L’essai analyse la structure de la philosophie politique de Fichte en l’inscrivant dans le contexte formé par les concepts politiques mis en place par la doctrine du droit naturel. De cette science, qui a pour éléments principaux les droits des individus, la souveraineté et la représentation, Fichte découvre la logique, qu’il poursuit jusqu’à son aporie constitutive. Dans la période de maturité de sa pensée, le philosophe paraît dépasser l’autosuffisance du droit naturel en direction d’une philosophie de la pratique, ce qui (...) semble conforme à l’évolution de la Doctrine de la Science.Duso’s essay focuses on Fichte’s political philosophy stressing its relation to the context of modern political concepts and their origin within the modern science of natural right. Fichte analyses its elements and thinks back over its logic, showing its aporetical core. In the years of his maturity Fichte seems to go beyond the self-sufficiency of natural rights theories towards a philosophy of practice more consonant with the developments of his Doctrine of the Science. (shrink)

Este texto se propone afrontar el problema del método en relación con los conceptos políticos necesarios para pensar Europa. Esto implica una reflexión de tipo filosófico- político y un cuadro de orientación histórico-conceptual. Se hace necesaria la referencia a un extenso trabajo crítico acerca de los conceptos políticos modernos que pone en cuestión su pretendida universalidad sin dejar por ello de discutir a la vez con el pensamiento de una larga tradición que encuentra su origen en el mundo griego. No (...) parece posible afrontar y comprender los problemas surgidos a partir del proceso que lleva a la Unión Europea a través de los conceptos que han dado lugar a la doctrina del Estado y que vertebran las constituciones modernas. Estos conceptos nacen en el seno de las doctrinas del contrato social y del derecho natural y resultan funcionales para una forma política que tiene como polos inseparables los derechos de los individuos y la soberanía del cuerpo político. Europa, precisamente por la pluralidad de los miembros que la constituyen, requiere, por una parte, de una superación del concepto de soberanía de los Estados y, por otra, debe no pensarse a sí misma como una nueva soberanía, o como una nueva y más amplia dimensión estatal. La superación de la conceptualidad política que se condensa en la soberanía comporta al mismo tiempo el repensar aquellos conceptos —como individuo, igualdad, libertad— que, en el modo en que han sido pensados a partir del iusnaturalismo moderno, aparecen como los fundamentos lógicos de la soberanía. (shrink)

Este ensayo se centra en la democracia entendida como forma política, como constitución democrática. El concepto de poder del pueblo indica, por una parte, un poder absoluto al que someterse, y, por otra, tiende a negar la sumisión en cuanto tal. Los dos conceptos fundamentales de la constitución democrática, la soberanía del pueblo y la representación política , que surgen para mostrar cómo el poder es de todos, en realidad crean un hiato estructural que impide pensar en la dimensión política (...) de los ciudadanos. En la base de la aporía se encuentra el ideal de la libertad y la libertad incondicional del individuo, la cual se afirma mediante la negación de la relación de gobierno. Esta incondicionalidad de la voluntad se convierte en el elemento fundador de la racionalidad formal propia de la legitimación democrática. Sólo la conciencia de la centralidad de la cuestión del gobierno, incluso en el interior de la democracia y más allá de su dispositivo legitimador, puede mostrarnos la vía para repensar a los ciudadanos como sujetos capaces de acción política. (shrink)

Cet ensemble d’études se présente comme un parcours dans l’histoire de la philosophie politique, orienté et déterminé par un questionnement sur les catégories propres à la démocratie : l’individu et sa volonté, l’égalité et la liberté, le peuple et la représentation. Partant du constat qu’aujourd’hui la démocratie constitue notre horizon de pensée (ce « notre » serait d’ailleurs à discuter) en apparence indépassable et que les catégories qui lui sont associées ont acquis une valeur d’évidence..

