Mental fictionalism holds that folk psychology should be regarded as a kind of fiction. The present version gives a Lewisian prefix semantics for mentalistic discourse, where roughly, a mentalistic sentence “p” is true iff “p” is deducible from the folk psychological fiction. An eliminativist version of the view can seem self-refuting, but this charge is neutralized. Yet a different kind of “self-effacing” emerges: Mental fictionalism appears to be a mere “parasite” on a future science of cognition, without contributing anything substantial. (...) The paper then rebuts the objection, illustrating that prefix semantics resolves a lingering problem for eliminativism from Boghossian. The problem is that eliminativists seem unable to adopt realism about neuroscience, for such realism implies that neuroscientific statements *represent* reality accurately. However, a deflationary version of prefix semantics allows the eliminativist to draw an ontologically relevant distinction (roughly) between truths that have a story-telling prefix and those that do not. (Deflationism means there is no implication that the unprefixed sentences robustly represent reality.) The overarching lesson is that eliminativists need to approach to ontology carefully so to avoid self-refutation; however, prefix semantical mental fictionalism provides the resources for them to do so. (shrink)

In 1582, Carlo Sigonio published a text entitled De Republica Hebraeorum. It used the format of the De repubblica Athenensium manual. The question of the political structure in ancient Israel had already been addressed before, but Siconio was the first to adopt a systematic approach. However, he did not know Hebrew and so used the translation of the Septuagint, giving rise to not a few problems.

Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...) such infallibility, the relevant psychological studies would be self-effacing. For they adopt a methodology where a subject is simply presumed to know her own second-order thoughts and judgments--as if she were infallible about them. After all, what she expresses as her second-order judgment is trusted as accurate without independent evidence — even though such judgments often misrepresent the subject’s first-order states. The upshot is that such studies do not discredit all infallibility hypotheses regarding self-attributions of occurrent states. (shrink)

When solving the problem of their placement of the orphans and children deprived of parental care, the parenting, which is carried out in family-type orphanages, foster families and adoptive families, became a priority. Translation into Ukrainian of Arleta James’ book «The science of parenting adopted children» will be a help for adoptive parents in its implementation. The book proposes the psychological characteristics of the arrived children and constructive practical advice on their parenting.

What happens when neuroscientific knowledges move from laboratories and clinics into therapeutic settings concerned with the care of children? ‘Brain-based parenting’ is a set of discourses and practices emerging at the confluence of attachment theory, neuroscience, psychotherapy and social work. The neuroscientific knowledges involved understand affective states such as fear, anger and intimacy as dynamic patterns of coordination between brain localities, as well as flows of biochemical signals via hormones such as cortisol. Drawing on our own attempts to adopt brain-based (...) parenting, and engaging with various strands and critiques of new materialism and affect theory, we explore the ways in which the social sciences and humanities might fruitfully engage with neuroscientific concepts and affects. How does science-affected indeterminacy, with all its promises of ontological and experiential agency, help us to observe, wait, bind or hold together volatile mixtures of habit, speech and action? (shrink)

The process of adopting a child is “not for the faint of heart.” This is what we were told the first time we, as a couple, began this process. Part of the challenge lies in fulfilling the licensing requirements for adoption, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. The question naturally arises for many people who are subjected to these requirements whether they are morally justified. We tackle this question in this paper. In our (...) view, while strong reasons exist in favour of licensing adoptive parents, these reasons support the licensing not only of adoptive parents, but of all or some subset of so-called “natural” parents as well. We therefore conclude that the status quo with respect to parental licensing, according to which only adoptive parents need to be licensed, is morally unjustified. (shrink)

Tout enfant adopté a deux filiations. Sa filiation d’origine pose souvent question aux parents adoptants. Au moment de l’adolescence et de ses remaniements identitaires, les parents sont confrontés à la nécessité d’un travail psychique : reconnaître que d’autres lui ont donné la vie, et accepter de laisser une place à ce temps où l’enfant n’était pas encore le leur. Pour un couple, adopter un enfant, c’est accepter de se confronter à l’originel de ce dernier et de d’interroger le sens de (...) sa démarche. (shrink)

