Abstract

There are many important connections between epistemic justification and moral justification. A recent example of such connections is offered by Sosa’s AAA model for the normative evaluation of epistemic performances. In order to count as knowledge, a belief has to be Accurate in attaining the truth, the subject has to be Adroit or competent for such task, and the belief has to be Apt in the sense that the accuracy of the belief has to manifest the adroitness of the subject. In addition, full knowledge would require full-aptness, which is obtained when the aim of aptness is achieved in an apt way. We have here a clear definition of the model. But the application of the model to particular performances is not so clear. Both the identification of a particular performance as a case of epistemic performance and the assessment of its aptness, or full-aptness, are strongly relative to intentional descriptions paying attention to contextual factors and personal aspects. Here is where we can find close proximity with ethics. An epistemic analog to the ethical problem of double effects appears. In our paper, we analyze that problem in detail, extracting some consequences.