Laws form counterfactually stable sets -- Natural necessity -- Three payoffs of my account -- A world of subjunctives.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Many philosophers argue that explanatoriness plays no special role in confirmation – that “inference to the best explanation” (IBE) incorrectly demands giving hypotheses extra credit for their potential explanatory qualities beyond the credit they already deserve for their predictive successes. This paper argues against one common strategy for responding to this thought – that is, for trying to fit IBE within a Bayesian framework. That strategy argues that a hypothesis’ explanatory quality (its “loveliness”) contributes either to its prior probability or (...) to its likelihood. This paper argues that this strategy fails because it must give different treatments to two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. The strategy therefore loses the insight into scientific reasoning that its reconstruction in terms of IBE is supposed to provide. The paper then provides a Bayesian account of the confirmatory role of explanatoriness that represents explanatory quality as having an impact in the same place for two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. This approach works by “putting explanation back into IBE” – that is, by invoking hypotheses that refer explicitly to scientific explanation and by invoking the agent's background opinions regarding the kind of explanation that the evidence is liable to have. On this approach, there is no list of “explanatory virtues” the possession of which always helps to make an explanation better. Rather, for different facts, there are different characteristics that our background knowledge of other explanations gives us some reason to expect the given fact's explanation to possess. (shrink)

Philosophers who regard some mathematical proofs as explaining why theorems hold, and others as merely proving that they do hold, disagree sharply about the explanatory value of proofs by mathematical induction. I offer an argument that aims to resolve this conflict of intuitions without making any controversial presuppositions about what mathematical explanations would be.

Fine and Rosen have argued that normative necessity is distinct from and weaker than metaphysical necessity. The first aim of this paper is to specify what it would take for this view to be true—that is, what normative necessity would have to be like. The author argues that in order for normative necessity to be weaker than metaphysical necessity, the metaphysical necessities must all be preserved under every counterfactual antecedent with which they are all collectively logically consistent—even when their preservation (...) requires that a normative necessity fail to be preserved. By exhibiting some examples that fail to display this pattern of counterfactual invariance, the author argues against the view that normative necessity is weaker than metaphysical necessity. To give this argument is the second aim of this paper. (shrink)

Existing discussions of partiality have primarily examined special personal relationships between family, friends, or co-nationals. The negative analogue of such relationships – for example, the relationship of enmity – has, by contrast, been largely neglected. This chapter explores this adverse relation in more detail and considers the special reasons generated by it. We suggest that enmity can involve justified negative partiality, allowing members to give less consideration to each other’s interests. We then consider whether the negative partiality of enmity can (...) be justified through projects or the value inherent in the relationship, following two influential views about the justification of positive partiality. We argue that both accounts of partiality can be conceptually extended to the negative analogue, but doing so brings into focus the problems with such accounts of the grounds of partiality. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 714-719, November 2019.

The concept of transliminality (''a hypothesized tendency for psychological material to cross thresholds into or out of consciousness'') was anticipated by William James (1902/1982), but it was only recently given an empirical definition by Thalbourne in terms of a 29-item Transliminality Scale. This article presents the 17-item Revised Transliminality Scale (or RTS) that corrects age and gender biases, is unidimensional by a Rasch criterion, and has a reliability of .82. The scale defines a probabilistic hierarchy of items that address magical (...) ideation, mystical experience, absorption, hyperaesthesia, manic experience, dream interpretation, and fantasy proneness. These findings validate the suggestions by James and Thalbourne that some mental phenomena share a common underlying dimension with selected sensory experiences (such being overwhelmed by smells, bright lights, sights, and sounds). Low scores on transliminality remain correlated with ''tough mindedness'' in on Cattell 16PF test, as well as ''self-control'' and ''rule consciousness,'' whereas high scores are associated with ''abstractedness'' and an ''openness to change'' on that test. An independent validation study confirmed the predictions implied by our definition of transliminality. Implications for test construction are discussed. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science: An Anthology assembles some of the finest papers in the philosophy of science since 1945, showcasing enduring classics alongside important and innovative recent work. Introductions by the editor highlight connections between selections, and contextualize the articles Nine sections address topics at the heart of philosophy of science, including realism and the character of scientific theories, scientific explanations and laws of nature, singular casusation, and the metaphysical implications of modern physics Provides an authoritative and accessible overview of the (...) field. (shrink)

