Este artículo aborda la filosofía de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a partir de su noción de Naturaleza, que funciona como idea reguladora. El efecto es paradójico; las premisas y las consecuencias son cristianas, pero semejante categoría le es hostil a esta religión. Comenzando por Hume y deteniéndose en el Emilio, se muestran las aporías resultantes.

El presente artículo aborda las primeras obras de Gilles Deleuze desde el ángulo que a él mismo le han merecido. Utiliza los textos, prólogos y entrevistas aparecidos en La isla desierta y otros textos (1953-1974), para proponer un comentario cuyo interés de fondo es la pregunta por la filosofía cuando a esta, sin ignorarlas, no le da por imitar a las ciencias positivas ni se presenta como sustituto de la religión.

This article deals with the problem of philosophy seen through myth, and that of the latter after the irruption of philosophy. Adorno and Horkheimer's texts on the Dialectic of Enlightenment and Giorgio Colli's text on The Birth of Philosophy are basically used to show their transfers and reconversions. The conclusion is that the scenario that opens up to lucidity is that of an innocent and ruthless game of forces within which none of them prevails absolutely and for eternity. Neither dialectic, (...) nor scientific, nor mystical: what is real is music. (shrink)

El sujeto cartesiano se constituye en la subordinación de todas las facultades a la inteligencia; ella ha de imponer en todo momento y situación sus condiciones, porque de lo que se trata es de asegurar el dominio de las cosas, algo que no se consigue sin interponer al deseo, a ese deseo, un entendimiento adecuado. Y Descartes sabe muy bien que no hay entendimiento que no sea de objetos. Los seres humanos están dotados de estas facultades, que habitualmente chocan y (...) no dejan de entrar en conflicto. En la sustitución de la confusión (y la superstición) por el método, Descartes lleva a su extremo la sujeción de las demás facultades por el entendimiento, injusticia que sublevará a muchos. En este artículo se aborda este problema. (shrink)

La escritura de Paul Valéry es un reto para la filosofía y en este artículo se toma nota del comentario de Karl Löwith para ejemplificar la dificultad. El artículo se divide en cuatro partes, de las cuales sólo la primera toma en cuenta la opinión de José María Valverde; las tres siguientes analizan la posición del filósofo K. Löwith para centrar el argumento básico del poeta. Se trata de ver cómo y hasta qué punto Valéry es cartesiano, tomando en consideración (...) que, como poeta, ha efectuado una disolución o rarefacción de la subjetividad. En este movimiento, el yo puro, al que se remite, designa el límite del mundo. (shrink)

This article starts from two books by Santiago Alba Rico and Peter Sloterdijk to address the problem of nihilism, leading to Nietzsche and Heidegger to theoretically center the discussion and to conclude that the very idea of Salvation is nihilistic and belongs to its own logic. The fundamental problem can be approached as the conflict between the escape to some metaphysical or transcendent instance — the State or the Revolution, material forms of the Kingdom —or the immersion— which implies the (...) whole assumption of suffering and enjoyment —in immanence. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda el problema de las relaciones entre lo trágico y lo divino tomando como referencia fundamental el libro de María Zambrano escrito originalmente en 1955 y revisado veinte años después. Se trata de una de las defensas más lúcidas de la religión cristiana, siempre en guardia contra la forma mítica de concebir el mundo. El supuesto subyacente es que los dioses de la mitología son productos humanos, mientras que, a la inversa, el Dios cristiano crea a los hombres. (...) En ningún momento, Zambrano se advierte con la menor disposición a discutir semejante argumento. Aquí se propone una crítica a esa posición. (shrink)

Espinosa começa a sua Ética com uma série de definições, em virtude do modelo geométrico de raciocínio que ele incorpora sistematicamente à filosofia. Assim, os comentadores analisam minuciosamente o conjunto das definições que abrem a Primeira Parte, mostrando que elas cumprem de maneira exemplar a exigência do método. Já na Segunda Parte da Ética, os mesmos comentadores manifestam dificuldade em reconhecer fidelidade irrestrita ao método. Porém, trata-se de uma dificuldade aparente. Este artigo enfoca as definições iniciais da parte II (...) da Ética, tendo por objetivo explicitar que elas se relacionam entre si de acordo com uma disposição formal precisa. Portanto, elas são escritas conforme o modelo matemático de raciocínio que Espinosa segue desde o começo da Ética. (shrink)

