The conception of thought as a kind of argumentative dialogue has been influential in curricula designed to promote the development of thinking skills. Educators have sought to “teach” this kind of thinking by providing their students with opportunities to participate in argumentative exchange. This practice is based on the belief that thinking processes will mirror or mimic the interpersonal exchanges in which the thinker engages. In this article, another approach to teaching argumentative thought is developed. It is argued that while (...) training and practice in interpersonal argumentation increases students’ overall argumentation skills, it is not particularly effective in helping students to develop the practice of engaging dialogically with their own beliefs. On this other approach, students are required to engage in “metacognitive inquiry” in which their own judgments in respect of curriculum materials, and in respect of the various strategies they have deployed to generate these judgments, become a subject matter for reflection and critical evaluation. The article concludes with the discussion of an in-class experiment in using the metacognitive approach. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential benefits and obstacles in the incorporation of a critical attitude in a critical thinking curriculum. Critical thinking entails more than just the transfer of information and critical thinking concepts to student within a course. The author suggests that professors should exemplify critical traits in the classroom to students as a means to develop a critical attitude or disposition. The adoption of a critical attitude encourages students to ascertain critical concepts and tools, and cultivate a critical (...) disposition, which would further allow students to internalize the insights and values of critical thought and thus be able to readily apply them to arguments. Despite its perceived benefits, the author is also aware of potential roadblocks in the path of developing a students’ critical disposition, such as different epistemic values and upsetting student psychological well-being. Nevertheless, the author contends that adopting a critical attitude provides students and educators with pedagogical tools and goals that enhance the overall effectiveness of critical theory courses. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: L'idée que les images mentales sont des tableaux ou des objets dans l'esprit joue un rôle extrêmement important dans la conception que David Hume se fait de l'esprit et dans sa doctrine générale quant à la nature de la pensée. La question que veut explorer le présent article est la suivante: la doctrine humienne des images mentales comme objets-dans-l'esprit est-elle viable? On soutiendra qu'une défense très forte de la conception de Hume peut être aujourd'hui développée sur la base de (...) données relatives à la nature de l'imagerie mentale qui ont été récemment avancées dans le domaine de la psychologie cognitive. (shrink)

This paper inquires into the nature and causes of credulous belief and proposes a way of making negative evidence more salient to believers so that they are less likely to fall into the habit of credulous believing. Contrasting the work of Richard Swinburne with recent work in cognitive psychology, the author argues that for the “strong credulity hypothesis”, namely that our comprehension of testimony is closely linked to an initial (albeit temporary) acceptance of what speakers claim. That is, we are (...) literally “set up” to believe irrespective of whether the belief in question is reasonable. In order to “neutralize” the effect of initial credulity, the author describes a pro/con procedure (suitable for a number of classes, e.g. critical thinking) that allows for the systematic analysis of beliefs and testimony. (shrink)

It is commonplace for undergraduate students to find certain concepts inherent to the disciplines of study troublesome. While some concepts are troublesome simply because they represent new vocabulary for the students, other concepts are troublesome in a more significant sense. Concepts of this kind are troublesome because they highlight an aspect of the deep structure of the discipline, a way of thinking and inquiry, that the students are likely to find strange and even, counter-intuitive, relative to their own pre-existing conceptual (...) frameworks. In this paper, I will argue that the concept of ‘argument’ in the discipline of philosophy, is one such concept. To make the case for this, I will be drawing upon a relatively new and important framework for inquiry into troublesome disciplinary concepts, known as “threshold concept theory” (Meyer and Land 2006, 2008). In addition, I propose to consider the implications, in terms of the design of curriculum and pedagogy for the philosophy classroom, of conceiving argument in threshold concept terms. (shrink)