Jacques Julien Pris entre ces manifestations de folie collective, en ces temps de détresse que furent le nazisme et le stalinisme, ébranlé par sa propre condition mentale, le poète Paul Celan veut faire entendre une voix qui s’élève « contre ». Afin de faire sentir cette opposition sans quartier, il la porte au coeur même de la langue allemande et de l’art poétique. Nous allons chercher à entendre la singularité de cette voix dans ses expressions qui nous sont (...) à la fois proches et lointaines, cheminant avec le poète dans les sentiers de ses poèmes, dans une sorte d’accompagnement fraternel et respectueux. (shrink)

Résumé Cette question pointe vers des domaines encore mal définis du contexte des théologies contemporaines. Ce contexte est à peine esquissé : l’essai se concentre sur l’état classique de la théologie telle qu’elle est entendue communément, depuis son héritage patristique mâle et clérical. L’interrogation sonde ce corpus à l’aide des propositions faites par Henri Meschonnic et par Jacques Derrida.The title of this paper directs our attention towards as-yet uncharted domains in contemporary theology. However, this aspect of the paper is (...) only sketched out, as it is primarily concerned with theology as it is commonly understood, that is, the legacy of the male, clerical Fathers. This corpus is examined using propositions put forth by Henri Meschonnic and by Jacques Derrida. (shrink)

L’objectif principal que nous poursuivons dans cet article est de montrer que pour un phénomène aussi complexe que le schwa, qui ne se laisse pas appréhender de manière triviale, la constitution de corpus s’appuyant sur une méthodologie rigoureuse et explicite est un élément indispensable de la construction des objets phonologiques. A cette fin, nous nous concentrons sur l’étude de la position finale, et plus spécifiquement de l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/, à la lumière de trois enquêtes du projet « Phonologie du (...) français contemporain (PFC) : usages, variétés et structure » : un corpus de Douzens (Aude), un corpus de Biarritz (Pays Basque) et un corpus de Treize-Vents (Vendée). Après avoir resitué la problématique du schwa dans le débat général sur le traitement des positions finales, nous présentons le projet PFC, sa méthodologie et ses outils. Nous exposons enfin les résultats obtenus pour les trois corpus : le corpus de l’Aude représente un français du Midi très conservateur, où l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/ est tenace malgré des variations entre générations ; le corpus du Pays Basque représente un français du Midi en évolution, où cette opposition tend à disparaître mais est résiduellement présente ; le corpus de Vendée (variété rarement décrite) se révèle plus proche du français de référence, et les données indiquent sans ambiguïté que l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/ a été éliminée. Notre conclusion, si la démarche est correcte, est que ces résultats et les analyses qu’ils permettent (y compris l’étude des corrélations entre oral et écrit) seraient difficiles, voire impossible, à obtenir sur la base d’intuitions ou d’observations non contrôlées. (shrink)

L’objectif principal que nous poursuivons dans cet article est de montrer que pour un phénomène aussi complexe que le schwa, qui ne se laisse pas appréhender de manière triviale, la constitution de corpus s’appuyant sur une méthodologie rigoureuse et explicite est un élément indispensable de la construction des objets phonologiques. A cette fin, nous nous concentrons sur l’étude de la position finale, et plus spécifiquement de l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/, à la lumière de trois enquêtes du projet « Phonologie du (...) français contemporain (PFC) : usages, variétés et structure » : un corpus de Douzens (Aude), un corpus de Biarritz (Pays Basque) et un corpus de Treize-Vents (Vendée). Après avoir resitué la problématique du schwa dans le débat général sur le traitement des positions finales, nous présentons le projet PFC, sa méthodologie et ses outils. Nous exposons enfin les résultats obtenus pour les trois corpus : le corpus de l’Aude représente un français du Midi très conservateur, où l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/ est tenace malgré des variations entre générations ; le corpus du Pays Basque représente un français du Midi en évolution, où cette opposition tend à disparaître mais est résiduellement présente ; le corpus de Vendée (variété rarement décrite) se révèle plus proche du français de référence, et les données indiquent sans ambiguïté que l’opposition /Cə#/ vs /C#/ a été éliminée. Notre conclusion, si la démarche est correcte, est que ces résultats et les analyses qu’ils permettent (y compris l’étude des corrélations entre oral et écrit) seraient difficiles, voire impossible, à obtenir sur la base d’intuitions ou d’observations non contrôlées. (shrink)

