In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeaters. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow
Peter Graham
University of California, Riverside
Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way.
Keywords Reliabilism  Defeater  John Pollock  Jennifer Lackey  Evidentialism  Normative Defeater  Justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.
The justification of comprehension-based beliefs.J. P. Grodniewicz - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):109-126.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Blackwell.
Pollock and Sturgeon on Defeaters.Albert Casullo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2897-2906.
Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
Defeat Reconsidered.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):49-51.
Rationality, Defeaters, and Testimony.Jennifer Lackey Reed - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
Higher-order defeat and intellectual responsibility.Ru Ye - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5435-5455.
Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.


Added to PP index

Total views
142 ( #81,162 of 2,498,264 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #37,572 of 2,498,264 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes