We focus on the literature about UBI and the experiments developed all around the world to test it in order to address how UBI implementation could affect entrepreneurship. Building on these findings and various strands of entrepreneurial theory, we develop a theoretical framework to explain how the implementation of UBI would dramatically change the environment of entrepreneurial activity, shaping entrepreneurial action at three levels: (i) the desirability of becoming an entrepreneur; (ii) the perceived feasibility of becoming an entrepreneur; (iii) the (...) propensity to act. Consequently, UBI implementation would arguably facilitate the decision to become an entrepreneur. The contribution of the paper is threefold. It firstly provides a theoretical framework that opens new directions for further research on the relationship between UBI and entrepreneurship. Secondly, it offers new insights for policy makers by shedding light on potential effects of UBI implementation. Finally, it raises further questions that remains unsolved related to the role of non-pecuniary motivations and financial constraints. (shrink)

While many philosophers of religion are familiar with the reconciliation of grace and freedom known as Molinism, fewer by far are familiar with that position initially developed by Molina’s erstwhile rival, Domingo Banez (i.e., Banezianism). My aim is to clarify a serious problem for the Banezian: how the Banezian can avoid the apparent conflict between a strong notion of freedom and apparently compatibilist conclusions. The most prominent attempt to defend Banezianism against compatibilism was (in)famously endorsed by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Even (...) if it were true that freedom does not require alternative possibilities, Banezians have a grounding problem. (shrink)

I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the “grounding problem” for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick (...) O’Neill. O’Neill responds in this present journal issue to that paper, arguing that I failed to be attentive to distinctions drawn by Garrigou-Lagrange which would resolve the dilemma. However, I fear that O’Neill’s presentation of both the dilemma and his own resolution is conceptually confused. I will try to illustrate that O’Neill’s own responses are at many points either a concession to a certain fork of the dilemma that I posed in the original paper, or change the subject and fail to address my concerns except superficially. However, since at many points O’Neill implies that I reject Báñezianism, despite my explicit qualification in the paper that I do not, I will end by proposing what would constitute a sufficient response to the dilemma. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Báñez with Love:A Response to a Response by Taylor Patrick O'NeillJames Dominic Rooney O.P.From where I stand, the traditional options of Molinism and Báñezianism seem logically exhaustive possible accounts of the way in which God can cause people to love him, under the influence of grace, while at the same time being able to affirm that those people remain free. Either God's giving efficacious grace to an individual (...) is such as to cause that individual to act a certain way, merely in virtue of giving that grace to that individual, or it is not. If that grace is not intrinsically efficacious, then you need to explain the way in which God can cause an action by giving grace which does not require grace to be intrinsically efficacious. On the latter front, Molinists aim to affirm that human beings are free even while acting under the influence of God's grace, and hold that God's grace is not such as to make it that one could not have done otherwise. They explain this by appeal to counterfactual truths about what human beings would do, metaphysically prior to and independent of God's subsequent decisions to give or withhold grace. These "counterfactuals of freedom" are central to Molinist accounts of freedom, since the truth of these counterfactuals alone secures the fact that human beings are acting freely even when God gives them grace and causes them to perform certain actions. Those human beings could have acted otherwise. Conversely, since God knows these truths, he can use them in order to give grace to an individual at those times when he knows it will be efficacious.To me, the Molinist view is a non-starter. What these truths consist in, what grounds them, how God uses them—I find the critiques compelling [End Page 675] and Molinist answers to these questions metaphysically problematic.1 I am committed to finding a Báñezian solution, therefore, to the riddle. From my perspective, the mystery of predestination invites confusion ultimately because the issue is a subtle philosophical, not a theological, problem. The resolution to the riddle of grace and free will can come only through an adequate account of the nature of human freedom. And I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the "grounding problem" for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick O'Neill.In short, Garrigou-Lagrange appears to accept that there need to be alternative possibilities if human action is to be free. He gives an accounting of those possibilities as follows. On one side, when I sin, Garrigou-Lagrange argues that God's denial of efficacious grace, even though this denial occurs prior to anything I do or could have done, does not necessitate my sin because I performed the sin by means of my normally operating volitional and intellectual capacities (which God merely refrained from interfering in), and I had alternative possibilities provided by the possibility of God providing efficacious grace. Then, on the other, when I do good, he appeals at many points to non-culpable "defects" regarding my intellectual or volitional capacities as grounding those alternative possibilities that I could have sinned even when acting under efficacious grace. In both cases, my acts are still metaphysically contingent. However, neither case provides a sufficient grounding for alternative possibilities (I argued), because I had no relevant control over God's decision to deny efficacious grace, nor were those "defects" in light of which I could have sinned under my control. Instead, I argued that Garrigou-Lagrange's account of humans having alternative possibilities for action would be successful only if there were facts about what I would have done under sufficient grace, truths prior to and independent of God's decision to give efficacious... (shrink)

