The foremost advocate of Baconian probability, L. J. Cohen, has credited Hume for being the first to explicitly recognize that there is an important kind of probability which does not fit into the framework afforded by the calculus of chance, a recognition that is evident in Hume's distinction between analogical probability and probabilities arising from chance or cause. This essay defends Hume's account of the credibility of testimony, including his notorious argument against the credibility of testimony to miracles, in light (...) of this insight. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Internalism1 Dorothy Coleman Hume is typically taken to be an internalist, that is, one who maintains that motivation is built into the acceptance or affirmation of a moral judgement.2However, Hume didnot provide any systematic defence of the internalist view, and consequently his views about moral motivation are problematic. Recently, for example, it has been argued that Hume is an externalist, one who maintains that the acceptance of a (...) mora] judgement does not itself motivate but requires independent desires to do so.3 This suggests thatclarification is needed to determine more precisely Hume's position on the issue ofmoral motivation. Since the distinction between internalism and externalism is a twentieth-century one,4 something should first be said about the wisdom of describing Hume in these terms. The contemporary debate between externalism and internalism concerns both the nature of moral motivation, whether moral judgements are themselves motivating, and the reason for this concern: internalists hold that motivation must be built into moraljudgements because it is "essential for an action's being or being shown to be obligatory."5 As Nagel puts it in ThePossibility ofAltruism, the problem with externalist accounts of motivation is that they cannot justify the requirement to perform one's obligations, "for they permit that someone who has acknowledged that he should do something and has seen why it is the case that he should do it, to ask ifhe has any reason for doing it."6 Seen in this way, the debate is about how to justify morality, how to account for our obligation to be moral at all, and how to answer the question, "Why ought I be moral?" Hume, on the other hand, was a thoroughgoing naturalist. He intended not tojustify morality but rather to provide its "natural history," a narration of the origin of moral concepts out of a set ofsocial and environmental conditions together with passions that constitute human nature. For example, concerning what he called the artificial virtues, such asjustice or the regardfor the public good, Hume argued that while the original motive to be just is self-interest, once individuals are educated and socialized into a community regulated by rules ofjustice, they come to "internalize" or moralize these norms so that their motive for being just is no longer self-interest but simply a regard for the public good, the sense ofjustice itself. Hume's concern with internalism, then, seems far removed from the problem of justifying morality that propels the current debate. Volume XVIII Number 2 331 DOROTHY COLEMAN Even though the internalist-externalist distinction applies only anachronistically to Hume, as long as those engaged in the contemporary debate insist on identifying historical figures as exemplars of one or the other of these viewpoints, and even disagree about who does and why,7 clarification of the extent to which this distinction can apply to Hume would be of assistance. Since the justification of morality is not a problem Hume addressed, for the purpose ofthis paper I will use the terms internalism and externalism to refer only to theories about moral motivation. To defend this interpretation ofHume, it will help first to clarify his terminology: whathe meantby moraljudgement, moral sense, and action from a sense ofduty. Hume claimed that moral judgements are based on feelings of pleasure or displeasure arising from impartial or disinterested reflection on the general influence ofmotives or traits of character. Those motives or passions that produce impartial feelings of approval are judged to be virtues; those that produce impartial feelings ofdisapproval arejudged to be vices.8 By moral sense or moral passions Hume meant feelings of approval and disapproval by which passions are judged to be virtuous or vicious.9 In defining duty or obligation, Hume stated that these are actions or qualities of mind whose neglect or non-performance causes disinterested displeasure or disapproval (T 517). To act from ásense ofduty or virtue would then be to be motivated by the sense whichjudges what our duties are, namely, bymoral passions, the feelings ofdisinterested approval ordisapproval ofmotives and the actions ofwhich they are signs. Thè Evidence for Hume's Internalism Hume's commitment to an internalist theory of ethical motivation is nowhere made explicit... (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of religion and the most artful instance of philosophical dialogue since the dialogues of Plato. It presents a fictional conversation between a sceptic, an orthodox Christian, and a Newtonian theist concerning evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause of nature based on observable features of the world. This edition presents it together with several of Hume's other, shorter writings about (...) religion, and with brief selections from the work of Pierre Bayle, who influenced both Hume's views on religion and the dialectical style of the Dialogues. The volume is completed by an introduction which sets the Dialogues in its philosophical and historical contexts. (shrink)

Revitalizing the “patchwork theory” of Hans Vaihinger and Norman Kemp Smith, yet repudiating their assumption that a chronological order of composition can be discerned in the disjointed lines of argumentation in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer’s Kant and the Claims to Knowledge presents a formidable though questionable analysis of the Critique showing Kant’s sustained ambivalence between ontological realism and transcendental idealism that begins in his early writings and continues through the revision of the Critique and in his later (...) unpublished manuscripts. (shrink)

David Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, first published in 1779, is one of the most influential works in the philosophy of religion and the most artful instance of philosophical dialogue since the dialogues of Plato. It presents a fictional conversation between a sceptic, an orthodox Christian, and a Newtonian theist concerning evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause of nature based on observable features of the world. This new edition presents it together with several of Hume's other, shorter writings (...) about religion, and with brief selections from the work of Pierre Bayle, who influenced both Hume's views on religion and the dialectical style of the Dialogues. The volume is completed by an introduction which sets the Dialogues in its philosophical and historical contexts. (shrink)

This book is a collection of papers and commentaries originally delivered at the Eighth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America in 1984 on the topic of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, an ambitious undertaking, as it includes nearly all of his systematic philosophy excluding logic and philosophy of nature.

Revitalizing the “patchwork theory” of Hans Vaihinger and Norman Kemp Smith, yet repudiating their assumption that a chronological order of composition can be discerned in the disjointed lines of argumentation in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Paul Guyer’s Kant and the Claims to Knowledge presents a formidable though questionable analysis of the Critique showing Kant’s sustained ambivalence between ontological realism and transcendental idealism that begins in his early writings and continues through the revision of the Critique and in his later (...) unpublished manuscripts. (shrink)

The first three essays by John Biro, Alexander Rosenberg, and Robert Fogelin, respectively, focus on Hume's project to develop a science of human nature that would provide a foundation for all other sciences. Biro shows that what unites Hume's science of human nature and twentieth-century cognitive sciences is their mutual commitment to explain the mind as one would any other natural phenomenon. Rosenberg traces Hume's influence on the development of philosophy of science to show how he came to be regarded (...) as the most important philosopher to have written in English. Fogelin characterizes Hume, at least with regard to his criticism of our intellectual capacities, as a "radical, unreserved, unmitigated sceptic". Though acknowledging Hume's constructive idea that nonrational aspects of our nature render these skeptical conclusions inconsequential, he stresses that this too "is a sceptical conclusion", a view endorsed by David Norton, whose introduction to the volume argues that Hume is a "post-sceptical" philosopher who "consciously developed a philosophical position that is at one and the same time fundamentally sceptical and fundamentally constructive". Addressing Hume's application of his science of human nature to religion, J. C. A. Gaskin's essay perspicaciously outlines his criticism of the design argument, his argument against the believability of miracles, and his account of the merits of secular morality over religious morality. The final section of Gaskin's essay convincingly refutes attempts to show Hume is a fideist or to find a justification of faith in his theory of natural belief. (shrink)