial que no obstante hace necesario un retiro y una demora de sí para (...) liberar lo que viene. Para hacer posible un encuentro con otro, dicha estructura autoafectiva debe darse el tiempo que impide la clausura autárquica de sí mismo. (shrink)

Exploring who, what and how we remember, this piece proposes that to remember requires, on the one hand, an auto-memoration, and at the same time, on the other hand, auto-memoration always detours through the world and through the other, which requires ‘con-memoration’. Referring to Derrida and Nancy, this piece argues that the memories of ourselves, and of others, is always already mediated because structured by differance and the other, and thus entails also a forgetting.

Trust has been widely investigated both theoretically and empirically. Whether thought of as the result of a calculation of costs/benefits, a shared identity, or a leap of faith, there always seems to be an ‘as if’ rhetorical gesture which is ultimately needed to explain how actors move from the base of trust to expectations of trust via suspending judgment on uncertainty and fear of vulnerability to betrayal and exploitation — the actors ultimately act ‘as if’ they do not fear uncertainty (...) and vulnerability to betrayal. Yet this ‘as if’ element has remained seriously under-theorised. Drawing on Derrida's deconstruction, I propose a way of thinking this ‘as if’ element of trust. I thus argue that the decision to trust occurs in a terrain of structural undecidability. The latter is thought of as the possibility condition of trust as well as the subject of trust and a sense of responsibility for this trust. The aporiatic nature of undecidability makes this trust an auto-immune trust which obeys the tripartite logic of ‘without’ which both negates and affirms trust. (shrink)

Take full advantage of your dSLR camera, and do it with confidence Many people buy dSLR cameras for their flexibility, but find themselves so intimidated by all the options and controls that they rarely venture beyond the automatic mode. With a friendly tone and clear, understandable instruction, photographer and educator Jen Bebb introduces you to every mode and setting on your sophisticated dSLR. After thoroughly explaining shutter speed, aperture, depth of field, ISO, and basic composition, she offers direction on what (...) each camera mode does and when it should be used. You'll gain the confidence to use the entire feature set you paid for. Beginning dSLR users are often intimidated by the scene, semi-automatic, and fully manual modes on their cameras; this guide gently explains each mode and setting Uses a conversational tone and liberal examples to define and explain basic concepts including shutter speed, aperture, ISO, depth of field, and composition Covers how each camera mode works and when to consider using it Helps those new to dSLR photography to gain confidence and begin taking advantage of all the flexibility a dSLR offers Written by a professional photographer who is also known for her skill as an instructor, Beyond Auto Mode encourages new and less experienced dSLR users to take the next step toward creative control. (shrink)

We propose a reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the problem of Self-Affection in the first Kantian Critique. If the Time and the ‘I Think’ are unified is due to the notion of time as pure Self-Affection, that could capture the formation of Self without subordinating it to an extra-temporal connection. We attempt to show that Heidegger’s account considers time as a self-referential movement which however requires a delay and a retreat of itself to release what is coming. In order to (...) allow an encounter with another, the self-affective structure must give time to herself, which prevents the autarchic closure of herself. (shrink)

Segundo Bernard Lonergan, a possibilidade de objectivarmos a estrutura imanente do sujeito cognoscente e agente exige um percurso de auto-transcendência cognitiva e de auto-transcendência moral. Esse dinamismo de "auto-apropriação da auto-consciência intelectual e racional começa por uma teoria do conhecimento, estende-se até uma metafísica e uma ética e ascende até uma concepção e uma afirmação de Deus, a qual é confrontada finalmente pelo problema do mal, exigindo a transformação de uma inteligência que confia em si mesma (...) num intellectus quaerens idem". Assim, o presente artigo pretende ser uma introdução ao reconhecimento do alcance e do impacto atribuído por Bernard Lonergan quer à gnosiologia quer à ontologia. Para tal, procede-se a uma apresentação do significado próprio do "acto de intelecção" e do sentido dos diferentes modos de operação consciente do sujeito, bem como a uma identificação das diversas configurações da experiência que essa compreensão revela, nomeadamente em ordem a uma explicitação das noções concretas, irrestritas e dinâmicas de "ser proporcionado" e de "ser transcendente". /// Taking into account that for Bernard Lonergan, the immanent structure of the human being as an agent and as a subject requires a process of cognitional and moral self-transcendence, the article intends to show how for Lonergan this dynamism of self-appropriation of one's own intellectual and rational self-consciousness begins as cognitional theory, expands into a metaphysics and an ethics, mounts to a conception and an affirmation of God, only to be confronted with the problem of evil and its inevitable demand for the transformation of the self-reliant intelligence into anintellectus quaerens fidem. The article, therefore, explores the relationship between the several meanings of "insight", the different modes of conscious operations of the subject, and the diverse configurations of experience, as disclosed by the dynamic, concrete, and irrestricted notions of "proportionate being" and "transcendent being". (shrink)

