François Duchesneau. cité de construire un jeu d'expressions symboliques s' emboîtant par paliers et répondant à une norme analogiquement combinatoire. Au sommet de la construction et en assurant l'intégration, figurent des expressions ...

Les notions relatives au vivant jouent un role central dans l'economie interne du systeme de la nature selon Leibniz. Elles ont aussi influe sur les theories qui ont ponctue le developpement des sciences de la vie. Le dessein de cet ouvrage est de traiter de ce double objet. Comment Leibniz dessine-t-il le profil d'une science des vivants suivant un modele en partie inspire de Malpighi? Comment la theorie leibnizienne de la substance influe-t-elle sur la determination du concept de vivant comme (...) machine de la nature? Quel role charniere la dynamique joue-t-elle dans la conception leibnizienne de l' organisme, concept scientifique nouveau en son temps? Echangeant avec des figures majeures de la science et de la medecine de cette epoque, Hartsoeker, Stahl, Hoffmann, Johann Bernoulli, Michelotti et d'autres, comment Leibniz developpe-t-il la vision d'une physique speciale dont le vivant serait l'objet specifique? De quelle maniere le modele leibnizien s'integre-t-il d'emblee dans des theories sur la generation que developpent Conti et Vallisneri, puis Bourguet? Ainsi une exploitation multiforme d'idees leibniziennes sur le vivant pourra-t-elle s'amorcer au siecle des Lumieres. (shrink)

_The first unabridged English translation of the correspondence between Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Georg Ernst Stahl detailing their opposing philosophies_ The correspondence between the eighteenth-century mathematician and philosopher G. W. Leibniz and G. E. Stahl, a chemist and physician at the court of King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia, known as the Leibniz-Stahl Controversy, is one of the most important intellectual contributions on theoretical issues concerning pre-biological thinking. Editors François Duchesneau and Justin E. H. Smith offer readers the first (...) fully annotated English translation of this fascinating exchange of philosophical views on divine action, the order of nature, causality and teleology, and the soul-body relationship. (shrink)

Par-delà le règne, puis l'éclipse, du paradigme newtonien, l'oeuvre philosophique et scientifique de ce penseur qui inventa le calcul infinitésimal, la dynamique et de nouveaux modèles pour la théorie de l'organisme, fournit un point d'ancrage privilégié à l'analyse épistémologique.

The theory of living beings as machines of nature and the conception of composite substances endowed with conjoined souls, entelechies, or monads, as well as that of organic bodies, were solidified over the course of the transformations of Leibniz's thought that issued in the New System of Nature. On this basis, the monadological versions of a system of nature centered upon the integrated organization ad infinitum of living beings were gradually articulated. Leibniz aimed to spell out a science, or physiology (...) of vital processes, that would be, as much as possible, in agreement with the epistemological exigencies of the complex metaphysical model that he had elaborated. On the one hand, Leibniz offers a critical evaluation of the methodological options that divide the allegiances of the physicians and naturalists who are his contemporaries; what is more, he determines the profile of the analyses and explications that are to be promoted. For This double preoccupation translates into the scientific exchanges and correspondences that accompany the construction of the theory of organic bodies as constituents of machines of nature. The author focuses on the particular case of the propositions concerning the science of the living that stem from his reaction to the work of Georg Ernst Stahl. (shrink)

Both Stahl and Leibniz worked out conceptions of the organism that diverged significantly from the mechanistic models involved in the Cartesian dualism of soul and body. In the polemics which developed in 1709-1710 concerning Stahl's Theoria medica vera , Leibniz focused his attacks on what he considered a paralogistic theory of the soul; he wondered in particular how such an abstruse metaphysics could be reconciled with the scientific analysis of vital phenomena. Contrary to Stahl, Leibniz would defend the view that (...) the sufficient reason of organisms at the phenomenal level depends on an integrative combination of specific mechanisms; but the soul conceived as an entelechy needs to be called upon to account for the functional integration of the whole at the substantive level. Thus, the psychic and the somatic would involve a joint rationality unfolding in analogical and expressive relationships. However, both domains would require the use of separate analytic methodologies in any attempt at explaining those relationships. (shrink)

Leibniz differs from Descartes insofar as he submits the search for mechanical explanations to regulatory norms. This is the case, for instance, in dioptrics: provided the law of sines is shown to conform to a sufficient reason of functionality, a relevant mechanical hypothesis is found acceptable. Explaining by means of hypotheses implies a twofold process of connections between an analytic model defining such an order of the elements as may fit the norm of a mathesis, and a presupposed mechanical disposition (...) of the elements such as may produce the constant effects revealed through experience. (shrink)

To paraphrase Locke (Essay, 9-10), Leibniz may be counted among the master-builders of modern science, but also among the philosophical under-labourers who helped clear the ground for scientific knowledge. In the area of natural philosophy, he contributed directly to the advancement of science, but his achievements, for instance the invention of the infinitesimal calculus and the foundation of the dynamics, bore the mark of a philosophical mind and were systematically exploited in furthering significant epistemological objectives. The scope of Leibniz's scientific (...) interest and contributions was broad. (shrink)