Physique des phénomènes vibratoires, dynamique des systèmes non linéaires, neurosciences, chronobiologie, chronopharmacologie, psychologie, psychiatrie, poétique, musique danse, sociologie, anthropologie, sciences de l'éducation, économie, histoire, géographie, architecture, urbanisme, constituent une liste non exhaustive des disciplines qui ne peuvent plus faire l'économie de la notion de rythme. Cependant, l'ample diffusion de la notion de rythme dans divers champs de recherches ne signifie pas pour autant que cette notion soit déjà reconnue dans son rôle heuristique, ni qu'elle fonctionne comme un paradigme commun. Prise (...) de manières très diverses, elle manque encore souvent de consistance conceptuelle, au risque parfois de perdre en compréhension ce qu'elle gagne en extension. L'objectif principal de cet ouvrage collectif dirigé par Jean-Jacques Wunenburger (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 et Université de Bourgoge) & Julien Lamy (Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3) est de faire un état des lieux des études sur le rythme et de fournir, dans le sillon des travaux de Bachelard, des repères théoriques, à la fois historiques et conceptuels, qui permettront de mieux comprendre la cohérence propre de cette notion complexe, aux significations et aux usages multiples... (shrink)

Cognitive Approaches to Early Modern Spanish Literature is the first anthology exploring human cognition and literature in the context of early modern Spanish culture. It includes the leading voices in the field, along with the main themes and directions that this important area of study has been producing. The book begins with an overview of the cognitive literary studies research that has been taking place within early modern Spanish studies over the last fifteen years. Next, it traces the creation of (...) self in the context of the novel, focusing on Cervantes's Don Quixote in relation to the notions of embodiment and autopoiesis as well as the faculties of memory and imagination as understood in early modernity. It continues to explore the concept of embodiment, showing its relevance to delve into the mechanics of the interaction between actors and audience both in the jongleuresque and the comedia traditions. It then centers on cognitive theories of perception, the psychology of immersion in fictional worlds, and early modern and modern-day notions of intentionality to discuss the role of perceiving and understanding others in performance, Don Quixote, and courtly conduct manuals. The last section focuses on the affective dimension of audience-performer interactions in the theatrical space of the Spanish corrales and how emotion and empathy can inform new approaches to presenting Las Casas's work in the literature classroom. The volume closes with an afterword offering strategies to design a course on mind and literature in early modernity. (shrink)

L'aventure de Jacques et Raîssa Maritain constitue un parcours unique par son ampleur et son rayonnement. Centre de gravité de la vie spirituelle et littéraire pendant l'entre-deux-guerres, point de ralliement des générations perdues et refuge des poètes maudits, le couple tissa autour de lui le réseau d'influence le plus riche et foisonnant de l'histoire de ce siècle. Disciples de Bergson et de Léon Bloy, confidents de François Mauriac, de julien Green et de Jean Cocteau, amis de Péguy, de (...) Mounier et de Paul VI, et jetant entre les milieux littéraires, artistiques et catholiques d'invisibles passerelles, Jacques et Raïssa Maritain menèrent dans le même temps une expérience de vie spirituelle fascinante. Convertis à vingt ans, ils se firent tous deux messagers de Dieu sur les routes du monde, mendiants du Ciel au nom d'un nouvel humanisme, et ils s'engagèrent ensemble dans les combats essentiels de leur temps pour faire prévaloir en tous lieux la primauté du spirituel. On connaît l'œuvre philosophique considérable laissée par Jacques Maritain, qui garde une audience internationale. Mais cette première biographie, qui s'appuie entre autre sur une importante correspondance inédite, révèle la trame même d'une réflexion qui touche aux multiples domaine de la connaissance : une destinée d'errance et d'exil, de grandes amitiés et de combats souvent âpres contre l'injustice et les dérives du monde moderne, notamment celles de l'Eglise. C'est aussi la face invisible et secrète de la vie d'un couple qui nous est ici dévoilée. Unis par un amour fou et liés par un vœu de chasteté, les Maritainlivrèrent leur existence à Dieu sans partage, au prix pour Raïssa de "la plus dure mort à soi-même" et, pour tous les deux, d'une bouleversante solitude. (shrink)

Entre les postes et le mouvement analytique, le principe de plaisir et l'histoire des télécommunications, la carte postale et la lettre volée, bref le transfert de Socrate à Freud, et au-delà. Cette satire de la littérature épistolaire devait être farcie - d'adresses, de codes postaux, de missives cryptées, de lettres anonymes, le tout confié à tant de modes, de genres et de tons.