Partant de l'idée énoncée par le philosophe Charles Taylor, selon laquelle les êtres humains sont « des animaux capables d'auto-interprétation », cet article vise à comprendre le rôle constitutif de l'auto-interprétation dans la connaissance de soi. Une conception satisfaisante de l'auto-interprétation devrait à la fois rendre compte de l'autorité de la connaissance de soi en première personne et satisfaire les exigences du réalisme ordinaire. Si la version constitutiviste de l'auto-interprétation semble incompatible avec de telles exigences, c'est (...) parce qu'elle considère ce pouvoir constituant comme le privilège du sujet de modeler ses états mentaux au gré de sa volonté. Pour autant, il est possible de conserver un rôle constitutif à l'auto-interprétation en évitant toute implication volontariste et en maintenant une certaine indépendance des contenus mentaux du sujet envers lui-même. C'est ce que proposent les philosophes américains Richard Moran et David Finkelstein, le premier, en redéfinissant l'activité d'auto-interprétation en termes de croyance impliquant l'adhésion du sujet à ses attitudes mentales. Considérant le sujet en tant qu'agent responsable de ses attitudes, Moran défend une conception cognitive et engagée de l'interprétation, un point de vue pratique du sujet sur lui-même. La délibération fournit ainsi les raisons d'adopter une croyance, un désir, une émotion,... raisons qui justifient en même temps l'auto-interprétation. Moins attaché à la valeur cognitive de l'auto-interprétation, Finkelstein développe également une conception pratique de la connaissance de soi, fondée sur la fonction expressive des auto-attributions et où l'auto-interprétation a valeur de contexte de cela même qu'elle interprète. (shrink)

The ideal of emancipation has been traditionally grounded on the premise that human activity is not restrained by external boundaries. Thus the realisation of values such as autonomy or recognition has been facilitated by economic growth and material expansion. Yet there is mounting evidence that the human impact on natural systems at the planetary level, a novelty captured by the concept of the Anthropocene, endangers the Earth’s habitability. If human development is to be limited for the sake of global sustainability, (...) can emancipation be kept as a mobilising ideal? As opposed to alternative views such as that of degrowth, this article argues that it can. The key lies in the ability of the Anthropocene to produce planetary subjectivities. By recognising the bounded quality of human embeddedness, the possibility of a different emancipation is opened up. The latter does not give up material well-being, yet it makes sure that the latter does not endanger planetary habitability. (shrink)

O debate consigo mesmo é um fenômeno corriqueiro. Diariamente tomamos decisões – sejam elas importantes ou triviais, teóricas ou práticas – em questões nas quais temos que escolher entre pelo menos duas opções. Para fazê-lo confrontamos uma com a outra seja deliberando pausadamente a respeito dos méritos de cada uma, seja impulsiva-mente adotando uma delas e descartando as demais. Os auto-debates que mais têm cha-mado a atenção dos filósofos são aqueles em que pareceria que a racionalidade é violada: do (...) wishful thinking ao auto-engano, passando pela akrasia e outras formas aparentemente paradoxais do pensar e do agir. Servindo-se de concepções da racionalidade e do debate desenvolvidas pelo autor, este artigo procura analisar a natureza do auto-debate e seus tipos, e mostrar que a irracionalidade que se costuma atribuir a alguns de seus exemplos típicos só se justifica devido a uma concepção que limita a racio-nalidade a seu modelo lógico-dedutivo.The debate with oneself is a common phenomenon. We make decisions every day – important or trivial, theoretical or practical – concerning issues in which we have to choose among at least two options. In order to do that we have to compare these options either by quietly reflecting about the merits of each one, or impulsively adopting one of them and discharging the others. The kinds of self-debate that have most attracted philosophers' attention are those in which rationality is apparently violated: from wishful thinking to self-deception, including akrasia and other apparently para-doxical forms of thinking and of acting. This paper tries to analyze the nature and differ-ent kinds of self-debate using the conceptions of rationality and of debate developed by the author, and tries to show that the irrationality that is usually attributed to some of its typical examples is only justified due to a conception that limits rationality to its logical-deductive model. (shrink)

