We prove the Main Gap for the class of a -models (sufficiently saturated models) of an arbitrary stable 1-based theory T . We (i) prove a strong structure theorem for a -models, assuming NDOP, and (ii) roughly compute the number of a -models of T in any given cardinality. The analysis uses heavily group existence theorems in 1-based theories.

We present a structure theorem for superstable quasi-varieties without DOP. We show that every algebra in such a quasi-variety weakly decomposes as the product of an affine algebra and a combinational algebra, that is, it is bi-interpretable with a two sorted structure where one sort is an affine algebra, the other sort is a combinatorial algebra and the only non-trivial polynomials between the two sorts are certain actions of the affine sort on the combinatorial sort.

We study perfectly trivial theories, 1-based theories, stable varieties, and their mutual interaction. We give a structure theorem for the models of a complete perfectly trivial stable theory without DOP: any model is the algebraic closure of a nonforking regular tree of elements. We also give a structure theorem for stable varieties, all of whose completions have NDOP. Such a variety is a varietal product of an affine variety and a combinatorial variety of an especially simple form.

Shepherdson [14] showed that for a discrete ordered ring I, I is a model of IOpen iff I is an integer part of a real closed ordered field. In this paper, we consider integer parts satisfying PA. We show that if a real closed ordered field R has an integer part I that is a nonstandard model of PA (or even IΣ₄), then R must be recursively saturated. In particular, the real closure of I, RC (I), is recursively saturated. We (...) also show that if R is a countable recursively saturated real closed ordered field, then there is an integer part I such that R = RC(I) and I is a nonstandard model of PA. (shrink)

Let M = 〈M, +, <, 0, {λ}λ∈D〉 be an ordered vector space over an ordered division ring D, and G = 〈G, ⊕, eG〉 an n-dimensional group definable in M. We show that if G is definably compact and definably connected with respect to the t-topology, then it is definably isomorphic to a 'definable quotient group' U/L, for some convex V-definable subgroup U of 〈Mⁿ, +〉 and a lattice L of rank n. As two consequences, we derive Pillay's conjecture (...) for a saturated M as above and we show that the o-minimal fundamental group of G is isomorphic to L. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. By and large, definitions of a differentiable structure on a set involve two ingredients, topology and algebra. However, in some cases, partial information on one or both of these is sufficient. A very simple example is that of the field ℝ where algebra alone determines the ordering and hence the topology of the field:In the case of the field ℂ, the algebraic structure is insufficient to determine the Euclidean topology; another topology, Zariski, is associated with the ield but (...) this will be too coarse to give a diferentiable structure.A celebrated example of how partial algebraic and topological data determines a differentiable structure is Hilbert's 5th problem and its solution by Montgomery-Zippin and Gleason.The main result which we discuss here is of a similar flavor: we recover an algebraic and later differentiable structure from a topological data. We begin with a linearly ordered set ⟨M, <⟩, equipped with the order topology, and its cartesian products with the product topologies. We then consider the collection of definable subsets of Mn, n = 1, 2, …, in some first order expansion ℳ of ⟨M, <⟩. (shrink)

We consider VC-minimal theories admitting unpackable generating families, and show that in such theories, forking of formulae over a model M is equivalent to containment in global types definable over M, generalizing a result of Dolich on o-minimal theories in [4].

We prove in particular that, in a large class of dp-minimal theories including the p-adics, definable types are dense amongst nonforking types.

We investigate the group of definable homomorphisms between two definable abelian groups A and B, in an o-minimal structure . We prove the existence of a “large”, definable subgroup of . If contains an infinite definable set of homomorphisms then some definable subgroup of B admits a definable multiplication, making it into a field. As we show, all of this can be carried out not only in the underlying structure but also in any structure definable in.

We prove a generalization of the Elekes–Szabó theorem [G. Elekes and E. Szabó, How to find groups?, Combinatorica 32 537–571 ] for relations defina...

