Este artículo muestra que la Biología del conocimiento de Humberto Maturana pretendió ser una Fenomenología del conocer pero devino gnoseología escéptica. El problema se originó cuando el autor no partió desde la descripción de las experiencias que justificarían la nueva "conciencia epistemológica" que buscaba, es decir, la conciencia de que la realidad debiera ponerse entre paréntesis. En vez de eso, prefirió adherir arbitrariamente a axiomas escépticos, porque su propósito principal era la refutación de la teoría de la objetividad.

La primera prueba cartesiana de la existencia de Dios tiene como condición la certeza de la finitud del ego. Esta certeza se obtiene, a su vez, mediante actos por los cuales el ego conoce su propia finitud al compararse con una idea implícita de l’infini (Dios). Estos actos son la duda y el deseo. Sin embargo, estos importantes problemas exigen previamente el análisis de la ideas de l’infini y l’indéfini. Sostengo en este artículo que l’indéfini es el término que ocasionalmente (...) designa en propiedad lo que el término l’infini designa por analogía de atribución cuando Descartes lo predica de entes ontológicamente finitos tales como la idea del número o extensión interminable. (shrink)

El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan advertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido un (...) enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el “texto de la adoración.”. (shrink)

RESUMEN El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan inadvertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido (...) un enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el "texto de la adoración." ABSTRACT The analytical character of Meditationes de Prima Philosophia implies that: a) no truth can be correctly interpreted without reference to the concrete place it occupies in the order of reasons of the text ; b) there are no fictions in Meditationes that remain inadvertently as such. However, the presence of some passions has not been adequately explained, putting into question the truly analytical character of the work. We propose that these passions are effects of true but implicit judgments. To test our hypothesis, we have chosen an enigmatic paragraph called the "text of the adoration.". (shrink)

Descartes afirma que el cogito se "experimenta en uno" (apud se experiatur)o se "siente en uno mismo" ("il sent in lui-même"), pero también ha señalado que uno no siente sino a través del cuerpo. El problema es que, en las Meditaciones, el cogito fue caracterizado cuando todavía no se había demostrado la existencia del cuerpo. Pese a esto, Descartes parece haberse dejado influir por ciertas sensaciones internas de duda y certeza. En el trabajo se sostiene que esto fue posible porque (...) esas sensaciones internas son efecto de una ratio implícita: la existencia de un Dios no engañador. Descartes states that the cogito is "experienced in oneself" (apud se experiatur) or "felt in oneself" ("il sent en lui-même"), but it has also been pointed out that one only feels through the body. The problem is that, in the Meditations, the cogito was characterized before the existence of the body had been demonstrated. Despite this fact, Descartes seems to have been influenced by certain internal sensations of doubt and certainty. The paper argues that his was possible because those internal sensations are the effect of an implicit ratio: the existence of a non-deceiving God. Descartes afirma que o cogito se "experimenta em si" (apud se experiatur) ou se "sente em si mesmo" ("il sent in lui-même"), mas também sinalizou que um não sente se não por meio do corpo. O problema se deve, nas Meditaciones, a que o cogito tenha sido caracterizado quando ainda não se tinha demonstrado a existência do corpo. Pese a isso, Descartes parece ter se deixado influenciar por certas sensações internas de dúvida e certeza. Neste trabalho, sustém-se que isso foi possível porque essas sensações internas são efeitos de uma ratio implícita: a existência de um Deus não enganador. (shrink)