O debate consigo mesmo é um fenômeno corriqueiro. Diaria-mente tomamos decisões – sejam elas importantes ou triviais, teóricas ou práticas – em questões nas quais temos que escolher entre pelo menos duas opções. Para fazê-lo confrontamos uma com a outra seja deliberan-do pausadamente a respeito dos méritos de cada uma, seja impulsiva-mente adotando uma delas e descartando as demais. Os auto-debates que mais têm chamado a atenção dos filósofos são aqueles em que pareceria que a racionalidade é violada: do (...) wishful thinking ao auto-engano, passan-do pela akrasia e outras formas aparentemente paradoxais do pensar e do agir. Servindo-se de concepções da racionali-dade e do debate desenvolvidas pelo autor, este artigo procura analisar a natureza do auto-debate e seus tipos, e mostrar que a irracionalidade que se costuma atribuir a alguns de seus exemplos típicos só se justifica devi-do a uma concepção que limita a racionalidade a seu modelo lógico-dedutivo. (shrink)

Greening Auto Jobs: A Critical Analysis of the Green Job Solution provides a major contribution to the growing and important field of environmental sociology and labor studies by providing a theoretical and practical understanding of how the broader political-economic relations of society affect the relationship between labor and the environment.

A semantic theory aims to make predictions that are accurate and comprehensive. Sometimes, though, a semantic theory falls short of this aim, and there is a mismatch between prediction and data. In such cases, defenders of the semantic theory often attempt to rescue it by appealing to Gricean pragmatics. The hope is that we can rescue the theory as long as we can use pragmatics to explain away its predictive failures. This pragmatic rescue strategy is one of the most popular (...) moves in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and formal semantics. In this paper I argue that this strategy fails whenever the predictive failures at issue can be recast in epistemological or metaphysical terms. This general “reformulation argument” undermines a wide variety of pragmatic rescue attempts. (shrink)

In the early Analytic Philosophy, the concept of a pseudosentence was used as a polemical device. To try and formalize a sentence without success was a means to ›debunk‹ it as a pseudosentence. The classical example is Heidegger’s dictum of the nothing which noths. But, according to Carnap, not only did Carnap not understand what Heidegger said, but also Heidegger himself must have misunderstood his own utterances! Does Carnap's diagnosis remain intact if one admits the possibility of a misunderstanding and (...) misconstrual on Carnap’s side, too? Should not Carnap's concept of formalization be substituted by that of logico-hermeneutical reconstruction in order to obviate any such infelicities? In everyday communication, we very rarely ever feel the need to undertake a significant effort to understand each other. This attitude is at odds with Friedrich Schleiermacher’s view that misunderstandings are ubiquitous and that one has to actively invest into the establishment of correct understandings. Therefore, one should ask: Are there good reasons to reject the view that we misunderstand ourselves all the time? Or: Is there any worth in the view that misunderstandings are prevalent? The answers developed in this paper are generalized so that they apply to philosophical contexts and a maxim of escalating formalization is formulated. The debate about peer disagreement is adduced as an illustration of philosophical practices that evade the maxim and thus stagnate cognitively. (shrink)