Las obras de Sergio Rábade contenidas en el presente volumen constituyen una de las aportaciones más valiosas de su legado filosófico. En los orígenes de la edad de la crítica, la aparición de nuevos valores asociados al conocimiento impulsó una afanosa renovación de los métodos en científicos y filósofos. Método y pensamiento en la modernidad analiza las exigencias de esta demanda en pro de un cambio real en los procedimientos de búsqueda y control de las ideas. Las complejas conexiones (...) entre el método teorizado y su práctica ocupan la atención del autor en Descartes y la gnoseología moderna. El filósofo francés, «faro de la moderna Europa», inaugura un nuevo estilo de pensar que será referencia obligada tanto para sus partidarios como para sus adversarios. Spinoza, considerado por Rábade como un «cartesiano anticartesiano», es el caso más representativo de referencialidad al autor del Discurso, aunque cargada de ambivalencia. El filósofo holandés de raíces judías entendió el cumplimiento del proyecto patrocinado por Descartes precisamente como una enmendación de los tópicos de su filosofía: el método, la sustancia divina, el hombre y las pasiones humanas (Espinosa: razón y felicidad). Los artículos insertados entre las obras del volumen no ocultan las contradicciones inherentes al pensamiento de estos dos grandes filósofos. (shrink)

Machado de Assis, no conto _A Sereníssima República_, aponta, por meio da alegoria, problemas de fundo do sistema político brasileiro. Uma espécie de cultura da fraude estaria presente nos comportamentos das aranhas, o que impossibilitaria a implantação reta e precisa da lei, bem como a instituição da paz e da _securitas_. Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, ao analisar, a partir de fontes primárias, o período em que se passa o conto, constata os mesmos problemas que Machado de Assis apontara. Os conceitos (...) políticos espinosanos são movimentados, ao final, para mostrar que em um _imperium_ no qual as leis são constantemente violadas, não se está distante do estado de natureza, com grande perigo de vida para os súditos-cidadãos. Seria este o caso da república do conto e do Brasil atual? (shrink)

Rational Powers in Action presents a conception of instrumental rationality as governing actions that are extended in time with indeterminate ends. Tenenbaum argues that previous philosophical theories in this area, in focusing on momentary snapshots of the mind of idealized agents, miss central aspects of human rationality.

In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good. This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, (...) but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions. (shrink)

The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show (...) that various distinctions and points are confused in the literature on direction of fit. But I also want to argue that once the proper distinctions are made, it’s not clear that the notion of direction of fit can do any of the philosophically significant work that it was supposed to do. I first argue that the best way to unpack the notion of direction of fit would indeed be by means of the constitutive relation between truth and belief. In particular, the notion of direction of fit is best understood as different ideals, or formal ends, guiding the inference, from what I call “prima-facie” attitudes to what I call “all-out” attitudes respectively in the theoretical and practical realm. However, I’ll argue that there’s no non-circular way of making this distinction. But even if no definition of “belief” and “desire” come out of the distinction between directions of fit, it does elucidate the different natures of practical and theoretical enquiry. However, understood this way, the notion of direction of fit does not seem to capture the distinction illustrated by Anscombe’s example. I try to argue in the last section that Anscombe’s compelling example is best explained not by a distinction between directions of fit, but by a distinction between two different inferential mistakes: one from general to general or particular to general, and the other from general to particular. There’s an important asymmetry between practical and theoretical endeavours in this neighbourhood. However, noticing this asymmetry will also fail to deliver the philosophical payoffs that the notion of direction of fit was supposed to have. (shrink)

