C'est à l'érudit jésuite américain Léo Sweeney que l'on doit de s'être intéressé le premier aux conditions de l'émergence du concept d'infini dans la théologie chrétienne ainsi qu'aux sources de ce concept dans l'antiquité. Un des grands mérites de Sweeney fut, dans un article paru en 1957, de mettre en évidence l'existence d'un groupe de penseurs actifs peu après 1241 et qui, confrontés à la question de savoir si l'essence de Dieu était infinie, avaient répondu par la négative, et étaient (...) même, semble-t-il, allés jusqu'à affirmer que l'essence divine était finie. Nous ne connaissons l'existence de ces quidam que par les allusions faites par des auteurs qui les citent afin de les réfuter. Sweeney en a donc conclu que les quidam étaient les «catalyseurs» de la doctrine classique de l'infini telle qu'elle allait prendre forme chez un Thomas d'Aquin et ses contemporains ou successeurs. Le problème se pose de savoir qui étaient ces énigmatiques quidam et quelle était la nature exacte de leurs doctrines. A la première de ces questions, laissée en suspens dans l'article de 1957, Sweeney vient récemment de proposer une tentative de solution précise, dans un ouvrage intitulé Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought: un auteur qui a très certainement défendu la thèse de la finitude de l'essence divine serait Guerric de Saint-Quentin. Le propos de cette note est simple: nous aimerions montrer, qu'à bien les lire, les textes de Guerric n'autorisent pas à lui imputer la doctrine de la finitude divine. Comme l'identification par Sweeney de Guerric comme un quidamdépend de sa reconstruction de la doctrine des quidam dans son article de 1957, il convient de commencer par là notre examen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Robert Owen’s ideas and achievements largely shaped French republicanism in the 1830s and 1840s, particularly through the action of former Saint-Simonian socialists. This article explores this process, focusing on two of its major actors: the philosophers Pierre Leroux and Jean Reynaud, who joined the Republican Party in 1833. The two friends formulated an ambitious and influential republican doctrine in their Encyclopédie Nouvelle, in which Owen’s philosophy was largely mobilised, most particularly when Leroux theorised his religion de la fraternité (...) on the model of the ‘Religion of Charity’. Furthermore, Reynaud implemented key elements of Owen’s educational principles in the Second Republic’s policies when he became a leading figure of Hippolyte Carnot’s Ministère de l’instruction publique et des cultes in 1848. Finally, as the two men had a great influence on George Sand, sometimes described as Leroux’s ‘prophetess’, they introduced her to Owen’s ideas, which she presented and discussed in her novels. Thus, even if they sometimes remained ambivalent towards the British reformer, Leroux and Reynaud introduced parts of his thought and ideals into French republicanism, be it in terms of ideology, policies, or literary mythologies. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Sarah is a young deaf woman in revolt, refusing to speak. She marries James, an orthophonist who works in a special school for the deaf. However, what gradually emerges in the course of their relationship is the latent suffering caused by what each of the partners isn't getting. James, tired of acting as Sarah's interpreter, frustrated by the limits of what they can share, shouts out:You want to be independent of me, you want to be a person in your own (...) right, you want people not to pity you … then you [must] learn to read my lips and you [must] learn to use that little mouth of yours for something besides eating and showing me you're better than hearing girls in bed! Come on! Read my lips? What am I saying? Say what I'm saying … You always have to be dependent on someone, and you always will for the rest of your life until you learn to speak. Now come on! I want you to speak to me. Let me hear it. Speak! Speak! Speak! …. (shrink)

Premier volet d'une relecture transversale de l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty à la lumière d'une connaissance d'ensemble de ses inédits, cet ouvrage se consacre à une période encore mal connue de l'évolution du philosophe, les années 1945 ...

Comment évolue depuis quelques années la démocratie en Occident? C’est au fond à cette question essentielle que sont consacrés les textes proposés ici par la section « Vie politique ». Même si la mort de Ben Laden, en mai dernier, a pu laisser penser que l’Amérique d’Obama avait retrouvé une certaine confiance en elle, le berceau de la démocratie n’en est pas...