This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive sci- entists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and philosophers of science. Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psy- chology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not suffi- (...) cient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a crucial issue. Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satis- factory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behav- ioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of relationship between those models? (shrink)

The moving spotlight account (MS) is a view that combines an eternalist ontology and an A-theoretic metaphysics. The intuition underlying MS is that the present time is somehow privileged and experientially vivid, as if it were illuminated by a moving spotlight. According to MS-theorists, a key reason to prefer MS to B-theoretic eternalism is that our experience of time supports it. We argue that this is false. To this end, we formulate a new family of positions in the philosophy of (...) time, which differ from MS in that, intuitively, they admit a plurality of moving spotlights. We argue that these ‘deviant’ variants of MS cannot be dismissed as conceptually incoherent, and that they are as well-supported by our experience as is MS. One of these variants, however, is consistent with the B-theory. Thus, if our experience of time supports MS, then it supports the B-theory as well. (shrink)

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is ‘open’, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open (...) futurists must adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of “actual future”, it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions. (shrink)

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...) rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration. (shrink)

Accidents involving autonomous vehicles raise difficult ethical dilemmas and legal issues. It has been argued that self-driving cars should be programmed to kill, that is, they should be equipped with pre-programmed approaches to the choice of what lives to sacrifice when losses are inevitable. Here we shall explore a different approach, namely, giving the user/passenger the task of deciding what ethical approach should be taken by AVs in unavoidable accident scenarios. We thus assume that AVs are equipped with what we (...) call an “Ethical Knob”, a device enabling passengers to ethically customise their AVs, namely, to choose between different settings corresponding to different moral approaches or principles. Accordingly, AVs would be entrusted with implementing users’ ethical choices, while manufacturers/programmers would be tasked with enabling the user’s choice and ensuring implementation by the AV. (shrink)

So-called Locke's thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke's thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of (...) the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke's thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic discussion, mainly for non-economists, on economic approaches to the concept of sustainable development. As a first step, the concept of sustainability is extensively discussed. As a second step, the argument that it is not possible to consider sustainability only from an economic or ecological point of view is defended; issues such as economic-ecological integration, inter-generational and intra-generational equity are considered of fundamental importance. Two different economic approaches to environmental issues, i.e. neo-classical environmental economics and ecological (...) economics, are compared. Some key differences such as weak versus strong sustainability, commensurability versus incommensurability and ethical neutrality versus different values acceptance are pointed out. (shrink)

There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, P(if A then B), is the conditional probability of B given A, P(B|A). We identify a conditional which is such that P(if A then B)=P(B|A) with de Finetti's conditional event, B|A. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate (...) how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to B|A from A and B can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals. (shrink)

CHAPTER Structure and function In physical systems made by a large number of basic constituents one can observe collective properties which find their ...

In this Introduction we lay out the context of a ‘Continental philosophy of biology’ and suggest why Georges Canguilhem’s place in such a philosophy is important. There is not one single program for Continental philosophy of biology, but Canguilhem’s vision, which he referred to at one stage as ‘biological philosophy’, is a significant one, located in between the classic holism-reductionism tensions, significantly overlapping with philosophy of medicine, philosophy of technology and other themes moving away from the more common existential and (...) phenomenological motifs of post-war European thought. Chapters examine (among other themes) his relation to Lebensphilosophie, to authors such as Kant, Nietzsche and Marjorie Grene, and to current theoretical biology. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the recent prominence of the term “problem” in the humanities, few scholars have analysed its history. This essay tries to partially fill that lack, principally covering the period from late modernity through to the 1960s, in order to understand the role that the term plays in “Continental” philosophy, with special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze. This analysis focuses on the strategies employed by different agents to define “philosophical” problems, or “philosophical” ways of posing problems. The term, originally (...) used in antiquity by knowledge-producers located in an autonomous position, implied an idea of cognition oscillating between production and reproduction. Once the term escaped the context of geometry, it was involved in symbolic struggles that radicalized during modernity. The Kantians placed “philosophy” in a supposedly neutral position of science treating “the problem of all the problems” and invented a new genre, the “history of philosophy,” focusing on the analysis of “philosophical problems.” This approach had great institutional success in the German and French universities and clashed, during the twentieth century, with another usage of philosophy as a practice of “dissolution of problems,” developed in the United Kingdom and the Austro-Habsburg Empire. (shrink)