Wilson derives various broad philosophical morals from the scientific role played by the Principle of Virtual Work. He argues roughly that PVW conditionals cannot be understood in terms of things as large as possible worlds; that PVW conditionals are peculiar and so cannot be accommodated by general accounts of counterfactuals, thereby reflecting the piecemeal character of scientific practice and standing at odds with the one-size-fits-all approach of “analytic metaphysicians”; and that PVW counterfactuals are not made true partly by natural laws. (...) I distinguish, elaborate and critically examine various arguments for these morals suggested by the PVW and Wilson’s text, looking especially at what makes a displacement “virtual” and the operation of the conditionals that the PVW takes to express necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium. Ultimately, I do not find the PVW to be especially well suited to support Wilson’s morals; some of these arguments fail, whereas others arise from general considerations rather than having to appeal to anything like the PVW. (shrink)

Solipsism is an extreme position. Ludwig Wittgenstein addressed this position several times over more than 20 years. Wittgenstein first became familiar with solipsism under the title of “theoretical egoism” when reading Schopenhauer at the tender age of 16. Elizabeth Anscombe related a personal conversation in which Wittgenstein said that Schopenhauer's theory of the world “as idea” struck him as fundamentally right, if in need of a few clarifications and adjustments, but that he opposed the theory of the world as will. (...) Wittgenstein's first philosophy was that of Schopenhauer and he was only liberated from it by Frege's conceptual realism. According to Schopenhauer, an “organic” philosophy needs an organic exposition. An organic philosophy stands in contrast to systematic philosophy, which argues sequentially “in the form of a chain” of propositions starting from one fundamental principle. Wittgenstein's overarching aim in the Tractatus is to delimit sense by expounding the limits for the expression of thoughts in language. (shrink)

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of (...) justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof. (shrink)

The pattern of recourse to late medieval church courts suggests how late medieval Christians imagined their Church. Their choice of defendants, crimes, and punishments allowed them to define their communities. In the case of excommunication for debt, the use of procedural excommunications announced from the choir screen after the bidding prayers permitted the exclusion of debtors from the sacramental and economic community. Indeed, failure to pay one’s debts was as uncharitable as usury because the two communities were imperfectly distinguished – (...) until c. 1500. (shrink)

Shastri & Ajjanagadde argue convincingly that both structured connectionist networks and parallel dynamic inferencing are necessary for reflexive reasoning - a kind of inferencing and reasoning that occurs rapidly, spontaneously, and without conscious effort, and which seems necessary for everyday tasks such as natural language understanding. As S&A describe, reflexive reasoning requires a solution to thedynamic binding problem, that is, how to encode systematic and abstract knowledge and instantiate it in specific situations to draw appropriate inferences. Although symbolic artificial intelligence (...) systems trivially solve the dynamic binding problem using computers' registers and pointers, it has remained a difficult problem for connectionist systems. S&A's temporal synchrony solution to the dynamic binding problem using synchronous firing of argument units and the entities that are bound to them illustrates one way in which connectionist networks can do thisusing a constrained but important class of long-term knowledge rules. Their structured connectionist solution allows dynamic inferencing to proceed in parallel and therefore has a number of advantages for reflexive reasoning over most other connectionist and symbolic systems. (shrink)

The contrast between the Marxian emancipatory project and what the progressive left has made of it has never been more glaring than now, a time in which capital no longer seems to confront a political barrier. It is this predicament that The Conformist Rebellion evaluates, for a renewed approach to emancipation from capital.

The quality of the animal-human relationship and, consequently, the welfare of animals can be improved by gentle interactions such as stroking and talking. The perception of different stimuli during these interactions likely plays a key role in their emotional experience, but studies are scarce. During experiments, the standardization of verbal stimuli could be increased by using a recording. However, the use of a playback might influence the perception differently than ‘live’ talking, which is closer to on-farm practice. Thus, we compared (...) heifers’ (n = 28) reactions to stroking while an experimenter was talking soothingly (‘live’) or while a recording of the experimenter talking soothingly was played (‘playback’). Each animal was tested three times per condition and each trial comprised three phases: pre-stimulus, stimulus (stroking and talking) and post-stimulus. In both conditions, similar phrases with positive content were spoken calmly, using long low-pitched vowels. All tests were video recorded and analyzed for behaviors associated with different affective states. Effects on the heifers’ cardiac parameters were assessed using analysis of heart rate variability. Independently of the auditory stimuli, longer durations of neck stretching occurred during stroking, supporting our hypothesis of a positive perception of stroking. Observation of ear positions revealed longer durations of the back up position and less ear flicking and changes of ear positions during stroking. The predicted decrease in HR during stroking was not confirmed; instead we found a slightly increased mean HR during stroking with a subsequent decrease in HR, which was stronger after stroking with live talking. In combination with differences in HRV parameters, our findings suggest that live talking might have been more pleasurable to the animals and had a stronger relaxing effect than ‘playback’. The results regarding the effects of the degree of standardization of the stimulus on the variability of the data were inconclusive. We thus conclude that the use of recorded auditory stimuli to promote positive affective states during human-animal interactions in experimental settings is possible, but not necessarily preferable. (shrink)