Alloparenting, wherein people provide care to children who are not their biological offspring, is a key aspect of human child-rearing. In the Pacific, many children are adopted or fostered by custodial alloparents even when both biological parents are still alive. From a behavioral ecology perspective, such behaviors are puzzling: why parent someone else’s child at your expense? Furthermore, little is known about how these arrangements are made in Pacific Islander societies today, who provides care, and what kinds of outcomes (...) fostered children experience. A better understanding of these proximate factors may help reveal the ultimate drivers behind custodial alloparenting. Here, we report findings from a survey carried out with the caregivers of 282 children in rural areas of Vanuatu, an island nation in Melanesia. Most fostered and adopted children lived with relatives such as aunts, uncles, and grandparents (87.5%) rather than unrelated caregivers, with a strong preference for maternal kin. The most common reasons for these arrangements were that the parents had separated (16.7%), were engaging in labor migration (27.1%), or a combination of both (27.1%). Results for investment in children’s education and their educational outcomes were mixed, although children removed from crisis situations did more poorly than children removed for aspirational reasons. Our findings suggest that custodial alloparenting helps families adapt to socioeconomic transitions and changing marriage practices. Outcomes may depend on a range of factors, such as the reason children were transferred out of the natal home to begin with. (shrink)

Denunciations of child sexual abuse in the sport context have been increasing in the last decades. Studies estimate that between 14 and 29% of athletes have been victim of at least one form of sexual violence in sport before the age of 18. However, studies suggest that many do not disclose their experience of CSA during childhood. This finding is alarming since studies have shown that the healing process usually starts with disclosure. Moreover, little is known about the healing process (...) of CSA experienced in the sport context. The aim of the study is to present a single case study of a CSA in sport to better understand the global experience over time from the perspective of the athlete. A narrative inquiry approach was adopted. Three non-structured interviews were conducted with the participant. Three pathways in the survivor journey have been identified through inductive thematic analysis: pathway to understanding, pathway to disclosure, and pathway to healing. These pathways represent distinct processes but are intertwined as they are dynamic and iterative. Indeed, the survivor explained how she had been, and is still, going back and forth between them. Results are consistent with those found in the literature on CSA in the general population. It suggests that theoretical models of CSA in the general population could be applied to CSA in sport. Practical implications include a need for education and clearer boundaries in the coach-athlete relationship. Sport stakeholders also need to be better equipped to recognize the signs of sexual violence in sport. Our results indicate that qualitative research could be a potential avenue to help victims heal from CSA. It gives them the chance to talk about and make sense of their abuse in a safe space. Finally, our results demonstrate the importance of reviewing the current justice system for victims. It should be based on a trauma-informed approach that places the victim at the center of the judicial process. (shrink)

This paper examines the consistency of parent selection procedures, focusing on adoption and embryo donation. It outlines the current methods of selection and their disparities, and considers reasons for these disparities; namely, the intentionality of the parents, the gestational experience, and the technological imperative. This discussion is followed by an analysis of the ethical validity of these reasons, in terms of their consistency and how well they meet standards of equity and justice. The paper concludes that current approaches to (...) parent selection are unsystematic and inadequate, and discusses the implications of this assessment. (shrink)

Scholars have extensively debated the family’s place within liberalism, generally, and specific attention and critique has been given to the family in Rawls’ work. What has received less focus are the requirements of parents in a Rawlsian polity and, further, what those requirements might imply for the one case where states explicitly regulate the process of becoming parents: adoption. This paper seeks to discover what might be required of parents, adoptive or otherwise, in a Rawlsian social contract state. Second, (...) it considers adoptive parent selection in light of these requirements as well as Rawls’ arguments regarding merit and fair equality of opportunity. Finally, it considers what such a merit-based selection of adoptive parents implies for the disputed rights of same-sex couples to adopt children. Further, because the question of merit in this case will hinge upon what it means to be a “fit parent,” it also draws upon relevant empirical social science studies regarding gay and lesbian parents. The paper, then, evaluates both the theoretical and empirical validity of generalized claims that same-sex couples are less fit to be parents than are heterosexual couples. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a duty to adopt many of the children without adequate parents, and that we can derive this duty straightforwardly from the right of children to be loved. It first considers and rejects the Easy Rescue view, according to which those who want to have children have a duty to adopt rather than have biological children, because, among other things, the cost of adoption will not be much more than the cost of having a biological (...) child. It then defends the Human Right view, according to which the duty to adopt belongs to every able person in appropriate circumstances. This chapter concludes by proposing a potential way of encouraging more people who are motivated to adopt actually to adopt. (shrink)