ResumenEl enfoque posracionalista surge desde la crítica constructivista a la forma en que el cognitivismo tradicional conceptualiza la relación entre sujeto y realidad. Tomando como principal unidad de análisis el estudio de la identidad personal como fenómeno bio-psicológico, el modelo de Vittorio Guidano se ha convertido en la formulación más popular de este enfoque. Lamentablemente, la abrupta partida de su fundador parece haber dejado una serie de cuestiones conceptuales abiertas a la base del modelo. El presente artículo identifica los aspectos (...) fundamentales de la epistemología posracionalista de Guidano y luego de explorar su obra tardía, propone que es posible identificar dos momentos fundamentales en el enfoque: (i) Un primer momento (que denominamos Guidano 1 y que concentra la mayoría de la literatura en el tema) que es la expresión de una marcada influencia constructivista que implica la idea de que el principio organizador del funcionamiento de los sistemas humanos es la sobrevivencia. (ii) Un segundo momento (que llamamos Guidano 2 y que no ha sido exhaustivamente explorado en la literatura actual) que puede ser identificado como el producto de un giro hacia la filosofía fenomenológico-existencial. Acá, la identidad de un organismo no solo está orientada a la sobrevivencia, sino que, sobre todo, al sentido de la existencia misma. Se concluye clarificando el tipo de fenomenología que guiaría la práctica clínica de Guidano 2.Palabras clave: cognitivismo; constructivismo; fenomenología; posracionalismo. (shrink)

Revision operation is the consistent expansion of a theory by a new belief-representing sentence. We consider that in a paraconsistent setting this desideratum can be accomplished in at least three distinct ways: the output of a revision operation should be either non-trivial or non-contradictory (in general or relative to the new belief). In this paper those distinctions will be explored in the constructive level by showing how the remainder sets could be refined, capturing the key concepts of paraconsistency in a (...) dynamical scenario. These are preliminaries results of a wider project on Paraconsistent Belief Change conduced by the authors. (shrink)

Este repertorio registra los artículos sobre Platón que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el primer semestre del año 2000.

Jose Marti contributed greatly to Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain with words as well as revolutionary action. Although he died before the formation of an independent republic, he has since been hailed as a heroic martyr inspiring Cuban republican traditions.

There is vast evidence that accounts for the association between entrepreneurial orientation and the probability of starting a business. However, there are not many studies that test how psychological factors moderate this relationship. A variable that has been little studied in this relationship is Grit. Grit is considered a personality trait defined as perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Grit considers two sub-dimensions, one linked to the consistency of interests and the other linked to perseverance in the effort. The objective (...) of this article is to analyze the moderating role that both sub-dimensions of grit plays in the relationship between EO and PSB, considering its interaction with sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, and culture. This cross-sectional study has a sample of 1,761 participants, active workers. The EO scale and a Grit Scale were applied. In addition, participants were asked, based on their perception, how likely they were to start their own business within the next 5 years. A simple moderation analysis was considered to test the moderating role of grit in the relationship between EO and PSB. Subsequently, a double moderation analysis was carried out in order to identify which sociodemographic variables moderate the moderating effect of grit on the relationship in question. The results show that only the Grit-Passion component of grit moderates the relationship between EO and PSB. Regarding the sociodemographic variables, neither age, culture, nor gender showed a moderating effect on the moderation exercised by Grit-Passion in the relationship between OE and PSB. The results are discussed in terms of psychological capital, particularly with an emphasis on explaining why only the Grit-Passion shows a moderating effect on the relationship between EO and PSB, in detriment of Grit-Perseverance. In addition, the power of grit in the field of entrepreneurship is discussed, considering that its moderating effect is transversal to variations in age, gender and culture, as well as its relevance when considering interventions and pedagogical models in the field of entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Este artigo investiga as posições do liberalismo político de John Rawls e do republicanismo de Hannah Arendt em relação ao humanismo cívico e ao republicanismo clássico. Defende que o republicanismo de Arendt não deve ser considerado um humanismo cívico abrangente e que há uma proximidade entre o liberalismo político e o republicanismo clássico, pois sustenta que um perfeccionismo minimalista baseado em virtudes políticas informa as duas teorias.

