A criticism of Frankfurt-counterexamples presented by David Widerker and known as the W-defense has been resilient for years and has been considered one of the strongest challenges these counterexamples have to face. In this paper I intend to offer an explanation of one of the appeals on the W-Defense, mainly, that it allows us to pass over the intricate debate on whether a successful Frankfurt counterexample can be presented or not. I defend this debate, although interesting and fruitful, misses the (...) main point Frankfurt counterexamples intend to make. Next I offer a defense of Frankfurt counterexamples from Widerker’s attack by presenting a dilemma for the Principle of Alternative Expectations, it’s main premise: either on the one hand, this principle rests on the Kantian maxim ought implies can, which makes the principle, and Widerker’s whole argument, redundant and unnecessary; or the principle does not rest on such maxim, but then there is no good reason to accept it a valid. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se interroga la atencionalidad propia del amor en cuanto que experiencia privilegiada y primordial del cuidado. En busca de un acceso al fenómeno del amor, se propone interrogarlo conforme al tipo de atención que promueve, asumiendo y discutiendo los recursos aportados por la fenomenología husserliana, así como por las fenomenologías contraintencionales, en particular la de Waldenfels. De este modo, si para describir este fenómeno es preciso dar cuenta del fundamento afectivo de la atención, también hay que reconocer que el (...) amor es vivido como un hecho original o un acontecimiento que implica para el amante una reorientación existencial y atencional. ABSTRACT The article inquires into the attentionality inherent to love as a privileged and primordial experience of care. Seeking access to the phenomenon of love, we suggest inquiring into it according to the type of attention it promotes, drawing on and discussing the resources provided by Husserlian phenomenology, as well as by counter-intentional phenomenologies, particularly Waldenfels'. Thus, while it is necessary to account for the affective grounds of attention in order to describe this phenomenon, it is also essential to recognize that love is experienced as an original fact or as an event that entails an existential and attentional reorientation of the lover. (shrink)

Una crítica a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, presentada por David Widerker y conocida como la "Defensa-W", ha persistido a través de los años como uno de los retos más difíciles que estos han de enfrentar. En este texto defiendo los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt de este ataque de Widerker presentando un dilema en el que su premisa fundamental, el Principio de expectativas alternativas, se ve envuelta: o bien la plausibilidad de este principio depende de la máxima kantiana "deber" implica "poder", lo cual haría (...) que el principio mismo, y con él todo el argumento de Widerker, sea redundante y prescindible; o bien no se basa en esta máxima, pero entonces no hay ninguna razón de fuerza por la cual se pudiera defender que este principio debe ser aceptado como válido. A critique presented by David Widerker on Frankfurt-counterexamples and known as the "W-defense" has persisted for years and has been considered one of the most difficult challenges these counterexamples have to face. This paper aims to defend Frankfurt counterexamples against Widerker's attack. For doing this, the paper presents a dilemma addressed to the main premise of Widerker's attack: The Principle of Alternative Expectations. The dilemma states: either this principle rests on the Kant's maxim, "ought" implies "can", and then this makes redundant and unnecessary the principle and Widerker's whole argument; or the principle does not rest on such maxim and then there is no good reason to accept it as valid. (shrink)

En este artículo se ofrece una defensa del libertarismo frente a dos acusaciones según las cuales éste comete un error categorial. Para ello, se utiliza la filosofía de Gilbert Ryle como herramienta para explicar las razones que fundamentan estas acusaciones y para mostrar por qué, pese a que cierta..

