Mulla Sadra is one of the most prominent figures of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophy and among the most important philosophers of Safavid Persia. He was a prolific writer whose work advanced the fields of intellectual and religious science in Islamic philosophy, but arguably his most important contribution to Islamic philosophy is in the study of existence and its application to such areas as cosmology, epistemology, psychology, and eschatology. Sadra represents a paradigm shift from the Aristotelian metaphysics of fixed (...) substances, which had dominated Islamic philosophy, to an analysis of existence as the ultimate ground and dynamic source of things. He posits that all beings derive their reality and truth from their wujud and that a proper philosophical analysis must therefore start and eventually end with it. The present work's focus on Sadra's gradational ontology provides a strong foundation for the reader to understand Sadra's other works and later texts by other philosophers working in the same field. This edition contains parallel English-Arabic texts and a new translation by preeminent scholar of Islamic philosophy Seyyed Hossein Nasr. (shrink)

The concept of reincarnation is believed to be the rebirth of humans in the world as a form of part of their life journey in accordance with their actions during life with various forms of reincarnation—including being able to be reborn as humans or animals. This article aims to discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s eschatological thoughts, especially his criticism of the concept of reincarnation which has been believed by Hindus and Buddhists. Reincarnation is a topic of discussion for philosophers including Islamic philosophers (...) in discussing the spirit, soul, body, death, and resurrection. Ṣadrā’s rejection of the concept of reincarnation is found in one of his main works entitled al-Asfār al-Arba‘ah. By using analytical and descriptive methods, it was concluded that Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the concept of reincarnation with his five philosophical arguments, including the natural unity argument, the material and form needs argument, Kawn and Fasād’s argument, the vacuum argument, and the argument with five premises. These philosophical arguments are based on Ṣadrā’s main philosophical principle, namely the substantial movement of the soul. Even though he rejects the concept of reincarnation, Ṣadrā still believes in the resurrection of the soul and body after death, which will continue the journey towards the highest perfection in the afterlife. (shrink)

In this article, I will discuss Mulla Sadrā's proof of ideas together with his evaluations of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī's views. The aim of the article is to try to provide a certain opinion about the proof that Sadrā developed. It is seen that Sadrā generally exhibits a dual attitude about ideas. Sadrā's first attitude is to match the theologians' teaching of names, Suhrawardi's view of the master of genres, the sufists' a'yan al-sābita theory and the Peripatetics’ concept (...) of universal with ideas. His second attitude is that he is alone at the point of understanding Plato and reaching the clearness of the issue. In other words, he states that there has been no one who have understood and explained the issue as it should be. Sadrā attributes his own success on the subject both to discovery and inspiration, and to his intellectual research on existence. The aim of Sadrā is to try to unite between Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, he also follows Plotinos and Fārābī, who had this purpose before him. Sadrā, who criticizes Avicenna on the subject, sees Suhrawardī as the philosopher who comes closest to the truth, but states that he is also inadequate in some points. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra is perhaps the single most important and influential philosopher in the Muslim world in the last four hundred years. The author of over forty works, he sought to bring to life the whole heritage of Islamic thought, from philosophy to mysticism, and create a more flexible and conciliatory approach to the problems which seemed to dissociate reason from faith. In this wide-ranging profile, Sayeh Meisami reaches beyond historical narrative to assess the true impact of the man (...) and his ideas. This thought provoking and comprehensive account is ideal for any philosopher wanting to uncover the life and thoughts of a man who represents the climax of intellectual tradition at a crucial point in the history of Islamic civilization. (shrink)

Mullā Ṣadrā and Eschatology: Evolution of Being By al-KutubiEiyad S, vii + 151 pp. Price HB £85.00. EAN 978–1138794160.

