Anselmo escribió su primer libro, el Monologion, forzado por los hermanos de su monasterio. El método también le fue impuesto: no decir nada desde la autoridad de la Escritura, profundizar todo desde la sola razón y, al mismo tiempo, presentar todo con claridad. El artículo estudia las tres partes del método. Se ve la importancia de los razonamientos dentro del peligro de no citar la Escritura, sobre todo en tiempo en que la dialéctica entusiasmaba a los jóvenes inexpertos. Las razones (...) necesarias son una marca indeleble del método anselmiano. La claridad de la verdad pone en marcha la búsqueda de una presentación clara de la doctrina cristiana y, al mismo tiempo, el drama del cristiano que no puede expresar totalmente esta verdad en palabras humanas porque la verdad nos sobrepasa. Además, la Verdad es Dios mismo, inefable. Este método y su estudio nos ayudan a entrar en el pensamiento anselmiano, especialmente en el Monologion. Nos introducen también en el método teológico actual. Por algo, Anselmo es el Padre de la escolástica. Anselm wrote his first book, the Monologion, forced by the brothers of his monastery. The method also was imposed: to say nothing from the authority of Scripture, to deep everything from reason alone and, at the same time, to present everything clearly. This article examines the three parts of the method. We see the importance of reasoning despite the danger of not quote the Scripture, especially in times when the dialectic excited young inexperienced. The reasons needed are an indelible mark of Anselm’s method. The clarity of truth starts the search for a clear presentation of Christian doctrine and at the same time, the drama of the Christian that cannot fully express this truth in human words because the truth is beyond us. In addition, Truth is God himself, ineffable. This method and its study help us to enter the Anselm's thought, especially in the Monologion. We also introduce in the current theological method. We all know that Anselm is the Father of scholasticism. (shrink)

Si la dépression du sujet âgé est souvent étudiée sous un angle individuel dans la littérature, la rencontre avec le conjoint du patient dépressif nous invite à l’articuler à une approche groupale du couple. Or, les résonances de la dépression restent mal connues dans le couple âgé, au point que le rôle du conjoint paraît souvent secondaire et qu’il se reconnaît rarement comme un aidant. Pourtant ses réactions aux troubles dépressifs de son partenaire semblent avoir une incidence sur le devenir (...) du lien conjugal et la restructuration du couple âgé face à la dépression. Cet article s’appuie à la fois sur les concepts psychanalytiques de la clinique du négatif et sur les apports de la théorie de l’attachement pour analyser les effets individuels et groupaux de la dépression dans le couple âgé. L’articulation de ces processus tend à éclairer la transformation des vécus de perte et d’étrangeté et l’aménagement du lien conjugal face à la dépression. Plusieurs observations cliniques visent à illustrer ces développements conceptuels. (shrink)

Si la dépression du sujet âgé est souvent étudiée sous un angle individuel dans la littérature, la rencontre avec le conjoint du patient dépressif nous invite à l’articuler à une approche groupale du couple. Or, les résonances de la dépression restent mal connues dans le couple âgé, au point que le rôle du conjoint paraît souvent secondaire et qu’il se reconnaît rarement comme un aidant. Pourtant ses réactions aux troubles dépressifs de son partenaire semblent avoir une incidence sur le devenir (...) du lien conjugal et la restructuration du couple âgé face à la dépression. Cet article s’appuie à la fois sur les concepts psychanalytiques de la clinique du négatif et sur les apports de la théorie de l’attachement pour analyser les effets individuels et groupaux de la dépression dans le couple âgé. L’articulation de ces processus tend à éclairer la transformation des vécus de perte et d’étrangeté et l’aménagement du lien conjugal face à la dépression. Plusieurs observations cliniques visent à illustrer ces développements conceptuels. (shrink)

À la fin du xviiie siècle, Diderot et Robinet occupent une place symétrique et inverse dans la République des Lettres : philosophes et traducteurs de Shaftesbury, ils construisent leur œuvre à partir de la position seconde de traducteur. Robinet a la capacité de s’effacer devant l’auteur qu’il traduit mais Diderot « use du bien d’autrui avec une grande liberté », la traduction constituant pour lui une méthode de lecture et une forme de dialogue critique avec lui-même. Tous les (...) deux néanmoins s’appuient sur la lecture de Shaftesbury pour développer l’hylozoïsme. (shrink)