On Contextual Robust Alternatives Resumen: En su libro El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presenta una objeción a los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt según la cual lo que hace que una alternativa sea robusta o no es el contexto en el que se encuentra el agente; así, alternativas que, en principio, no se verían como robustas y eximentes, pueden llegar a serlo en circunstancias especiales y los contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt presentan, justamente, este tipo de circunstancias. En este escrito presento tres objeciones (...) al brillante argumento de Moya. En primer lugar, defiendo que no es claro que la alternativa que él considera robusta esté cumpliendo el papel de soportar, al menos en parte, la atribución de culpa del agente. En segundo lugar, retomo la respuesta que Moya ha dado a una crítica de Pereboom quien lo acusa de presuponer en el seno de su argumento al principio de posibilidades alternativas y, por ende, de caer en una petición de principio. Defiendo que la respuesta que ha dado Moya no le permite eludir la crítica de Pereboom. Finalmente, ofrezco una consideración acerca de cómo podría desarticularse la propuesta de Moya si se logra presentar un contraejemplo tipo-Frankfurt de corte determinista. Palabras clave: Alternativas robustas, contexto, contraejemplos tipo-Frankfurt, Principio de posibilidades alternativas, determinismo.: In his book El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico Carlos Moya presents an argument against Frankfurt-Style cases according to which what makes an alternative robust and exempting is a matter of the context in which the agent finds himself; thus, alternatives that don’t seem to be robust can become robust and exempting in certain special circumstances, and Frankfurt scenarios present just such circumstances. In this paper I offer three objections to Moya’s brilliant argument. First, I defend that it is not clear that the alternative Moya finds in such cases is doing the work of grounding, at least partially, the attribution of blame to the agent. Secondly, I examine a reply Moya gives to a critique made by Pereboom according to which Moya’s argument presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities and thus begs the question against the compatibilist. I defend that Moya’s response is insufficient to elude Pereboom critique. Finally, I defend that Moya’s strategy can be disarticulated if a deterministic Frankfurt-case can be presented. Keywords: Robust alternatives, context, Frankfurt-style cases, Principle of alternative possibilities, determinism. (shrink)

In the contemporary debate between determinism and indeterminism, quantum mechanics are used by libertarianists, both as a resource to escape the determinism imposed by classical physics, and as a tool to search for a ground to the possibility of free will and moral responsibility. This paper will show that every defense of free will based on quantum mechanics has to overcome at least two objections: on the one hand what I have decided to call the scale principle, and, on the (...) other hand Robert Kane´s luck principle. As will be shown, to answer the first objection does not imply answering the second. Through an analysis of the most recent proposals attempting to solve the latter, this paper will try to conclude that none of the proposals offers a convincing explanation of how quantum mechanics can help to solve the problem of free will. Instead, quantum mechanics seem to contribute to its complication. (shrink)

Hume's Reception in Early America: Expanded Edition brings together the original American responses to one of Britain's greatest men of letters, David Hume. Now available as a single volume paperback, this new edition includes updated further readings suggestions and dozens of additional primary sources gathered together in a completely new concluding section. From complete pamphlets and booklets, to poems, reviews, and letters, to extracts from newspapers, religious magazines and literary and political journals, this book's contents come from a wide variety (...) of sources published in colonial America and the early United States between 1758 and 1850. As well as classics by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, it contains scores of unknown and hard-to-locate items, many of which have not been reprinted since their original publication. These responses are divided into four parts covering Hume's Essays; his Philosophical Writings; his History of England; and his Character and Death. Each of those parts has a separate introductory essay, and every selection is introduced by a short headnote that sets the piece in its historical context and provides bibliographical references. Packed with new insights into Hume and American thought and culture, Hume's Reception in Early America reveals the relevance and impact of Hume on American political, philosophical, historical, religious, and aesthetic debates. (shrink)

Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe- notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo- lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis- cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in- teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys- tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of (...) time the ”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec- tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability of the ”phase space”, no laws of mo- tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep- tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical level, that of the very phase space. Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces in that discipline. The role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under- stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This will restrict causal analyses to differential cases. Mutations or other causal differ- ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi- ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym- metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding of the living state of matter. (shrink)

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

Editor James Fetzer presents an analytical and historical introduction and a comprehensive bibliography together with selections of many of Carl G. Hempel's most important studies to give students and scholars an ideal opportunity to appreciate the enduring contributions of one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century.

This entirely new work guides the reader through the most basic systems of modal propositional logic up to systems of modal predicate with identity, dealing with both technical developments and discussing philosophical applications.