Over-time variability characterizes not only individual-level emotions, but also group-level emotions, those that occur when people identify with social groups and appraise events in terms of their implications for those groups. We discuss theory and research regarding the role of emotions in intergroup contexts, focusing on their dynamic nature. We then describe new insights into the causes and consequences of emotional dynamics that flow from conceptualizing emotions as based in group membership, and conclude with research recommendations.

John Mackie's stimulating book is a complete and clear treatise on moral theory. His writings on normative ethics-the moral principles he recommends-offer a fresh approach on a much neglected subject, and the work as a whole is undoubtedly a major contribution to modern philosophy.The author deals first with the status of ethics, arguing that there are not objective values, that morality cannot be discovered but must be made. He examines next the content of ethics, seeing morality as a functional (...) device, basically the same at all times but changing significantly in response to changes in the human condition. He sketches a practical moral system, criticizing but also borrowing from both utilitarian and absolutist views. Thirdly, the frontiers of ethics, areas of contact with psychology, metaphysics, theology, law and politcs, are explored.Throughout, his aim is to discuss a wide range of questions that are both philosophical and practical, working within a distinctive version of subjectivism-an "error" theory of the apparent objectivity of values. John Mackie has drawn on the contributions of such classic thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant and Sidgwick, and on more recent discussions, to produce a thought-provoking account that will inspire both the general reader and the student of philosophy. (shrink)

In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan’s (...) new neo‐Lockean proposal is inadequate. (shrink)

The late John L. Mackie, formerly of University College, Oxford.

Annotation In this book Mr. Mackie selects for critical discussion six related topic which are prominent in John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding: ...

Nurses are increasingly faced with situations in practice regarding the prolongation of life and withdrawal of treatment. They play a central role in the care of dying people, yet they may find themselves disempowered by medical paternalism or ill-equipped in the decision-making process in end-of-life situations. This article is concerned with the ethical relationships between patient autonomy and medical paternalism in end-of-life care for an advanced cancer patient. The nurse’s role as the patient’s advocate is explored, as are the differences (...) between nursing and medicine when confronted with the notion of patient autonomy. The impetus for this discussion stems from a clinical encounter described in the following scenario. (shrink)

Classic work by one of the most brilliant figures in post-war analytic philosophy.

Mackie examines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It is argued that Locke's distinction supports the claim that he held a representative theory of perception. Mackie discussed Locke's arguments for the distinction. The relation of Locke's account to Molyneaux's problem is considered. Mackie critically compares his reformulation of the primary/secondary distinction with that of Jonathan Bennett.

In this chapter, Mackie presents a defence of Locke against Berkeley's attack on abstraction. It is argued that Locke's theory of ideas primarily concerns our ability to employ words and statements. Locke's theory concerning ideas of numbers is criticized. Three theories of universals are considered: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism; it is concluded, however, that the notion of there being distinct things with which we connect general words with particular things is mistaken. Mackie instead proposes a theory of general (...) words being ‘annexed’ to features of things. (shrink)

Studies causation both as a concept and as it is 'in the objects.' Offers new accounts of the logic of singular causal statements, the form of causal regularities, the detection of causal relationships, the asymmetry of cause and effect, and necessary connection, and it relates causation to functional and statistical laws and to teleology.

Penelope Mackie; IV*—Identity, Time, and Necessity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 98, Issue 1, 1 June 1998, Pages 59–78, https://doi.org/10.11.

Mackie sets out Locke's general theory of identity and raises some difficulties with the account. Hume's claim that the notion of identity is a fiction is critically assessed. Mackie argues that there is a relation between Locke's notion of identity and the notion that individuals can have essences. He presents an argument for what he calls Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity. The relevance of Kripke's discussion of identity and named individuals is examined. It is argued that (...) Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity can provide a means of understanding some problems concerning identity through time. (shrink)

Mackie attempts to revise Locke's theory of the identity of persons. Locke's equation of personal identity with the unity of consciousness is set out. Mackie examines various objections to Locke's theory and his use of puzzle cases is highlighted. Recent theories of personal identity, such as Parfit's, are critically discussed. Mackie suggests that the equation of personal identity with the continuity of neurophysiological structure would resolve some of the difficulties associated with an account of personal identity.

Mackie outlines Locke's representationalist theory. He analyses the relation between representationalism and the picture theory of ideas. The theory's relation to the veil of perception doctrine is also critically examined. Mackie criticizes the verificationist theory of meaning and instead argues that ideas should be understood as intentional objects. Mackie introduces and defends a version of realism, which he calls ‘common‐sense realism’.

Examines the relation between empiricism and realism. Mackie criticizes Locke's arguments against innate ideas. He draws a distinction between ‘minimal’ and ‘authoritative’ senses of knowledge and claims that innate knowledge is only possible in the minimal sense. Mackie argues that there is no necessary conflict between empiricism and realism. He concludes that it is possible to endorse both an empirical basis for our actual knowledge of the world as well as to accept the importance of certain innate propensities (...) that contribute to that knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter considers both Locke's theory of substance and Berkeley's subsequent criticisms of it. Mackie discusses the difference between real essence and nominal essence. He argues that Locke should have equated substance with real essence and rejected the notion of substance as substratum. Mackie also argues that Locke invokes a theory of the use of language that anticipates the theory of natural kinds put forward by Kripke.

1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.

A novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned metaphysicians.

Speed, flexibility, negotiated control of outcomes, savings and absence of future enmity. Why lose all this in litigation when a new user‐friendly alternative is on the increase? The author is Chief Executive of the Centre for Dispute Resolution , 7 St. Katharine's Way, London E1 9LB, and Special Professor in ADR in the University of Birmingham, England.

I discuss a thesis that I call ‘The Appearance of Mind-Independence’, to the effect that, to the subject of an ordinary perceptual experience, it seems that the experience involves the awareness of a mind-independent world. Although this thesis appears to be very widely accepted, I argue that it is open to serious challenge. Whether such a challenge can be maintained is especially relevant to the assessment of any theory, such as Berkeley’s idealism, according to which the only objects of which (...) we are aware in perception are mind-dependent. But the issue is of significance for the philosophy of perception more generally. In the course of my sceptical discussion, I argue that recent work by Campbell and Cassam may be flawed by a failure to take sufficiently seriously the requirements for genuine mind-independence. (shrink)