This is a reply to Ryszard Wójcicki's polemics against the view expressed in the author's paper „Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later” which have been published together in the previous issue of Filozofia Nauki. Contrary to Ryszard Wójcicki, the author is of the opinion that Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is pragmatic, and more exactly syntactico-pragmatic. The reason for this claim is the indisputable fact that while formulating the meaning-directives and the definition of synonymity and meaning, Ajdukiewicz has used merely (...) syntactical and pragmatical notions (the notion of meaning, which could have semantic implications, was the subject of explication). Since (for obvious reasons) Ajdukiewicz did not want to make use of the semantic notions as primitive notions, he had no other option. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers, especially the \"post-modern ones,\" claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of \"right representations,\" a concept that - according to him - is \"an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.\" In order to support his nihilistic position, (...) Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty\'s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine\'s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that - contrary to Rorty\'s claim - Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine\'s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as \"disquotational.\" The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation. (shrink)

Tarski believed that the notion of truth should be relativised not to the notion of meaning - as many philosophers would claim - but rather to the notion of language. In general terms, he would identify a language with a structure L = containing an alphabet, a class of sentences and an operation of consequence. As to the specific languages of deductive sciences Tarski maintained that they should be inseparably conjoined with theories, so that the notion of language should be (...) supplemented with a set of axioms and a set of true sentences: L' = . First four elements of L' are quite conveniently expressable in syntactic terms. About the set of Ver, to the contrary, it can be said only that it is one of many complete and coherent sets of sentences containing Ax and closed for the operation Cn. For a very general characteristic it could perhaps be enough. For a more specific definition of Ver, however, Tarski needed some semantic tool. As is well known, he used the notion of satisfying, defined for every particular language L* . Thus, as it seems, according to Tarski, the general notion of truth relative to language is a primary notion of the theory of formalized languages. Were we after introducing it as a secondary notion, we would have to enrich the notion of language with some semantic (referential) aspects, what in turn would require some standarization of syntax and thus narrow the notion of formalized language. (shrink)

The author claims that Ingarden's ontology is a contemporary version of Platonism. He argues that the concepts of distinct realizations of pure and ideal qualities in ideas and in individuals are unclear and unnecessary. In authors opinion the essential parts of Ingarden's ontology may by explained in terms of possible and real individuals and its possible properties.

New Tenth Anniversary edition of this classic text with a new preface by the author, compares myths about meat-eating with myths about manliness, and seeks to ...

Ulrich Beck's best selling Risk Society established risk on the sociological agenda. It brought together a wide range of issues centering on environmental, health and personal risk, provided a rallying ground for researchers and activists in a variety of social movements and acted as a reference point for state and local policies in risk management. The Risk Society and Beyond charts the progress of Beck's ideas and traces their evolution. It demonstrates why the issues raised by Beck reverberate widely throughout (...) social theory and covers the new risks that Beck did not foresee, associated with the emergence of new technologies, genetic and cybernetic. The book is unique because it offers both an introduction to the main arguments in Risk Society and develops a range of critical discussions of aspects of this and other works of Beck. (shrink)

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has drawn attention to the technology’s transformative potential, including what some see as its prospects for causing large-scale harm. We review two influential arguments purporting to show how AI could pose catastrophic risks. The first argument — the Problem of Power-Seeking — claims that, under certain assumptions, advanced AI systems are likely to engage in dangerous power-seeking behavior in pursuit of their goals. We review reasons for thinking that AI systems might seek power, that (...) they might obtain it, that this could lead to catastrophe, and that we might build and deploy such systems anyway. The second argument claims that the development of human-level AI will unlock rapid further progress, culminating in AI systems far more capable than any human — this is the Singularity Hypothesis. Power-seeking behavior on the part of such systems might be particularly dangerous. We discuss a variety of objections to both arguments and conclude by assessing the state of the debate. (shrink)

What makes your life go well for you? In this paper, we give an account of welfare. Our core idea is simple. There are impersonally good and bad things out there: things that are good or bad period, not (or not only) good or bad for someone. The life that is good for you is the life in contact with the good. We’ll understand the relevant notion of ‘contact’ here in terms of manifestation: you’re in contact with a value either (...) when it is manifest in parts of your life or parts of your life are manifest in it. So, the more the good is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the good, the better for you. The more the bad is manifest in your life, or your life manifest in the bad, the worse for you. We’ll argue that this account is extensionally adequate: it explains the welfare value of achievements, friendships, knowledge, pleasures and virtues. Moreover, it has a number of explanatory virtues: it’s unified, elegant and explanatorily powerful. So, we’ll suggest, it’s an excellent account of welfare, and in many ways superior to its main competitors. (shrink)

Toward an ontology of the social-historical -- Proto-institutions and epistemological encounters -- Anthropological aspects of subjectivity: the radical imagination -- Hermeneutical horizons of meaning -- The rediscovery of physis -- Objective knowledge in review -- Rethinking the world of the living being -- Reimaging cosmology -- Conclusion: the circle of creation.