This article deals with the historical position of Domingo Báñez in the De Auxiliis Controversy. He was a protagonist of the beginning of the dispute and his name was used by the defenders of Luis de Molina to describe the traditional Thomist account on divine providence and free will; even today, many Thomists use the name of Báñez to designate their own position. This article tries to determine his personal opinion regarding the ontology of physical premotion without presupposing the later (...) development of Bañecian doctrine. Most Thomists conceive it as a kind of entity inherent in the creature, but Báñez did not interpret it this way in his own account. According to him, God moves the created will so that the free human act is the first new entity in the creature, and it is produced by both God and created free will. (shrink)

In 1601 certain Jesuits in Alcalá de Henares defended the following thesis: «It is not by faith that we confess that this man, for example, Clement VIII, is Pope.» During 1602 this fact became known in Rome and the Pope urged that the Spanish Inquisition imprison these Jesuits. To defend themselves, they alleged that the thesis was not unusual among scholars, indicating the names of several authors who defended it, among them, the eminent professor emeritus of Salamanca Domingo Báñez. However, (...) he convened an academic act in Valladolid on July 2, 1602 to show that his position was not such. Shortly thereafter, the Jesuits held another event in the same town to challenge the thesis of their coreligionists, underscoring their opposition even more than Báñez. New, partly unknown material on the subject is copied in these pages: the letters from the nuncio to the head of the Vatican State, with annotations written by the Pope, and a letter from the King of Spain to his ambassador; the complete text of the theses defended by Báñez and by the Jesuits in July 1602, as well as two unpublished letters from Báñez on the occasion of his act, one to the master general of his Order and the other to the Pope. (shrink)

Desde la perspectiva de su coincidencia histórica con Alonso de Veracruz, se presenta el contexto de la los rasgos más sobresalientes del pensamiento de D. Báñez: su opción por una fidelidad estricta al pensamiento de Santo Tomás, y la controversia de auxiliis. Se señalan sus planteamientos acerca de la cuestión americanista, la doctrina jurídica, la configuración de la enseñanza autónoma de la Metafísica, y la doctrina por la que suele ser identificado en la historia del pensamiento: la premoción física.

Gaëlle Demelemestre | : On présente généralement Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto et Domingo Bañez comme des auteurs de la Seconde Scolastique, et plus précisément de sa première vague. Il est de ce fait supposé que leurs positions intellectuelles sont suffisamment similaires pour que l’on puisse les traiter ensemble, et qu’elles soient exposées et complétées les unes par les autres. Des personnalités d’une telle envergure peuvent-elles cependant réellement avoir fondu leurs objet et visée propres en une thèse commune qu’elles (...) auraient perpétuée? C’est la question que nous nous poserons en comparant précisément la façon dont ils comprennent les notions de dominium et de ius. | : Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto and Domingo Bañez are generally presented as authors of the Second Scholastic, and more precisely of his first wave. It is thereby assumed that their intellectual positions are sufficiently similar to be treated together, and exposed and completed the one by the others. However, such personalities could they really have flow together their own object and aim in one same position that they have perpetuated? That’s the question we will ask in comparing precisely their meaning of the notions of dominium and ius. (shrink)

El presente trabajo aborda el tema acerca del conocimiento divino de los actos libres del hombre. El problema se relaciona con el tratamiento de Aristóteles acerca de los enunciados sobre futuros contingentes. Si Dios conoce los actos futuros libres, etos es, antes de su realización, y los conoce con verdad determinada, deberían estar predeterminados, y en tal caso no podrían ser libres. Se da cuenta en especial el tratamiento del tema por parte de los autores ibéricos de los siglos inmediatamente (...) posteriores al Descubrimiento de América, esto es, Domingo Báñez, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suá-rez; a su vez se da cuenta de estos planteamientos en base al pensamiento del escotista chileno Alonso Briceño. This paper addresses the divine knowledge of man's free acts. The problem is related to Aristotle's approach to utterances about future contingencies. If God knows of free future acts, that is, befare their realization, and knows them with determined truth, these acts should be predetermined and, in that case, they could not be free. The approaches to this subject taken by Spanish authors from the period after the Discovery of America, such as Domingo Báñez, Luis de Molina, Francisco Suárez as well as the approach adopted by Chilean Scotist Alonso Briceño are especially discussed. (shrink)

