Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as whole. Many (...) scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist. However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known, a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION Anyone who reads David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature cannot but be struck by the diversity of philosophical issues Hume addresses, ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:55. HUME'S RELATIVE IDEAS The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy In this paper I shall show that Hume found within the "way of ideas" the basis for a distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. By examining the (...) distinction between positive and relative ideas and Hume's discussions of relative ideas in the light of the logical writings of Antoine Arnauld and Isaac Watts, I shall argue that relative ideas are the cognitive analogues of definite descriptions. Although Hume often regarded epistemic claims based upon relative ideas with at least a modicum of scepticism, the doctrine of relative ideas provides the basis for the intelligibility of and the critical moves in his discussions of that unintelligible chimera of... substance. The recognition that Hume espoused the doctrine of relative ideas also sheds light on his discussions of the missing shade of blue and his claim that one has an idea of the thousandth part of a grain of sand, even though one's mental image of that minute entity differs in no way from one's mental image of an entire grain of sand. I. Positive and Relative Ideas Empiricism was the predominant intellectual force in early eighteenth century British philosophy. It was on the basis of their commitment to empiricism that such philosophers as Locke and Berkeley granted ontological status to those qualities that are directly available to the senses. As states of mind, ideas were held either to represent real qualities and objects (Locke) or to be real qualities and 56. objects (Berkeley). Nonetheless, as substance theorists, the ontological commitments of both Locke and Berkeley went beyond the domain of a pure ontology of qualities, and since substance is in principle imperceptible, such an ontological commitment seems to raise a problem for an empirical theory of ideas. Although it might be reasonable to assume that an idea of a quality is a mental image of that quality, such a claim is less plausible regarding one's ideas of substance. The early empiricists responded to this apparent problem by drawing a distinction between two kinds of ideas: positive ideas and relative ideas. A positive idea represents an entity as it is in itself, and it might be reasonable to construe such ideas as mental images. On the other hand, a relative idea—what Berkeley often called a notion 4 or a relative notion —singles out an unperceived entity on the basis of its relations to a perceived entity, i.e., a positive idea. Both Locke and Berkeley were explicit in claiming that one has no positive idea of substance. For example, Locke wrote: We have no such clear Idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word Substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (i.e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) Idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support of those Ideas we do know. On· has only an "obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general", indeed, "we have no Idea of what it [substance] is, but only a confused and obscure one of what it does." O» this point Berkeley was at one with Locke. Regarding one's putative ideas of material substance, he wrote the following: Now I desire that you would explain what is meant by matter's supporting extension: say you, I have no idea of matter, and therefore 57. cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive yet if you have any meaning at all, you must have at least a relative idea of matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents, g and what is meant by its supporting them. Notice that in the writings of both Locke and Berkeley one's idea of substance is not a positive idea: one has no idea that represents substance as it is in itself. The most one can claim to have is a relative idea of substance... (shrink)

Rene Descartes credited his success in philosophy, mathematics, and physics to the discovery of a universal method of inquiry, but he provided no systematic description of his method. _Descartes and Method_ carefully examines Descartes' scattered remarks on his application and puts forward a systematic account of his method with particular attention to the role it plays in the _Meditations_. Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen boldly and convincingly argue against the orthodox conception that Descartes had no method. Through a (...) rigorous and thorough examination, Flage and Bonnen unearth and explain the role of the method of analysis in the _ Meditations_. _Descartes and Method_ is a ground-breaking book that is sure to make a considerable impact on the philosophy community. Anyone wishing to gain a new understanding of Descartes's _Meditations_ should read this book. (shrink)

Rene Descartes credited his success in philosophy, mathematics, and physics to the discovery of a universal method of inquiry, but he provided no systematic description of his method. _Descartes and Method_ carefully examines Descartes' scattered remarks on his application and puts forward a systematic account of his method with particular attention to the role it plays in the _Meditations_. Daniel E. Flage and Clarence A. Bonnen boldly and convincingly argue against the orthodox conception that Descartes had no method. Through a (...) rigorous and thorough examination, Flage and Bonnen unearth and explain the role of the method of analysis in the _ Meditations_. _Descartes and Method_ is a ground-breaking book that is sure to make a considerable impact on the philosophy community. Anyone wishing to gain a new understanding of Descartes's _Meditations_ should read this book. (shrink)

Does George Berkeley provide an argument for the existence of the Judeo-Christian God at Principles of Human Knowledge, part I, section 29? The standard answer is that he does. In this paper, we challenge that interpretation. First, we look at section 29 in the context of its preceding sections and argue that the most the argument establishes is that there are at least two minds, that is, that the thesis of solipsism is false. Next, we examine the argument in section (...) 29 in light of the conclusions Berkeley draws in sections 30–33. There Berkeley concludes that there is one cause of the ordered world of ideas, a cause he calls the "Author of Nature." We argue that Berkeley's Author of Nature is conceptually distinct from, although numerically identical with, the Judeo-Christian God, for whose existence Berkeley argues in section 146. Finally, we ask whether, if our conclusion is correct, it is significant that Berkeley drew a conceptual distinction between the Author of Nature and the Judeo-Christian God. (shrink)

Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as whole. Many (...) scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist . However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known , a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

