Depuis une quinzaine d'années, on assiste à l'émergence en France d'un modèle de débat public relativement original. Son institutionnalisation progressive, par la création de la Commission nationale du débat public, correspond à la volonté d'intégrer des acteurs différents autour d'une discussion au plus près des instances d'exécution de la politique publique. Elle est révélatrice d'une tension entre deux modes de conception de la communication en politique, l'une délibérative et l'autre instrumentale. Ainsi, bien que la création de la CNDP corresponde incontestablement (...) à un élargissement de la palette des modalités d'expression démocratique et contribue à la diffusion d'une « culture du débat » en France, il reste que son ancrage dans le processus décisionnel reste problématique et encore contesté par de nombreux élus.Past fifteen years have seen the emergence in France of a model of public debate relatively original. Its progressive institutionalization by creating the National Commission for public debate is the desire to integrate different actors around a closer discussion of the enforcement of public policy. It reveals a tension between two modes of communication design in politics, one deliberative and the other instrumental. Thus, although the creation of the CNDP undoubtedly corresponds to a broadening of the range of conditions for democratic expression and contributes to the spread of a "culture of debate" in France, the fact remains that its anchoring in the decision-making process remains problematic and still contested by many elected officials. (shrink)

ONE Introduction The history of psychology in the twentieth century is a story of the divorce and remarriage of psychology and philosophy. ...

In vertebrates it is often found that if one considers a group of genes clustered on a certain chromosome, then the homologues of those genes often form another cluster on a different chromosome. There are four explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, to explain how such homologous clusters appeared. Homologous clusters are expected at a low probability even if genes are distributed at random. The duplication of a subset of the genome might create homologous clusters, as would a duplication of the (...) entire genome. Alternatively, it may be adaptive for certain combinations of genes to cluster, although clearly the genes must have duplicated prior to rearrangement into clusters. Molecular phylogenetics provides a means to examine the origins of homologous clusters, although it is difficult to discriminate between the different explanations using current data. However, with more extensive sequencing and mapping of vertebrate genomes, especially those of the early diverging chordates, it should soon become possible to resolve the origins of homologous clusters. BioEssays 21:697–703, 1999. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Robert Cummins has recently used the program of Clark Hull to illustrate the effects of logical positivist epistemology upon psychological theory. On Cummins's account, Hull's theory is best understood as a functional analysis, rather than a nomological subsumption. Hull's commitment to the logical positivist view of explanation is said to have blinded him to this aspect of this theory, and thus restricted its scope. We will argue that this interpretation of Hull's epistemology, though common, is mistaken. Hull's epistemological views were (...) developed independently of, and in considerable contrast to, the principles of logical positivism. (shrink)

This book is about the eminent behavioral scientist B. F. Skinner, the American culture in which he lived and worked, and the behaviorist movement that played a leading role in American psychological and social thought during the twentieth century. From a base of research on laboratory animals in the 1930s, Skinner built a committed and influential following as well as a utopian movement for social reform. His radical ideas attracted much public attention and generated heated controversy. By the mid-1970s, he (...) had become the most widely recognized scientist in America, surpassing even Margaret Mead and Linus Pauling. Yet Skinner himself was an unassuming family man from a modest middle-class background, a machine-shop tinkerer whose tastes ran to English and French literature. Drawing on archival research, interviews, and historical styles appropriate to the evidence, the authors assembled in this volume examine Skinner's remarkable rise to prominence in the wider context of America's intellectual, cultural, and social history. (shrink)

The neobehaviorist Clark L. Hull and his disciple Kenneth Spence shared in common many views on the nature of science and the role of theories in psychology. However, a telling exchange in their correspondence of the early 1940s reveals a disagreement over the nature of intervening variables in behavior theory. Spence urged Hull to abandon his interpretations of intervening variables in terms of physiological models in favor of positivistic, purely mathematical interpretations that conflicted with Hull's mechanistic explanatory aims and ontological (...) commitment to materialism. This dispute is set against the background of similar disputes in physics, and the origins of Hull's and Spence's divergent views on theoretical explanation are described. (shrink)

This book is the result of a retired judge's curiosity about the meaning of 'moral' and 'ethical,' two ambiguous terms that mean different things to different people. Following ten guidelines, the author concludes that the terms 'right' and 'wrong' provide a more practical standard of conduct.

The French philosopher Auguste Comte is known to most of us as a somewhat obscure figure of modest historical significance. We are likely to know that he was the founder of positivism, that he propounded the influential doctrine of the hierarchy of the sciences, and that he held some peculiar views about humanity passing through stages of theological, metaphysical, and scientific thought. The more historically informed among us might also be aware that he founded a secular alternative to the Catholic (...) Church , and that he clashed with his younger and better-known contemporary John Stuart Mill over the feasibility of a science of psychology. An interesting life, one thinks, but surely Comte is not a philosopher to warrant renewed interest during a postmodern era when the positivist tradition has finally been laid to rest a failed venture. (shrink)

Broadening access to both computational and educational resources is crit- ical to diffusing machine learning (ML) innovation. However, today, most ML resources and experts are siloed in a few countries and organizations. In this article, we describe our pedagogical approach to increasing access to applied ML through a massive open online course (MOOC) on Tiny Machine Learning (TinyML). We suggest that TinyML, applied ML on resource-constrained embedded devices, is an attractive means to widen access because TinyML leverages low-cost and globally (...) accessible hardware and encourages the development of complete, self-contained applications, from data collection to deployment. To this end, a collaboration between academia and industry produced a four part MOOC that provides application-oriented instruction on how to develop solutions using TinyML. The series is openly available on the edX MOOC platform, has no prerequisites beyond basic programming, and is designed for global learners from a variety of backgrounds. It introduces real-world applications, ML algorithms, data-set engineering, and the ethi- cal considerations of these technologies through hands-on programming and deployment of TinyML applications in both the cloud and on their own microcontrollers. To facili- tate continued learning, community building, and collaboration beyond the courses, we launched a standalone website, a forum, a chat, and an optional course-project com- petition. We also open-sourced the course materials, hoping they will inspire the next generation of ML practitioners and educators and further broaden access to cutting-edge ML technologies. (shrink)

