This series will include monographs and collections of studies devoted to the investigation and exploration of knowledge, information, and data-processing systems of all kinds, no matter whether human, (other) animal, or machine. Its scope is intended to span the full range of interests from classical problems in the philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology through issues in cognitive psychology and sociobiology (concerning the mental capabilities of other species) to ideas related to artificial intelligence and computer science. While primary emphasis will (...) be placed upon theoretical, conceptual, and epistemological aspects of these problems and domains, empirical, experimental, and methodological studies will also appear from time to time. While most philosophers and psychologists tend to believe that the rise of cognitive psychology has occurred concomitant with the decline of operant psychology, Terry L. Smith contends that nothing could be further from the truth. He maintains that operant psychology has discovered (and continues to discover) reasonably well-confirmed causal principles of intentional behavior, which go beyond what cognitive psychology can provide, while cognitive psychology, in tum, has the potential to supply analyses (and explanations) that account for them. Smith thus advances a surprising but nonetheless illuminating perspective for appreciating the place of operant conditioning within the discipline of psychology in this rich and fascinating work. J. H. F. (shrink)

Are there universal structures or stages of experience, so-called contemplative landmarks, that unfold during meditative practice? As commonly described in contemplative manuals or handbooks, there is a transition from a form of meditation where the subject must exert continual effort in order for consciousness to remain focused. As Kenneth Rose has recently shown, these manuals, stemming from the Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian traditions, agree that a transition will take place from effortful meditation into a state where attention is fixed or (...) locked in on the meditation object. This article describes the micro-phenomenology of this phenomenon, sometimes called dhyana or access concentration, from the first-person perspective. This study both confirms and refines the traditional account, engaging with certain difficulties involved in establishing a correspondence between traditional, clear-cut, and sometimes contradictory concepts and actual experiences, which can be hard to conceptualize precisely. (shrink)

Most of the issues in the philosophy of mind were formulated long before Charles Darwin produced a scientific theory of biological evolution. That theory had an immediate impact on issues in many areas. But on the philosophy of mind its impact was delayed, and discussions continued for some time as though Darwin had never existed. Even today this is largely true. Yet a theory whose consequences are so far-reaching, and which has radically altered ideas about living things, was bound, sooner (...) or later, to affect discussions of mental phenomena. The pragmatists were the first group of philosophers to work out in detail a philosophy of mind based on evolutionary principles. Moreover, since they were familiar with classical ideas in the field, they were able to assess the kinds of changes in those ideas which evolutionary principles required. My aim in this paper is to review the main features of their enterprise, and to offer some assessment of it. (shrink)

_Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...) cases, these judgments are self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and the author does not wish to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible. The book will be of interest to scholars working on the issue of self-reflection across a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Can the issue of how important it is whether or not there is a God be decided prior to deciding whether or not there is a God? In this paper, I explore some difficulties that stand in the way of answering this question in the affirmative and some of the implications of these difficulties for that part of the Philosophy of Religion which concerns itself with assessing arguments for and against the existence of God, the implications for how its importance (...) may best be defended within secular academe. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 225 Seiten: 1-18.

SummaryThe traditional account of micro‐reductive explanations, in terms of bridge‐law derivations and attribute‐identities, is subjected to critical analysis. Formal expositions of this approach especially those of R. L. Causey, are shown to have oversimplified certain relations between micro‐parts and wholes, and between identities and explanations, and to have neglected a key difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous micro‐explanatory contexts. An alternative treatment of part‐explanation adequacy is outlined and illustrated.

Utilitarian ethics and metaphysical idealism, especially of a Bradleyan sort, are not usually thought of as natural allies. Yet when one considers that it is a crucial part of utilitarian doctrine that the only genuine value is experienced value and almost the definition of idealism that for it the only genuine reality is experienced reality one should surely suspect that the two views have a certain affinity. The essential impulse behind utilitarianism is the sense that the only criterion of something (...) really being intrinsically good is that it feels good. To the ordinary man to say that something feels good is much the same as saying that it is a pleasure, so that for him it is a small step from identifying good with what feels good to identifying it with pleasure. It suggests itself, then, that the utilitarian is essentially one who thinks that, so far as the good goes, esse ispercipi. In that case the utilitarian is an idealist about value. It does not follow that he should be an idealist about things in general, but it does suggest the converse, that the idealist about things in general might be expected to be a utilitarian in his ethics. (shrink)

