Common sense has it that animals matter considerably less than humans; the welfare and suffering of a cow, a chicken or a fish are important but not as much as the welfare and suffering of a human being. Most animal ethicists reject this “speciesist” view as mere prejudice. In their opinion, there is no difference between humans and other animals that could justify such unequal consideration. In the opposite camp, advocates of speciesism have long tried to identify a difference that (...) would fit the bill, but they have consistently seemed to fail. In light of this, some naturally began to appeal to Moorean arguments: the case against speciesism must be flawed somehow, these philosophers maintain, because speciesism is supported by a strong and widespread intuition. This chapter draws on recent findings in social psychology to criticize this defence of speciesism. It argues that the strong and widespread intuition that humans count more than animals is epistemically defective because it is causally shaped by a pair of irrelevant influences: cognitive dissonance and tribalism. Accordingly, it is no suitable basis for a Moorean argument. (shrink)

This paper analyzes recent attempts to reject reproduction with lineage formation as a necessary condition for evolution by means of natural selection :560–570, 2008; Stud Hist Philos Sci Part C Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 42:106–114, 2011; Bourrat in Biol Philos 29:517–538, 2014; Br J Philos Sci 66:883–903, 2015; Charbonneau in Philos Sci 81:727–740, 2014; Doolittle and Inkpen in Proc Natl Acad Sci 115:4006–4014, 2018). Building on the strengths of these attempts and avoiding their pitfalls, it is argued that (...) a robust formulation of evolution by natural selection without reproduction can be established. The main contribution of this paper is a reformulation of Lewontin’s three principles stating that minimal evolution by natural selection occurs when two conditions are met in a population: fitness-related variation and memory. Paradigmatic evolution by natural selection, which can generate adaptations, takes place when an additional condition is present, namely regeneration. (shrink)

Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism, naturalism, and fictionalism. In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they (...) are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists cannot consistently subscribe. This leaves us with only one revisionary solution to the now-what problem. (shrink)

Conversational implicatures do not normally fall within the scope of operators because they arise at the speech act level, not at the level of sub-locutionary constituents. Yet in some cases they do, or so it seems. My aim in this paper is to compare different approaches to the problem raised by what I call 'embedded implicatures': seeming implicatures that arise locally, at a sub-locutionary level, without resulting from an inference in the narrow sense.

In 'Ethics Without Sentience: Facing Up to the Probable Insignificance of Phenomenal Consciousness' (Kammerer, 2022), I argued that phenomenal consciousness is probably normatively insignificant, and does not play a significant normative role. In 'Preserving the Normative Significance of Sentience' (Dung, 2024), Leonard Dung challenges my reasoning and defends sentientism about value and moral status against my arguments. Here I respond to Dung's criticism, pointing out three flaws in his reply. My conclusion is that the view that phenomenal consciousness is distinctively (...) significant is still very much under threat. (shrink)

Cher*** Me revoici après neuvaine. Et aujourd'hui, mon regard porte au large. Et la mer apportera à chaque homme des raisons d'espérer, comme le sommeil la cohorte des rêves. C'est le point où la résidence numérique sur « Rhuthmos », en vient à s'enlacer avec l'exposition que je prépare à la « Galerie des Paysages » durant le festival d'Avignon. Le thème aura trait à une poétique intime — tu fais bien de me rappeler, cher ami, mon abus de langage (...) : je prends cette - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

D'Avignon, en cette nuit du 7 mars Cher **** De nouvelles rêveries m'ont porté vers le cœur de mes structures Lorsqu'on s'y projette, on s'y trouve enveloppé du textile qui abrite mais n'enferme Ni toiles, ni filets, ce sont des jerseys lâches, des tulles diaphanes Des interfaces sensibles, qui au vent s'emplissent et se plissent, et qui bruissent aux flux, et qui vibrent à la terre Des mailles qui distillent les rosées, percolent des alcools, infusent la nuit, pénètrent le jour (...) Et qui pourtant, - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher ***, En ce temps de festival, j'ai le plaisir de te présenter l'exposition que je donne actuellement à la galerie d'Avignon. Le titre en est « Les bateaux ivres de la liberté ». Sache que je dispose de quelques bannettes pour des festivaliers en déshérence dans la ville surpeuplée. Graphisme : FW En ce ci bel été, très cher. Fr - Résidence numérique — François Villais.