Ces deux tomes de la Correspondance découpent la littérature épistolaire de Maine de Biran en deux périodes : avant la correspondance échangée avec Ampère sur la période 1766-1804, de 1805 à 1824 les lettres se multiplient alors que commencent les échanges avec Ampère. Le volume des pièces publiées est doublé par rapport à ce que l’on connaissait. Des correspondants inconnus apparaissent alors que les échanges connus sont complétés et révisés. L’ensemble est référé à ses sources originales et à ses traditions (...) éditoriales. Chaque document est accompagnés de notes historiques qui ouvrent aux commentaires. Ces pièces ont été présentées comme une biographie épistolaire continue relative aux épisodes des fonctions publiques de Maine de Biran. Elles constituent ainsi le pendant des écrits politiques. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY analogo, e che l"'analogia entis" constituisce nello spinozismo ancora uno dei principali presupposti della metafisica, sebbene il termine "analogia" non sia quasi mai usato da Spinoza. Non costituisce obiezione il fatto che per Spinoza non c'~ altro ente reale che l'ente necessario. Si ~ veduto, e meglio si vedr~tnel seguito, chela necessit~ spettante a Dio non puo essere confusa in nessun modo con quella che (...) tocca "sub specie aeternitatis" agli enti reali, questa essendo semplicemente derivata dall'eternit~t divina, e implicando un rapporto dell'essenza con l'esistenza affatto diverso da quello che l'essenza di Dio ha con la sua esistenza. L'analogia del concetto di ente reale, a nostro giudizio, ~ tale per attribuzione e per proporzionalit ~. Ma in codesta analogia alia attribuzione spetta il senso primitivo, ealla proporzioualit~t quello derivato (p. 251). HERBERTW. SCnNEIDEg Claremont, Caliyornia Leibniz et Spinoza. By Georges Friedmann. (Paris: Gallimard, 1962. Pp. 350. 23 NF.) This is a "new edition revised and enlarged," the first edition having appeared in 1946. On its first appearance, the book was welcomed as a fresh and well-executed approach to one of the classical places for fruitful comparison in the history of philosophy: the doctrinal and personal relations between Spinoza and Leibniz. For a long while, historians relied upon the 1890 study by Ludwig Stein, who depicted Leibniz as having passed through an early phase of basic agreement with Spinoza and as having worked out his mature position largely through his tardy reaction to the Dutch philosopher's metaphysical views. But Friedmann felt that the evidence adduced by Stein did not justify the attribution of an early phase of Spinozism to Leibniz. The relationship was nmch more complex than that of a young Leibniz giving untroubled assent to Spinoza and then becoming disturbed about the pantheistic implications of the Ethics. Instead, Friedmann pointed out that the very writings of Leibniz cited by Stein show the German thinker to be in possession of his own governing ideas even as a young man and admirer of Spinoza. Moreover, a study of the standard edition of Leibniz's correspondence was sufficient to show that he gave ambivalent opinions about Spinoza even during his early years. When Leibniz.wrote to the friends of Spinoza, he was much more laudatory than when he wrote to his own friends among the Catholic and Protestant theologians. Friedmann concluded that there was a certain objective duplicity displayed by Leibniz and that this stood in sharp contrast with Spinoza's straightforward concern for truth. In his preface to this new edition (Friedmann calls it "the second edition," thus correcting the publisher's claim in my copy of a "fourth edition" issued late in 1946), the author specifies the sense in which this is a revised and enlarged edition. He has introduced nuances to make it perfectly clear that he is passing no moral judgment upon Leibniz for duplicity, which he equates with a multiplicity of attitudes and evaluations in respect to Spinoza's work taken as a whole. Furthermore, he takes account of recent work done by Belaval, Robinet, and others on the reactions in later seventeenth-century France to Spinozism. These researches show that Leibniz was not unique in looking both favorably and unfavorably upon the political and religious doctrines of Spinoza and then in concentrating fire upon a concocted phantom of Spinozistic pantheism. But the main justification for reconsidering the matter is the publication since World War II of many relevant manuscripts (in the collection made by Gaston Grua) and of a few important historical studies, notably Grua's own volumes on universal justification in Leibniz and Belaval's book on Leibniz as a critic of Descartes. In his first edition, BOOK REVIEWS 111 Friedmann had relied mainly on the same sources available in 1890 to Stein; now he adds evidence taken from these later publications. He is able to specify more closely the presence of Leibniz's own principles at least in germ in his early writings, as well as the only gradual discovery by Leibniz of the metaphysical teachings of the Ethics. But the use of the new materials is made quite firmly within the... (shrink)

