In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated the-ory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an (...) equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argumentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fic-tionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint. (shrink)

This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in (...) the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self-defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the aporetic situation of the Bias Argument arises. (shrink)

By means of the Rollback Argument, this paper argues that metaphysically robust probabilities are incompatible with a kind of control which can ensure that free actions are not a matter of chance. Our main objection to those (typically agent-causal) theories which both attribute a kind of control to agents that eliminates the role of chance concerning free actions and ascribe probabilities to options of decisions is that metaphysically robust probabilities should be posited only if they can have a metaphysical explanatory (...) role but probabilities can explain anything only if chance has a role. First, we reconstruct the Rollback Argument. Second, we criticize the standard ways of reconciling non-chancy control with metaphysically robust probabilities. Finally, we respond to those worries that are related to the thought experiment of the Rollback Argument. (shrink)

Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we explain the concept of mental fictionalism. In the second part, we present the various versions of fictionalism and their main sources of motivation.We do this because in the third part we argue that mental fictionalism, as opposed to other versions of fictionalism, is a highly undermotivated theory.

This chapter has three aims. Firstly, it elaborates the so-called pragmatic approach to fictionalism. By evoking some classical pragmatic theories of fictive utterances, it gives an account of pragmatic properties responsible for the difference between serious and fictive utterances. The authors argue for the thesis that the pragmatic approach can be applied plausibly to all kinds of fictionalism, that is from instrumentalism to figuralism. Secondly, the authors investigate some consequences of the suggested account for fictionalist theories in general. They show (...) that some more or less known difficulties of fictionalist theories become more serious if one accepts the pragmatic approach. The chapter discusses two of them, namely the problem of entirely fictional discourses and the apparent contradiction between hermeneutic fictionalism and first person authority. Thirdly, the authors investigate the consequences of the pragmatic approach for mental fictionalism in particular. At the end of the paper, they argue that once the pragmatic approach is applied to mental fictionalism, the well-known problem of cognitive suicide becomes especially nagging. They suggest it is highly questionable that mental fictionalism is worth to endorse in the light of these serious difficulties. (shrink)

Our paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive and permanent philosophical disagreement over philosophers’ epistemic self-esteem. In the second part, we investigate the attitude of philosophers who have high epistemic self-esteem even in the face of philosophical disagreement and who believe they have well-grounded philosophical knowledge. In the third section, we focus on the attitude of philosophers who maintain a moderate level of epistemic self-esteem because they do not attribute substantive philosophical (...) knowledge to themselves but still believe that they have epistemic right to defend substantive philosophical beliefs. In the fourth section, we analyse the attitude of philosophers who have a low level of epistemic self-esteem in relation to substantive philosophical beliefs and make no attempt to defend those beliefs. We argue that when faced with philosophical disagreement philosophers either have to deny that the dissenting philosophers are their epistemic peers or have to admit that doing philosophy is less meaningful than it seemed before. In this second case, philosophical activity and performance should not contribute to the philosophers’ overall epistemic self-esteem to any significant extent. (shrink)

My paper consists of five parts. In the first part I explain what I mean by the phenomenology of mind. In the second part I show that in contemporary analytic philosophy the prevailing metaphysical theories of the mind are typically not connected to the phenomenology of mind. Views on the nature of the mind are developed without considering the phenomenological facts. In the third part I outline a notion of metaphysics connected to the phenomenology of mind, then in the fourth (...) and fifth parts I give some examples to illustrate how I envision the nature of this connection. (shrink)

According to the phenomenological argument for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions about perception (what Michael Martin calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. In this paper, I try to explain why is the phenomenal argument exceptionally strong argument for (...) disjunctivism and at the same time against sense-datum and intentional theories. Furthermore, I try to show that the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination (which is allegedly the weak point of the theory) is as plausible as its rivals’. (shrink)

Our paper consists of three parts. In the first part we provide an overall picture of the concept of the Cartesian mind. In the second, we outline some of the crucial tenets of the theory of the embodied mind and the main objections it makes to the concept of the Cartesian mind. In the third part, we take aim at the heart of the theory of the embodied mind; we present three examples which show that the thesis of embodiment of (...) the subjective perspective is an untenable position. However, everything these examples testify to can be accommodated and explained by our non-embodied or Cartesian view. (shrink)