Si l ’ on peut bien affirmer que certains Sceptiques s ’ auto-réfutent, ce n ’ est pas le cas de Sextus Empiricus. En distinguant entre les modèles auto-référentiel et performatif de l ’ auto-réfutation auxquels on confronte les problèmes anciens du Menteur et du renversement ( peritropè ), on peut montrer que Sextus recourt à ce qu ’ il désigne par le mot sumperigraphè, qu ’ il convient de considérer comme un schème topologique verbal (une boucle (...) récursive). Il ressort que Sextus circonscrit la logique dont relève l ’ auto-réfutation, dans un effet réfléchissant et abyssal, rejoignant la grande tradition sceptique du théâtre grec. (shrink)

This article is a response to Ole Martin Skilleås's "Knowledge and Imagination in Fiction and Biography." The first section of the article summarizes the line of the argument in four theses: (1) What is real is more influential than what is made up; (2) there is no metaphysical chasm between autobiographers and us; (3) (auto)biographies are not just empirical; and (4) the moral lesson of a fiction need not be accepted. In the second section each of these theses is (...) criticized. This criticism leads to the conclusion that we should welcome (auto)biographical texts in our moral investigations, but not at the cost of fictional texts. This conclusion is coupled with a proposal to formulate criteria to distinguish texts that matter from those that do not. (shrink)

Despite its imperative to include all gendered positions under one umbrella, ‘trans’ is continually riven by intramural confrontation over the differences between its masculine and feminine iterations. Whether in political organizing, on social media or in the pages of academic trans theory, it sometimes seems like ‘trans’ is subject to an interminable and gendered custody battle. Dissatisfied with the terms of masc–femme antagonism, this essay uses the gendered interfaces of critique and autotheory to enmesh the work of Jules Gill-Peterson and (...) Paul B. Preciado. Reading into the interdependence of Gill-Peterson’s and Preciado’s texts yields a different theory: trans as an auto-antonym, a word that produces opposite meanings depending on context. Treating trans as auto-antonymic conjures a relational and even erotic escape from the naturalization of gendered antagonism in trans theory, affirming the unexpected bridges, reversals or ‘sex changes’ of specifically trans writing. (shrink)

A bare individual was conceived by Tichý as an individual such as if the property the individual instantiates is non-trivial , it is possible for the individual to lack it ; and for any trivial property that it cannot lack this kind of property. The exact readings of Tichý’s original formulations of are subjected to a detailed analysis to reveal that any of them is refutable by means of Cmorejian objection that there exist contingent properties which are partly essential . (...) To avoid such objection, the present paper attempts to rebuild Tichý’s definitions into viable ones. (shrink)

The paper questions an official narrative of Soviet Marxism that had been formulated both by the Bolshevik leaders and the Western European Marxists. It proposes to shift the discussion from a historically constituted understanding of Soviet Marxism as a partisanship of theory to the epistemic conditions of Marxism after the October Revolution. The paper argues that a post-revolutionary Soviet logic assumes that theory should start where Marx ended and that it should act in a Marxist fashion across all conceptual and (...) practical realms. Instead of asking ‘how’, the Soviet thought returns to the old pre-critical question of ‘what is’, and reformulates this ‘what is’ in the Marxist post-critical terms. Constructing a new critical concept of Soviet Marxism, the paper proceeds with the analysis of the post-critical status of knowledge after the revolution and recovers forgotten and repressed epistemological alternatives to orthodox Bolshevism. (shrink)

Dirac’s relativistic theory of electron generally results in two possible solutions, one with positive energy and other with negative energy. Although positive energy solutions accurately represented particles such as electrons, interpretation of negative energy solution became very much controversial in the last century. By assuming the vacuum to be completely filled with a sea of negative energy electrons, Dirac tried to avoid natural transition of electron from positive to negative energy state using Pauli’s exclusion principle. However, many scientists like Bohr (...) objected to the idea of sea of electrons as it indicates infinite density of charge and electric field and consequently infinite energy. In addition, till date, there is no experimental evidence of a particle whose total energy (kinetic plus rest) is negative. In an alternative approach, Feynman, in quantum field theory, proposed that particles with negative energy are actually positive energy particles running backwards in time. This was mathematically consistent since quantum mechanical energy operator contains time in denominator and the negative sign of energy can be absorbed in it. However, concept of negative time is logically inconsistent since in this case, effect happens before the cause. To avoid above contradictions, in this paper, we try to reformulate the Dirac’s theory of electron so that neither energy needs to be negative nor the time is required to be negative. Still, in this new formulation, two different possible solutions exist for particles and antiparticles (electrons and positrons). (shrink)