Bringing political philosophy out of the ivory tower and within the reach of all, this book provides us with tools to cut through the complexities of modern ...

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.

This chapter provides empirical evidence about everyday attitudes concerning euthanasia. These attitudes have important implications for some ethical arguments about euthanasia. Two experiments suggested that some different descriptions of euthanasia have modest effects on people’s moral permissibility judgments regarding euthanasia. Experiment 1 (N = 422) used two different types of materials (scenarios and scales) and found that describing euthanasia differently (‘euthanasia’, ‘aid in dying’, and ‘physician assisted suicide’) had modest effects (≈3 % of the total variance) on permissibility judgments. These (...) effects were largely replicated in Experiment 2 (N = 409). However, in Experiment 2, judgments about euthanasia’s moral permissibility were best predicted by the voluntariness of the treatment. Voluntariness was a stronger predictor than some demographic factors and some domain general elements of moral judgments. These results help inform some debates about the moral permissibility of euthanasia (e.g., the slippery slope argument) suggesting that some of the key premises of those arguments are unwarranted. (shrink)

Multiple sclerosis significantly affects how patients maintain the resources they consider important. The aim of this paper is to describe the moderation effect of time since diagnosis on the evaluation of resources by patients with multiple sclerosis, on the basis of S.E. Hobfoll’s Conservation of Resources theory. The study was conducted using paper and pencil methods and involved 77 patients, of whom 32 received their diagnosis less than four years ago, and 45 more than four years ago. The patients’ resource (...) evaluation was investigated using the Polish adaptation of the COR questionnaire. Patients who received their diagnosis more than four years ago were more likely to consider vital and spiritual resources to be more important. In patients diagnosed less than four years ago, the loss of economic, political, and vital resources was significant. It is shown moderation effect of time since diagnosis. The results may for the basis for further research. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

In Freedom: An Impossible Reality (FAIR), Raymond Tallis finds room in a law-abiding universe for a uniquely human form of agency, capable of envisioning and pursuing genuinely open possibilities, thereby deflecting rather than merely inflecting the course of events, in accordance with self-owned intentions, reasons and goals. He argues that the genuinely free human pursuit of such propositional attitudes depends on our acting from a “virtual outside”, at an epistemic distance from the physical world that reveals not only what is (...) the case, but that it is the case. The enactive approach in cognitive science and philosophy of mind aims to supersede the cognitivist traditional that has long dominated the field, by reframing cognition as an agentʼs immediate, embodied engagement with its environment. In an appendix of FAIR, Tallis argues that this approach risks both eliminating propositional attitudes, and collapsing the epistemic distance between agent and world. He concludes that if enactive theorists are to distinguish between genuinely pursuing an intention and merely responding to a stimulus, their corrective to cognitivism is in need of a correction of its own. This paper argues that such a correction is already to be found within the enactive literature, and furthermore, that it bears striking similarities to Tallis own account of what makes human agency unique. It is therefore concluded that the case for freedom set out in FAIR is compatible with the enactive approach. (shrink)

The paper gives a brief characterization of philosophical problems; points up something of their significance for the culture, the social order, and our lives; indicates the methodology appropriate for the problems; and presents a view of the cultural mission of philosophy today. Philosophy attempts to bring under critical review and to correct errors in the cultural mind of our civilization, the prevailing assumptions and beliefs about our knowledge‐yielding powers, the various sectors of the culture, and the basic structure of the (...) world. It holds the cultural mind accountable to the unavoidable presuppositions of experience, thought, and action. Errors in the cultural mind can lead to distortions in the development of the culture and to social and personal pathologies. I contend that our modern Western cultural mind undermines the humanistic dimension of the culture, and ultimately the whole culture, by a restricted view of our knowledge‐yielding powers and the resulting impoverished view of reality. The mission of philosophy today is to point out the errors in our cultural mind and to work for a humanistic cultural reformation. (shrink)