Nous examinons ici comment Merleau-Ponty, en lien étroit avec sa conception personnelle de l’être, aborde certaines thématiques frayées par Levinas – désir, transcendance, altérité, responsabilité… Marquée par une grande attention au monde perçu, son ontologie met en valeur la négativité de l’être comme ressort de notre naissance et de notre coexistence. Indéfini et relatif, résistant et porteur, l’être travaille notre chair dans une dialectique de limitation et d’ouverture, jusqu’à nous libérer de l’ambivalence qui entrave nos relations et nos concepts. Riche (...) de virtualités éthiques, cette ontologie se veut opposée à Sartre, se pense incompatible avec Heidegger, et contraste fortement avec Levinas – y compris avec la lecture que celui-ci a pu en faire. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads (...) to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità. (shrink)

Présente le parcours philosophique de Merleau-Ponty tant dans sa formation que dans ses objectifs. Ses références : Descartes, Leibniz, Gabriel Marcel. Ses concepts opératoires : le concret, l'incarnation, l'intentionnalité, les chiasmes.

For several centuries prior to the founding of the Theosophical Society in 1875, individual 'theosophers' in Britain and Europe were quietly in touch with one another all seekers of the inward way. Theosophic Correspondence (1792 1797) is a series of inspiring letters, personal and philosophic, exchanged during the climactic days of the French Revolution between Kirchberger, member of the Sovereign Council at Berne, Switzerland, and Saint-Martin, whom Kirchberger regarded as 'the most eminent writer . . . and most profound (...) of his age'. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage se consacre à une période encore mal connue de l'évolution du philosophe, les années 1945-1951. Pendant cette phase de transition indispensable à la compréhension de la genèse des derniers écrits, Merleau-Ponty commence à se libérer des concepts classiques pour s'acheminer vers deux éléments capitaux de sa pensée: la chair et l'empiétement. A partir du bilan moral et politique de 1945, il fait de l'empiétement une figure de la modernité, et travaille en lui l'alliance singulière de pessimisme et d'optimisme (...) par laquelle il veut traduire sa propre version de l'existentialisme. Dans une complicité significative avec l'onirisme des " psychanalyses " de Bachelard, de la " co-naissance " de Claudel et de l'" amour fou " de Breton, Merleau-Ponty prépare ses propres éléments ontologiques, aux antipodes de l'imaginaire sartrien. (shrink)

We attempt to introduce the necessity, meaning and anthropological issues surrounding anew concept, “lift” [portance]. This thinking stems from both a clinical and philosophicalbackground that explores the carnal (fleshly) foundation of desire. From a phenomenologyin dialogue with psychology, psychoanalysis and philosophy of education, the concept oflift addresses the very foundations of our openness to the world and to others.

Is ecological anxiety—sometimes called eco-anxiety—just a paralyzing affect, or can it lead to an ethical and political commitment? At first glance, it seems that this anxiety implies, by definition, a lack of knowledge, and must therefore be overcome in order to live better and be able to act again. However, I wish to argue in this article that ecological anxiety, when it is a fear for the future, is not a pathology to be rid of, but a valuable awareness. Indeed, (...) in a period of social and environmental disasters on a global scale, this affect is above all indicative of a concern for the world. The question that then arises is that of the effectiveness of practical wisdom, in the sense of Aristotelian φρόνησις [phronesis], in deliberating on issues as complex as global warming. However, it seems necessary, to overcome the paralysing anxiety, to return to the sources of a collective practical wisdom that could enable citizens to reappropriate issues that concern them directly. (shrink)

