Hans Lipps compares pragmatism (William James and John Dewey) existentialism (Friedrich Nietzsche, Soren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger) in this 1936 article translated from French. He claims that they aim at the same goals, e.g., a return to lived experience and a rejection of the Cartesian legacy in philosophy. While summarizing the commonalities of each, he engages in a polemic against philosophy then that remains relevant now into the next century.

[Hans Lipps est élève de Husserl, participant au premier cercle phénoménologique de Göttingen, dans lequel il discute avec Koyré, Reinach, Hering, et bien sûr Husserl lui-même. Cependant, Lipps ne suit pas l'orthodoxie husserlienne et s'oriente très tôt dans une compréhension toujours plus personnelle de la phénoménologie, qui le tourne vers l'herméneutique. Le cheminement de Lipps est alors parallèle à celui de Heidegger, qu'il lira avec attention, et dont il reprendra plusieurs traits dans...

Ce texte, une des dernières oeuvres du philosophe allemand, élève de Husserl et de Reinach, présente une analyse des rapports entre le langage et la réalité, suivant les apports méthodologiques de la phénoménologie. Son analyse herméneutique du discours constitue une critique de la théorie husserlienne de la signification.

Hans Lipps’s originality lies in a tension between his hermeneutical and existential philosophy on the one hand, and his analysis of themes belonging to classical logic, on the other. To understand this tension, it must be examined at its point of origin – when Lipps discusses Husserl’s philosophy. The purpose of this text is to explain the opposition between Lipps and his first Master. Lipps’s critique of Husserl concerns transcendental idealism, the transcendental reduction, and the (...) concept of intentionality, which appear to Lipps as an escape from the realm of facticity. Husserlian idealism is then similar to Kant’s critical philosophy. Pursuing his inquiry from the perspective of facticity, Lipps refutes Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendentalism and their focus on the realm of representation. He tries nevertheless to analyse the classic problems of phenomenology and Kantian logic from the point of view of facticity. (shrink)

L'approche herméneutique du vouloir-dire, représentée ici par Martin Heidegger et Hans Lipps décrit le véritable lieu d'origine de ce qu'on appelle signification dans l'expérience que chacun fait de sa situation, et donc antérieurement à tout langage. La signification n'apparaît pas alors simplement comme le contenu idéal et théorique du discours, mais semble en première analyse appartenir à la tournure pratique d'une situation : elle est ce que l'on comprend d'une chose quand on en détermine les emplois possibles en (...) vue d'une fin déterminée. Mais du point de vue des herméneutiques heideggerienne et lippsienne, cette détermination pragmatique de la signification demeure incomplète tant que ne lui est pas ajoutée une compréhension langagière de la signification qui échappe justement à tout pragmatisme. Il s'avère alors que le rôle du vouloir-dire, de la signification attachée au discours effectivement prononcé, est de compléter les significations attachées aux choses dans une situation donnée. La parole n'a pas pour rôle de simplement refléter les significations préalablement données dans l'expérience pratique de la situation, mais doit au contraire les compléter en les faisant assumer par quelqu'un. La signification du discours, le vouloir-dire, est un vouloir-se-dire du locuteur, sans lequel les significations pragmatiques de la situation demeureraient inachevées. (shrink)

in his last work, the phenomenological philosopher hans lipps raises the cuestion of human nature. this nature can only be revealed by striking the concepcion of its very essence. this conception has to be found within the realm of the differenciating possibilities, in which human nature appears. one of these is the possibility of having affections. through his phenomenological analysis of the human embarrassment and its expresion, lipp calls into question the "psycho-physical nature" of man by showing its (...) original embodiment. in his aurel kolnai`s analysis of repugnance and criticizes ludwing klages´theory of gestures. the human embarrassment and its expression is a striking example of the fundamental "befindlichkeit" of human being. (shrink)

Written in the 1960s, TRUTH AND METHOD is Gadamer's magnum opus.