Cher*** Je rentre à l'instant des « Iles d'Auvergne », d'où mon silence de ces dernières semaines. La traversée, avec « Gevaudan Airline », ne s'est pas faite sans péripéties. Je m'étendrai, sous peu, sur l'installation pilote « dénouée, déliée, déroulée, dressée » que j'ai pu élever là-bas, et dont je te donne un aperçu ci-dessous. Mais tu voudras bien, avant cela me suivre brièvement dans les étranges fantasmagories qui hantent mon avance vers l'été. « Les chiens de fer » (...) A l'approche d'Avignon, autour de - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Le posé-sol, Dans mes installations, touche à l'origine du mouvement qui me porte. Si je puis rêver un détail achevé, c'est bien celui de ce délicat contact. Mâture : le touché Elle pèse et appuie, mais sans bruire Un touché sans blesser Un posé, mais léger De bambous, infondés Non encastrés, enfoncés, enterrés La surface n'est ni creusée, ni troublée Le mat est creux Sa trace est — moins qu'un disque — un anneau A sa disparition, sur le gazon, ce (...) seul signe Griffe d'un visiteur fugace - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher***, Il est temps de te rapporter le « filage », cette gestuelle que j'ai donnée durant mon séjour aux « îles d'Auvergne », en cette vitalité printanière de fin de mai. Le résultat final, en frange d'univers, est autonome, inattendu, énigmatique et incongru. La structure, arrivée ce matin, repartira sous peu. Anecdote improbable dans le paysage, l'on marche à lui, en cette montagne, et je te donne ci-dessous la scène finale, en son décor naturel : A l'entrée, l'invite : (...) L'appel s'étend loin sur la - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher*** Je m'en viens te soumettre un projet d'exposition à la Galerie des Paysages, à Avignon, durant le festival de théâtre, en juillet prochain. « New York à vif » Une approche de la matière de la ville de New York, au delà du minéral, comme d'un « corps urbain », incarné, quasi charnel. Ce thème s'inscrit dans la continuité de mes travaux et installations de land-art, et de mes expositions, qui prolongent depuis 2002 ma carrière d'architecte, commencée en 1987. (...) Ces recherches sont centrées sur - Résidence numérique — François Villais. (shrink)

Cher ****, Il émane de ma Rêverie d'aujourd'hui un désir de projet de volumes dans le paysage mieux assis et assumé. Détachement progressif des modes d'insertion confortables — qui ont été néanmoins de bons leviers : M'appuyant sur le « land-art », mobiliser le génie du paysage comme plateforme pour des expressions plastiques de grande échelle afin d'en faire émerger du sens. Utiliser le paysage comme environnement harmonique à un statuaire monumental - Résidence numérique — François Villais.

The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called “now-what problem”: if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace (...) our moral beliefs with fictional attitudes, beliefs in natural facts, or conative attitudes. But all these philosophers have set aside an important question about the content of these attitudes: which moral propositions, and more generally which moral theory, should we accept? The present paper addresses this neglected issue, arguing that moral error theorists should adopt a utilitarian moral fiction. In other words, they should accept the set of moral principles whose general acceptance would maximize overall well-being. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against a widely accepted model of utterance interpretation, namely the LS model, according to which the literal interpretation of an utterance (the proposition literally expressed by that utterance) must be computed before non-literal interpretations can be entertained. Alleged arguments in favor of this model are shown to be fallacious, counterexamples are provided, and alternative models are sketched.

In the first English translation of his work, Laruelle explores the major European thinkers from Nietzsche to Derrida to define his own 'non-philosophical' ...

On the basis of two thought experiments, I argue that self-building technologies are possible given our current level of technological progress. We could already use technology to make us instantiate selfhood in a more perfect, complete manner. I then examine possible extensions of this thesis, regarding more radical self-building technologies which might become available in a distant future. I also discuss objections and reservations one might have about this view.

Illusionists claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Most debates concerning illusionism focus on whether or not it is true—whether phenomenal consciousness really is an illusion. Here I want to tackle a different question: assuming illusionism is true, what kind of illusion is the illusion of phenomenality? Is it a “rich” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incorrect representation—or a “sparse” illusion—the cognitively impenetrable activation of an incomplete representation, which leads to drawing incorrect judgments? I (...) present this distinction and I classify the most influential illusionist theories along this line of divide. I then offer an argument against the accounts of the illusion of phenomenality in terms of sparse illusion. (shrink)

This paper is about the Descriptivism/Singularism debate, which has loomed large in 20-century philosophy of language and mind. My aim is to defend Singularism by showing, first, that it is a better and more promising view than even the most sophisticated versions of Descriptivism, and second, that the recent objections to Singularism (based on a dismissal of the acquaintance constraint on singular thought) miss their target.