Diabetes contributes to COVID‐19 deaths in Colombia and Mexico, where the latter having the highest prevalence of diabetes among OECD countries. Some reports consider that advertising influences diabetes by confusing labels on ultra‐processed foods and soft drinks that lead to unhealthy food choices. Both countries are in the process of modifying their labeling legislation; however, governments and food industries have pushed to delay its implementation. Using a mixed research design, we interviewed 550 consumers in both countries during June–July 2020; a (...) high number of respondents misunderstand today's food labeling and are unaware of the new labeling legislation. Respondents strongly agree that the food industry should be in charge of changing the labels; otherwise, they would consider not buying their products. Using cluster analysis, we identified three groups that would help design public policies, nutritional and educational campaigns. Although changes in food labeling alone are not enough to reduce obesity and diabetes rates, food labels constitute public health tools due they assist consumers to make food and nutritional choices (considering that nutrition can help prevent and overcome COVID‐19). The costs of maintaining current labels could increase Colombians and Mexicans illnesss and poverty. These deceptive practices of the food industry would harm their brands. (shrink)

Renal replacement therapy is the indicated treatment for individuals with chronic kidney disease (CKD) to survive. However, not all sick people have access to the same treatment. This study compares renal care in two developing countries with different health systems. Specifically, it explores hemodialysis treatment from the perspective of low‐income individuals. A qualitative, comparative study was performed in Brazil and Mexico. Using purposive sampling, the research was based on open‐ended interviews with nineteen participants with kidney failure undergoing hemodialysis treatment in (...) public hospitals and ten relatives. According to our results, Brazilian participants perceived hemodialysis care as satisfactory because of health personnel courtesy as well as free access to dialysis treatment, prescription drugs, hospitalization and transportation. However, they reported deficiencies in the care they were receiving due to shortages of specialists, prescription drugs, laboratory tests and transportation. Mexican participants, in contrast, highlighted the catastrophic costs of medical care because they had no free access to renal therapy, nor adequate financial resources. Our findings suggest that low‐income Brazilian CKD sufferers experience renal care differently, as they are more satisfied and face less obstacles with hemodialysis compared with those of Mexico. More studies on the topic are needed. (shrink)

Scientific representation is a currently booming topic, both in analytical philosophy and in history and philosophy of science. The analytical inquiry attempts to come to terms with the relation between theory and world; while historians and philosophers of science aim to develop an account of the practice of model building in the sciences. This article provides a review of recent work within both traditions, and ultimately argues for a practice-based account of the means employed by scientists to effectively achieve representation (...) in the modelling sciences. (shrink)

This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception captures the objectivity of the cognitive representations (...) used by science, it sheds light on their truth and completeness, and it explains the source of the analogy between scientific and artistic modes of representation. (shrink)

I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that similarity and isomorphism are not the constituents of scientific representation. I (...) finish by looking at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to radically naturalize scientific representation are likely to be successful. (shrink)

Depersonalization is characterised by a profound disruption of self-awareness mainly characterised by feelings of disembodiment and subjective emotional numbing.It has been proposed that depersonalization is caused by a fronto-limbic suppressive mechanism – presumably mediated via attention – which manifests subjectively as emotional numbing, and disables the process by which perception and cognition normally become emotionally coloured, giving rise to a subjective feeling of ‘unreality’.Our functional neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies support the above model and indicate that, compared with normal and clinical (...) controls, DPD patients show increased prefrontal activation as well as reduced activation in insula/limbic-related areas to aversive, arousing emotional stimuli.Although a putative inhibitory mechanism on emotional processing might account for the emotional numbing and characteristic perceptual detachment, it is likely, as suggested by some studies, that parietal mechanisms underpin feelings of disembodiment and lack of agency feelings. (shrink)

1Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, UKScience Without Laws Ronald Giere Chicago, IL University of Chicago Press 1999 x + 285 Hardback£17.50.

