Gupta’s gambit

Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39 (2011)
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Abstract

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

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Selim Berker
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Coherentism via Graphs.Selim Berker - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):322-352.
On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.
Replies to Selim Berker and Karl Schafer.Anil Gupta - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):41 - 53.
Adam Marushak on the hypothetical given.Anil Gupta - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):167-174.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

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