Widespread preservation of fossilized biomolecules in many fossil animals has recently been reported in six studies, based on Raman microspectroscopy. Here, we show that the putative Raman signatures of organic compounds in these fossils are actually instrumental artefacts resulting from intense background luminescence. Raman spectroscopy is based on the detection of photons scattered inelastically by matter upon its interaction with a laser beam. For many natural materials, this interaction also generates a luminescence signal that is often orders of magnitude more (...) intense than the light produced by Raman scattering. Such luminescence, coupled with the transmission properties of the spectrometer, induced quasi‐periodic ripples in the measured spectra that have been incorrectly interpreted as Raman signatures of organic molecules. Although several analytical strategies have been developed to overcome this common issue, Raman microspectroscopy as used in the studies questioned here cannot be used to identify fossil biomolecules. (shrink)

One puzzle concerning highly idealized models is whether they explain. Some suggest they provide so-called ‘how-possibly explanations’. However, this raises an important question about the nature of how-possibly explanations, namely what distinguishes them from ‘normal’, or how-actually, explanations? I provide an account of how-possibly explanations that clarifies their nature in the context of solving the puzzle of model-based explanation. I argue that the modal notions of actuality and possibility provide the relevant dividing lines between how-possibly and how-actually explanations. Whereas how-possibly (...) explanations establish claims of possible explanations, how-actually explanations establish claims of actual ones. Models, in turn, simply provide evidence for these claims. (shrink)

There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...) has it. Requiring a mark of truth makes the view infallibilist. Requiring it to be discernible makes the view internalist. I call the view Classical Infallibilism. (shrink)

The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...) -/- The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: -/- the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. -/- Including chapter summaries and guides to further reading, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction is an ideal starting point for any philosopher or student studying the emotions. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as psychology and the social sciences. (shrink)

When spelled out properly infallibilism is a viable and even attractive view. Because it has long been summary dismissed, however, we need a guide on how to properly spell it out. The guide has to fulfil four tasks. The first two concern the nature of knowledge: to argue that infallible belief is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for knowledge. The other two concern the norm of belief: to argue that knowledge is necessary, and that it is sufficient, for justified (...) certainty. With such a guide in hand infallibilism can be evaluated on its own merits. The most controversial parts are the first and fourth. The idea that knowledge requires infallible belief is thought to be excessively sceptical. The idea that knowledge warrants certainty is thought to be excessively dogmatic. The present paper addresses the first. It argues that knowledge requires infallible belief. (shrink)

For Hannah Arendt, authority is the shape educational responsibility assumes. In our time, authority in Arendt’s sense is under pressure. The figure of Greta Thunberg shows the failure of adult generations, taken collectively, to take responsibility for the world and present and future generations of newcomers. However, in reflecting on Arendt’s use of authority, we argue that her account of authority also requires amendments. Arendt’s situating of educational authority in-between past and future adequately captures its temporal dimension. We make explicit (...) another, spatial, dimension: authority in-between world and earth. Arendt’s neglect of the material earth also has implications for the relational dimension of authority. Arendt’s authority depends on a dichotomy between the private and the public sphere. This is problematic. First, we agree with Arendt’s feminist critics that the personal can be made into the site of the political. Second, we point once more to Thunberg, the child, taking the public stage, thereby contesting the division between public and private. In response, we situate the relational dimension of authority in-between private and public. The three dimensions of educational authority taken together imply that it is situated in-between domains that cannot be reduced to each other or taken as absolutes: past and future, world and earth, and the private and public sphere. This brings us to our concept of ambiguous authority, which expresses the Arendtian nature of our reflections and the ways in which we seek to renew her original insights on educational authority. (shrink)

Argumentation has been an important topic in knowledge representation, reasoning and multi-agent systems during the last twenty years. In this paper, we propose a new abstract framework where arguments are associated with a strength, namely a quantitative information which is used to determine whether an attack between arguments succeeds or not. Our Strength-based Argumentation Framework combines ideas of Preference-based and Weighted Argumentation Frameworks in an original way, which permits to define acceptability semantics sensitive to the existence of accruals between arguments. (...) The question of accruals arises in situations where several arguments defending the same position against another argument are unable to individually defeat this argument, but could do it collectively if they combine their strengths. We investigate some of the theoretical and computational properties of our new framework and semantics, and present a reasoning algorithm that is based on a translation of the problem into pseudo-boolean constraint satisfaction. This paper proposes an intuitive framework which allows strength compensations in an argumentation context where attacks may not succeed, completed by an approach which detects accruals throughout the reasoning process without requiring the elicitation of all compensatory combinations of arguments as an input. (shrink)