This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selections provide the only known solution to the measurement problem (...) that does not relinquish any of the explicit premises of the insolubility proofs. Second, unlike some no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, selections suffer no difficulties with non-ideal measurements. Third, unlike most collapse interpretations, selections can be independently motivated by an appeal to quantum propensities. IntroductionThe problem of quantum measurement2.1 The ignorance interpretation of mixtures2.2 The eigenstate–eigenvalue link2.3 The quantum theory of measurementThe insolubility proof of the quantum measurement3.1 Some notation3.2 The transfer of probability condition (TPC)3.3 The occurrence of outcomes condition (OOC)A defence of the insolubility proof4.1 Stein's critique4.2 Ignorance is not required4.3 The problem of quantum measurement is an idealisationSelections5.1 Representing dispositional properties5.2 Selections solve the measurement problem5.3 Selections and ignoranceNon-ideal selections6.1 No-collapse interpretations and non-ideal measurements6.2 Exact and approximate measurements6.3 Selections for non-ideal interactions6.4 Approximate selections6.5 Implications for ignoranceSelective interactions test quantum propensities7.1 Equivalence classes as physical ‘aspects’: a critique7.2 Quantum dispositions7.3 Selections as a propensity modal interpretation7.4 A comparison with Popper's propensity interpretation. (shrink)

Scientific representation is a booming field nowadays within the philosophy of science, with many papers published regularly on the topic every year, and several yearly conferences and workshops held on related topics. Historically, the topic originates in two different strands in 20th-century philosophy of science. One strand begins in the 1950s, with philosophical interest in the nature of scientific theories. As the received or “syntactic” view gave way to a “semantic” or “structural” conception, representation progressively gained the center stage. Yet, (...) there is another, older, strand that links representation to fin de siècle modeling debates, particularly in the emerging Bildtheorie of Boltzmann and Hertz, and to the ensuing discussion among philosophers thereafter. Both strands feed into present-day philosophical work on scientific representation. There are a number of different orthogonal questions that philosophers ask regarding representation. One set of questions concerns the nature of the representational relation between theories or models, on the one hand, and the real-world systems they purportedly represent. Such questions lie at the more metaphysical and abstract end of the spectrum—and they are often addressed with the abstract tools of the analytical metaphysician. They constitute what we may refer to as the “analytical inquiry” into representation. On the other hand there are questions regarding the use that scientists put some representations to in practice—these are questions that are best addressed by means of some of the favorite tools of the philosopher of science, including descriptive analysis, illustration by means of case studies, induction, exemplification, inference from practice, etc., and are best referred to as the “practical inquiry” into representation. The notion of representation invoked in such inquiries may be “deflationary” or “substantive”—depending on whether it construes representation as a primitive notion, or as susceptible to further reduction or analysis in terms of something else. (shrink)

El modelo de ser humano: homo oeconomicus, impuesto por la racionalidad económica capitalista, ha tenido en las dos últimas décadas una metamorfosis compleja, a saber, la formación de un tipo de subjetividad representada en la figura del “emprendedor” o “su propio jefe” que, desde una nueva gramática teológica, encarna un proyecto mercantil solapado y subrepticio que condiciona las relaciones entre sujetos. En razón a esto, el propósito de este texto es pensar dicha problemática desde el ejercicio hermenéutico-crítico que lleva a (...) cabo el joven Marx, para someter al análisis las categorías de culpa, deuda, sacrificio y expiación destacadas por Walter Benjamin, a la luz de la categoría esencia subjetiva de la propiedad privada que permita entender cómo el capitalismo se vale hoy de la teología y su lenguaje para continuar responsabilizando al ser humano de su pobreza, de su riqueza o su fracaso económico. (shrink)

Abstract: It is often assumed without argument that fictionalism in the philosophy of science contradicts scientific realism. This paper is a critical analysis of this assumption. The kind of fictionalism that is at present discussed in philosophy of science is characterised, and distinguished from fictionalism in other areas. A distinction is then drawn between forms of fictional representation, and two competing accounts of fiction in science are discussed. I then outline explicitly what I take to be the argument for the (...) incompatibility of scientific realism with fictionalism. I argue that some of its premises are unwarranted, and are moreover questionable from a fictionalist perspective. The conclusion is that fictionalism is neutral in the realism-antirealism debate, pulling neither in favour nor against scientific realism. (shrink)

