The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic (...) expressivism, as well as two further arguments, framed in terms of the two most promising attempts to ground claims about epistemic value in something other than commitments to particular conceptions of inquiry. While this does not establish that moderate epistemic expressivism is true, its ability to explain a significant but puzzling axiological datum, as well as withstand strong counterarguments, makes clear that it is a theory to be reckoned with. (shrink)

The overwhelmingly dominant view of epistemic normativity has been an extreme form of deontology. I argue that although the pull towards deontology is quite understandable, given the traditional concerns of epistemology, there is no good reason for not also adopting a complementary consequentialist notion of epistemic normativity, which can be put to use in applied epistemology. I further argue that this consequentialist notion is not, despite appearances and popular sentiment to the contrary, any less genuinely epistemic than the deontological notion (...) and that it may even be considered more genuinely normative. (shrink)

An epistemic duty would be a duty to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from a proposition, and it would be grounded in purely evidential or epistemic considerations. If I promise to believe it is raining, my duty to believe is not epistemic. If my evidence is so good that, in light of it alone, I ought to believe it is raining, then my duty to believe supposedly is epistemic. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no (...) epistemic duties. Though people do sometimes have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Epistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.RÉSUMÉ: Les fonctions épistémiques sont censées désigner le fait de croire ou de (...) ne pas croire des propositions, ou de suspendre notre jugement, et seraient fondées uniquement sur la prise en compte de l’évidence. Je présente un nouvel argument soutenant que les fonctions épistémiques n’existent pas. Bien que nous devions recourir aux fonctions de croire ou de ne pas croire des propositions, ou de suspendre notre jugement, ces fonctions ne sont jamais fondées sur d’uniques considérations épistémiques. Ce que l’on reconnaît comme des fonctions épistémiques appartient plutôt à l’espèce des fonctions morales. (shrink)

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...) express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed. (shrink)

This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes (...) about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity. (shrink)

Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the (...) practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability. (shrink)

There are many important connections between epistemic justification and moral justification. A recent example of such connections is offered by Sosa’s AAA model for the normative evaluation of epistemic performances. In order to count as knowledge, a belief has to be Accurate in attaining the truth, the subject has to be Adroit or competent for such task, and the belief has to be Apt in the sense that the accuracy of the belief has to manifest the adroitness of the subject. (...) In addition, full knowledge would require full-aptness, which is obtained when the aim of aptness is achieved in an apt way. We have here a clear definition of the model. But the application of the model to particular performances is not so clear. Both the identification of a particular performance as a case of epistemic performance and the assessment of its aptness, or full-aptness, are strongly relative to intentional descriptions paying attention to contextual factors and personal aspects. Here is where we can find close proximity with ethics. An epistemic analog to the ethical problem of double effects appears. In our paper, we analyze that problem in detail, extracting some consequences. (shrink)

Are there aesthetic obligations, and what would account for their binding force if so? I first develop a general, domain‐neutral notion of obligation, then critically discuss six arguments offered for and against the existence of aesthetic obligations. The most serious challenge is that all aesthetic obligations are ultimately grounded in moral norms, and I survey the prospects for this challenge alongside three non‐moral views about the source of aesthetic obligations: individual practical identity, social practices, and aesthetic value primitivism. I conclude (...) by raising questions for further work in this area. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to debates over naturalism and 'the ethics of belief', I argue (...) that, despite enjoying considerable popularity among both epistemologists and philosophers of science, it is ultimately indefensible. Having thus argued for the distinctness of epistemic and instrumental rationality, I attempt to clarify the role played by each in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. I suggest that being theoretically rational--that is, being proficient with respect to theoretical reasoning--is best construed as a hybrid virtue, inasmuch as it involves manifesting sensitivity to two very different kinds of reasons. (shrink)