Émile Durkheim remains one of the most controversial, and deeply misunderstood, classics of social theory. His work differs from the dominant version of sociology that has essentially accepted the modernist self-description of contemporary societies; and it contradicts the individualism that has come to dominate the social sciences. For everybody who is interested in constructing theoretical alternatives to this individualism, Durkheim's sociology can be a useful inspiration - not only because of the solutions it suggests, but already because of the questions (...) it asks. Making use of the theoretical possibilities offered by the Durkheimian tradition, however, requires going beyond the familiar appropriations. The Oxford Handbook of Émile Durkheim takes stock of the different recent debates on Durkheimian sociology, and makes them accessible to a wide audience spanning various disciplines; this includes crucial debates that, due to language barriers, are not easily accessible for an English-reading public. The handbook's chapters elucidate the controversial key concepts of Durkheimian sociology; situate them within the contemporary political and theoretical debates they were originally responding to; offer surveys of empirical research that uses Durkheimian concepts (on topics that were already central for Durkheim's own work as well as on topics that Durkheim hardly touched upon), thus demonstrating the possibilities of a Durkheimian sociology; bring out the divergent, and competing, ways in which Durkheim's ideas have been appropriated and reformulated within more recent theoretical developments in the social sciences. In doing so, this volume is an important resource for all scholars and students looking to understand Durkheimian sociology. (shrink)

The paper aims at drawing the main lines of a reflection about architectonic space, starting from the comparison between two hypothesis, as much as ever different: Theodor Lipps’ spatial aesthetics and Hans van der Laan’s elemental theory. The emphasis given by both authors to the intersection between directions and way, but also to the mutual subordination between thing and space, allows to rewrite the obituary of architecture as a spatial art, according to which the Modern Style has turned (...) the spatiality into its specular visibility, into the spaciousness, into the indefinite continuity of the Bigness. (shrink)

Facial attributes such as race, sex, and age can interact with emotional expressions; however, only a couple of studies have investigated the nature of the interaction between facial age cues and emotional expressions and these have produced inconsistent results. Additionally, these studies have not addressed the mechanism/s driving the influence of facial age cues on emotional expression or vice versa. In the current study, participants categorised young and older adult faces expressing happiness and anger or sadness by their age and (...) their emotional expression. Age cues moderated categorisation of happiness vs. anger and sadness in the absence of an influence of emotional expression on age categorisation times. This asymmetrical interaction suggests that facial age cues are obligatorily processed prior to emotional expressions. Finding a categorisation advantage for happiness expressed on young faces relative to both anger and sadness which are negative in valence but different in their congruence with old age stereotypes or structural overlap with age cues suggests that the observed influence of facial age cues on emotion perception is due to the congruence between relatively positive evaluations of young faces and happy expressions. (shrink)

Persoonlijk verslag van de zoektocht van de beroemde auteur naar de essentie van haar leven.

In 1890 C. S. Peirce wrote a review of A. C. Fraser’s recent book on Locke, published to coincide with the bicentennial of Locke’s Essay. Peirce remarked that “Locke’s grand work was substantially this: Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception…. We cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke’s thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.” This estimate of Locke was (...) not the common opinion in England during the nineteenth century. This opinion was reflected in Fraser’s book which, Peirce remarked, could not “be said to be a sympathetic account of [Locke]. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming.” Locke had his knowledgeable critics and defenders—for instance Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill—but the common opinion ranged from extreme hostility and contempt to condescending criticism of isolated minor points. His style was deplored, his philosophy was called unoriginal and a mere unacknowledged plagiarism of Gassendi and Hobbes; he was said to have so thoroughly misunderstood Descartes that he had merely repeated him with new errors; he was said to owe his philosophical reputation entirely to his advocacy of the popular argument for political freedom or merely to the intellectual circumstances of his time; he was held accountable for Condillac’s rejection of reflection and reason; he was knocked down with a few bare sentences loosely drawn from Leibniz; he was said to have made the mind a puny, passive, mechanical thing. He was called a sensualist, a materialist, a sceptic, an atheist, and a utilitarian though at the same time—and not without contradiction—he was generally, especially by his critics, styled a “great lover of truth,” a plain and simple, well-meaning and religious man. To the nineteenth century Locke meant the Essay, and the history of the Essay was in large measure the history of modern thought, of the eighteenth century. Precisely for this reason there was something nearly sinister about him, in spite of his good personal character. “Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man,” said Carlyle, “had paved the way for banishing religion from the world.”. (shrink)