The definitions of ‘deduction’ found in virtually every introductory logic textbook would encourage us to believe that the inductive/deductive distinction is a distinction among kinds of arguments and that the extension of ‘deduction’ is a determinate class of arguments. In this paper, we argue that that this approach is mistaken. Specifically, we defend the claim that typical definitions of ‘deduction’ operative in attempts to get at the induction/deduction distinction are either too narrow or insufficiently precise. We conclude by presenting a (...) deflationary understanding of the inductive/deductive distinction; in our view, its content is nothing over and above the answers to two fundamental sorts of questions central to critical thinking. (shrink)

How does Descartes justify his claim that conceiving of a mind as a thinking thing and a body as an extended thing show that mind and body are distinct substances? The paper attempts to answer that question by following a clue Descartes gave Arnauld that virtually everything in Meditations Three through Five is germane to the real distinction between mind and body. The paper develops the distinction between material truth and formal truth from Descartes’s discussions of falsity in Meditation Three. (...) In Meditation Three, clear and distinct ideas are materially true. They are consistent. They represent the possibility that there is something that corresponds to the idea (de dicto possibility). God is not a deceiver. Since it is psychologically impossible to doubt a clear and distinct idea, Descartes concludes Meditation Four by arguing that clear and distinct ideas are formally true (representative). Clear and distinct ideas represent true and immutable natures (essences). It is in virtue of true and immutable natures that it is possible that there are things of determinate kinds. Hence, in Meditation Five, clear and distinct ideas represent de re possibilities. Since the mind/body distinction is a distinction between true and immutable natures, Descartes takes clearly and distinctly conceiving a thinking thing as distinct from an extended thing to be sufficient for claiming a real distinction between mind and body. (shrink)

In the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused. This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then from Arnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and therefore the notion of self-causation is unintelligible. In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartes distinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends that God's essence is properly the formal cause of God's existence, and attempts to find a cause midway between (...) a formal cause and an efficient cause. (shrink)

If there is a normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works and if the recent critics of the utilitarian interpretation of Hume are correct in claiming that he was not a utilitarian, then what is the nature of Hume's moral theory? In this paper I hope to provide a plausible answer to that question by examining Hume's contention that the moral sentiment is analogous to a secondary quality. I shall show that his discussions of the moral sentiment provide one with (...) a method for evaluating the moral value of an agent's motive. Turning to Hume's discussions of obligation, I shall show that, for Hume, questions regarding one's obligations are resolved on the basis of societal conventions. Hume's social relativism, however, does not commit him to moral relativism, for questions of moral obligation are to be resolved by considering both whether one is socially obligated to perform a certain kind of action and whether or performing that kind of action in a certain set of circumstances in virtuous or vicious. Granting that there are utilitarian strains in Hume's moral theory, I shall conclude by discussing the role of the principle of utility in Hume's moral theory. (shrink)

While most of hume's criticisms of the doctrine of substance are epistemological and theory-Independent, We show that in "treatise" i.Iv.5, Hume develops a metaphysical criticism of the cartesian theory of substance. Using three of pierre bayle's arguments of his own ends, He argues that on an empiricist theory of meaning, The cartesian theory of substance is reduced to absurdity.

In Section 38 of the Theory of Vision Vindicated, George Berkeley claims that he had used the method of analysis throughout the Theory of Vision. What does that mean? I first show that "analysis" denoted a fairly well-defined method in the early modern period: it was regularly described as a method of discovery. Then I show that the discussion of distance perception in the Theory of Vision exemplifies the method of analysis and may be seen as a modification of a (...) non-geometrical account of distance vision in Rene Descartes' Optics. (shrink)

The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook for Critical Thinking provides a quick and authoritative reference for issues regarding reasoning, and provides clear and succinct discussions of issues such as counterfactuals, rational decision-making, and critical thinking in writing.

The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.

In both the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, George Berkeley provides a description of God’s attributes immediately after his arguments for God’s existence. Neither description deems God omnipotent, yet shortly after each he freely uses “omnipotent” and its synonyms to describe God. Why is this? The author argues that his reluctance to ascribe omnipotence is God is the reluctance of a careful philosopher, his willingness is that of a religionist, and his account of (...) language explains why he can speak in two voices. Focusing on Principles §146, the author shows that the argument does not support the claim that God is omnipotent. The notion of omnipotence is ambiguous, so a careful philosopher should avoid it. Nonetheless, his discussion of noncognitive uses of language allows the religionist to use “omnipotent” to express divine veneration. Berkeley’s use of the word “omnipotence” is religious. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works is an act-deontological theory. After providing a conceptual framework for my discussion, I show that in Book III, Part i, Section 1 of the *Treatise* Hume rejected the thesis that there are synthetic a priori constitutive rules of moral obligation. Next I show that the positive evidence indicates that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value. Since constitutive moral rules need not be synthetic a priori (...) propositions, and since it might be suggested that Hume proposed rules defining moral obligation, I show that the rules Hume proposed were fundamentally rules of nonmoral obligation. I conclude with a brief examination of "Of the Standard of Taste." Since Hume held that ethical and aesthetic theories are on a par, evidence that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of aesthetic value will tend to confirm my contention that he also accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value. (shrink)

IT IS ARGUED THAT DESCARTES DREW A METHODOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ORDER IN WHICH ONE ENTERTAINS PROPOSITIONS AND THE ORDER OF EPISTEMIC PRIMACY. RECOGNIZING THIS RECONCILES ANY "PRIMA FACIE" INCONSISTENCIES AMONG THE "COGITO" PASSAGES, MOST NOTABLY, THOSE BETWEEN THE "COGITO" PASSAGES IN THE "PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY" AND THE "SECOND REPLIES".

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”.