This article provides a state-of-the-art review of the philosophical literature on scientific representation. It first argues that the topic emerges historically mainly out of what may be called the modelling tradition. It then introduces a number of helpful analytical distinctions and goes on to divide contemporary approaches to scientific representation into two distinct kinds, substantive and deflationary. Analogies with related discussions of artistic representation in aesthetics and the nature of truth in metaphysics are pursued. It is finally urged that the (...) most promising approaches—and the ones most likely to feature prominently in future developments—are deflationary. In particular, a defense is provided of a genuinely inferential conception of representation. (shrink)

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim (...) to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es presentar el problema triple (trilema) de Agripa que cuestiona la posibilidad de alcanzar una justificación epistemológica del conocimiento empírico. Una posible reconstrucción del problema es la que se apoya en el problema del regreso al infinito -uno de los modos de..

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

The article turns to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of state capitalism and their theorization of money and debt in their critique of capitalism to develop an analysis of the governmental management of the current crisis determined by ordo- and neoliberalism. The paper argues that analyses which fail to properly recognize the power of capital to determine both state apparatuses and economic policy thereby fail to grasp the real functioning of money, debt and the Euro in the crisis and end up (...) unwittingly supporting liberalism. This is true of positions such as heterodox theory that, though critical of conventional and neoliberal political economy, nevertheless continue to uphold the state as an independent or mediating mechanism in relation to the power of capital. The neglect of the role which money plays in the strategies of capital to control both the creation of value and the functioning of the state is to be found even in Foucault’s genealogy of neoliberalism, a neglect which undermines his analysis of power. The paper highlights the implications of the standpoint of state capitalism for a more incisive analysis of the current crisis that reveals what is at stake for political struggles. (shrink)

El presente texto desea dar cuenta, a partir de aquellos aspectos fenomenológicos de la teoría del conocimiento de Thomas Hobbes, el fundamentoy justificación de la génesis del Estado civil. Sin lugar a dudas, serán la percepción o la intuición, lo sensible, la imaginación o la memoria, el lenguaje, el movimiento, el cómputo, el deseo, el miedo, entre otros, lo que lleva al sujeto a comprender su propia naturaleza y a partir de ella, a pactar con otros sujetos cediendo sus derechos (...) naturales a un tercero para dar fin al estado de naturaleza y poder conservar su vida y vivir en paz. (shrink)

There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one, concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correlations in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment, and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments. But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work, it is only in the last two decades that (...) it has become recognizably and explicitly a debate about causal inference in the quantum realm. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a review of three influential arguments in the philosophical literature that aim to show that causal models for the EPR correlations are impossible, due to Bas Van Fraassen, Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. I contend that all these arguments are inconclusive since they contain premises or presuppositions that are false, unwarranted, or at least controversial. Five different common cause models are outlined that seem perfectly viable for the EPR correlations. These models are then employed to illustrate various difficulties with the premises and presuppositions underlying Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and Price’s arguments. In all these cases it is argued that the difficulties cut deep against these authors’ own theories of causation and causal inference. My conclusions are that causal models for the EPR correlations remain viable, that philosophical work is still required to assess their relative virtues, and that in any case the mere theoretical conceivability and empirical possibility of these models sheds doubts over Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and (important elements in) Price’s theories of causation and causal inference. (shrink)

This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse representational practices in the sciences. These insights are (...) applied to some mathematical models, thus showing that the mathematical sciences are not in principle counterexamples to RSC. (shrink)

This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim (...) to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful. In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations. (shrink)

It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.

This article provides a state of the art review of the philosophical literature on scientific representation. It first argues that the topic emerges historically mainly out of what may be called the modelling tradition. It then introduces a number of helpful analytical distinctions, and goes on to divide contemporary approaches to scientific representation into two distinct kinds, substantive and deflationary. Analogies with related discussions of artistic representation in aesthetics, and of the nature of truth in metaphysics are pursued. It is (...) finally urged that the most promising approaches - and the ones most likely to feature prominently in future developments - are deflationary. In particular, a defence is provided of a genuinely inferential conception of representation. (shrink)

I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling literature in order to characterize these three separate concepts functionally (...) in terms of their roles in modelling practice. (shrink)