This thesis modifies the wording of William Clifford’s 1877 evidence principle (that ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’) to propose an explicitly moral principle, restricted to descriptive beliefs (about what is or is not the case) and excluding prescriptive beliefs (about what ought or ought not to be the case). It considers potential counter-examples, particularly William James’s 1896 defence of religious belief; and concludes that the modified principle survives unscathed. It then searches (...) for suitable criteria for ‘sufficient’ and ‘insufficient’ evidence, first within a Bayesian framework enriched by pragmatic considerations, and finally by returning to Clifford’s conception of our shared responsibilities to our shared epistemic asset. Combined with elements of Edward Craig’s (1990, 1999) ‘state-of-nature’ theory of knowledge this gets us to a minimum threshold to avoid insufficient evidence and an aspirational criterion of sufficient evidence. (shrink)

The “ ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence, or to withhold belief in (...) the perceived absence of it? Is it ever or always obligatory to seek out all available epistemic evidence for a belief? Are there some ways of obtaining evidence that are themselves immoral or imprudent? -/-. (shrink)

اصطلاح «اخلاق باور» برای اولین بار در مقالة معروف کلیفورد، با همین عنوان، به سال 1876 به‌کار رفت. طبق بیان کلیفورد، که بعدها به قاعده یا اصل کلیفورد مشهور شد، «همیشه، همه‌جا، و برای هرکس خطاست که بر اساس قرائن ناکافی به چیزی معتقد شود». از زمانی که کلیفورد این بحث را مطرح کرده است، تاکنون، مورد مناقشات فراوانی بوده است؛ مسئلة اصلی که در پس همة این مناقشات مطرح بوده است این است که آیا اصولاً باورهای آدمی در اختیار (...) انسان‌اند، تا مشمول ارزش‌گذاری‌های اخلاقی شوند، یا این‌که باید آن‌ها را، همچون بسیاری از حالات روانی، غیر ارادی و انفعالی و در نتیجه، معاف از ارزش‌گذاری‌های اخلاقی دانست. عده‌ای بر این باورند که باورهای ما غیر ارادی‌اند و در اختیار ما نیستند. درمقابل، عدة دیگری به تأثیر اراده بر باور یا اراده‌گروی اعتقادی معتقدند. این نوع از اراده‌گروی، بسته به میزان تأثیر اراده بر باور، به دو قسم کلی قابل تقسیم است: اراده‌گروی مستقیم و اراده‌گروی غیر مستقیم. اراده‌گروی اعتقادی از حیث دیگری، به اراده‌گروی توصیفی و اراده‌گروی هنجاری تقسیم می‌شود. در اراده‌گروی هنجاری سخن از نوعی وظیفه‌گرایی معرفتی در باب باورهاست که مستلزم اخلاق باور است. درواقع، زمانی می‌توان از اخلاق باور سخن گفت که به چیزی به نام وظیفه‌گرایی معرفتی قائل باشیم. مطهری تعقل و تفکر را افعالی نفسانی می‌داند که در دست اراده و انتخاب مستقیم انسان قرار دارند. از نظر وی، میان «عقیده» و «تفکر» تمایز وجود دارد. او عقیدة مبتنی‌بر فرایند معقول و عقلانی را تفکر می‌نامد و آن را موجِد معرفت می‌داند. توجه به فرایند شکل‌گیری معرفت از منظر مطهری به‌خوبی نشان‌ می‌دهد که وی به مسئلة توجیه باورها و قائل‌شدن به نوعی وظیفه‌گرایی معرفتی توجه خاص داشته است. بر این‌ اساس، مطهری توصیه‌هایی را در نحوة کسب معرفت بیان می‌دارد که می‌توان آن‌ها را ذیل اخلاق باور گنجاند. از جملة این توصیه‌ها می‌توان به این موارد اشاره کرد: تأثیرناپذیری از قضاوت دیگران، پیروی‌نکردن از اکثریت، پرهیز از خوش‌باوری، استماع قول مخالف، تفکیک باور از صاحب باور، و اجتناب از جمود و تعصب. (shrink)

Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified (...) with the variety of actions characteristic of inquiry; that contrary to what has been maintained by recent pluralists about epistemic value, the only goal relevant to inquiry is that of forming true belief; and that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to implement epistemically paternalistic practices that constrain our freedom to exercise agency in substantial ways. In other words, when it comes to our freedom to express epistemic agency, more is not always better. In fact, less is often so much more. (shrink)