Mulla Sadrā refers to ancient Greek philosophers in his writings quite often, especially when the subject matter is the soul. In this article, I will address how Mulla Sadra reiterates Avicenna’s summary and analyses of ancient theories of the soul as discussed in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of, al-Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliya fi asfār al-ʿaqliyyat al-arbaʿa. The source of these discussions, when the structure and basic contents are considered, is Aristotle’s De Anima Book I. Before defining (...) the soul, Aristotle discusses what kind of a science, a science on the soul should be, and afterwards, he evaluates previous theories on the soul as those defining the soul through movement, perception, and life. We observe that this evaluation on previous theories play a preparatory role for his own definition of the soul as perfection and actualization. In a similar manner, in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of Asfār al-aqliyyat al-arbaʿa, Mulla Sadrā reinterprets and discusses Ancient theories in such a way that the discussion leads us to a theory similar to Mulla Sadrā’s. In the presentation of this chapter, we find out that the soul is immaterial and modulated (tashkīkī) reality and is represented as a unity which is in a constant movement in its substance. The soul is matter in its origin, yet turns into an immaterial reality through substantial movement. In direct disagreement with Aristotelian philosophy, for Mulla Sadrā, movement in substance is possible as well as it is essential in understanding the reality of the soul. When Mulla Sadrā evaluates the ancient discussions and the criticisms by Avicenna, he finds that the discussion focuses on the source of mobility yet the soul is supposed to be defined as the source of immobility equally. Next in the discussion on movement, he focuses on the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial movement. According to Mulla Sadrā, Avicenna (following Aristotle’s presentation and interpretation) is misleading in his evaluation and criticisms of the ancient theories on the soul mainly because he follows a literalist reading. On the contrary, sources for Ancients’ knowledge is perennial wisdom, and their words on the soul have deeper meanings than what is understood at the first reading. When read with more trustful lenses, it will be manifested that the soul is an immaterial reality for them as well. For example, when they talk about the soul as a sphere, Mulla Sadrā thinks that they want to direct attention to the perfection. When fire is mentioned, the dynamic reality of the soul is brought to light. Mulla Sadrā, adds the principle of gradation (tashkīk) to his presentation and talks about modulation of fire from material fire to the immaterial light (nūr).The lowest level of fire is related to the changes in nature of the soul, the soul responsible of irascible and concupiscent establishes the next level. Once the soul is under total control, then it completes the passage to its incorporeality and becomes light. So this chapter is important in its structure because it allows us to read into how Sadrā’s historical reiteration is influenced by his own theoretical framework on the one hand. On the other hand, thanks to the long lineage of De Anima commentary literature, we can compare Sadrā with Aristotelian readings in this chapter. The interpretative reading of Mulla Sadrā, in opposition to the literalist reading of Avicenna on the ancient theories, also leans on a history of other philosophers before him. In this regard, a lineage of historiography might be traced back to Āmirī, Qādi Saʿīd, and Shahristāni. What the article comes to conclude is that a particular presentation found in Aristotles’ De Anima- Book I is molded in Mulla Sadrā’s hands with a more interpretative version of pre-Socratic theories to such an extent to support Mulla Sadra’s own theories on the soul. (shrink)

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted his view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of (...) the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. (shrink)

This study investigates the problem of the natural universal in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. The problem of universals made its way into Arabic/Islamic philosophy via its Greek sources, and was transformed into the problem of natural universals by Avicenna. Weighing in on this problem, Ṣadrā reinterprets the nature of natural universals against the backdrop of his doctrine of “the primacy of being.” As he argues, a natural universal or quiddity qua quiddity is an “accidental being” that requireswujūdfor its existentiation. (...) Thus, Ṣadrā re-envisions the status of natural universals by stripping them of their disputed status as independently existing entities.RésuméDans cette étude je me propose de réfléchir sur le problème de l'universel naturel dans l’œuvre de Mullā Ṣadrā. Le problème des universaux s'est introduit dans la philosophie arabe et musulmaneviales sources grecques et s'est trouvé transformé en celui des “universaux naturels” aux mains d'Avicenne. En contribuant à son tour à l’évolution de ce problème, Ṣadrā réinterpréta le statut des universaux naturels à partir de sa propre doctrine de la “primauté de l’être”. Selon lui, un universel naturel ou “quiddité en tant que quiddité” est un “être par accident” qui requiertwujūdpour son existentiation. Ainsi, Ṣadrā re-envisage le statut des universaux naturels en les privant de leur statut contesté en tant qu'entités “indépendantes existantes”. (shrink)

Anthropology in psychology under the title of "personality theories" has been able to be effective in the field of behavioral studies and interpersonal relationships. The need to explain and analyze the true nature of man in the field of "being" - contrary to psychological personality theories that generally identify human nature in the field of "appearance" - caused this article based on Sadra's anthropological opinions and view According to Allport's trait theory, which is one of the pioneers of the (...) trait approach, it should be organized by descriptive-analytical method. The individualistic approach based on traits is the main feature of Allport's and Mulla Sadra's personality theory. The foundation of personality in both theories is based on the most profound characteristics of person; However, in the analysis of Mulla Sadra's philosophical texts, the quality of the appearance of these traits and why they influence the structure of personality and, accordingly, human behavior, have been explained. "Self" or ego, contrary to its abstract concept in Alport's view, is a real and existential thing in Sadrai's system. The dynamism and unity of Alporti's personality can be rationally explained by the rule of "unity of the known and the known" and "intrinsic volitional movement". (shrink)

