To say that mental phenomena are self-intimating means, roughly, that there is no more to them than what meets the "inner" eye. Gilbert Ryle was the first to emphasize this as one of the central features of the classical Cartesian picture of mind. He wrote.

In this richly detailed analysis, Barbara Von Eckardt lays the foundations for understanding what it means to be a cognitive scientist.

We argue that dominant research approaches concerning mental illness, which are centered on traditional categories of psychiatric classification as codified in the DSM-IV, have serious empirical, conceptual, and foundational problems. These problems have led to a classification scheme and body of research findings that provide a very poor map of the domain of mental illness, a map that, in turn, undermines clinical and research pursuits. We discuss some current efforts to respond to these problems and argue that the DSM-5 revision (...) process is not very promising, whereas the NIMH Research Domain Criteria initiative and some recent research in cognitive neuroscience fares better, although the latter remains potentially compromised by residual influences of the DSM-based approach. We conclude with some lessons and suggestions for the pursuit of alternative research pathways. (shrink)

When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability (...) of cognitive science. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations 'do not earn their explanatory keep'. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or nonconnectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

Ramsey (1997) argues that connectionist representations ‘do not earn their explanatory keep’. The aim of this paper is to examine the argument Ramsey gives to support that conclusion. In doing so, I identify two kinds of explanatory need—need relative to a possible explanation and need relative to a true explanation and argue that internal representations are not needed for either connectionist or non‐connectionist possible explanations but that it is quite likely that they are needed for true explanations. However, to show (...) that the latter is the case requires more than a consideration of the form of explanation involved. (shrink)

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a (...) “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated. (shrink)

To say that mental phenomena are self-intimating means, roughly, that there is no more to them than what meets the "inner" eye. Gilbert Ryle was the first to emphasize this as one of the central features of the classical Cartesian picture of mind. He wrote.

When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability (...) of cognitive science. (shrink)

When is it rational to pursue a research tradition? In Progress and Its Problems, Laudan suggests that if a research tradition RT has a higher rate of progress than any of its rivals, where the rate of progress of an RT is the problem solving effectiveness of its theories over time, then it is rational to pursue RT. In this paper I offer a number of criticisms of this suggestion, with special attention to the current controversy over the rational pursuability (...) of cognitive science. (shrink)

People often make trait judgments about themselves and others. Social perception researchers have attempted to study the accuracy of such judgments. Such studies raise the philosophical/conceptual question of what it means to say that a person's judgment is accurate. Two attempts have recently been made to taxonomize current research in terms of the notion of accuracy which has been adopted. My aim in this paper is twofold: first, to argue that the proposed philosophical taxonomies are problematic and, hence, should be (...) abandoned, and second, to recommend adoption of an alternative "minimalist" notion of accuracy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the usefulness of the Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) mechanism approach to gaining an understanding of explanation in cognitive neuroscience. We argue that although the mechanism approach can capture many aspects of explanation in cognitive neuroscience, it cannot capture everything. In particular, it cannot completely capture all aspects of the content and significance of mental representations or the evaluative features constitutive of psychopathology.

In Explaining Attitudes, Lynne Rudder Baker considers two views of what it is to have a propositional attitude, the Standard View and Pragmatic Realism, and attempts to argue for Pragmatic Realism. The Standard View is, roughly, the view that “the attitudes, if there are any, are particular brain states”. In contrast, Pragmatic Realism that a person has a propositional attitude if and only if there are certain counterfactuals true of that person.Baker’s case against the Standard View is a complex one. (...) One aspect of that case is that there are no good general arguments for the Standard View. We argue that one of the three she considers, an argument from causal explanation, can be defended. The problematic premise, according to Baker, is the claim that unless beliefs are [identical to, constituted by, or realized by] brain states, they cannot causally explain behavior. Baker tackles this premise in two ways: in Chapter 4, she attempts to undermine the brain-explain thesis by taking issue with the conception of causal explanation that she believes supports it; in Chapter 5, she argues against the brain-explain thesis directly, by attempting to show that it is false, whether or not the Standard View is true. Neither of these attempts are successful, on our view.The alternative version of the causal argument we develop uses the doctrine of physicalism as a supplementary premise rather than appeal to a reductive conception of causal explanation. After presenting this alternative version, we consider how Baker might respond to it by drawing on her discussion of materialism. We conclude that Baker’s argument against materialism does not generalize to physicalism as we construe it. (shrink)