The Hague Conference on Private International Law currently has a Parentage/Surrogacy Project, which evaluates the legal status of children in cross-border situations, including situations involving international contract pregnancy. Should a convention focusing on international contract pregnancy emerge from this project, it will need to be consistent with the Hague convention on Intercountry Adoption. The latter convention prohibits adoptions unless, among other things, ‘the competent authorities of the receiving State have determined that the prospective adoptive parents are eligible and suited (...) to adopt’. Included in it, therefore, is a parental vetting or licensing requirement. In our view, a similar requirement must also appear in any Hague Convention on international contract pregnancy if the two conventions are to be ethically consistent with one another. In particular, there should be a licensing requirement in such a convention for at least some of the prospective parents in contract pregnancy arrangements. We consider several arguments against this conclusion, and argue that none of them is successful. (shrink)

Early parental loss or trauma has been proposed by some as a significant factor in the adoption of atheist, non-theist, or irreligious worldviews. Relevant empirical data, however, have been limited, impressionistic, methodologically questionable, or limited to historically prominent figures. Survey data from the GSS and a study of affirmatively non-theistic and irreligious secular group affiliates in the U.S. do not provide evidence of disproportionately high rates of early parental loss among individuals who describe themselves as “atheist” or “anti-religious,” reject belief (...) in God, or express strong anger about religion. Loss of a parent or other loved may play a role in turns toward, as well as away from, God and religion for some. There is also evidence of comparatively high rates of parental loss in the lives of historically prominent figures, both religious and non-religious. Present results, however, do not support the hypothesis that early loss is a disproportionately frequent experience in the lives of atheistic or irreligious people. (shrink)

Most people would agree that adoption is a good thing for children in need of a family. Yet adoption is often considered a second best or even last resort for parents in making their families. Against this assumption, I explore the unique value of adoption for prospective parents. I begin with a criticism of the selective focus on the value of adoption for only those people using assisted reproductive technologies. I focus on the value of adoption for all prospective parents, (...) reflecting on non-relative, non-procreative adoptions. First, adoption can meet the important need that a child has for a family, whereas procreation creates rather than meets needs. Second, adoption provides a morally noble opportunity to extend to a stranger benefits usually withheld for one's genetic kin. As such, adoption offers a unique possibility in which impartial concern for an other can be the starting point for a lifetime of love and care. Finally, adoptions can have transformative power over adoptive parents’ conception of family and self. In highlighting the unique value of adoption, I aim to challenge the widespread assumption that adoption has second best status to procreation. Indeed adoption can exemplify the human potential for moral compassion and impartial concern for the needs of others. (shrink)

The status quo on parental licensing in most Western jurisdictions is that licensing is required in the case of adoption but not in the case of assisted or unassisted biological reproduction. To have a child via adoption, one must fulfill licensing requirements, which, beyond the usual home study, can include mandatory participation in parenting classes. One is exempt from these requirements, however, if one has a child via biological reproduction, including assisted reproduction involving donor gametes or a contract pregnancy. In (...) an earlier paper, we challenged this system of parental licensing by showing that arguments in favour of it do not succeed. One argument we failed to consider, however, is that prospective biological parents have a right to reproduce that protects them against the sort of state interference that is involved in parental licensing. According to this argument, because prospective adoptive parents do not exercise a similar right when attempting to become parents, they are not similarly protected. In this paper, we argue that this reproductive rights argument, like other arguments in favour of the status quo on parental licensing, is flawed. We also question whether people in fact have a right to reproduce, and in doing so distinguish this right from others that we think are legitimate, including a right to become a parent and a right to bodily autonomy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The concept of ‘intimate citizenship’ stresses the right of people to choose how they organize their personal lives and claim identities. Support and interest groups are seen as playing an important role in the pursuit of recognition for these intimate choices, by elaborating visible and positive cultures that invade broader public spheres. Most studies on intimate citizenship take into consideration the exclusions these groups encounter when negotiating their differences with society at large. However, much less attention is paid to (...) the ways in which these groups internalize the surrounding ideologies, identity categories and hierarchies that pervade society and constrain their recognition as full citizens. In contrast, this paper aims to emphasize the reproduction of otherness within alternative spheres of life, and to reveal the ambiguities and complexities involved in their dialectic relationship with society at large. To address this issue, the paper focuses on the role that ‘adoption cultures’ of Flemish adoptive parents with children from Ethiopia play in the pursuit of being recognized as ‘proper’ families and full citizens. The ethnographic research among adoptive parents and adoption professionals shows a defensive discourse and action that aims at empowering against potential problems, as well as a tendency to other the adoptive child by pathologizing its non‐normativity. By showing the strong embeddedness of adoptive families' practices of familial and cultural construction in larger cultural frames of selfing and othering, characterized by biologism and nativism, one begins to understand the limits of their capacity to realize full citizenship. (shrink)

