Introduction:Prehospital emergency medicine is a specific field of emergency medicine. The basic approach of prehospital emergency medicine is to provide patients with medical intervention at the scene of the incident. This special environment causes health professionals to encounter various problems. One of the most important problems in this field is ethics, in particular questions involving refusal of treatment and the processes associated with it.Objective:The objective of this study is to identify emergency health professionals’ views regarding refusal of treatment.Methods:This study was (...) conducted with 356 health professionals who were on active duty in prehospital emergency health services. The data were collected through a form which included 10 statements. The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statements given by rating them between 0 and 10.Ethical considerations:Before conducting the research, permission was received from the local ethics committee. Participants were given written information about the purpose of the study. Participants were assured that their participation was voluntary.Results:The healthcare professionals with fewer years of experience in the profession and female participants adopted an attitude of giving priority to providing care. Young participants, in general, respected patient autonomy. However, paradoxically, when it comes to emergency medical cases, they expressed an opinion closer to paternalism.Conclusions:This study has found that prehospital emergency health professionals generally respect the patient’s right to refuse treatment; however, they do not prioritize this right when there is a life-threatening situation or when the person does not have decision-making capacity. In these cases, prehospital emergency health professionals tended to adopt a more paternalistic approach. (shrink)

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

We introduce crossed modules in cycloids, as a generalization of cycloids, which are algebraic logical structures arising in the context of the quantum Yang–Baxter equation. As a spacial case, we in particular focus on the crossed modules of $L-$algebras. These types of crossed modules are exceptional, since the category of $L-$algebras is not protomodular, nor Barr-exact, but it nevertheless has natural semidirect products that have not been described in category theoretic terms. We identify crossed ideals of crossed module in $L-$algebras, (...) and obtain some characteristics of these objects that are normally not encountered on crossed modules of groups or algebras. As a consequence, we characterize crossed self-similarity completely in terms of properties of $L-$algebras and the boundary map forming the crossed module. (shrink)

Pionnière dans la pénalisation du viol en 1980, la France a été en eurocrime qu’aurait entraîné l’unanimité dans l’acceptation de la nouvelle définition proposée par la Commission européenne. L’absence de consentement devient finalement pour tous le critère principal, et de nombreux pays ont aligné récemment leur législation avec la directive européenne. Sur le droit à l’avortement, la convergence est moins sensible, plusieurs pays mettent d’importantes restrictions. La constitutionnalisation de la liberté d’avorter et de sa garantie en France va peut-être conduire (...) à son inscription dans les droits humains. (shrink)

The use of ensemble learning, deep learning, and effective document representation methods is currently some of the most common trends to improve the overall accuracy of a text classification/categorization system. Ensemble learning is an approach to raise the overall accuracy of a classification system by utilizing multiple classifiers. Deep learning-based methods provide better results in many applications when compared with the other conventional machine learning algorithms. Word embeddings enable representation of words learned from a corpus as vectors that provide a (...) mapping of words with similar meaning to have similar representation. In this study, we use different document representations with the benefit of word embeddings and an ensemble of base classifiers for text classification. The ensemble of base classifiers includes traditional machine learning algorithms such as naïve Bayes, support vector machine, and random forest and a deep learning-based conventional network classifier. We analysed the classification accuracy of different document representations by employing an ensemble of classifiers on eight different datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that the usage of heterogeneous ensembles together with deep learning methods and word embeddings enhances the classification performance of texts. (shrink)

Le mot de « phallocratie » des années 1970 est remplacé par celui de « patriarcat » dans le mouvement des femmes des années 2010. Ce changement s’accompagne d’une dépolitisation du mouvement, aujourd’hui soucieux, avant tout, d’obtenir des actions gouvernementales efficaces, et ouvert à toutes les opinions politiques. Il s’ensuit une forte demande de moralisation des comportements comme en témoigne le travail de l’unité de « dépatriarcalisation » du ministère du tourisme en Bolivie.

L’histoire politique du Bangladesh, complexe et contradictoire, démonte tous les fantasmes entretenus aujourd’hui sur l’islam, érigé en ennemi global prenant la suite du défunt communisme. Le pays est devenu indépendant en 1971 après une guerre de libération meurtrière qui a vu sa population musulmane s’affronter au Pakistan, créé par l’ex-colonisateur anglais de l’Inde comme nation musulmane. Son gouvernement s’affirme d’abord laïc avant de décréter l’islam religion d’État et d’entamer une profonde réislamisation de la société. Aujourd’hui cette dictature militaire islamique avec (...) à sa tête la Ligue Awami, l’ancien parti indépendantiste, a liquidé régulièrement toutes ses oppositions politiques au nom de la lutte anti-terroriste mondiale. (shrink)

« An anthropologist from the suburbs to the world. » I had never been to the suburbs and had never had any contact with a working-class population. I was in a position of total discovery, both social and imaginary. I was 25 years old and the women I was interviewing were 35 to 40. It was a kind of social relation I had never experienced. That was still the late 60s/70s, when there was this immense desire for the unknown, when (...) the other was everything. (shrink)

Résumé Je n’étais jamais allée en banlieue et je n’avais jamais eu de contact avec une population ouvrière auparavant. J’étais dans une position de découverte complète, sociale et imaginaire. J’avais vingt-cinq ans et les femmes que j’interviewais avaient trente-cinq à quarante ans. C’était un type de rapport social que je n’avais jamais connu. Au tournant des années 1960-1970, il y avait un immense désir de l’ailleurs et l’autre était survalorisé.

Un nouveau discours politique prétend restaurer le peuple dans sa dignité en s’attaquant aux timides réformes multiculturalistes de ces dernières années. Une nouvelle séparation sociale est revendiquée en termes ethnoculturels, notamment dans le domaine scolaire, pour faire réapparaître les distances sociales qui ne peuvent plus être parlées en termes de classes.

This paper will examine a sample case encountered by ambulance staff in the context of the basic principles of medical ethics.An accident takes place on an intercity highway. Ambulance staff pick up the injured driver and medical intervention is initiated. The driver suffers from a severe stomach ache, which is also affecting his back. Evaluating the patient, the ambulance doctor suspects that he might be experiencing internal bleeding. For this reason, venous access, in the doctor's opinion, should be achieved and (...) the patient should be quickly started on an intravenous serum. The patient, however, who has so far kept his silence, objects to the administration of the serum. The day this is taking place is within the month of Ramadan and the patient is fasting. The patient states that he is fasting and that his fast will be broken and his religious practice disrupted in the event that the serum is administered. The ambulance doctor informs him that his condition is life-threatening and that the serum must be administered immediately. The patient now takes a more vehement stand. ‘If I am to die, I want to die while I am fasting. Today is Friday and I have always wanted to die on such a holy day,’ he says. The ambulance physician has little time to decide. How should the patient be treated? Which type of behaviour will create the least erosion of his values? (shrink)