Kant’s views on the relation between freedom and moral law seem to undergo a major, unannounced shift. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant seems to be using the fact that we must act under the idea of freedom as a foundation for the moral law. However, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant claims that our awareness of our freedom depends on our awareness of the moral law. I argue that the apparent conflict between the two texts depends (...) on a reading of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III, and on an interpretation of Kant’s claim that we “act under the idea of freedom”, that is implausible on textual and on philosophical grounds. I then present an alternative interpretation of what Kant means by “acting under the idea of freedom” and of the opening paragraphs of Groundwork III. I argue that the only substantive conclusion of these paragraphs is that no theoretical proof of freedom is necessary. Moreover I argue that although these paragraphs raise concerns about the validity of the moral law, these concerns and Kant’s answers to them, do not give rise to any significant conflict with his views in the Critique of Practical Reason. (shrink)

Most contemporary action theorists accept – or at least find plausible – a belief condition on intention and a knowledge condition on intentional action. The belief condition says that I can only intend to ɸ if I believe that I will ɸ or am ɸ-ing, and the knowledge condition says that I am only intentionally ɸ-ing if I know that I am ɸ-ing. The belief condition in intention and the knowledge condition in action go hand in hand. After all, if (...) intending implies belief, and if ɸ-ing intentionally implies intending to ɸ, then in ɸ-ing, I intend to be ɸ-ing, and, by the belief condition, I believe that I am ɸ-ing, and if this belief is justified, and we are not in a Gettier situation, etc., then, I will also satisfy the knowledge condition. Moreover, the claim that when intentions properly result in action, the corresponding belief constitutes knowledge is a relatively safe assumption, at least as an assumption about what it is generally the case. (shrink)

Most philosophers working in moral psychology and practical reason think that either the notion of "good" or the notion of "desire" have central roles to play in our understanding of intentional explanations and practical reasoning. However, philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of "desire" and "good", how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. In particular, the "Guise of the Good" thesis - the view that desire (...) (or perhaps intention, or intentional action) always aims at the good - has received renewed attention in the last twenty years. Can one have desire for things that the desirer does not perceive to be good in any, or form intentions to act in way that one does not deem to be good? Does the notion of good play any essential role in an account of deliberation or practical reason? Moreover, philosophers also disagree about the relevant notion of good. Is it a purely formal notion, or does it involve a substantive conception of the good? Is the primary notion, the notion of the good for a particular agent, or the notion of good simpliciter? Does the relevant notion of good make essential appeal to human nature, or would it in principle extend to all rational beings? While these questions are central in contemporary work in ethics, practical reason, and philosophy of action, they are not new; similar issues were discussed in the ancient period. This volume of essays aims to bring together "systematic" and more historically-oriented work on these issues. (shrink)

Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 384-411, June 2014.

It is intended to problematize the concept of essence, based on Edmundo Huserl’s menology, which is directly related to the zero of knowledge, which takes place from the process of époche, or suspension of the degree of judgment, to apprehend the knowledge of to intentional experiences (Husserl, 1907). Would we be able to reach the zero degree of knowledge? Would it be possible to apprehend the essence of things? Would the phenomenological method give us elements that allow it to aim (...) at things? Would we be able to overcome, through suspension of judgments, the concepts that we use on a daily basis? What essence would this be, when we are formed and conformed to the concept of essence, as a pure form deriving from the Platonic doctrine (Plato, 1972). What conclusion can we reach on this matter? And what are the consequences for a rigorous reading of the concept of essence in Husserl? This is our intention in this article, as a reflective challenge. (shrink)

The practice of parkour in urban spaces by young people, especially those who call themselves traceurs, illustrates how identities are formed in an ephemeral way by reinterpreting spaces in the city – briefly and without leaving a trace. However, in a sort of paradox, these interventions are registered in the socio-digital spectrum, tokenistically anchoring and incorporating them into conversations and social interactions. This work aims to explain the practice of the sport called parkour as a socio-semiotic phenomenon. We have used (...) some zones of Mexico City as a specific case for our approach. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that the meaning of parkour goes beyond its recreational role and places it as a relevant piece of identity for excluded urban social groups – even though these practices have been appropriated by marketing strategies. Our approach will use a cultural semiotics perspective, as well as direct observations and interviews as research techniques. (shrink)

We discuss the axiomatization of generalized consequence relations determined by non-deterministic matrices. We show that, under reasonable expressiveness requirements, simple axiomatizations can always be obtained, using inference rules which can have more than one conclusion. Further, when the non-deterministic matrices are finite we obtain finite axiomatizations with a suitable generalized subformula property.