Exploitation is a fundamental element of the parental strategies of many species of birds. Cuckoos, for example, lay their eggs in the nest of other birds, who often unwittingly rear the alien nestlings as their own. Nest parasitism is an efficient reproductive strategy for cuckoos, who do not have to worry about building a nest, incubating their eggs, or feeding their nestlings. But not all hosts respond passively to such intrusions. In response to parasitic cowbirds, for example, robins have evolved (...) the ability to detect and selectively eject alien young from their nests. Human parenting strategies differ sharply from the strategies of cuckoos and robins. Unlike cuckoos, we are reluctant to allow our children to be raised by others. Unlike robins, we knowingly rear strange young. What makes human behavior toward children so different from that of cuckoos and robins? Humans seem to share a number of predispositions that facilitate successful adoptive relationships, and the desire to raise children seems to be pervasive among modern humans. Despite these commonalities, patterns of adoption transactions vary greatly among contemporary human societies. This paper considers the origins and causes of cross-cultural variation in human adoptive behavior from an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

An increasing number of children are adopted in the United States from countries where both medical care and environmental conditions are extremely poor. In response to worries about the accuracy of medical histories, prospective adoptive parents increasingly request genetic testing of children prior to adoption. Though a general consensus on the ethics of pre-adoption genetic testing (PAGT) argues against permitting genetic testing on children available for adoption that is not also permitted for children in general, a view gaining traction (...) argues for expanding the tests permitted. The reasoning behind this view is that the State has a duty to provide a child with parents who are the best “match,” and thus all information that advances this end should be obtained. While the matching argument aims to promote the best interests of children, I show how it rests on the claim that what is in the best interests of children available for adoption is for prospective adoptive parents to have their genetic preferences satisfied such that the “genetics” of the children they end up adopting accurately reflects those preferences. Instead of protecting a vulnerable population, I conclude, PAGT contributes to the risks of harm such children face as it encourages people with strong genetic preferences to adopt children whose genetic backgrounds will always be uncertain. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that the relationship between a parent and a child is objectively valuable, but few believe that there is any objective value in first creating a child in order to parent her. But if it is indeed true that all of the objective value of procreative-parenting comes from parenting, then it is hard to see how procreative-parenting can overcome two particularly pressing philosophical challenges. A first challenge is to show that it is morally permissible for prospective (...) parents to procreate given that adoption takes us much closer to both environmental and social justice. A second challenge is to show that it is morally permissible for biological parents to parent their biological child given that other prospective parents are willing and able to do a much better job at furthering the child's interests. In this essay, I argue that there is value in procreative-parenting, and that this value is of sufficient magnitude so as to block both the case against procreation and the case in favour of child re-distribution. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 6, pp 652 - 668 Do biological parents have the right to parent their own biological children? It might seem obvious that the answer is yes, but the philosophical justification for this right is uncertain. In recent years, there has been a flurry of philosophical activity aimed at providing fresh justifications for this right. In this paper, I shall propose a new answer, namely, the right to parent one’s own biological children is a (...) human right. I call this the human rights account of parental rights and I shall explain how this account is better than these other alternatives. (shrink)

Adoption may be defined as ‘the legal process through which the state establishes a parental relationship, with all its attendant rights and duties, between a child and a (set of) parent(s) where there exists no previous procreative relationship’ . In adoptions from care, state intervention effectively converts an established, or nascent, adult– child relationship into ‘family’ in the legal sense. From the state’s perspective, adoption thus entails the transfer of parental responsibilities for a child in public care to a (...) private family unit, enabling the state to permanently delegate its duties towards a child to this new unit. This seemingly straightforward legal act raises deeper philosophical questions relating to such state ‘family creation’, particularly when the child’s perspective is taken. Such a child- centric approach normatively regards children as equal moral beings, who ought to be included in actions concerning them, regardless of their capacity to form and express an opinion. Accordingly, adoption from care can be described as a moral decision, aimed at doing what is in the child’s best interests. The purpose of this chapter is to explore a suspicion of a lack of child- centrism in adoption from care practice, and to illustrate how adopted children’s rights are inferior to those of their non- adopted peers. This will shed light on a practice currently lacking transparency and accountability and will increase our understanding of how we fail to treat children as equal moral individuals in decision- making that severely impacts children’s lives. (shrink)