Le Tableau naturel des rapports qui existent entre Dieu, l'homme et l'univers est un ouvrage fondamental pour ceux qui cherchent à comprendre les mystères de la Création. Pour Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin, l'homme porte en lui-même la clé de tous les mystères. Se connaître soi-même est donc la condition primordiale pour accéder à la Connaissance. Les textes sacrés nous enseignent que l'histoire de l'humanité est liée à un drame en trois actes. Le premier est celui de l'âge d'or ; le (...) deuxième celui d'une chute douloureuse dans la matière ; le troisième, qui reste à venir, sera marqué par une rédemption, une réintégration dans le Divin. L'auteur de ce livre s'efforce de percer le sens ésotérique de ces trois étapes. Il montre aussi que l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve l'homme résulte de la confusion qui règne dans ses pensées. S'il nourrissait sa volonté à la chaleur de l'Amour divin, il accéderait à la régénération d'une manière naturelle, et l'humanité trouverait la Connaissance menant à la Paix Profonde. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty s’est toujours intéressé aux rapports complexes entre christianisme, philosophie et théologie. Ses écrits, publiés ou inédits, opposent régulièrement « la nouveauté du christianisme » – comme expérience de l’homme, comme attitude religieuse, et jusque dans sa conception de Dieu – à une théologie dite « explicative », qui ne parviendrait pas à penser cette nouveauté, voire la trahirait. Accusée d’importer le Dieu des philosophes, cette théologie expliquerait Dieu et expliquerait par Dieu pour mieux se passer des mystères de l’homme, (...) des dimensions tragiques de sa condition, manquant ainsi paradoxalement une négativité qui est le lieu même où s’ouvre l’attitude religieuse. Dans cette confrontation originale, Merleau-Ponty transpose sa propre lutte contre certains philosophes et mobilise les axes essentiels de sa pensée : ses conceptions de l’homme et de l’être, une anthropologie de la chair perceptive et désirante, une ontologie de l’être inachevé et inépuisable. Merleau-Ponty was always interested in the complex relationship between christianity, philosophy and theology. His writings, published or unpublished, regularly contrast « the novelty of Christianity » — as experience of man, as religious attitude, and including its conception of God — with a so-called « explanatory » theology, which would not manage to think this novelty, might even betray it. Charged with importing the God of the philosophers, this theology would explain God and explain by God in order to bypass the mysteries of man, the tragic dimensions of its condition, thus paradoxically missing a negativity which is the very place where the religious attitude unfolds. In this original confrontation, Merleau-Ponty transposes his own fight against some philosophers and summons the essential axis of his thought : his conceptions of man and being, an anthropology of perceptive and desiring flesh, an ontology of unfinished and inexhaustible being. (shrink)

La série Hippocrate place au cœur de son récit de jeunes internes en médecine qui se découvrent tout aussi vulnérables que compétents. Parmi les séries médicales, Hippocrate développe donc une critique de la faculté de soigner de jeunes médecins, pris au piège d’un hôpital public malade de ses contradictions. Regarder Hippocrate revient ainsi à affronter la question : quelle société pour prendre soin de ceux qui prennent soin de nous?

Le 9 novembre 1989, le mur de Berlin s’effondrait sous les applaudissements de la communauté mondiale, rêvant d’une « fin de l’histoire », un monde ouvert et sans frontières1. Moins de vingt ans après cet événement, le Congrès des États-Unis d’Amérique votait le 15 décembre 2005 la loi no 6061 autorisant la construction d’un mur long de plus de 1 000 km pour protéger..

‘Incongruity is never superfluous’Thea Arbee (2016) Is the superfluous a (new) modality?11. Even if much has been written about ingredients that trigger laughter, researchers are still far from hav...

Avec l’article 4 de la loi du 23 février 2005 rappelant « le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer », les pouvoirs publics pourront au moins se flatter d’une chose : jamais depuis de longues années, un texte législatif n’aura suscité autant de débats au sein de la communauté des historiens, d’ordinaire plutôt discrète. Quatre pétitions contradictoires, de multiples tribunes dans la presse, deux missions sinon concurrentes, du moins parallèles, tout cela pour tenter de résoudre une crise lancée par (...) un amendement parlementaire ! (shrink)

Peut-être l’un des mots les plus forts pour résumer les politiques mises en place pour combattre la crise du subprime aura-t-il été celui prêté à l’ancien dirigeant Mikhaël Gorbatchev. Analysant en 2008 cette profusion d’interventions publiques pour sauver des grandes banques en faillite, tandis qu’on laissait les surendettés se faire expulser..