Despite the prevalence of post-colonial theory in the humanities and social sciences, why is it that the two main secular formations in the study of religion(s), as philosophy of religion and history of religions, continue to deploy very similar mechanisms that reconstitute past imperialisms such as the hegemony of theory as specifically Western and/or the division of labor between universal and particular knowledge formations? To answer this question this paper stages an oblique engagement between the seemingly divergent discourses: (i) philosophy (...) of religion, (ii) history of religion—more specifically the area specialism called South Asian religions, and (iii) post-colonial theory especially where these discourses intersect with the discipline of Indology and the representation of Indic phenomena. A different version of this engagement occurs in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (LPR). A post-colonial reading of the LPR reveals closer and often unacknowledged connections between the birth of these two disciplines. More importantly the LPR anticipates the auto-immunizing mechanism that underpins the continued lack of engagement between the various disciplines of contemporary religions. Ironically, this mechanism, it will be argued, is located in the very heart of the comparative enterprise itself. (shrink)

Science frequently gives us multiple, compatible ways of solving the same problem or formulating the same theory. These compatible formulations change our understanding of the world, despite providing the same explanations. According to what I call "conceptualism," reformulations change our understanding by clarifying the epistemic structure of theories. I illustrate conceptualism by analyzing a typical example of symmetry-based reformulation in chemical physics. This case study poses a problem for "explanationism," the rival thesis that differences in understanding require ontic explanatory (...) differences. To defend conceptualism, I consider how prominent accounts of explanation might accommodate this case study. I argue that either they do not succeed, or they generate a skeptical challenge. (shrink)

El punto de partida de este trabajo es que la idea de autoconservación es constitutiva para la comprensión y el desarrollo histórico de la subjetividad moderna. El análisis kierkegaardiano de la psicología del individuo moderno en La enfermedad mortal retoma y reelabora el tópico de la autoconservación. Anti-Climacus (el pseudónimo kierkegaardiano) sostiene que los seres humanos no están ocupados con el mantenimiento de un yo ya determinado y concluido; sino, más bien, con la constitución misma de ese yo. En su (...) exposición, él considera que la potenciación de la auto-constitución puede conducir a la autodestrucción. Este artículo procura interpretar la desesperación como autodestrucción y ofrecer, desde dicha interpretación, una comprensión consistente de sus dos modalidades principales: no querer ser sí mismo y querer ser sí mismo. Por último, el artículo considera la posibilidad de superación de la desesperación y concluye reflexionando en torno al desarrollo moderno del concepto de autoconservación. (shrink)

Comentaremos neste trabalho sobre o ecossistema do Círio de Nazaré, com base na Teoria dos Sistemas Complexos, para isso utilizarei quatro autores relevantes, Edgar Morin (2018), Ettore Bresciani Filho (2008), Eunice Quilici Gonzalez (1998) e Michael Debrun (1998), sobre os conceitos de sistemas, sistemas complexos, organização, auto-organização e atratores. No livro Introdução ao Pensamento Complexo de Edgar Morin (2008), o autor discute as noções de complexidade, sistemas, organização e auto-organização. Trabalharemos os primeiros capítulos do livro, utilizando-o como base (...) para explicar o ecossistema que ocorre no Círio de Nazaré. Mostraremos a complexidade em relação ao feedback e à desordem que surgem durante a jornada como atratores, fatores intrínsecos do fenômeno da autoorganização. (shrink)

Hillel Steiner argues that a necessary and sufficient condition for the compossibility of a set of rights is that those rights be extensionally differentiable. However, given that two or more actions can extensionally overlap without thereby being mutually unperformable, if such actions are specified in the relevant rights, then those rights will not be incompossible, notwithstanding their extensional overlap. The set of compossible sets of rights then is greater than the subset of extensionally differentiable rights, and extensional differentiability is a (...) sufficient but unnecessary condition of compossibility. (shrink)