This study provides a moral justification of the family as a child-bearing and child-rearing institution by arguing that procreation may entitle parents to their children. It begins by observing that the belief that parents have such a right is deeply ingrained in the laws and customs of Western civilization but that at present we have no satisfactory theoretical explanation of this belief; and it further underscores the need for such an explanation by pointing to the conflict between a commitment to (...) equal opportunity and the family. ;Part I first considers the historical arguments philosophers have made on behalf of the family and shows why they fail. It argues that the traditional property argument fails because it interprets parental rights in terms of an absolute property right which is incompatible with the child's rights; that natural affection fails because some parents abuse their children and because adoptive parents may display "natural affection"; and that the best interest of the child fails because it cannot provide parents with a unique claim to their children. ;It then develops the property argument in a new and fruitful way. By replacing the traditional concept of an absolute property right with the modern "bundle of rights" analysis of property, it provides a means of analyzing parental rights in a way that prohibits abuse and is therefore compatible with the child's basic rights. Finally, it examines entitlement theory and argues that, since procreation satisfies its conditions, parents who adequately care for their children are entitled to them. ;Part II examines the nature of the parental entitlement claim. It argues for the rights necessary for paternalistic agency, interprets them according to a standard analysis of ownership, and concludes that a parental right to rear the child according to parental values is consistent with the child's rights. Next it argues that, in excluding others, parents incur a special obligation to do as much as they reasonably can for their child. And finally, it places things in a historical context, argues against an interpretation of parental obligation in terms of needs, and shows how the theory might work in practice. (shrink)

Technology is not just a tool but an amalgam of conceptual, institutional, and interactional issues that occupy the space of technical reason. In this space, parents' identity is becoming narrowed according to a limited conception in which the place of caring is in danger of being lost. Parents are increasingly required to adopt knowledge on parent ing instead of adapting it to their child's needs. By use of the Heideggerian idea of Enframing, I argue that educational experts and practitioners (...) need to undo parent ing from this technological straitjacket. It needs to be recognised that being a parent is about ac knowledging that caring for your children is about questioning the borders of Enframing rather than accepting its boundaries uncritically. I argue that experts, in order to provoke parents to care, ought to create space for ethical questions on how the Information and Communication Technology we once managed has come to manage us. (shrink)

Services for single parents constitute a category of child and family services. These services are carried out by public and non-governmental bodies for people who are single parents by the unfortunate events or by their own choice. Individuals come to single parenthood mainly through divorce, separation, birth outside of marriage, child abuse/neglect, death of a partner/widowhood, and adoption.

A serious moral weakness of reproductive ‘surrogacy’ is that it can be harmful to the children who are created. This article presents a proposal for mitigating this weakness. Currently, the practice of commercial ‘surrogacy’ operates only in the interests of the adults involved , not in the interests of the child who is created. Whether ‘surrogacy’ is seen as the purchase of a baby, the purchase of parental rights, or the purchase of reproductive labor, all three views share the same (...) significant flaws. They endorse the transfer, for a fee, of the infant from the woman who gestated it to those who commissioned it, but without justifying such a transfer; they fail to demonstrate that the commissioners have any entitlement to the infant, or, for that matter, suitability to be the infant's parents; and they fail to take any notice of the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing. A mere genetic connection is not enough to establish that the commissioners are entitled to receive the baby or that they are competent to raise it. Their good intentions, however caring, are not enough. Therefore, just as in the practice of adoption, there should be a formal institutionalized system for screening and licensing the prospective social parents, which would make the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing paramount. I reply to several potential objections to this proposal, including the objection that genetic parents who raise their own child are not screened and licensed. (shrink)

This book examines the question of what parental obligations procreators incur by bringing children into being. Prusak argues that parents, as procreators, have obligations regarding future children that constrain the liberty of would-be parents to do as they wish. Moreover, these obligations go beyond simply respecting a child’s rights. He addresses in turn the ethics of adoption, child support, gamete donation, surrogacy, prenatal genetic enhancement, and public responsibility for children.

Philosophical defenses of parents’ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers the wills (...) of children in otherwise morally objectionable ways. Such subjection generates duties to compensate children, even if the child’s life is on balance a benefit to her. The right to procreate is thus conditioned on prospective parent’s willingness to compensate for the harms of procreation. And because parents bear such compensatory duties, they must be accorded permissions (i.e., rights) to fulfill these duties. These rights include familiar exclusionary rights to promote children’s welfare, etc. Moreover, because subjecting children to harms or the risks thereof violates their autonomy, parental duties (and rights) include the provision of education and other goods that enable their subsequent autonomy as adults. Grounding parental rights in compensatory procreative duties avoids problems associated with appeals to the interests of children (e.g., that these interests do not seem to generate exclusive parental rights) or to the interests of parents (e.g., that these interests do not appear strong enough to permit the creation of a new, vulnerable human individual). (shrink)