L'oeuvre philosophique d'Eric Weil (1904-1977) est l'une des plus importantes de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle. Oeuvre systématique qui repense l'héritage de la philosophie en fonction du problème radicalement moderne que pose le choix de la violence absolue - dont la réalité hitlérienne est l'exemple -, la Logique de la philosophie (1950) est prolongée par une Philosophie politique (1956), une Philosophie morale (1961), qui explicitent le même problème dans les domaines déterminés de la réalité politique et de la vie (...) morale, et elle se double de la lecture philosophique des philosophes -Hegel et l'Etat (1950), Problèmes kantiens (1963), 2è édition augmentée, 1970) - et de nombreuses études dont quelques-unes sont réunies dans Essais et conférences (1970-71). Co-fondateur de Critique, Eric Weil fut professeur aux Université de Lille (1956-68) et de Nice (1968-74).Un premier colloque sur la pensée d'Eric Weil s'est tenu à l'Ecole Normale Supérieure de Pise, les 7 et 8 novembre 1979. A l'initiative de notre Centre et des Archives de Philosophie, un second colloque aura lieu les 21 et 22 mai 1982, à Chantilly, qui portera sur l'actualité d'Eric Weil.Les membres de l'équipe qui a fondée en 1979 à l'UER de Philosophie de Lille III le Centre Eric Weil ont, pour la plupart, suivi l'enseignement de Weil à Lille et participé à son séminaire dont aujourd'hui, cinq ans après la mort du philosophe, ils entendent encore la leçon. Ces Sept Etudes sur Eric Weil, présentées et discutées lors de rencontres régulières et amicales, prennent la suite de leurs contributions au numéro spécial de 1970 des Archives de Philosophie, au colloque de Pise de 1979, aux Cahiers philosophiques de 1981/82. Ont collaboré à cet ouvrage: Gérard AlmalehAlbert BaraquinLucien BescondMireille DepadtGilbert KirscherJean QuillienJean-François Robinet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Caroline, Leibniz, and ClarkeD. Bertoloni Meli*The papers which passed between Leibniz and Clarke from 1715 to 1716 have long been considered classics in the history of science and philosophy, attracting a large number of scholarly works. Their exchanges, consisting of ten letters, five by Leibniz and five by Clarke, ended with Leibniz’s death in November 1716. 1 The letters deal with issues such as God’s role in the universe, (...) the notion of miracles, the cause of gravity, and space and time. The difficulties in interpreting the texts induced most, if not all, editors to present Leibniz’s and Clarke’s papers together with other writings to provide a context for the dispute and to elucidate the most obscure passages. This tradition was inaugurated by Samuel Clarke himself, who included in his editio princeps a number of explanatory footnotes, an appendix with passages from Leibniz’s printed works, and additional epistolary exchanges between himself and others on liberty and necessity, all with appropriate cross-references. 2 Later editors made a different selection of explanatory material, emphasizing different contexts and aspects of the dispute.The context I have selected for this essay centers on Caroline of Ansbach, Princess of Wales, her life and contacts with Leibniz prior to her departure for London, and their correspondence before and during the dispute with Clarke. [End Page 469] Portions of this correspondence can be found in the editions by H.G. Alexander and André Robinet, but the letters on which I shall spend more time are curiously excluded. They can be found among Leibniz’s political and state papers edited at the end of last century by Onno Klopp, and only in part in those edited by John M. Kemble, and in the recent German edition by Volmar Schüller. 3 The reader unaware of Caroline’s life and intellectual horizon may well wonder why Leibniz and Clarke went on relentlessly, month after month, debating in letters addressed to her whether space is the sensorium of God, dissecting the notion of miracle, and arguing about God’s role in the world. I hope to show that there are several reasons for paying attention to Caroline. The text which has become known as “Leibniz’s first paper” was in fact an extract of a letter to Caroline, not intended for Clarke, belonging to an important exchange with the Princess of Wales. Caroline engaged in a dispute with Clarke, passed the extract of Leibniz’s letter to him, and sent Clarke’s reply to Leibniz together with a request for help. Thus Leibniz’s “first paper” ought to be seen as part of his correspondence with Caroline. Later papers between Leibniz and Clarke went through Caroline.The Princess of Wales was not just a convenient address for the correspondence; nor was she a spectator uninterested in such an intellectual confrontation. She was involved in the dispute by arguing with Clarke and even with Newton, exchanging opinions with Leibniz, and functioning as an arbiter and moderator. Her presence helped shape the style and contents of the letters, and characterizes the genre to which the correspondence belongs. This is a complex issue because of the composite nature of the exchanges: on the one hand we have Leibniz’s letters to both Caroline and Clarke, on the other we have Caroline’s and Clarke’s letters to Leibniz, and Clarke’s discussions with Caroline. Clearly the standard label “Leibniz-Clarke correspondence” does not capture all levels of the exchanges. Moreover, in order to appreciate Caroline’s status in London it is worth recalling that the wife of George I, Sophie Dorothea, remained in Germany, secluded in the Castle of Ahlden. 4 Without a Queen, the Princess of Wales was the highest female royal. As an example of her influence, it was widely believed at the time that the election of William Wake as Archbishop of Canterbury in December 1715 was due to his close contacts with Caroline. At the time of the dispute Wake, who was a close friend of Clarke, neglected his pastoral duties as Bishop of Lincoln in order to be close to Caroline, with whom he held daily meetings. Thus Caroline was an... (shrink)