Argues that morals and politics require on a metaphysical backing and proposes a neoclassical metaphysics.

Heidegger claimed that Western philosophy ended, failed even, in the German Idealist tradition. In The Culmination, Robert B. Pippin explores the ramifications of this charge through a masterful survey of Western philosophy, especially Heidegger's critiques of Hegel and Kant. Pippin argues that Heidegger's basic concern was to determine sources of meaning for human life, particularly those that had been obscured by Western philosophy's attention to reason. The Culmination offers a new interpretation of Heidegger, German Idealism, and the fate of Western (...) rationalism. (shrink)

This paper provides a phenomenological analysis of postphenomenological philosophy of technology. While acknowledging that the results of its analyses are to be recognized as original, insightful, and valuable, we will argue that in its execution of the empirical turn, postphenomenology forfeits a phenomenological dimension of questioning. By contrasting the postphenomenological method with Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology as developed in his early Freiburg lectures and in Being and Time, we will show how the postphenomenological method must be understood as mediation theory, (...) which adheres to what Heidegger calls the theoretical attitude. This leaves undiscussed how mediation theory about ontic beings involves a specific ontological mode of relating to beings, whereas consideration of this mode is precisely the concern of phenomenology. This ontological dimension is important to consider, since we will argue that postphenomenology is unwittingly technically mediated in an ontological way. The upshot of this is that in its dismissal of Heidegger’s questioning of technology as belonging to “classical philosophy of technology,” postphenomenology implicitly adheres to what Heidegger calls technology as Enframing. We argue that postphenomenology overlooks its own adherence to the theoretical attitude and ultimately to Enframing, and we will conclude with calling for a phenomenological questioning of the dimension that postphenomenology presently leaves unthought, meaning that we will develop a plea for a rehabilitation of the ontological dimension in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTDuring his philosophical life, Husserl sought to develop his phenomenology as a “science of true beginnings, or origins” that is metaphysically neutral. Nevertheless, according to Heidegger and Derrida, Husserl’s phenomenology remains a kind of metaphysics of presence in that it presupposes a metaphysical notion of “origin”. This paper attempts both to correct Heidegger and Derrida’s misunderstandings of Husserl’s notion of “origin” and to clarify the reason why Husserl’s phenomenology and its pursuit of “origin” is still a metaphysical project.

The article refers to the issue of freedom from a philosophical perspective. First of all, it discusses Plato’s metaphor of the cave in Politeia, in which the philosopher writes of freedom in its individual and collective forms. Then the article indicates how the metaphor was read by such contemporary philosophers as Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, who interpret Plato’s metaphor from existential-phenomenological and political perspectives. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential (...) experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. A person, who experienced the truth as un-concealment, is not enslaved anymore to the impersonality of the crowd. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of freedom is shown in his care for others, even if it means risking one’s life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right forcefully to pull them out of the cavern? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? In this way Arendt refers to the concept of freedom, as it is sketched in Plato’s cave. At the same time, she argues with Heidegger’s interpretation of the Platonic metaphor. Heidegger stresses the freedom of a human being, who in the light of the subjective existential experience begins to live objectively in an authentic way. He frees himself up from the impersonal-I. Human, who experienced the truth as un-concealment and freedom, is not enslaved anymore with the impersonality of the crowd, which reject individualism and authenticity. He is able to face his own mortality and to take responsibility for his own fate. A special expression of so understood freedom is shown in his care for others, even if this way he risks his own life. Hannah Arendt interprets Plato’s metaphor rather from the perspective of political philosophy. Her assessment, rooted in the very foundation of the political-philosophical thought becomes some kind of memento. What if the prisoners of the cave, simply do not want to leave their place? Does the philosopher have a right to forcefully pull them out of the cave of shadows? What is better, the attitude of Socrates, who dialogues with people and treats them as equal partners or the attitude of Plato, who simply lectures the mob? (shrink)

Comment Richard Wolin a-t-il pu, à deux ans d'intervalle, publier deux fois le même volume dans des maisons d'édition différentes, et pourquoi cellesci ont-elles accepté un tel marché? On se trouve en effet ici en présence de deux ouvrages, ayant même directeur de publication et même titre, portant tous deux sur le nazisme de Heidegger, et qui plus est, ayant exactement le même contenu à une différence près! En fait, c'est le résultat d'une rocambolesque histoire impliquant Heidegger, Derrida et Wolin (...) lui-même, exégète minutieux du corpus politique heideggerien. Mais avant de relater cette aventure, laquelle, bien que révélatrice, relève tout au plus de la petite histoire, parlons d'abord de l'histoire avec un grand «H», celle qui, sous la forme du nazisme, s'est engouffrée à la dérobée dans l'œuvre du penseur de Fribourg, et qui menace actuellement d'entacher la philosophie tout entière de celui que d'aucuns appelaient encore, il y a peu, le «plus grand philosophe du XXe siècle». (shrink)