The aim of Schunn, Crowley and Okada's (1998) study is to address the question of whether the current state of cognitive science, as represented by Cognitive Science and the Cognitive Science Society, “reflects the multidisciplinary ideals of its foundation.” To properly interpret and respond to their results, we need to ask a prior question: What is cognitive science's multidisciplinary ideal? There are at least two conceptions—a “localist” conception, which seems to be implicit in Schunn, Crowley and Okada's discussion, and a (...) “holist” conception. I argue that while both have been endorsed by some cognitive scientists, there are reasons for preferring the holist conception. I then consider what Schunn, Crowley and Okada's findings tell us about the state of cognitive science in light of a holist approach and report on an analysis of the journal's contents which looks at the domain, subdomain, and cognitive capacity investigated. (shrink)

The collection focuses on meaning change as a topic of interdisciplinary research.

Von philologischer Nüchternheit und humanistischem Engagement... Der Band dokumentiert exemplarisch die Verbindung von Altertumswissenschaft und moderner Kulturwissenschaft auf hohem philologischem und kritisch reflektierendem Niveau.

Der Klimawandel ist die globale Krise unserer Gegenwart. Mit Blick auf die sich hieraus ergebenen Handlungsoptionen und -zwänge stellt der verantwortliche Umgang mit Energie sicher einen der zentralen Bereiche dar. Unsere ethische Verantwortung betrifft dabei beides: Erzeugung und Verbrauch von Energie gleichermaßen. Der vorliegende Band verfolgt zwei Ziele: Erstens soll ein interdisziplinärer Dialog ermöglicht und die dafür notwendigen fachlichen Reflexionen angestoßen werden. Keine Einzeldisziplin kann auf die komplexen Probleme des Klimawandels oder die mit dem Terminus Energieverantwortung angezeigten Herausforderungen alleine eine (...) plausible Antwort geben. Vielmehr müssen die Wissenschaften ein gemeinsames Verständnis der Probleme entwickeln, um auch interdisziplinär geteilte Antworten bereitstellen zu können. Zweitens soll dies in transdisziplinärer Perspektive erfolgen. Das bedeutet, die von der Gesellschaft an die Wissenschaft herangetragenen Fragen und Problemstellungen ernst zu nehmen, aufzugreifen und Antworten zu formulieren, die auch außerhalb der wissenschaftlichen Diskurse als Antworten auf diese Fragen und Problemstellungen verstanden werden können. (shrink)

Der Band widmet sich der Frage, wer verantwortlich ist für einen ethisch angemessenen Umgang mit Energie. Dazu sollen zunächst im ersten Teil die normativen Grundlagen von Energieverantwortung skizziert werden. Im zweiten Teil werden mögliche Spannungsfelder identifiziert, die in verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Dimensionen bestehen. Im abschließenden dritten Teil wird die Perspektive auf Probleme erweitert, die durch die Implementierung energieverantwortlicher Maßnahmen und Bestrebungen entstehen. So leistet der Band eine Ordnung der Fragen rund um Energieverantwortung sowie die Darstellung, Bewertung und Lösung (...) konkreter Handlungsprobleme im Feld der Energie-Nachhaltigkeit. (shrink)

Das menschliche Leben vollzieht sich in der Spannung von "Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit". Jede Epoche definiert ihre Lebensvollzüge in dieser Spannung neu. Die Gegenwart verzeichnet in ihrem technisch zivilisierten Ambiente neue Schübe von "Künstlichkeit", denen kompensatorisch neue Ideen von "Natürlichkeit" entgegentreten. Der Sport ist davon zentral betroffen. Diese Tagung versucht, von unterschiedlichen philosophischen Fragestellungen her sich dem Problem der Künstlichkeit unseres gegenwärtigen Lebens (und des Sports) zu nähern und das Postulat der "Natürlichkeit" in seiner regulativen Funktion zu begreifen. Die nun in (...) Schriftfassung vorgelegten Vorträge dieser Tagung bieten Diskussionsgrundlagen für notwendige Überlegungen, wenn es darum geht, Konzepte von Bewegung, Spiel und Sport kulturell-historisch zu verstehen und moralisch-ethisch zu kritisieren und zu würdigen. (shrink)