Mulla Sadra (c. 1572—1640) Mulla Sadra made major contributions to Islamic metaphysics and to Shi’i theology during the Safavid period (1501-1736) in Persia. He started his career in the context of a rising culture that combined elements from the Persian past with the newly institutionalized Shi’ism and Sufi teachings. Mulla Sadra was heir to a […].

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of BeingLatimah-Parvin Peerwani ArlingtonMullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. By Sajjad H. Rizvi. Culture and Civilization in the Middle East Series, edited by Ian Richard Netton. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xii + 222. Hardcover $135.00.In Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, Sajjad H. Rizvi focuses on tashkīk (modulation), variously translated as the systematic ambiguity, analogical gradation, or just (...) gradation of being from the perspective of Mullā Ṣadrā, comparing it with classical Islamic philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. He states that he makes two major claims in this study. First, he argues that modulation is a hermeneutic concept that describes the threefold division of being and its gradation. Second, gradation and modulation occur in each mode of being. Each mode of being refers to a branch of Ṣadrā's philosophy: mental being is a discussion of epistemology and psychology; 'being-in-language' is critical to Sadrian semantic theory; being in re focuses on 'traditional metaphysics.' But the philosophy of Ṣadrā is not compartmentalized; being cuts across these fields and unites them. Each mode of being as modulated shares features of intensification. According to Rizvi, Ṣadrā has extended the normal understanding of modulation and of being beyond the simple division of the two realms of mental and concrete existence to bring out the semantics of being. This aspect of Islamic philosophy, according to Rizvi, has often been neglected (p. 3). [End Page 278]This study consists of an Introduction and two parts. In the Introduction, Rizvi states the problem of tashkīk as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian ontology. An analysis of this critical concept, according to Rizvi, facilitates our understanding of Ṣadrā's position on a wide variety of important philosophical issues such as predication, the problem of reconciling unity and plurality in being, and God-world relationship. It provides an answer to the age-old problem of the One and the many, and the median way between the ontological monism of Ibn ʿArabi and the metaphysical pluralism of Avicenna. Rizvi says that according to Ṣadrā there are four levels of being: the concept of being, its reality, its uttered manifestation (sound), and its written manifestation.Part 1 consists of two chapters. In the first chapter Rizvi outlines his methodology and some of his assumptions about the cultural history of the period and the context of Ṣadrā. The significant contention, according to Rizvi, is that a proper understanding of Ṣadrā's philosophy requires an appreciation of philosophy in the Neoplatonic traditions "as a way of life" that is often closely related to spiritual practice and religious commitment. The aim of philosophical inquiry for Ṣadrā, according to Rizvi, is therapy for the rational soul and its perfecting and development in its path of return to its origins in the One.Four methodological approaches are utilized in this study. (1) Tashkīk is seen as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian metaphilosophy, and not ontology; Rizvi argues that tashkīk is a central guiding principle in Ṣadrā's metaphilosophy and permeates all branches of his philosophical system. (2) The aporetic method is used in analyzing Ṣadrā's philosophy. (3) Rizvi maintains that Ṣadrā's philosophy is processual, for it represents a shift from substance to process metaphysics. (4) Ṣadrian hikmat (philosophy, wisdom) is approached as a metaphilosophical inquiry. Metaphysics is a foundational science for Ṣadrā, instrumental in the possibility of acquiring knowledge and in the construction of definitions and meaningful discourse. Hikmat, according to Rizvi, is doubly transcendent, (1) as a higher synthesis of Avicennan, Illuminationist, Sufi, and esoteric Shiʿite systematic thought, and (2) as a prophetic philosophy that claims to be derived from direct 'revelation.'The second chapter introduces the tashkīk (modulation) of being. Rizvi traces its historical development from the Aristotelian pros hen homonym to Avicenna, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Ibn ʿArabi, and offers an account of an intensifying scale of being toward a hierarchy of being that is singular but with multiple degrees defined by their intensity, that is, in terms of scales of intensification and deliberation. He makes explicit the Neoplatonic logic of being that this implies and examines how... (shrink)

Introducing readers to the fascinating world of Mulla Sadra's thought, one of the most important figures of the later Islamic intellectual tradition, the book takes us through the world of Sadra, his intellectual journeys to shows his relevance for today's philosophical issues in the Islamic and Western worlds.