What gives someone a moral right to parent? What role should the liberal state play in the creation of families? Are prospective parents allowed to create a child in a world facing a changing climate and full of parentless children? -/- In this book, Luara Ferracioli defends a new theory of the moral right to parent by focusing on the special role of parents in creating the conditions for the flourishing of their children irrespective of whether there is (...) a biological connection between them, and by explaining why the parent-child relationship remains valuable even after the child reaches the age of majority. Ferracioli also argues that although procreative and adoptive parenting enjoy equal moral standing, justice towards children requires that the liberal state make adoption more desirable and feasible for its citizens. Finally, the book provides a partial theory of childrearing which focuses on the goods of childhood that parents are primarily responsible for fostering: carefreeness, enjoyment-driven or curiosity-driven achievement, and friendship. (shrink)

In this paper we re-examine Hugh LaFollette's proposal that the state carefully determine the eligibility and suitability of prospective parents before granting them a ?license to parent?. Assuming a prima facie case for licensing parents grounded in our duty to promote the welfare of the child, we offer several considerations that complicate LaFollette's radical proposal. We suggest that LaFollette can only escape these problems by revising his proposal in a way that renders the license effectively obsolete, a route he (...) implicitly adopts in his recent revisiting of the licensing proposal. We conclude that there is little merit in the idea of licensing ?natural? parents as a practical policy proposal, and raise some questions about its continued use in relation to adoptive and foster parents. (shrink)

I am concerned with a very problematic concept of identity which one encounters in studies of practical problems concerning the adoption of children. The notion is problematic in the extreme, as I shall try to show. It seems to crop up not only in the work of researchers on this topic, but in the spontaneous and (apparently) untutored accounts of themselves given by adoptees. The question is whether there is a concept here at all: by which I mean not, instead, (...) a family of concepts linked by family resemblances, but rather some disparate ideas linked only by verbal similarities, and run together for mistaken theoretical purposes. The notion arises crucially in attempts to deal with practical questions arising in determining policies with regard to adoption: with regard to the placement of children for adoption, and the advice to be given to adoptive parents and to adopted children, whether young or adult, who encounter, or perhaps do not even encounter, difficulties. (shrink)

Global trends increasingly appear to be legitimizing same-gender relationships, yet international research shows that despite statutory rights to marry—and by extension, adopt children—same-gender couples continue to experience difficulties when trying to adopt. Primary among these barriers are the persistent heteronormative beliefs, which strongly underpin the unfounded myths about parenting abilities of same-gender couples. Such biased beliefs are perpetuated by some adoption professionals who oppose placing children with lesbian or gay couples. In 2013, New Zealand passed the Marriage Equality Act, making (...) it possible for same-gender couples to legally marry—and by extension, adopt. This provided an opportunity to investigate the perceptions of New Zealand professionals about children being placed with same-gender couples, in a country often perceived to be more tolerant of LGBT people. New Zealand social workers and lawyers (an under-studied group)—the professions most likely involved in adoption—were recruited via professional bodies. Because studying perceptions and beliefs on socially sensitive topics are highly susceptible to social desirability, we designed an instrument utilizing multiple methods to assess and corroborate participants’ views about placing children for adoption with couples of the same gender. Administered online and anonymously, the survey included demographic questions, evaluation of negative-meaning and positive-meaning statements, and used a sc... (shrink)

The COVID-19 outbreak has ravaged all societal domains, including education. Home confinement, school closures, and distance learning impacted students, teachers, and parents’ lives worldwide. In this study, we aimed to examine the impact of COVID-19-related restrictions on Italian and Portuguese students’ academic motivation as well as investigate the possible buffering role of extracurricular activities. Following a retrospective pretest–posttest design, 567 parents reported on their children’s academic motivation and participation in extracurricular activities. We used a multi-group latent change score model to (...) compare Italian and Portuguese students’: pre-COVID mean motivation scores; rate of change in motivation; individual variation in the rate of change in motivation; and dependence of the rate of change on initial motivation scores. Estimates of latent change score models showed a decrease in students’ motivation both in Italy and in Portugal, although more pronounced in Italian students. Results also indicated that the decrease in students’ participation in extracurricular activities was associated with changes in academic motivation. Furthermore, students’ age was significantly associated with changes in motivation. No significant associations were found for students’ gender nor for parents’ education. This study provides an important contribution to the study of students’ academic motivation during home confinement, school closures, and distance learning as restrictive measures adopted to contain a worldwide health emergency. We contend that teachers need to adopt motivation-enhancing practices as means to prevent the decline in academic motivation during exceptional situations. (shrink)