Originally published in 1988, this landmark study develops its own positive account of the nature and foundations of moral judgement, while at the same time serving as a guide to the range of views on the matter which have been given in modern western philosophy. The book addresses itself to two main questions: Can moral judgements be true or false in that fundamental sense in which a true proposition is one which describes things as they really are? Are rational methods (...) available in ethics which can be expected to produce convergence on shared moral views on the part of those who use them intelligently? (shrink)

Dada continues to attract a small following among scholars, but has perhaps not yet been recognized as providing invaluable insight into the underlying functions and potentials of culture generally. This article explores the nature and theoretical import of Dada, and two radically different visions of culture as they might try to accommodate and explain Dada. Models of culture taken from Bourdieu and Nietzsche are brought to bear, first on Dada, and then on each other, with the aim of developing a (...) theoretically informed understanding of Dada, and also demonstrating the practical, political and philosophical difficulties involved in choosing between a conflict model of culture and an `existential' model. Ultimately, both models are found to be helpful but insufficient at providing an adequate account of Dada, and it is suggested that present models of cultural analysis can benefit by revisiting both Dada and Nietzsche, trying to incorporate their insights and critically evaluate their visions of culture. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: The process of writing a discussion case study requires that a researcher become embedded in the domain being studied; it entails constructing a reality as it is perceived by the participants; it demands a high level of humility, since complex environments have a tendency to thwart rational reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these very characteristics lead conventional researchers to disparage case writing, even questioning (...) whether it warrants the label of “research.” The propositions of second-order cybernetics offer a glimmer of hope to those of us who continue to write cases, as they inform us that what we are doing is science, just a different flavor of science. (shrink)

This paper develops an explicit, pragmatic solution to the problem of deciding when an explanans which only approximately "covers" a desired event-explanandum E is acceptable as an adequate explanation. It shows in detail how comparisons made by the explanation's audience with the numerical value in E are what determine how closely E must be approximated for success. With the aid of several physics examples, it spells out the principles that govern these explanandum-comparisons, the conditions under which those principles hold, and (...) the audience traits that influence which comparisons they take seriously. (shrink)

Although context and comparison are widely regarded as vital to explanatory pragmatics, no systematic treatment of them is available which is free from unnecessary vagueness. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to develop a network of clear, explicit principles describing the conditions under which an audience finds a sentential explanation pragmatically adequate. Previous suggestions are spelled out overtly, and revised or rejected when they cannot overcome counter-examples. The roles and interrelationships of type appropriateness, explanatory power and explanatory appeal as (...) pragmatic concepts are examined and clarified. In the process of formulating improved pragmatic principles, misleading assumptions by earlier writers are disclosed, and the logical consequences of each proposal are compared. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination the claim that Galileo was a Platonist. It contends that neither his use of mathematics (as Koyre asserts), nor his hypothetic-deductive method of testing (as Cassirer maintains), nor a realistic interpretation of this abstract theories (as Crombie argues) offers reasonable and consistent evidence that Galileo shared or advocated the metaphysics or methods of Plato.

That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defeated" in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is (...) not. (shrink)

That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defeated" in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is (...) not. (shrink)

This paper inventories the skills needed for success as a technical writer. I argue that while some of these are undeniably vocational, others are general and analytic. With specific examples, I show the relevance of four mainstream philosophical skills to the problem of document design (making distinctions, extracting important patterns, detecting logical structure, and assessing alternatives) and I contend that truly effective technical writing presupposes such skills.

There seem to exist special conditions unique to those scientific explanations which exmploy micro-parts under which alone such explanations are considered intellectually adequate. Two attempts to specify these conditions have been endorsed since antiquity, but serious counter-examples exist for each one. This paper contends that only in certain circumstances may each of the traditional criteria of adequacy be regarded as acceptable, identifies these circumstances, and examines the consequences of adopting such a dualistic or contextual solution to the problem of micro-explanation.

This paper presents preliminary solutions to three conceptual problems posed by the use of triage to sort candidates for scarce medical resources: (1) By what criteria are the candidates grouped? (2) To what extent can triage be justified? (3) Under what conditions are different versions of triage equivalent? Four explicit methods of applying triage are described and compared, with the aid of examples. The extent to which they either maximize expected utility or show cost-benefit dominance is discussed. And cases in (...) which one triage method reduces to another are contrasted with others where no such reduction occurs. (shrink)