John Pollock aims to construct a theory of rational decision making for real agents--not ideal agents. Pollock argues that theories of ideal rationality are largely irrelevant to the decision making of real agents. Thinking about Acting aims to provide a theory of "real rationality.".

I have argued, then, that is simplistic and potentially dangerous to suppose that a contractarian model can adequately account for all of the moral relations in agriculture or serve singularly as a basis for policy. Conversely, I do not naively argue that we ought simply to replace a contractarian based agricultural ethic with an ethic of care such as the one I have outlined. A single farmer may be a spouse, parent, son or daughter, caretaker of land, keep of animals, (...) business operator and partner, employer, processor, and consumer. Agriculture itself encompasses all of these relations. Both our ethical systems and social and economic policies must reflect and build on this diversity of contexts and associated practices. (shrink)

Climate change poses real and immediate impacts to the public health of populations around the globe. Adverse impacts are expected to continue throughout the century. Emphasizing co-benefits of climate action for health, combining adaptation and mitigation efforts, and increasing interagency coordination can effectively address both public health and climate change challenges.

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an urgent priority. While few would argue that action to mitigate the causes of climate change should be led by public health practitioners, public health has a critical role in adaptation efforts. Adaptation seeks to lessen human vulnerability to extreme weather and to increased variability in temperature and precipitation. Climate change as an emerging health issue provides a test case for new approaches to public health: approaches that emphasize both collaboration with other government and private (...) entities and application of innovative legal strategies. (shrink)

Scott Sturgeon has recently challenged Pollock’s account of undercutting defeaters. The challenge involves three primary contentions: the account is both too strong and too weak, undercutting defeaters exercise their power to defeat only in conjunction with higher-order beliefs about the basis of the lower-order beliefs whose justification they target, and since rebutting defeaters exercise their power to defeat in isolation, rebutting and undercutting defeaters work in fundamentally different ways. My goal is to reject each of these contentions. I maintain (...) that Sturgeon fails to show that Pollock’s account of undercutting defeaters is either too strong or too weak, his own account of how undercutting defeaters exercise their power to defeat is both too strong and too weak, and his claim that rebutting and undercutting defeaters work in fundamentally different ways is mistaken. (shrink)

The epistemologist John Pollock has implemented computationally an architecture for a rational agent which he calls OSCAR. OSCAR models both practical and theoretical (or epistemic) reasoning. I argue that Pollock's model of practical reasoning, which has seven components, is superior not only to the two-component belief-desire model stemming from Aristotle, but also to the three-component belief-desire-intention model developed especially by Michael Bratman. Despite its advantages, Pollock's model of practical reasoning is incomplete in at least three respects: it (...) is solipsistic, it is egoistic and it is unsocial. (shrink)

Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition provides the first detailed historical account of one of England's great jurists. Drawing upon a vast array of sources, Neil Duxbury examines Pollock's career, jurisprudence, philosophy of the common law, treatise writing, and editorial initiatives, and shows that Pollock's contribution to the development of English law and juristic inquiry is both complex and crucial.Readership: Scholars and students of legal history and legal thought, barristers, and judges.

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although (...) Pollock’s evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way. (shrink)

An introduction to the motivations and mechanics of John Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.

Abstract An examination of John Pollock's theory of artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind raises difficulties for his mechanist concept of person. Token physicalism, agent materialism, and strong artificial intelligence are so related that if the first two propositions are not well?established, then there is no justification for believing that an artificial consciousness can be designed and built. Pollock's arguments are shown to be inconclusive in upholding a functionalist theory of persons as supervenient but purely physical entities. In (...) part this is the result of Pollock's thin definition of the concept of supervenience, according to which any complex supervenes on its proper parts. The limitations of this account are apparent when contrasted with richer conceptions of supervenience, such as Joseph Margolis?. But on Margolis? theory, the mind and its expressions supervene on or rise above their material embodiments in the sense that they cannot be fully explained in physical terms, which contradicts Pollock's token physicalism and agent materialism. The consequence for Pollock's project to explain the mind as mechanical, and to manufacture artificial persons, is that these systems can at best aspire to impressive innovations in weak artificial intelligence, but realistically cannot aspire to strong or mentalistic artificial intelligence. (shrink)

In everyday life people frequently recognize that a person at a time may be more or less strongly motivated to carry out an intentional action and that “trying harder” frequently affects the successful completion of an intentional action. In “Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence,” John Pollock provides an original account of rational choice in which “trying to do an action” is a basic factor. This paper argues that Pollock’s “expected-utility optimality prescription” is deficient because it lacks a parameter (...) for intensity of trying. The paper also indicates specific ways in which this deficiency could be corrected. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue DÉMéter, Université de Lille-3, en juin 2004. Résumé : En interrogeant la notion de rythme – successivement chez Henri Maldiney et chez Paul Valéry – nous montrerons ici qu'une approche chorégraphique de la période dripping du peintre américain Jackson Pollock est possible et qu'elle révèle – au-delà de l'aspect physique de sa peinture – l'état de corps de l'artiste, notion en vogue dans le domaine de la danse, et que nous essaierons (...) à cette occasion de mieux cerner. En - Arts plastiques et autres – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

