This essay addresses the problem of the essentiality of nursing knowledge and what kind of theory, if any, is essential to nursing practice. The overarching aim of the essay was to argue for the thesis that nursing may be described as a kind of philosophical activity, and, consequently, that philosophy is the kind of “theory” that is essential to nursing practice and to the nursing discipline at large. The essay consists of two papers. The present paper, Part I, is a (...) critical examination of Mark Risjord's discussion of the problem of the theory‐practice gap in his Nursing Knowledge: Practice, Science, Philosophy, from 2010. According to Risjord, the cause of the theory‐practice gap originates in an erroneous conception of science (logical positivism) which had a decisive influence upon the way nursing scholars appropriated theoretical frameworks for the nursing discipline. This philosophical influence is considered in effect to have generated the theory–practice gap. In order to bridge the gap, Risjord suggests, the nursing discipline needs to adopt a standpoint epistemology conjoined with a postpositivist conception of scientific theory. In this way, a legitimate brand of nursing science may be developed and the theory–practice gap overcome. I will argue that neither Risjord's diagnosis of the problem, nor his recommended cure, may succeed in rescuing the nursing discipline from the theory–practice gap. Rather, the real cause of the theory–practice gap, I will claim, derives from an erroneous conception of nursing (not of science), namely the conception of nursing as a kind of science (roughly speaking). On my view, to overcome the gap, the nursing discipline needs to make salient the inherently philosophical character of nursing. In the second paper (Part II), I will continue the discussion of nursing knowledge and delineate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. (shrink)

This is the second paper of an essay in two parts. The first paper (Part I) is a critical discussion of Mark Risjord's conception of nursing knowledge where I argued against the conception of nursing knowledge as a kind of nursing science. The aim of the present paper (Part II) is to explicate and substantiate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. My strategy is to elaborate upon certain themes from Wittgenstein's Tractatus in order to canvass a (...) general scheme of philosophy based on a distinction between reality and the world. This distinction will be employed in the appropriation of certain significant features of nursing and nursing knowledge. By elaborating on the contrast between the abstract and the concrete, I will suggest that nursing may be seen as a kind of concrete philosophy, being primarily concerned with reality (and secondarily with the world). This thesis, I will argue, implies that philosophy is the kind of theory that is essential to nursing (which is not so much a theory than a certain kind of activity). (shrink)

This essay addresses the problem of the essentiality of nursing knowledge and what kind of theory, if any, is essential to nursing practice. The overarching aim of the essay was to argue for the thesis that nursing may be described as a kind of philosophical activity, and, consequently, that philosophy is the kind of “theory” that is essential to nursing practice and to the nursing discipline at large. The essay consists of two papers. The present paper, Part I, is a (...) critical examination of Mark Risjord's discussion of the problem of the theory‐practice gap in his Nursing Knowledge: Practice, Science, Philosophy, from 2010. According to Risjord, the cause of the theory‐practice gap originates in an erroneous conception of science (logical positivism) which had a decisive influence upon the way nursing scholars appropriated theoretical frameworks for the nursing discipline. This philosophical influence is considered in effect to have generated the theory–practice gap. In order to bridge the gap, Risjord suggests, the nursing discipline needs to adopt a standpoint epistemology conjoined with a postpositivist conception of scientific theory. In this way, a legitimate brand of nursing science may be developed and the theory–practice gap overcome. I will argue that neither Risjord's diagnosis of the problem, nor his recommended cure, may succeed in rescuing the nursing discipline from the theory–practice gap. Rather, the real cause of the theory–practice gap, I will claim, derives from an erroneous conception of nursing (not of science), namely the conception of nursing as a kind of science (roughly speaking). On my view, to overcome the gap, the nursing discipline needs to make salient the inherently philosophical character of nursing. In the second paper (Part II), I will continue the discussion of nursing knowledge and delineate the thesis of nursing as a kind of concrete philosophy. (shrink)

The Greek poetry of Sulṭān Walad poses two main problems for Greek philology: the fact that the texts were written and passed on in Arabic writing, and that they were composed in the perished colloquial Greek of the city Ikonion/ Konya (13th / 14th centuries). A final edition of these poems therefore requires a stepwose approach regarding reading and interpretation of these trxts. The article attempts to reconstruct a double verse by Sulṭān Walad and to interpret it with the help (...) of ist Islamic background. (shrink)