Let ℛ be an o-minimal expansion of a real closed field R. We continue here the investigation we began in [11] of differentiability with respect to the algebraically closed field [Formula: see text]. We develop the basic theory of such K-differentiability for definable functions of several variables, proving theorems on removable singularities as well as analogues of the Weierstrass preparation and division theorems for definable functions. We consider also definably meromorphic functions and prove that every definable function which is meromorphic (...) on Kn is necessarily a rational function. We finally discuss definable analogues of complex analytic manifolds, with possible connections to the model theoretic work on compact complex manifolds, and present two examples of "nonstandard manifolds" in our setting. (shrink)

Ocherk 1. Voprosy ontologii -- Ocherk 2. Voprosy ėtiki i ėstetiki -- Ocherk 3. Voprosy gnoseologii i aksiologii.

We study the Vapnik–Chervonenkis density of definable families in certain stable first-order theories. In particular, we obtain uniform bounds on the VC density of definable families in finite $\mathrm {U}$-rank theories without the finite cover property, and we characterize those abelian groups for which there exist uniform bounds on the VC density of definable families.

Zoé Chatzidakis , David Marker , Amador Martin-Pizarro , Rahim Moosa , Sergei Starchenko Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic, Volume 54, Number 3-4, 277--277.

Prologue, invitation to thinking about God In the Hebrew Bible? -- Part I, questions about God? -- Why does God in the Bible have a body? -- What do God's body parts in the Bible mean? -- Why is God angry in the Bible? -- Does God in the Bible have gender or sexuality? -- Part II, questions about God in the world? -- What can creation tell us about God? -- Who-or what-is the Satan? -- Why do people suffer (...) according to the Hebrew Bible? -- Epilogue, God in the Bible and beyond. (shrink)

Many books explain what is known about the universe. This book investigates what cannot be known. Rather than exploring the amazing facts that science, mathematics, and reason have revealed to us, this work studies what science, mathematics, and reason tell us cannot be revealed. In The Outer Limits of Reason, Noson Yanofsky considers what cannot be predicted, described, or known, and what will never be understood. He discusses the limitations of computers, physics, logic, and our own thought processes. Yanofsky describes (...) simple tasks that would take computers trillions of centuries to complete and other problems that computers can never solve; perfectly formed English sentences that make no sense; different levels of infinity; the bizarre world of the quantum; the relevance of relativity theory; the causes of chaos theory; math problems that cannot be solved by normal means; and statements that are true but cannot be proven. He explains the limitations of our intuitions about the world -- our ideas about space, time, and motion, and the complex relationship between the knower and the known. Moving from the concrete to the abstract, from problems of everyday language to straightforward philosophical questions to the formalities of physics and mathematics, Yanofsky demonstrates a myriad of unsolvable problems and paradoxes. Exploring the various limitations of our knowledge, he shows that many of these limitations have a similar pattern and that by investigating these patterns, we can better understand the structure and limitations of reason itself. Yanofsky even attempts to look beyond the borders of reason to see what, if anything, is out there. (shrink)

Study of Hans-Georg Gadamer's and Julius Stenzel's interpretations of Plato.

The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, (...) all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. (shrink)

The first major work in the history of philosophy to bear the title "Metaphysics" was the treatise by Aristotle that we have come to know by that name. But Aristotle himself did not use that title or even describe his field of study as 'metaphysics'; the name was evidently coined by the first century C.E. editor who assembled the treatise we know as Aristotle's Metaphysics out of various smaller selections of Aristotle's works. The title 'metaphysics' -- literally, 'after the Physics' (...) -- very likely indicated the place the topics discussed therein were intended to occupy in the philosophical curriculum. They were to be studied after the treatises dealing with nature (ta phusika). In this entry, we discuss the ideas that are developed in Aristotle's treatise. (shrink)

Walter Glannon argues that our proposal for routine recovery of transplantable cadaveric organs is unacceptable After carefully reviewing his counterarguments, we conclude that, although some of them have merit, none are sufficiently strong to warrant abandoning this plan. Below we respond to each of Glannon's concerns.