We focus on a key IR Theory article by Alexander Wendt (1992) and two Jackson Pollock paintings. Our aim is to identify meanings Pollock’s art communicates and reveals for Wendt (1992). It derives from an appeal to visual imagination and a desire for semiotic interpretation of Constructivist view of anarchy. The visual sign is an association such that there is Wendt’s theoretical claim on the one hand and an abstract painting on the other. We do not gaze at (...) Wendt’s claim, we read it. We do not read a painting, look at it. This remark does not imply a one-way relationship. We can argue that a specific painting comes to life in our mind where colored movements are inextricably mixed up when we read the constructivist claim. Both Pollock paintings selected for our sign-making effort confirm the dynamic character of Constructivism and reveal not only three but countlessly many anarchies in international relations. They foment our assessments of abrupt changes of intersubjectivity among states. Cyclicality of dripped paints provides an anchor to fix Wendt’s anarchy conceptualization in these structural-abstract paintings. As to Wendt’s concept of anarchy, it acts as a helper, as a standard, against which interpretations of Pollock’s artwork construct meanings. (shrink)

In Thinking and Acting John Pollock offers some criticisms of Bayesian epistemology, and he defends an alternative understanding of the role of probability in epistemology. Here, I defend the Bayesian against some of Pollock's criticisms, and I discuss a potential problem for Pollock's alternative account.

Pollock’s drip technique generated certain unconventional representational possibilities, including the possibility of expressing the pre-reflective involvement of an embodied, intentional subject in a perceptual world. Consequently, Pollock’s art can be understood to explore or investigate the pre-objective conditions of reflective and intellectual consciousness. His painting—here I consider Number 1, 1949—motivates viewers to consider the relationship between intention and meaning as it appears in both primordial and reflective dimensions of experience. The account proceeds in three stages. First, I review (...) key features of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the pre-objective and attempt to clarify the reflexive nature of investigating it by considering his analysis of Paul Cézanne’s technique. Second, I consider Pollock’s technique and some critical responses to it, while analyzing some of its implications for a notion of pictorial address. Finally, I examine the perceptual effects of Number 1, 1949 and interpret them, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, in view of a revised understanding of the relationship between automatism and intention. (shrink)

The critique of capitalism is the bedrock on which rests the reputation of Frankfurt School critical theory. Though critical theory has often been heralded – or criticized and rejected – as a reformulation of Marxian theory for our times, its relation with the critique of political economy, and in particular the economic treatises, has barely been studied. Friedrich Pollock, who was Max Horkheimer’s lifelong friend and close associate at the Institute for Social Research, was responsible for all administrative and (...) financial questions, but he wrote few theoretical essays and Wiggershaus calls him ‘the last unknown member of the Frankfurt School’. Nevertheless this article asks whether not only has his influence on early critical theory been sorely underestimated, but also his impact on the late philosophies of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. (shrink)

Pollock is developing, and testing computationally a theory of rationality. I endorse his claim that the structure of argument is not always linear, his replacement of the deductive-inductive distinction with a deductive-defeasible distinction, and hi s distinction between rebutting defeaters, and undercutting defeaters. I question the absence of pragmatic constraints in his acceptance rule, an absence which fits ill with his criterion of interruptibility, that it is reasonable to act on the conclusions drawn at any point. I also wonder (...) about building a model of a rational agent in which there is no place for interpersonal argumentative discussion. (shrink)

In this paper two theories of defeasible reasoning, Pollock's account and my theory of ranking functions, are compared, on a strategic level, since a strictly formal comparison would have been unfeasible. A brief summary of the accounts shows their basic difference: Pollock's is a strictly computational one, whereas ranking functions provide a regulative theory. Consequently, I argue that Pollock's theory is normatively defective, unable to provide a theoretical justification for its basic inference rules and thus an independent (...) notion of admissible rules. Conversely, I explain how quite a number of achievements of Pollock's account can be adequately duplicated within ranking theory. The main purpose of the paper, though, is not to settle a dispute with formal epistemology, but rather to emphasize the importance of formal methods to the whole of epistemology. (shrink)

John Pollock (1940?2009) was an influential American philosopher who made important contributions to various fields, including epistemology and cognitive science. In the last 25 years of his life, he also contributed to the computational study of defeasible reasoning and practical cognition in artificial intelligence. He developed one of the first formal systems for argumentation-based inference and he put many issues on the research agenda that are still relevant for the argumentation community today. This paper presents an appreciation of (...) class='Hi'>Pollock's work on defeasible reasoning and its relevance for the computational study of argument. In our opinion, Pollock deserves to be remembered as one of the founding fathers of the field of computational argument, while, moreover, his work contains important lessons for current research in this field, reminding us of the richness of its object of study. (shrink)

a review of John Pollock's *Thinking about Acting* with a focus on his aim of describing psychological mechanisms which are humanly feasible.

In this paper two theories of defeasible reasoning, Pollock's account and my theory of ranking functions, are compared, on a strategic level, since a strictly formal comparison would have been unfeasible. A brief summary of the accounts shows their basic difference: Pollock's is a strictly computational one, whereas ranking functions provide a regulative theory. Consequently, I argue that Pollock's theory is normatively defective, unable to provide a theoretical justification for its basic inference rules and thus an independent (...) notion of admissible rules. Conversely, I explain how quite a number of achievements of Pollock's account can be adequately duplicated within ranking theory. The main purpose of the paper, though, is not to settle a dispute with formal epistemology, but rather to emphasize the importance of formal methods to the whole of epistemology. (shrink)

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