Parental substance use is a major risk factor for child development, heightening the risk of drug problems in adolescence and young adulthood, and exposing offspring to several types of traumatic event. First, prenatal drug exposure can be considered a form of trauma itself, with subtle but long-lasting sequalae at the neuro-behavioural level. Second, parents’ addiction often entails a childrearing environment characterised by poor parenting skills, disadvantaged contexts and adverse childhood experiences, leading to dysfunctional outcomes. Young adults born from/raised by parents (...) with drug problems and who develop a Substance Used Disorder (SUD) themselves might display a particularly severe condition in terms of cognitive deficits and impaired personality function. This preliminary study aims to investigate the role of early exposure to drugs as a traumatic event, capable of affecting the psychological status of young drug addicts. In particular, it intends to examine the neuropsychological functioning and personality profile of young adults with severe SUDs who were exposed to drugs early in their family context. The research involved 3 groups each consisting of 15 young adults (aged 18-24): a group of inpatients diagnosed with SUDs and exposed to drugs early, a comparison group of non-exposed inpatients and a group of non-exposed youth without SUDs. A neuropsychological battery (Esame Neuropsicologico Breve-2), an assessment procedure for personality disorders (Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure-200) and the Symptom CheckList-90-Revised were administered. According to present preliminary results, young drug addicts exposed to drugs during their developmental age were characterised by elevated rates of neuropsychological impairments, especially at the expense of attentive and executive functions; personality disorders were also common but did not differentiate them from non-exposed young people with SUDs. Alternative multi-focused prevention and intervention programs are needed for children of drug-misusing parents, addressing executive functions and adopting a trauma-focused approach. (shrink)

Trivers’s theory of parental investment suggests that adults should decide whether or not to invest in a given infant using a cost-benefit analysis. To make the best investment decision, adults should seek as much relevant information as possible. Infant facial cues may serve to provide information and evoke feelings of parental care in adults. Four specific infant facial cues were investigated: resemblance (as a proxy for kinship), health, happiness, and cuteness. It was predicted that these cues would influence feelings of (...) parental care for both sexes, but that resemblance would be more important for men than women because of the importance of paternity uncertainty in the ancestral environment. Seventy-six men and 76 women participated in a hypothetical adoption task in which they made judgments of infant faces. Average zero-order, partial, and component score correlations all revealed that men placed primary emphasis on cues of resemblance, while women placed primary emphasis on cues of health and cuteness (cues of infant quality). The correlations also showed that men placed a significantly greater emphasis on cues of resemblance than did women. (shrink)

A sustained analysis of the moral permissibility of withholding or of the obligation to disclose information to an adopted child is lacking in the literature on parental duties, disclosures, and adoption. These two sets of questions raise issues that appear to fall within the parameters of the concepts of stewardship and gratitude. I propose that adoptive parents are the stewards of the information they receive concerning their child and I show how stewardship and gratitude can aid adoptive parents (...) as they negotiate the terrain of disclosure. (shrink)

I am concerned with a very problematic concept of identity which one encounters in studies of practical problems concerning the adoption of children. The notion is problematic in the extreme, as I shall try to show. It seems to crop up not only in the work of researchers on this topic, but in the spontaneous and (apparently) untutored accounts of themselves given by adoptees. The question is whether there is a concept here at all: by which I mean not, instead, (...) a family of concepts linked by family resemblances, but rather some disparate ideas linked only by verbal similarities, and run together for mistaken theoretical purposes. The notion arises crucially in attempts to deal with practical questions arising in determining policies with regard to adoption: with regard to the placement of children for adoption, and the advice to be given to adoptive parents and to adopted children, whether young or adult, who encounter, or perhaps do not even encounter, difficulties. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to explore the forcefulness of the adoption challenge to procreative parenting. After framing the challenge, I consider two of the most developed attempts to respond to it, due to Luara Ferracioli and Elizabeth Brake. I argue that neither strategy is a promising way to vindicate the permissibility of procreative parenting. I then present several reasons to value procreative parenting that are underappreciated in the recent literature. Though these considerations deserve more philosophical attention, I’m (...) agnostic about whether they are strong enough to overcome the adoption challenge. I explain why this agnosticism is reasonable, and the debate about permissibility arguably intractable, in the context of prevailing deontological assumptions structuring discussions of procreation. I conclude by arguing that an independently interesting metaethical thesis, which I call deontic fictionalism, may give us some perspective on this debate and others like it. (shrink)