I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity . The general problem of my study may be expressed as follows: What is the metaphysical justification of the validity and existence of the pertinent classes of truths, the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, according to the Kripke Paradigm? My approach is meant to disclose the logical and ontological principles underlying Kripke's arguments for the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori respectively. The (...) results of my study are to a certain extent negative: They attempt to show that the classes of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori statements cannot possibly be valid. If the general argument of this thesis is sound, then, on this ground, the realist conception of metaphysical essentialism is rejected. The positive thesis of this study is the articulation of certain ways to frame the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori which avoid the problems of realistic essentialism and which suggest a certain transcendental reading of modality. According to the Kripke Paradigm, any de dicto modal status derives ultimately from the de re modality inherent in the object designated, as the object is characterised by contingent and necessary properties on the ontological level. Thus, the Kripke Paradigm is primarily a thesis in de re realist essentialism. The final verdict in this study is that the Kripke Paradigm cannot sustain the realistic conception of de re metaphysical essentialism. If we should adopt a transcendental reading of modality, then certain portions of the Kripke Paradigm are valid. I do not delineate or possess the details of a comprehensive doctrine of transcendental metaphysic. Nevertheless, the observations I make should suffice to bring about the rough orientation of how I conceive the notion of transcendental modality. (shrink)

L’article propose une relecture « à rebours » de la Constitution Dei Verbum sur la Révélation divine à partir de son dernier chapitre sur « la Sainte Écriture dans la vie de l’Église», en tenant compte des transformations intervenues depuis Vatican II, tant dans la culture européenne que dans l’exégèse critique. Le rapport de nos sociétés aux traces culturelles du christianisme, surtout à la Bible dont est montrée la fonction « inspirante » ou « révélatrice », et une « foi (...) » élémentaire, essentielle à toute existence humaine, fournissent le point de départ d’une démarche inductive qui désigne les « seuils » que cette « foi » peut passer quand elle est mise en relation avec le Nazaréen, à travers ses disciples, et accède à l’expérience de Révélation en jeu dans ces rencontres. (shrink)

This book raises in a new way a central question of Christology: what is the divine motive for the incarnation? Throughout Christian history a majority of Western theologians have agreed that God's decision to become incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ was made necessary by "the Fall": if humans had not sinned, the incarnation would not have happened. This position is known as "infralapsarian." A minority of theologians however, including some major 19th- and 20th-century theological figures, championed a "supralapsarian" (...) Christology, arguing that God has always intended the incarnation, independent of "the Fall." Edwin Chr. van Driel offers the first scholarly monograph to map and analyze the full range of supralapsarian arguments. He gives a thick description of each argument and its theological consequences, and evaluates the theological gains and losses inherent in each approach. Van Driel shows that each of the three ways in which God is thought to relate to all that is not God -- in creation, in redemption, and in eschatological consummation -- can serve as the basis for a supralapsarian argument. He illustrates this thesis with detailed case studies of the Christologies of Schleiermacher, Dorner, and Barth. He concludes that the most fruitful supralapsarian strategy is rooted in the notion of eschatological consummation, taking interpersonal interaction with God to be the goal of the incarnation. He goes on to develop his own argument along these lines, concluding in an eschatological vision in which God is visually, audibly, and tangibly present in the midst of God's people. (shrink)

Treatise on Mimamsa philosophy; critical edition.

The conception of “prospective potency” was defined by its author H.Driesch as “the sum of the possible modes of development of a given part of the embryo”. However, in the language of science the word “potency” usually means “power”, not “possibility”. Therefore this conception from the beginning possessed a certain ambiguity, that it retained up to the present. The distinction of “active” and “passive” potency, introduced by Roux, has found no general acceptance. It appeared necessary to submit the conception of (...) “potency” to a profound analysis. In the first place it is shown, that the ambiguity of this conception vanishes, if we understand by the word “potency” those fundamental properties of the embryonic material, that are responsible for its various developmental possibilities. We can distinguish among these properties the “reactive powers”, by which the embryonic material reacts to inductive stimulations, and its own “developmental tendencies”. These faculties only differ by their strength; a “reactive power” may change into a “tendency”, when its intensity increases during development; conversely, a “tendency” may change into a mere “reactive power” by a decrease of its strength. The determination of the material results from the conflict of its tendencies. The inductive actions interfere by strengthening or weakening different tendencies, and by activating new tendencies by reinforcement of the “reactive powers” of the embryonic material. (shrink)