This is the first reliable biography of Mulla Sadra Shirazi that examines his influences and legacy and includes an extensive survey of his work.

: A central assumption in this essay, in terms of both historical development and methodological approach, is that later Islamic philosophy is characterized by a shift from a substance-based metaphysics to a processoriented metaphysics. Defenders of substance metaphysics often focus on the nature of causation to attack process metaphysics. If there is no substance or substratum for process, then how can events have any causal nature? If neither cause nor the caused are somehow stable in terms of their essence and (...) essential features, then how can one be said to act upon the other? After considering the function of causation in other metaphysical systems and certain skeptical denials of causation, its role in the mystical thought and onto-theology of the Iranian philosopher Mullā Sadrā (d. 1641) is examined. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his (...) account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

The eastern Islamic concept of the imaginal realm, which explains how supra-sensory realities present themselves to imaginative perception, can enrich the imagination of film-philosophy. The imaginal realm, in Arabic ‘alam al-mithal, world of images, or ‘alam al-khayal, imaginative world, is part of a triadic ontology of sensible, imaginal, and intelligible realms. Diverging from roots shared with Western thought in the concept of the imaginative faculty, the Islamic imaginal realm is supra-individual and more real than matter. The imaginal realm is a (...) radically pro-image concept, affirming the importance of poetry, art, and images in motion. As developed by the Persian philosopher Sadr al-Dîn Muhammad al-Shîrâzî, known as Mullâ Sadrâ, the imaginal realm flows and intensifies, in a process philosophy we may fruitfully compare with Spinoza, Leibniz, and Whitehead. I sketch the genealogy of the imaginal realm and compare it to contemporary Western film-philosophy. I suggest how this transcendental concept can be made immanent. Finally, I draw from contemporary Muslim thinkers, such as Mohammed Arkoun, who ground a visionary collective politics in the imaginal realm. My central example, the documentary The Lebanese Rocket Society by Joana Hadjithomas and Khalil Joriege, exemplifies film's imaginal powers. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra, on the one hand, proves detailed foreknowledge of God based on the rule of “simple reality is whole things” and using the rule of particular gradation in existence. On the other hand, from his standpoint, sometimes freedom is coextensive with willingness and sometimes relying on the same rule of "simple reality is whole things" – that analyzes causality in the form of epiphany – is equivalent to the subjectivity of God. In this philosophical system, the conflict (...) between divine foreknowledge and human freedom is resolved with regard to activity of divine knowledge–rather than passivity of divine knowledge–and, also, belonging of divine knowledge to the voluntary human action gets resolved. But it seems that Mulla Sadra’s antecedents and favorite solution is not very effective. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra both criticized the previous theories on the soul-body problem, which held that the body is a mere instrument in the employ of the soul. Instead, they, following Aristotle, regard the connection between the soul and the body as form and matter since, they thought of it as an essential connection not accidental. Despite this initial similarity there are differences between Aquinas and Sadra on this problem which in the end lead them to (...) two distinctive results. (shrink)

Immortality, or life after death one of the deep-rooted problamatics that most noteworthy backgrounded and never losing its freshness, in the philosophic-thelogical custom. While the expectations of people about the next life, is satisfied as ‘resurrection’ by the theistic beliefs doctorines-thoughts, it is also answered as ‘soul immortality’ by the philosophical approaches. But it is impossible to say both thesis have smootly aspects. In this study, we will rank how this ancient problematic in the history of thought is dealt with (...) in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Sadra offers an original doctrine of resurrection, which is based on the existential evolution of the self and continues to develop in a continuous process. This doctrine, in which the theories of substantive movement, abstractness of imagination and selestial-spiritual bodies are used as basic parameters, is a critical answer to the philosophical doctrine that acknowledges the continuity of spiritual existence with the classical thelogical thought that advocates the return of worldly bodies. In this respect, it appears as a third alternative alternative for Islamic eschatology, trapped between theories of de resurrection through biological body and spiritual immortality. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra and Leibniz are two philosophers of the East and the West, and belong to two different worlds. Though they were unaware of ideas of each other, they share certain points that are comparable. Monads constitute the basis of Leibniz's thought and he refer to their features in his various works. Mulla Sadra's philosophy also is based on being and he tried to deal with its reality in his philosophy. Though Leibniz's monads are many and (...) Mulla Sadras being is one, they use certain terms for monads and being which are very close to each other and are comparable from different points of view. Leibniz monads while being many are one as well. Similarly Mulla Sadra's philosophy too enjoys multiplicity in unity. Leibniz's monads enjoy perception and Mulla Sadra's being too coexist withknowledge. In this paper apart from comparing Leibniz's monads and Mulla Sadra's concept of being, their philosophies also have been compared and their common and different points have been unraveled. (shrink)