The following pages, which deal with the pre-history of the concept of history from Homer to Herodotus, first propose to decenter and historicize the Greek experience. After briefly presenting earlier and different experiences, they focus on three figures: the soothsayer, the bard, and the historian. Starting from a series of Mesopotamian oracles , they question the relations between divination and history, conceived as two, certainly different, sciences of the past, but which share the same intellectual space in the hands of (...) the same specialists. The Greek choices were different. Their historiography presupposes the epic, which played the role of a generative matrix. Herodotus wished to rival Homer; what he ultimately became was Herodotus. Writing dominates; prose replaces verse; the Muse, who sees and knows everything, is no longer around. So I would suggest understanding the emblematic word "historia" as a subsititute, which operates as an analogue of the omnivision of the Muse. But before that, Herodotean "invention"- the meeting of Odysseus and the bard Demodocus, where for the first time the fall of Troy is told-can be seen as the beginning, poetically speaking at least, of the category of history. (shrink)

Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from (...) discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature. (shrink)

Review of Insensitive Semantics, by H. Cappelen and E. Lepore.

L'auteur consacre sa réflexion à l'amplification et à l'achèvement de la non-philosophie, en combinant science et philosophie qui sont considérées comme des variables définissant un espace ondulatoire et particulaire de l'opération de penser.

A defence of the 'pragmatic' theory of anaphora (which stresses the analogy between anaphora and deixis) against an argument put forward by Gareth Evans.

I distinguish, and discuss the relations between, five types of context-shift involving indexicals. For 'intentional' indexicals - indexicals whose value depends upon the speaker's intention - we can shift the context more or less 'at will', by manifesting one's intention to do so. For other indexicals we can shift the context through pretense. Following a number of authors, I distinguish two types of context-shifting pretense, corresponding to two sets of linguistic phenomena. The fourth type of case is that of expressions (...) which are not really indexical, but perspectival, and for which we do not need to appeal to the notion of context-shift in order to account for their shifty behaviour. The fifth category I introduce and discuss is that of 'shiftable indexicals'. Do we need it, given that we already have the other four categories? My answer is a qualified 'yes'. (shrink)

A historical overview, with an attempt to rebut Grice's argument against Contextualism.

In the beginning of this article, the author discusses the biographical context of his engagement in the French translation of Sein und Zeit in the 1980s, under the guidance of Jean Beaufret. He integrates the discussion into the general problem of philosophical translation. The author argues that one of the most important things in this matter is the decision of translating. Concerning Heidegger translations, the author – answering to some critics he received – insists upon the idea of the intimate (...) relationship between thinking and poetry, justifying his constant appeal to examples from literature in his translator’s notes at the end of his version of Sein und Zeit. (shrink)

A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.

It is argued there is nothing special or deviant about the use of 'now' to refer to a time in the past (or about the use of 'here' to refer to a distant place) — no need to appeal to pragmatic mechanisms such as context-shifting to account for such uses. Such uses are puzzling only if one (mistakenly) maintains that 'here' and 'now' are pure indexicals. In the paper it is claimed that they are more similar to demonstratives than to (...) pure indexicals. Updated material on this can be found in *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, Chapter 6, 2010. (shrink)

Mental files, in Recanati's framework, function as 'singular terms in the language of thought' ; they serve to think about objects in the world (and to store information about them). But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files, Recanati introduces the notion of an 'indexed file', i.e. a vicarious file that stands, in the subject's mind, for another subject's file (...) about an object. Using that notion, he argues, one can provide an analysis of attitude ascriptions and the conniving use of empty singular terms. (shrink)

Our societies are marked by anthropocentrism: most people treat animals in ways in which they would by no means treat fellow humans. One might nonetheless expect this prejudice to be much less prevalent in animal shelters since these places are created for the very sake of non-humans and generally managed by people who truly care about animal welfare. This chapter questions this expectation. It discusses three practices that are widespread in animal shelters and yet could be suspected of anthropocentrism: killing (...) animals for lack of resources, partnering with the livestock industry, and feeding animals meat. Drawing on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory, the chapter argues that management euthanasia and cooperation with animal agriculture are acceptable in non-ideal theory even though they would be condemned by ideal theory. Then it argues that meat-based pet food should be rejected even in the non-ideal circumstances faced by animal shelters. (shrink)

Response to Carston's paper, 'How Many Pragmatic Systems Are There'?