the Mona Lisa, the Mondscheinsonate, the Chanson d’automne are works of art, the salt shaker on your table, the car in your garage, or the pijamas on your bed are not. the basic question of the metaphysics of works of art is this: what makes a thing a work of art? that is: what sort of property do works of art have in virtue of which they are works of art? or more simply: what sort of property being a work (...) of art is? In this paper we argue that things are works of art in virtue of what they are like, their intrinsic features, that is, in virtue of the fact that they have the perceptual (auditory, visual, etc.) properties they have. In other words: being a work of art supervenes on perceptual-intrinsic features. Currently, this metaphysical view is extremely unpopular within the philosophy of art. It is unpopular because there allegedly exists a knock-down objection to it, the well-known argument from indiscernible counterparts. our thesis implies, among other things, that every perceptual duplicate of a work of art is also a work of art. according to the argument from indiscernible counterparts, however, there could be (or even: there are) indiscernible counterparts such that one of them is a work of art while the other is not. hence things cannot be works of art solely in virtue of what they are like. Our paper divides into three parts. In the first part we state our views. In the second part we defend it against various versions of the argument from indiscernible counterparts. (In doing so our position will become more plausible, we hope). In the final part we provide some meta-reflections on the matter. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to show that the privacy of conscious experience is inconsistent with any kind of physicalism. That is, if you are a physicalist, then you have to deny that more than one subject cannot undergo the very same conscious experience. In the first part of the paper we define the concepts of privacy and physicalism. In the second part we delineate two thought experiments in which two subjects undergo the same kind of conscious experience in (...) such a way that all the physical processes responsible for their experiences are numerically the same. Based on the thought experiments and their interpretations we present our argument for the inconsistency of the privacy of experience with physicalism in the third part of the paper. In the final part we defend our argumentation against some objections. (shrink)

Entangled states provide the necessary tools for conceptual tests of quantum mechanics and other alternative theories. These tests include local hidden variables theories, pre- and postselective quantum mechanics, QND measurements, complementarity, and tests of quantum mechanics itself against, e.g., the so-called causal communication constraint. We show how to produce various nonlocal entangled states of multiple cavity fields that are useful for these tests, using cavity QED techniques. First, we discuss the generation of the Bell basis states in two entangled cavities, (...) when there is at most one photon in either of the cavities, and then a straightforward generalization to similar N-cavity states. We then show how to produce a nonlocal entangled state when there is precisely one photon hiding in three cavities. These states can be produced by sending appropriately prepared atoms through the cavities. As applications we briefly review two proposals: one to test quantum mechanics against the causal communication constraint using a two-cavity entangled state and the other to test pre- and postselective quantum mechanics using a three-cavity entangled state. The outcome of the latter experiment can be discussed from the viewpoint of the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics and therefore provides an opportunity to subject quantum cosmological ideas to laboratory tests. Finally, we point out the relation between these schemes and the schemes suggested for quantum computing, teleportation, and quantum copying. (shrink)

Genesis 2:4–25, the story of the creation of man and woman, has received great attention in modern theology. The text indeed contains the most fundamental teaching of the Bible on the relation between man and woman, on sexuality, and on marriage. In this article, however, I attempt to highlight some of the theoretical/philosophical potential of the text. While I accept the main theological teaching of Genesis 2 about the equality of the sexes, I argue that the text goes beyond the (...) mere presentation of this theological doctrine, and provides a structure that allows for a dynamic interplay between the sexes. I contend, furthermore, that this structure and the ensuing dynamics can be interpreted as a subtle treatment of the issue of the same and the other. Finally, I argue that in this way the biblical text can provide a description of the experience of love and an account of human creativity. In other words, it accounts for the possibility of realizing our divine likeness, the divinity of the human. (shrink)

Any part of the world can be viewed and modelled in terms of its chosen qualitative and/or quantitative properties, OR its structure. The former approach has been used by nearly the whole of ‘human intellectual endeavor’, i.e conventional science of physics, the arts etc. Development of the latter or the ‘systemic view’ is the subject matter of the current work. The Purpose of Change is Problem Solving suggests that the ‘structural view’ is empirical, pervasive throughout experience and as such results (...) in a single domain as opposed to conventional science which consists of many domains like mechanics, electricity etc. Thus, a unique approach is required which is based on ‘general principles of systems’ translated into operational form by the symbolism of processed natural language called ‘linguistic modelling of scenarios’ which can carry mathematics and uncertainties. To model scenarios with complex structure, a description or story in natural language is expressed in terms of homogenous language of one – and two – place sentences, the ‘elementary constituents’ of which complex structures can be constructed [like a variety of buildings from bricks]. To correspond to the single domain, based on the logic of causation, a single scheme of ‘Management/producers – Product – User/consumer’ is proposed which is immediately applicable to structuring scenarios and guides their detailed linguistic modelling or design. The approach, subject to debate, can have significant impact on society and education, especially that of engineering which lacks a ‘comprehensive theory of structure’ of problematic scenarios. (shrink)

This study analyzes key concepts in al-Fārābī’s cosmology and provides a new interpretation of his philosophical development through an analysis of the Greco-Arabic sources and a contextualization of his life and thought in the cultural and intellectual milieu of his time.

The application of evolutionary perspectives to analyzing sex differences in aggressive behavior and dominance hierarchies has been found useful in multiple areas. We draw attention to the parallel of gender differences in the worsening health status of restructuring societies. Drastic socio-economic changes are interpreted as examples of hierarchy disruption, having differential psychological and behavioral impact on women and men, and leading to different changes in health status.