The aim of the present study is to analyze the general outlook of Heidegger and Mullā Ṣadrā with regard to the meaning of metaphysics, occupying as it does a central position in their respective philosophies. It should first be made clear that “metaphysics” refers to First Philosophy or the scientia divina in the philosophical system of Ṣadrā.1 The English word “metaphysics” can be traced back to its etymological source in the Greek plural noun-phrase ta meta ta phusika, which became metaphysica (...) in Medieval Latin. The word was used both as a title for Aristotle’s seminal work Metaphysics and as the name of the “science” that was its subject matter. The term for... (shrink)

At the title of this article, we have introduced Mulla Sadra as the "founder of the wisdom of Throne" and, thus, it is befitting to go to analyze the notions of ``wisdom'' and ``throne''.Given to Mulla Sadra's points of view about the "wisdom, some important points can be inferred:First: wisdom must deal, instead of particular things, with the understanding of universal ones.Second: wisdom is, in fact, to do good acts.Third: wisdom is to follow the Lord in (...) safeguarding the nation as well as in ruling on the subordinates.Fourth: wisdom means resemblance to God, to the extent of man's capability, in various aspects.Now we go to survey in the connotation of the Throne.Throne means, verbally, seat and roof.Sages and philosophers think that by the Throne, the macrocosm or the ``Supreme Throne''"is meant. In his al-Shawahid al-rububiyyah, however, Mulla Sadra writes: The sphere of Atlas, i.e. the ninth sphere, which encompasses, according to Ptolemaic system, all other spheres as well as the material world, is devoid of stars. And in terminology of the people of mysticism and wisdom, the Supreme Throne, which is the formal base of the Divine absolute decree, is beyond the human sense and intuition; for, because of its greatness and encompassing all the world and perfect connection with the world of ideas, it seems to be among the immaterial things and the world of ideas, which are free of, and beyond, the human senses. (shrink)

This paper investigates the attitudes of two Islamic and Christian thinkers, Saint Aquinas and Mulla Sadra Shirazi, about occurrence and eternity hypothesis issue. Aquinas faces two ideas. The first approach is eternity of the world based on Aristotle's theory and his followers another approach is the world temporal occurrence derived from Christian scriptures. Aquinas believes that the reasons presented for proving the world's occurrence are not convincing and therefore criticizes them. Although he accepts the universe occurrence he has (...) a worshiping view to it and finally regards the world's eternity and occurrence as an antinomical problem. In contrast, Mulla Sadra who has accepted the occurrence does not consider a starting point for the issue and in turn tries to prove it by Substantial Motion approach and therefore regardless of worship aspect of the issue and by employing a rational approach he gains a higher status than Aquinas. (shrink)

This paper evaluates the potentials of Mullā Şadrā’s philosophy to explain the possibility of the Islamization of philosophy. This contributes to a more general, yet controversial, project in post-revolutionary Iran, namely the Islamization of knowledge, especially in the humanities. If there would be a mechanism through which Islamization of philosophy – as a historical example and as a field of knowledge that provides theoretical grounds of other humanities – can be plausibly explained, then one might think of Islamizing the humanities, (...) as well. One famous explanation in Iran is based on the distinction between contexts of discovery and justification. It explains how a philosopher is permitted to use the Islamic content in the context of discovery – not justification – and how this helps to Islamize philosophy. In this article, we claim a new explanation which is based on Mullā Şadrā’s transcendent philosophy. Such a philosophical explanation not only acknowledges using the Qur’an and authentic narrations in the context of discovery but also necessitates involving revelation as a philosophical criterion in the context of justification and a highly valid epistemic source in producing the new philosophical content. This provides a strong account of the Islamization of philosophy. (shrink)