En 1594 el padre Suárez escribe en castellano un memorial destinado al público lego donde da cuenta y razón de la polémica de auxiliis. El memorial desata las iras de los dominicos y otras órdenes porque según ellos se están vulgarizando tendenciosamente problemas que debían reservarse a los teólogos. Por ello el dominico Domingo Báñez escribe en el mismo año una refutación del memorial de Suárez, también en castellano, dirigido a la Inquisición. Este artículo estudia ambos documentos especialmente relevantes para (...) el hispanismo filosófico por varias razones: están pensados y escritos en castellano, lengua vehicular además del latín de las altas especulaciones teológicas de la época; constituyen un momento de aclaración conceptual por parte de Suárez en la configuración de su propio sistema: el congruismo; funcionaron como embrión de la Apología de Bañez; y son una espléndida y sintética introducción al problema para el no iniciado. (shrink)

Banez’ commentary on I, q. 3, art. 3, is justly well-known for the criticism of earlier Thomists and for its metaphysical acuity. But Banez’ skill is best seen when we read not only his commentary, but the other texts which he himself was reading, such as the works of Capreolus, Soncinas, and Cajetan. In particular, he connects three issues which at first glance might seem unrelated, namely the view that esse is the ultimate act, that it is reduced (...) to the categories, and that it is less perfect than essence. The view that esse is the ultimate act implies that it can be reduced to the category of what is prior to it as the imperfect to the perfect. The position that essence on its own is prior and belongs to a category can lead to the view that essence is more perfect than esse. (shrink)

Study of the reception of Aristotelian syllogistic in the sixteenth century and, in particular, the philosophy of Domingo Bañez, is a very important for showing how Aristotle’s philosophy was taken up within the cultural environment of the School of Salamanca. This article, after a brief presentation of the historical trajectory bringing Aristotelian syllogistic to Bañez, shows how, in his Institutiones minoris dialecticae, he faces the problem of the Trinity, and how this work is valued for its usefulness in the understanding (...) of the divine mystery. (shrink)

The notion of physical premotion (praemotio physica) is usually associated with the theological topic of divine concurrence (concursus divinus). In the present paper I argue that the Thomist Domingo Báñez (1528–1604) applied the concept of premotion (though not the expression “praemotio”) also in his psychology. According to Báñez, the active intellect (intellectus agens) communicates a kind of “actual motion” to the phantasma (i.e. the mental sensory image perceived by the imagination) in order to render it a collaborator of intellectual cognition. (...) Such an actual motion is, in other words, a premotion to the effect, as the phantasma is, in Báñez’s view, “elevated” to the production of an effect that transcends its proper powers. This Báñez’s theory was largely accepted in the subsequent development of Thomism. (shrink)

Domingo Báñez proposes the distinction between personalitas, individualized nature and act of being in order to resolve the christological problem of the hypostatic union. Those notions can be applied to every man, and so it makes evident the distinction between individual and person, while it shows the radical dependence from the creating free act of God.

The doctrine of the Image of God which is to be found in humankind is usually based by the Scholastic tradition in the human intellect and will. Bañez, a commentator of St. Thomas Aquinas, takes the further step of basing this Image in the personal act of being. In this way the Image of God as found in the created human being is never lost. The Image of God in the “re-created” human being (in the order of grace) can be (...) lost, however, due to the vicious use of one’s freedom. (shrink)

This unpublished manuscript of the Spanish Dominican Domingo Báñez reflects his personal account of the proceedings held during July 1602 in Valladolid in defense of his own doctrine against suspicious theses formulated by some Jesuits from Alcalá de Henares the previous March. The Jesuits denied that the adhesion of faith to the Roman Pontiff included him as a specific man, e.g. Pope Clement VIII. In support of their thesis, they provided the authority of Báñez. The Dominican theologian clarified in Valladolid (...) that the fact that Clement VIII was Pope did belong to the faith indeed but not in a primary and immediate sense, although this was later supported by other Jesuits in a third session held a few days later, again in Valladolid. (shrink)

In the years that saw the transition from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century, a controversy arose in Spain over the problem of the harmony between created freedom and divine omnipotence. This dispute arose in Salamanca, but it would have important consequences for the conception of man in Europe from then on. In my proposal, I pay attention to Domingo Báñez, an important member of the School of Salamanca, which point of view has been somewhat blurred due to the heat (...) of the polemic. In particular, I would like to emphasise his way of pointing to human dignity as the basis of the relationship between divine and human freedom. Such dignity does not lie in a misunderstood autonomy but in its dependence on God. Thus, according to Báñez, human freedom is an image of divine freedom, so that its dignity is not so much reflected in its independence from the power of God—which only occurs, to a certain extent, in sin—but in the concord between the two freedoms. (shrink)