Ne serait-ce que par son titre, dont l’oxymore est d’emblée assumée (p.11) et dont les protagonistes sont associés d’une manière qui ne laisse de surprendre, l’ouvrage de Julien Boudon publié dans la collection « Les sens du droit » des éditions Dalloz, mériterait de retenir l’attention.Dans ce court opus, l’auteur entend, à travers un examen qui puise tout à la fois aux sources de l’histoire, de la philosophie, du droit, de la science politique, et qui emprunte à la fois (...) au style de la monog.. (shrink)

Since Saul Kripke’s influential work in the 1970s, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that the main revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that they are unable to block.

The phenomenon of species extinction raises more and more concern among ecologists facing the actual crisis of biodiversity. Scientific investigations of the causes and effects of extinction must be completed by a philosophical analysis of the concept of extinction that aims to clarify the meanings of the term ‘extinction’ and to analyse modalities, criteria and degrees of extinction. We will focus our attention on the apparent paradox of the possible ‘resurrection’ of species in the near future with the help of (...) genetic biotechnology and cloning techniques. The ontological background of the extinction concept is analysed in relation to the idea of species as classes. We will also show that there is no simple analogy between death and species extinction, and develop a conceptualist and dualistic system of supra-individual entities , supported by an instrumentalist approach to genetic manipulations which transform species into interactive kinds, which can go extinct and be recreated. (shrink)

How can we use models to understand real phenomena if models misrepresent the very phenomena we seek to understand? Some accounts suggest that models may afford understanding by providing causal knowledge about phenomena via how-possibly explanations. However, general equilibrium models, for example, pose a challenge to this solution since their contribution appears to be purely mathematical results. Despite this, practitioners widely acknowledge that it improves our understanding of the world. I argue that the Arrow–Debreu model provides a mathematical how-possibly explanation (...) which establishes claims of mathematical dependence. The account developed reveals how mathematical knowledge can inform claims about the world, allow ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ inferences, and thus improve our understanding. (shrink)

Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance shows how a strongly internalist conception of justification can be derived from a strongly externalist conception of knowledge, given an identification of justification with second-order ignorance and a set of structural principles concerning knowing and being in a position to know. Among these principles is an epistemic analogue of the Geach modal schema which states that one is always in a position to know that one doesn’t know p or in a position to know that (...) one doesn’t know not-p. Even suitably refined, the principle faces a range of counterexamples in which it misleadingly and persistently seems to one that one knows whether p without it seeming to one that one knows p nor that one knows not-p. These cases also threaten the book’s case for the luminosity of second-order ignorance, which is in turn central to its derivation of strongly internalist principles of justification. (shrink)

While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...) in our normative theories. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, a value that's notoriously difficult to understand if we think of justification as but a fallible means to a desired end. We will argue that these bridge-principles will be incredibly difficult to defend. While we do not think that normative facts necessarily stand in any interesting relationship to our justified beliefs about them, there might well be a way of defending the idea that our justified beliefs about what to do won't lead us astray. In turn, this might help us understand the value of justification, but this way of thinking about justification and its value comes with costs few would be willing to pay. (shrink)

Knowledge-first evidentialism combines the view that it is rational to believe what is supported by one's evidence with the view that one's evidence is what one knows. While there is much to be said for the view, it is widely perceived to fail in the face of cases of reasonable error—particularly extreme ones like new Evil Demon scenarios (Wedgwood, 2002). One reply has been to say that even in such cases what one knows supports the target rational belief (Lord, 201x, (...) this volume). I spell out two versions of the strategy. The direct one uses what one knows as the input to principles of rationality such as conditionalization, dominance avoidance, etc. I argue that it fails in hybrid cases that are Good with respect to one belief and Bad with respect to another. The indirect strategy uses what one knows to determine a body of supported propositions that is in turn the input to principles of rationality. I sketch a simple formal implementation of the indirect strategy and show that it avoids the difficulty. I conclude that the indirect strategy offers the most promising way for knowledge-first evidentialists to deal with the New Evil Demon problem. (shrink)