Hugh LaFollette proposed parental licensing in 1980 (and 2010)--not as a requirement for pregnancy, but for raising a child. If you have a baby, are not licensed, and do not get licensed, the baby would be put up for adoption. Despite the intervention required in an extremely personal area of life, I argue that those who endorse the harm principle ought to endorse parental licensing of this sort. Put differently, I show how the harm principle strengthens the case for parental (...) licensing. (shrink)

This essay considers the moral status of certain practices that aim to enhance offspring traits. I develop an objection to offspring enhancement that draws on an account of the role morality of parents. I work out an account of parental ethics by reference to premises about child development and to observations about parenting culture in the United States. I argue that excellence in parenthood consists in a dual responsibility both to guide children toward the good life and to accept them (...) as they are. I conclude that prenatal manipulation of healthy and normal characteristics in human offspring fails to balance the dispositional extremes of control and restraint to which many parents today are susceptible. I apply this account of good parenting to the challenging case of height enhancement for short but otherwise healthy children. Finally, I reply to objections, first, about the phenomenology of bearing normative obligations to people who do not yet exist and, second, about the moral logic of criticizing embryo selection in the context of assisted reproduction when we accept child selection in the context of adoption. (shrink)

Cet article expose, à partir de deux cas, certaines difficultés de l’adoption. Il vise à montrer le décalage entre le désir des adoptants et la réalité parfois très dure qu’ils vont devoir affronter. Surtout lorsqu’il s’agit d’enfants de plus de cinq ans, porteurs d’un passé traumatique qui reste non dit. La création de liens forts se fait cependant au milieu de ce vécu difficile et, dans le meilleur des cas, les parents y jouent alors un rôle de soignants.

A central question in the ethical debate on the practice of relinquishing in vitro fertilization surplus embryos for family building is whether we ought to think of it more in terms of donating these embryos or in terms of having them adopted. Deciding between these two alternatives is more than a matter of mere terminology. It has an impact on normative questions, e.g., on the question of what criteria for parent selection ought to be applied to the recipients of (...) the embryos, and on the moral evaluation of the act of ‘donating’ the embryo or ‘having it adopted’. In this article, I defend the view that we should conceptualize the relinquishment of spare embryos according to the adoption model, not as a donation. Section 2 sketches the outline of the argument by making clear how we may ground a defense of the adoption model in a theory of parental responsibility without implicitly elevating the moral status of the embryo. Section 3 contains a preliminary defense of the adoption model that draws on geneticism as what seems to me the most persuasive theory of parental responsibility. In section 4, I examine three objections to geneticism and either rebut them or, insofar as they are justified, try to accommodate them into my view. In section 5, I point out some features that distinguish embryo adoption from the adoption of (born) children. I contend, however, that these differences are compatible with the adoption model. Section 6 is concerned with the normative ramifications of this view. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to evaluate the defensibility of wide-spread beliefs concerning the moral value of procreating. Very many of us are ‘pro-natal’ — that is, we have a positive moral view of making more people — but pro-natalism is under serious threat. In particular, I argue that combining several arguments in procreative ethics generates a powerful case for the Anti-Natal Pro-Adoption View, or the view that we are obligated not to procreate, but instead to satisfy any parenting (...) desires through adoption. Although this article ultimately serves as a defence against ANPA, it does so in a very limited way: while it is false that we are obligated to adopt-rather-than-procreate, I contend, this does not mean that we are off the moral hook altogether. Failing in our obligations is only one way to fail morality. Our procreative acts may yet be bad, dishonourable, selfish, and open to multiple other criticisms. And indeed, I'm afraid many of them are. (shrink)

abstract This essay considers the moral status of certain practices that aim to enhance offspring traits. I develop an objection to offspring enhancement that draws on an account of the role morality of parents. I work out an account of parental ethics by reference to premises about child development and to observations about parenting culture in the United States. I argue that excellence in parenthood consists in a dual responsibility both to guide children toward the good life and to accept (...) them as they are. I conclude that prenatal manipulation of healthy and normal characteristics in human offspring fails to balance the dispositional extremes of control and restraint to which many parents today are susceptible. I apply this account of good parenting to the challenging case of height enhancement for short but otherwise healthy children. Finally, I reply to objections, first, about the phenomenology of bearing normative obligations to people who do not yet exist and, second, about the moral logic of criticizing embryo selection in the context of assisted reproduction when we accept child selection in the context of adoption. (shrink)