Authors
Chase Wrenn
University of Alabama
Abstract
An epistemic duty would be a duty to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from a proposition, and it would be grounded in purely evidential or epistemic considerations. If I promise to believe it is raining, my duty to believe is not epistemic. If my evidence is so good that, in light of it alone, I ought to believe it is raining, then my duty to believe supposedly is epistemic. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people do sometimes have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgment from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations
Keywords rationality  epistemology  epistemic duty  deontology  epistemic normativity  evidentialism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S001221730000158X
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
The Duty to Object.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):35-60.
Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Comments on the Will to Believe.Richard M. Gale - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):35 – 39.
Epistemic Responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
Deontology in Ethics and Epistemology.Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):530-545.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Deontology and Defeat.Michael Bergmann - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,737 ( #2,744 of 2,506,002 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
606 ( #593 of 2,506,002 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes