1. Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-242.
  2. Animalism versus lockeanism: No contest.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):369-376.
    In ‘Animalism versus Lockeanism: a Current Controversy’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 302–18, Harold Noonan examined the relation between animalist and neo‐Lockean theories of personal identity. As well as presenting arguments intended to support a modest compatibilism of animalism and neo‐Lockeanism, he advanced a new proposal about the relation between persons and human beings which was intended to evade the principal animalist objections to neo‐Lockean theories. I argue both that the arguments for compatibilism are without force, and that Noonan’s (...)
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    The individuation of actions.David Mackie - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):38–54.
    I argue against a view of the individuation of actions endorsed most notably by Hornsby and Davidson. This is the view that in, for example, Anscombe’s case of the pumping man, we have a single action which can be described, variously, as a pumping, a poisoning and so on. I argue that, even in the area of the standard arguments against this view, such as that based on the logic of ‘by’ and the argument from temporal dimensions, the case against (...)
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    Animalism.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):369-376.
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  5. Animalism vs.David Mackie - 1999 - Lockeanism 49:369-76.
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    Going topless.David Mackie - 1998 - Ratio 11 (2):125-140.
    The view that people go where their brains go remains popular in discussions of personal identity. But since the brain is only a small part of the body, defenders of that view need to provide an account of what it is that makes the brain specially relevant to personal identity. The standard answer is that the brain is special because it is the carrier of psychological continuity. But Peter van Inwagen has recently offered (in Material Beings) an alternative account of (...)
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    Fischer on alternative possibilities and responsibility.David Mackie - 2000 - In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 103--112.
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