Dramatisation d'un dialogue souhaite par Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz mais refuse par John Locke, les Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain mettent en scene Theophile et Philalethe: et Leibniz pouvait ainsi donner la replique a l'Essay concerning Human Understanding de Locke. Longtemps consideres comme la simple synthese de la philosophie leibnizienne, les Nouveaux Essais ne nous presentent-ils pas plutot le philosophe de Hanovre empruntant des pistes originales d'analyse et offrant des orientations epistemologiques plus marquees que dans toute autre de ses oeuvres? S'interessant (...) a l'Essay, Leibniz avait declare:...] j'ai fort medite moi-meme sur ce qui regarde les fondements de nos connaissances....] De toutes les recherches il n'y a point de plus importante, puisque c'est la clef de toutes les autres. Ce sont les tenants et les aboutissants de ce jugement de Leibniz, qui fixait ainsi - par anticipation - le propos des Nouveaux Essais, auxquels les auteurs ont ici consacre leurs analyses. (shrink)

L'une des tâches séculaires de la philosophie est de surmonter ce que Locke nommait l'abus des mots; le dictionnaire des ntions s'efforce de l'accomplir en présentant une technologie des réseaux sémantiques.

Les considérations physiologiques sont étrangères, en tant que telles, au projet de l'Ethique, et sans doute, à l'ensemble des préoccupations philosophiques de Spinoza. Au début de Ia seconde partie de l'Ethique, Spinoza précise clairement: “j'expliquerai seulement ce qui peut nous conduire comme par la main à la connaissance de l’ Arne humaine et de sa béatitude suprême”. Pourtant, le livre ne laisse pas de contenir une révision intéressante du modèle mécaniste que Descartes appliquait à l'explication du corps humain; il contient (...) surtout une hypothèse sur Ia structure organique, qui, nous le croyons, a joué un rôle de modèle pour un certain type de théorie de l'être vivant. Ce type de conception se trouve d'abord dans l'iatromécanisme de Boerhaave et de ses disciples au XVIIIe siècle, mais les séquelles en sont identifiables jusque dans Ia philosophie biologique contemporaine. (shrink)

. G. W. Leibniz did not contribute directly to scientific discoveries in the life sciences, but he provided several relevant analyses on methods of investigation applicable to complex, and in particular organic, phenomena. Leibniz's theory of organic bodies and his methodological model had deep and broad implications for the development of physiology at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This paper focuses on a methodological issue which divided natural philosophers and physiologists during the early Enlightenment—about which Leibniz supported (...) original viewpoints which have kept a certain relevance, mutatis mutandis, in later contexts. The issue in question concerns the relation between the surface organization of phenomena and the deeper organization of underlying micro-structures and micro-processes. In a search for the sufficient reason for phenomena, hypothetical models are called upon to provide determining reasons for surface effects. These reasons represent processes involving micro-mechanisms combined so as to account for the emerging organization. (shrink)

François Duchesneau | : Nicolas de Béguelin, philosophe et scientifique, membre de l’Académie de Berlin, entreprit de concilier des thèses contrastées sur les fondements de la philosophie de la nature, qui semblaient suggérer une antinomie irréductible entre les principes leibniziens-wolffiens et les principes newtoniens. Dans une série de mémoires consacrés à ce projet, il tente d’établir qu’une philosophie expérimentale reste incertaine de ses hypothèses, si elle ne les confronte aux réquisits qu’imposent certains des principes architectoniques dérivant du principe de (...) la raison suffisante. Au coeur de l’argument figure une analyse visant à rattacher le concept de loi de la nature à la catégorie des vérités contingentes. Illustration en est fournie par la « déduction » des lois fondamentales de la mécanique : celles-ci ne sauraient être réduites à des propositions abstraites relevant de la seule nécessité géométrique. C’est en se fondant sur le réquisit de l’harmonie universelle que Béguelin propose des hypothèses sur l’intégration de forces motrices, intégration qui serait sous-jacente à l’inertie des corps, et sur l’espace comme ordre de coexistence des corps qui dépendrait de l’interrelation entre des éléments monadiques. | : Nicolas de Béguelin, philosopher and scientist and a member of the Berlin Academy, undertook to conciliate such conflicting views concerning the foundations of natural philosophy as seemed to suggest an irreducible antinomy between the Leibnizian-Wolffian and the Newtonian principles. In a series of memoirs, he argued that experimental philosophy would remain unsettled about the validity of its hypotheses as long as it failed to check them against requisites arising from architectonic principles and their source in sufficient reason. At the heart of his argument, one finds an analysis of the relationship that holds between laws of nature and contingent truths. Case studies were provided relative to the “deduction” of the fundamental laws of mechanics : these should be in no way equated with abstract statements featuring geometrical necessity. Relying on the requisites of universal harmony, Beguelin framed up hypotheses concerning the integration of motive forces underpinning inertia, as well as concerning space as an order of coexistent bodies that would depend on the interrelation between monadic elements. (shrink)