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

Responding to volatile criticisms frequently leveled at Leo Strauss and those he influenced, the prominent contributors to this volume demonstrate the profound influence that Strauss and his students have exerted on American liberal democracy and contemporary political thought. By stressing the enduring vitality of classic books and by articulating the theoretical and practical flaws of relativism and historicism, the contributors argue that Strauss and the Straussians have identified fundamental crises of modernity and liberal democracy.

This thoughtful new abridgment is enriched by the brilliant commentary which accompanies it. In it, Laurence Dickey argues that the _Wealth of Nations_ contains--and conceals--a great deal of how Smith actually thought a commercial society works. Guided by his conviction that the so-called Adam Smith Problem--the relationship between ethics and economics in Smith's thinking--is a core element in the argument of the work itself, Dickey's commentary focuses on the devices Smith uses to ground his economics (...) in broadly ethical and social categories. An unparalleled guide to an often difficult and perplexing work. (shrink)

SYMPATHY IN SMITH The most wide-spread, but ill-informed, opinion about Adam Smith, based on his reputation as the founder of modern economics, makes him out to be a Social Darwinist for whom the most important form of human interaction is competition. In fact, the most important principle in Smith's moral psychology is what he calls sympathy, broadly understood as fellow feeling: the imaginative placing of ourselves in the situation of another, representing to ourselves what we would sense, (...) think, and feel were we in his or her situation. We not only conceive some idea of what the other is experiencing, but in a weaker degree also feel something like it; for to conceive or imagine that we are feeling something "excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception." Mutual sympathy, a sense of a "correspondence of the sentiments of others with our own" seems to provide a distinct pleasure of its own: grief can be alleviated and mirth and joy enlivened by being sympathetically shared. Teaching, for example, would lose much of its relish, if one could not enter into and enjoy the feelings good students have in being introduced to important and exciting ideas--ideas that may no longer be that exciting in themselves for their teacher. Sympathy then, the key notion in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, provides the foundation for Smith's understanding of natural sociality: society, or association, proves to be an association in morality. (shrink)

I was commissioned by Barry Smith, Editor of The Monist , to act as Advisory Editor for issue 88.1, January 2005 on the topic Humor, and we drafted the appended description. The deadline for submissions is January 31, 2004, and you are welcome to submit an article to me for consideration (word limit 7,500 words, including footnotes). What the Editor and I are, hoping for, is some serious and seriously good philosophical writing on this topic.

IN THE LAST PART of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith puts his theory in a class with those of his contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, namely, the systems that make sentiments the principle of approbation. Despite recognizing important differences with both of them, he thinks that since he has placed the origin of moral sentiments in sympathy, and in particular the fact that we are able to enter into the motives of the agent and get pleasure (...) from finding them appropriate to their cause, sentiments are the foundation of his theory of morals. Many of Smith’s commentators, in fact almost all of the most important studies over the last few years, reaffirm the author’s self-description. However, my aim in this paper is to challenge this view by showing that Smith’s system can also be plausibly seen as a theory of practical reasoning, and in some important aspects very similar to Aristotelian ethics. Surprisingly few scholars have seen this parallel. Laurence Berns, Samuel Fleischacker, Charles Griswold, and Gloria Vivenza are the latest exceptions, identifying several points of coincidence between Adam Smith and Aristotle’s ethics. None of them, however, has tied all these similarities under a unified interpretation, such as the one I propose here: The basic analogy between these theories, and the source of those particular coincidences, is the operation of practical reason. Moreover, and besides the common elements with Aristotle’s ethics, Smith’s reconstruction of practical reason simultaneously announces some of the main features of modern accounts of ethics, such as impartiality and universality as preconditions of moral judgment. The integration of these ancient and modern elements in a single coherent theory allows Smith’s TMS to overcome the insufficiencies and paradoxes of both these traditions, and it constitutes one of the most interesting and challenging proposals of modern ethics. (shrink)

One of the most important recent developments in the study of concepts has been the resurgence of interest in nativist accounts of the human conceptual system. However, many theorists suppose that a key feature of neural organization—the brain’s plasticity—undermines the nativist approach to concept acquisition. We argue that, on the contrary, not only does the brain’s plasticity fail to undermine concept nativism, but a detailed examination of the neurological evidence actually provides powerful support for concept nativism.

The essays collected in this volume concern the general question of truthmaking.

This volume puts together twelve new essays by scholars who have done groundbreaking work in epistemology over the past four decades. Unfortunately, the editor’s brief introduction offers only a sketchy presentation of the papers and their background. Given the variety and complexity of the issues tackled, one would have expected a more detailed account of the nature and developments of the epistemological theories and arguments put forward and discussed by the contributors. The absence of such an account is all the (...) more surprising considering that the editor does not himself contribute a paper to the volume. (shrink)

" Now Laurence Lampert sets out to fulfill this prophecy by providing a section by section interpretation of this philosophical masterpiece that emphasizes its unity and depth as a comprehensive new teaching on nature and humanity.According ...

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.