This essay considers the philosophical and theological significance of the phenomenological analysis of Christian faith offered by the early Heidegger. It shows, first, that Heidegger poses a radical and controversial challenge to philosophers by calling them to do without God in an unfettered pursuit of the question of being (through his ‘destruction of onto-theology’); and, second, that this exclusion nonetheless leaves room for a form of philosophical reflection upon the nature of faith and discourse concerning God, namely for a philosophy (...) of religion in a phenomenological mode (as exemplified most clearly in Heidegger’s 1920/21 lectures on the phenomenology of religious life). However, it is argued that the theological roots of Heidegger’s own phenomenological analyses subvert his frequently asserted claim concerning the incompatibility of Christian faith and philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

In The Mysterious Relations to the East, Lin Ma takes a stance against a recent trend to see in Heidegger a thinker whose thought has been formed in an 'intercultural dialogue' with the Asian, Oriental tradition of thinking. In fact, Lin Ma demonstrates, words like 'Morning-Land', 'Orient', 'East' or 'Asia' can be shown to refer in each case to the beginning of philosophy in preSocratic, Greek thought. Thus to speak of the "mysterious relations [of philosophy] to the East" is not (...) to speak of a relation of European philosophy with other traditions of thinking, but rather concerns an investigation into the very roots of European philosophy itself. Despite Heidegger's concerns with the possibility of 'inter-cultural' dialogue, as evidenced, for example, in A Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer, such a dialogue has to be questioned in its very possibility in order to avoid relapsing into the universalistic language of metaphysics. (shrink)

This speculative essay develops a unique understanding of Socrates by reading Heidegger in relation to contemporary Platonic scholarship arising from the Continental tradition, which embraces Plato’s Socrates as a non-doctrinal philosopher. The portrait of Heidegger’s Socrates that emerges is related to contemporary education and its drive toward emphasizing an academic focus on Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) at the exclusion of the Liberal Arts, with the goal of showing that other forms of “knowledge,” such as the philosophical “truth” emerging (...) from the relationship between the human and the unfolding of Being, while stifled or neglected in STEM curricula, are also crucial to our continued development as human beings. Ultimately, the essay seeks to draw out an authentic vision of paideia by turning to the valuable, albeit limited, writings of Heidegger focused specifically on the historical philosopher Socrates, as opposed to Plato. (shrink)

In his early, unfinished essay entitled Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, Søren Kierkegaard enters into a polemic with Hegel’s interpretation of the methodic Cartesian doubt. Kierkegaard questions the philosophical absolutism of Cartesian scepticism and his methodological universalism. For the first time in Kierkegaard’s writings, the sphere of speculation is confronted with personal involvement. Kierkegaard never published this work, and did not make any direct reference to Descartes in the same form ever again. However, certain subjects and themes remained: (...) doubt and the alias, used when writing that early essay. (shrink)

This article is about our relationship with things; about the abundant material geographies that surround us and constitute the very possibility for us to be the beings that we are. More specifically, it is about the question of the possibility of an ethical encounter with things (qua things). We argue, with the science and technology studies tradition (and Latour in particular), that we are the beings that we are through our entanglements with things, we are thoroughly hybrid beings, cyborgs through (...) and through – we have never been otherwise. With Heidegger we propose that a human-centred ethics of hybrids will fail to open a space for an ethical encounter with things since all beings in the sociomaterial network – humans and non-human alike – end up circulating as objects, enframed as ‘standing reserve’, things-for-the-purposes-of the network. We suggest that what is needed is an ethos beyond ethics, or the overcoming of an ethics – which is based on the will to power – towards an ethos of letting be. We elaborate such a possibility with the help of Heidegger, in particular with reference to the work of Graham Harman and his notion of ‘tool-being’. From this we propose, very tentatively, an ethos that has as its ground a poetic dwelling with things, a way of being that lets being be (Gelassenheit). We show how such a poetic dwelling, or ethos of Gelassenheit, may constitute the impossible possibility of a very otherwise way of being with things – an ethos of a ‘community of those who have nothing in common’ as suggested by Alphonso Lingis. (shrink)

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences? It is necessary to address the philosophic crisis of realism vs relativism in the natural sciences. This crisis is seen as a part of the cultural crisis that Husserl and Heidegger identified and attributed to the hegemonic role of theoretical and calculative thought in Western societies. The role of theory is addressed using the hermeneutical circle to probe the origin of theoretic meaning in scientific cultural praxes. This is studied in Galileo's discovery (...) of the phases of Venus; the practice of measurement; the different theories and practices of space perception; the historicality and temporality of scientific research communities which ground paradigm change; and the process of discovery. The paper draws particularly from the work of Heidegger. Though envisaging all science and scholarship, the highlighted theme is research in the natural sciences. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, or interpretation, is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld, and was the original method of the human sciences stemming, from F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey. The `hermeneutic philosophy' refers mostly to Heidegger. This paper addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger's analysis of meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and (...) explanation, to re-orient the current discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology. (shrink)