In all kinds of implementations of computing, whether technological or biological, some material carrier for the information exists, so in real-world implementations, the propagation speed of information cannot exceed the speed of its carrier. Because of this limitation, one must also consider the transfer time between computing units for any implementation. We need a different mathematical method to consider this limitation: classic mathematics can only describe infinitely fast and small computing system implementations. The difference between mathematical handling methods leads to (...) different descriptions of the computing features of the systems. The proposed handling also explains why biological implementations can have lifelong learning and technological ones cannot. Our conclusion about learning matches published experimental evidence, both in biological and technological computing. (shrink)

Die Thematisierung des modernen Verhältnisses zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft ist so ausgerichtet, dass sie von vornherein zu einer Privilegierung der Gesellschaft neigt. Die neuzeitliche sozialphilosophische Diskussion läuft auf eine Zurücknahme des Staates in die Gesellschaft hinaus. An die Stelle der staatlich bestimmten Gesellschaft tritt der gesellschaftlich bestimmte Staat. Die entscheidende Frage ist, wie kann die Gesellschaftlichkeit des Staates begründet werden. Der Staat ist nicht mehr selbstständig, schwebt nicht mehr über der sozialen Wirklichkeit, sondern muss selbst als sozial bestimmt verstanden werden. (...) Die grundsätzliche Frage der neuzeitlichen Sozialphilosophie ist daher: Wie ist der Staat überhaupt möglich? Diese Frage wird durch eine Theorie der Konstitution des Staates beantwortet. (shrink)

The ongoing Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is disrupting most specialized healthcare services worldwide, including those for high-risk newborns and their families. Due to the risk of contagion, critically ill infants, relatives and professionals attending neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) are undergoing a profound remodeling of the organization and quality of care. In particular, mitigation strategies adopted to combat the COVID-19 pandemic may hinder the implementation of family-centered care within the NICU. This may put newborns at risk for several adverse (...) effects, e.g., less weight gain, more nosocomial infections, increased length of NICU stay as well as long-term worse cognitive, emotional, and social development. This article aims to contribute to deepening the knowledge on the psychological impact of COVID-19 on parents and NICU staff members based on empirical data from the literature. We also provided evidence-based indications on how to safely empower families and support NICU staff facing such a threatening emergency, while preserving the crucial role of family-centered developmental care practices. (shrink)

The paper examines the difference between János Bolyai’s and Lobachevskii’s notion of non-Euclidean parallelism. The examination starts with the summary of a widespread view of historians of mathematics on János Bolyai’s notion of non-Euclidean parallelism used in the first paragraph of his Appendix. After this a novel position of the location and meaning of Bolyai’s term “parallela” in his Appendix is put forward. After that János Bolyai’s Hungarian manuscript, the Commentary on Lobachevskii’s Geometrische Untersuchungen is elaborated in order to see (...) how Bolyai and Lobachevskii’s notions of parallelism differ. The careful examination of the Commentary reveals a seeming incoherence of Bolyai’s translation, and finally the explanation of this incoherence offered by the Received View and that of the novel position will be compared and assessed. L’article examine la différence entre la notion du parallélisme non-Euclidean de János Bolyai et celle de Lobachevskii. Tout d’abord le travail s’occupe de l’opinion répendue parmi les historiens de géometrie (le « Received View » ), selon laquelle János Bolyai précise la notion du parallélisme non-Euclidean dans le premier paragraph de l’Appendix. Ensuite une pointe de vue toute neuve sera présentée concernant la place et le sens du terminus technicus,,paralella” de Bolyai dans l’Appendix. Enfin on va analyser les Commentaires (un manuscrit hongrois) de János Bolyai sur le livre Geometrische Untersuchungen de Lobachevskii àfin de voir jusqu’à quel point la notion de parallelisme de Bolyai se diffère de celle de Lobachevskii. L’analyse bien fondue des Commentaires va nous relever un apparent incohérence de la traduction de Bolyai. On examine et on compare l’opinion répendue dans le vaste public avec la nouvelle interpretation de l’Appendix, et on discute les explications probables de cet incohérence. (shrink)

The goal of constructing artificial photosynthetic assemblies is to use sunlight for the generation of hydrogen from water; the hydrogen obtained should be an ideal energy source. The use of surfactant vesicle entrapped‐catalyst coated colloidal semiconductors and sacrificial electron donors for photosensitized water reduction illustrates how chemists mimic photosynthesis.

This volume contains a collection of articles focusing on the philosophical and theological exchanges between Muslim and Christian intellectuals living in Baghdad during the classical period of Islamic history, when this city was a vibrant center of philosophical, scientific, and literary activity.

This essay tries to review the main elements of the concept of public reason as presented by John Rawls with reference to his latest book (The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited) and simultaneously brings up the arguments for and against this concept that have been put forward by the literature. Many of the arguments presented here are not new, but what this essay aims at is a reassessment of the debate by confronting many of the (...) interpretations and points of view raised around the concept of public reason. Based on the argumentation that if ‘right’ precedes this leaves room for the (different existences of) ‘good’ I propose that public reason ought to be conceived more as a political concept and less of a comprehensive account of morality. (shrink)