수사학과 화용론의 만남이라눈 부제롤 달고 인간의 의사전달 체계인 언어의 문법구조를 집중 분석한 연구서.

수사학과 화용론의 만남이라눈 부제롤 달고 인간의 의사전달 체계인 언어의 문법구조를 집중 분석한 연구서.

001. 마르크스 철학의 탈현대적 재구성 002. 철학은 세계를 변혁시킬 수 있는가:인간소외와 사회실천의... 003. 이데올로기 개념의 탈현대적 이해 004. 페레스트로이카의 철학적 이해:마르크스주의의 해체와... 005. 마르크스의 자연개념과 생태학적 사회철학 006. 한스 요나스의 생태학적 윤리학:노동과 기술적 유토피아의 한계 007. 포스트마르크스주의의 사회철학적 비평 008. 자니 바티모의 '약한 존재론'과 포스트마르크스주의 009. 허무주의 시대의 책임윤리:세기전환기의 사회철학적 지평 010. 미셸 푸코-권력,지식 그리고 욕망:후기 자본주의 사회의... 011. 위르겐 하버마스-비판적 사회이론과 담론적 실천 012. 후기 자본주의의 생산양식과 삶의 형식:마르크스 유물론의...

Friedrich Nietzsche has emerged as one of the most important and influential modern philosophers. For several decades, the book series Monographien und Texte zur Nietzsche-Forschung (MTNF) has set the agenda in a rapidly growing and changing field of Nietzsche scholarship. The scope of the series is interdisciplinary and international in orientation reflects the entire spectrum of research on Nietzsche, from philosophy to literary studies and political theory. The series publishes monographs and edited volumes that undergo a strict peer-review process. The (...) book series is led by an international team of editors, whose work represents the full range of current Nietzsche scholarship. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the idea of God in the first Critique prefigures but does not imply a theism. It is in his ethical philosophy that this idea is given a theistic interpretation, and that the postulation (or fideic affirmation) of God’s existence, along with immortality, is practically justified as a condition of the possibility of the summum bonum. This paper argues that Kant’s reasoning from his initially austere conception of morality to the summum bonum and to immortality and God’s existence (...) lacks compelling logic. It also argues that Kant’s practical justification of faith, amounting to no more than the claim that practical reason explicates its own inherent need and satisfies this need by faith, fails to satisfy the demand of religious consciousness for an ontology of reason that includes an account of the grounding of reason in what it postulates. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the idea of God in the first Critique prefigures but does not imply a theism. It is in his ethical philosophy that this idea is given a theistic interpretation, and that the postulation (or fideic affirmation) of God’s existence, along with immortality, is practically justified as a condition of the possibility of the summum bonum. This paper argues that Kant’s reasoning from his initially austere conception of morality to the summum bonum and to immortality and God’s existence (...) lacks compelling logic. It also argues that Kant’s practical justification of faith, amounting to no more than the claim that practical reason explicates its own inherent need and satisfies this need by faith, fails to satisfy the demand of religious consciousness for an ontology of reason that includes an account of the grounding of reason in what it postulates. (shrink)

The author indicates some ways in which cartesian dualists can counter strawson's argument that no cartesian mind can be identified either by itself or by other such minds. Judging the identification argument inconclusive, The author formulates what he regards as a more effective argument against cartesian dualism. The argument is to the effect that cartesian dualism promises no satisfactory account of the unity of a mind. Noting that a cartesian mind is presumed to be the subject of a multiplicity of (...) simultaneous and successive experiences, The author thinks it legitimate to ask how the attribution of many experiences to the same subject is possible. He considers and rejects some answers that could be given in the framework of cartesian dualism. (shrink)

In the “Fifth Meditation” of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl tries to answer the expected objection to his transcendental phenomenology that it commits him to a solipsism. Is his attempt successful? In order to get a proper answer to this question, it is necessary to clarify how he understands the objection. Since he counters the objection by showing how other egos can be “constituted,” it can be said at least that he understands the objection to be the claim that other egos (...) cannot be constituted within the framework of his transcendental phenomenology. The objection is not that he is committed to deny the actual existence of other egos but rather that he cannot explicate the sense of other egos in the way the principles of his transcendental phenomenology require him to. (shrink)