Some commentators, such as Jürgen Habermas, think Martin Heidegger is guilty of a performative contradiction, because he uses judgments to situate judgments in a non-judicative context. This paper defends Heidegger by distinguishing two senses of judgment in his thought. Temporality enables two different directions of inquiry and hence two kinds of judgment. Scientific judgments arise when we turn from the temporal horizon toward entities alone; phenomenological judgments arise when we return to the temporal horizon in which such entities are accessible. (...) Consequently, using phenomenological judgments to show the condition for the possibility of scientific judgments is not contradictory. (shrink)

When on the last page of What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1995: 218) claim that philosophy needs a non-philosophy, this statement is the result of a long engagement with the problem of thinking in society. It is this engagement that we intend to reconstruct in this article. By developing an original definition of thinking after Heidegger, Deleuze is able to claim that philosophy is not the only ‘thinking’ discipline. Our point of departure is Deleuze's constant reference to a phrase (...) from Heidegger's lecture course What Is Called Thinking?: ‘We are not yet thinking’ (Deleuze 1988: 116, 1989: 167, 1994: 144, 2002: 108; Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 56). This phrase points to the demand for a new distribution of the relation between philosophy and its outside. The purpose of this article is to trace Heidegger's influence on Deleuze's definition of thinking and to raise two points. First, Deleuze borrows some elements of Heidegger's definition of thinking to further his own understanding of politics as an involuntary practice. For both, the question of thinking is political. Second, by departing from Heidegger, Deleuze can democratise the definition of thinking, beyond its confinement to philosophy, by turning to cinema. Deleuze calls cinema the art of the masses because it brings the masses in contact with external signs. Finally, in the last part of this article, we will discuss how Deleuze raises stupidity (and not error) as a transcendental problem that should be constantly fought. In this way, we hope to shed light on how Deleuze moves from Heidegger's question ‘what is called thinking?’ to the problem of stupidity and shame. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the conceptualisations of space which underlie debate of gentrification-related displacement. Using Derrida's concept of the spatial metaphor, the paper illuminates the Cartesian understandings of space that act as architecture for displacement debate. The paper corrects this through arguing that the philosophy of Heidegger and Lefebvre better serves to understand displacement. Emphasising the topology of Heidegger's Dasein and, following Elden, relating this to Lefebvre's understanding of space, the paper 'constructs' displacement in a way that avoids the (...) abstraction of displacement-as-out-migration and instead emphasises the lived experience of space. (shrink)

The return to religion in contemporary continental philosophy is characterized by a profound sense of intellectual humility. A significant influence within this discussion is Heidegger’s anthropology of finitude in Being and Time and his later critiques of onto-theology. These critiques, however, were informed by Heidegger’s earlier phenomenology of the lived experience of religious humility performed alongside his reading of Martin Luther’s theology. This article shows that for Luther and Heidegger, religious humility is foremost an affection structured according to the enactment (...) of one’s dissimilitude from God and resulting existential tribulation. During a seminal period in his development, Heidegger’s phenomenology of humility changed from an Eckhartian conception of detachment culminating in the unio mystica to a Lutheran conception of humiliation and Anfechtung . Heidegger’s break from a mystical phenomenology of humility parallels Luther’s own break from that tradition, and anticipates contemporary developments in the continental philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Background mood differs from focal emotions in that it is an inchoate “bodily felt sense” rather than full fledged emotional syndromes such as anger, sadness, etc. Microanalysis of a Focusing therapy session is made to illustrate how the cultivation and maintenance of background mood with its characteristic double vision is essential to emotional creativity.

Affinities have been noted between radical behaviorism and phenomenology, hermeneutics, and poststructuralism, but this paper claims the most promising one has been neglected. Skinner's behaviorism is best seen as elucidating that time-sense characteristic of ordinary, habitual life which Heidegger calls a "temporalizing of everydayness." We usually live 'from moment to moment' as if we were just as predictable as the things around us, but Heidegger and Skinner agree there are moments when noticing this makes 'more of the same' seem unacceptable. (...) Yet in Skinner's deterministic ontology such occasions are only envisioned via the anomaly of "self-management." With Heidegger, behaviorism can be the science of ordinary life, yet leave room for that real but ill-conceived 'volition' which Skinner rightly criticizes but wrongly rejects. (shrink)