RNA polymerase II (RNAP II) non‐coding transcription is now known to cover almost the entire eukaryotic genome, a phenomenon referred to as pervasive transcription. As a consequence, regions previously thought to be non‐transcribed are subject to the passage of RNAP II and its associated proteins for histone modification. This is the case for the nucleosome‐depleted regions (NDRs), which provide key sites of entry into the chromatin for proteins required for the initiation of coding gene transcription and DNA replication. In this (...) review, recent data on the effects of pervasive transcription through NDRs are summarized and a model is proposed to explain how RNAP II‐driven transcription is able to modify the nucleosomes flanking the NDRs, leading to nucleosome repositioning and NDR closure. Even though much of the mechanistic detail underlying these events remains to be elucidated, such a model provides a basis to explain how non‐coding transcription through NDRs can regulate the initiation of coding gene expression and DNA replication. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage aurait pu s'intituler " matière et vie ". L'auteur nous guide sur le long chemin qui va des constituants élémentaires d'un jeune univers, dans lequel la vie est évidemment absente, jusqu'aux formes complexes de la matière. Il explique comment et pourquoi la matière se complexifie dans le coeur des étoiles de premières générations, dans la nébuleuse protosolaire, sur la jeune Terre envoie de différenciation, dans les premiers océans terrestres. Il décrit ce que l'on croit savoir, mais aussi passe (...) en revue tout ce que l'on ignore à propos de la génération spontanée des premières cellules vivantes. Lorsque la vie apparaît, l'histoire de la matière devient dépendante de l'évolution biologique. Après trois milliards d'années environ, celle-ci conduit à l'apparition de l'homme, seul être vivant capable de faire évoluer la matière. Ce livre propose ainsi une fresque d'une réelle ampleur, sans équivalent à ce jour, écrite pour être accessible à tous. Et pourtant, les questions abordées relèvent de nombreuses disciplines, comme l'astrophysique, la biologie, la chimie, le génie génétique et l'histoire des techniques. (shrink)

Models typically have actual, existing targets. However, some models are viewed as having non-actual targets. I argue that this interpretation comes at various costs and propose an alternative that fares better along two dimensions: (1) agreement with practice and (2) ontological and epistemological parsimony. My proposal is that many of these models actually have actual targets.

For the past two decades, philosophers of religion have paid close attention to the debates on public reason taking place within the context of political philosophy. Some thinkers claim that religious arguments should play a very limited role in political discourse, as this would amount to a politically sanctioned imposition of religious beliefs on people with different religious or non-religious worldviews. Others claim that excluding religious reasons would lead to an unfair exclusion of religious citizens from democratic processes. Underlying these (...) positions is a highly problematic idea of what it means to be a religious citizen. On the one hand, religious citizens are conceptualized as highly self-reflective theologians. Others instead imagine religious citizens to be wholly incapable of such self-reflection and of distinguishing between public and non-public spheres. In my article I attempt to criticize these underlying assumptions and point towards a more nuanced conception of the religious citizen. (shrink)

On a widespread naturalist view, the meanings of mathematical terms are determined, and can only be determined, by the way we use mathematical language—in particular, by the basic mathematical principles we’re disposed to accept. But it’s mysterious how this can be so, since, as is well known, minimally strong first-order theories are non-categorical and so are compatible with countless non-isomorphic interpretations. As for second-order theories: though they typically enjoy categoricity results—for instance, Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for second-order PA and Zermelo’s quasi-categoricity (...) theorem for second-order ZFC—these results require full second-order logic. So appealing to these results seems only to push the problem back, since the principles of second-order logic are themselves non-categorical: those principles are compatible with restricted interpretations of the second-order quantifiers on which Dedekind’s and Zermelo’s results are no longer available. In this paper, we provide a naturalist-friendly, non-revisionary solution to an analogous but seemingly more basic problem—Carnap’s Categoricity Problem for propositional and first-order logic—and show that our solution generalizes, giving us full second-order logic and thereby securing the categoricity or quasi-categoricity of second-order mathematical theories. Briefly, the first-order quantifiers have their intended interpretation, we claim, because we’re disposed to follow the quantifier rules in an open-ended way. As we show, given this open-endedness, the interpretation of the quantifiers must be permutation-invariant and so, by a theorem recently proved by Bonnay and Westerståhl, must be the standard interpretation. Analogously for the second-order case: we prove, by generalizing Bonnay and Westerståhl’s theorem, that the permutation invariance of the interpretation of the second-order quantifiers, guaranteed once again by the open-endedness of our inferential dispositions, suffices to yield full second-order logic. (shrink)