Gabriel Marcel is a neosocratic philosopher, a permanent questioner in search for truth. His thought, which is not existentialist in a strict sense, is addressed to the other men and tries to arouse their hope and their ability to heart to heart dialogue.

We explore the notion that culture influences people’s values, and their subsequent ideologies and ethical behaviors. We present the idea that culture itself changes with time, and explore the influence of culture and generational markers on consumer ethics by examining differences in these ethical dimensions between Australians, Indonesians, and Indonesian Migrants in Australia, as well as differences between Generation X versus Generations Y and Z. The present study addresses the need to investigate the role that culture plays in consumer ethics, (...) and the interaction between culture and generational attitudes in determining consumer ethics. Results established a distinct multiculturality in our three cultural samples, including a generational cohort differences. This suggests that culture and generational markers influence ethical beliefs, ideologies, and consumer ethics. It further indicates that Indonesian Migrants have acculturated to Australian society both in terms of their values and consumer behaviors, illustrating a crossvergence effect; scores indicate that these Migrants have the highest cultural intelligence among our samples. Implications of the findings for consumer ethics theory and practice are considered and future directions identified. (shrink)

John Jewel, regarded as the principal apologist and theologian for the Elizabethan Church, was also esteemed as one of England’s most important authority on the subject of usury, and therefore was cited frequently by opponents of usury towards the end of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century. One of the most sustained interpretations of Jewel as a theologian on the subject of usury was by Christoph Jelinger, who observed that the late bishop of Sarum employed the same theological (...) method in opposing usury as he did in defending the doctrines and practices of the Church of England against its Catholic opponents, that is, by appealing to the Scriptures, the Church Fathers, Church Councils, and the example of the primitive church. This article seeks to confirm the opinion of Jelinger, and in doing so show that Jewel’s opposition to usury stemmed primarily from the conviction that it was both a vice and heresy that eroded the unifying attribute of Christian society which was love. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The author of a Christian Letter cited a passage from John Jewel’s A Reply to Harding’s Answer in which the first major apologist of the Elizabethan Settlement spoke of the role of faith and the sacraments in union with Christ. Andrew Willet, the likely author of this work, quoted it against Richard Hooker in order to show how the latter contravened the sacramental theology of the national Church as interpreted by Jewel as one of the foremost expositors of its (...) doctrine. Jewel, however, in his Reply to Harding’s Answer, enumerates four means of the Christian’s union with Christ: the Incarnation, faith, baptism, and the Eucharist-a fact overlooked in A Christian Letter by its author in his endeavor to impeach Hooker’s orthodoxy. Proceeding from the observation that both Jewel and Hooker believed that the locus of Christian salvation is union with Christ, this essay compares the two divines’ respective views of this union by examining the manner in which they understand the role of each of these means forming and maintaining this union. On the basis of this comparison, the essay argues that A Christian Letter misrepresented Jewel’s position and that Hooker’s view of union with Christ was essentially the same as the late bishop of Salisbury’s, notwithstanding some differences in detail and emphases. The article concludes with the opinion that Hooker represents continuity of a particular soteriological emphasis in the Elizabethan Church that can possibly be traced back to Jewel as a representative of the Reformed tradition stressing this doctrine. (shrink)

In his Apology of the Church of England as well as many of his other works, John Jewel defended the orthodoxy of the Elizabethan Church on the basis of the following criteria: Scripture, the first four general councils, the writings of the Church Fathers, and the example of the primitive church.1 By emphasizing these authorities, the bishop of Salisbury also sought to impeach the Roman Church’s claim to orthodoxy by arguing that doctrines and practices which developed subsequently to the early (...) church as defined by these criteria contradict them, thereby nullifying its charge of heresy against Protestants while simultaneously indicting the papacy itself as heretical. A question that emerges from studying Jewel’s prodigious polemical works concerns the source of this means of determining orthodoxy. Answering this question requires a close analysis of the apologist’s use of sources. This article will attempt to answer this question by arguing that this criteria for defining orthodoxy derived mainly from canon law tradition that is confirmed specifically by Gratian’s Decretum. This thesis maintains that Jewel’s criteria constituted a form of the ius antiqua with which he attacked the ius novum that provided the authoritative basis for papal supremacy, and in so doing, sought to vindicate the Elizabethan Church’s place in ancient catholic tradition. (shrink)

This article will examine the role the first four ecumenical councils played in the controversial enterprises of John Jewel (1522-71) as well as two later early modern English theologians, Richard Hooker (1553-1600) and George Carleton (1559-1628). In three different polemical contexts, each divine portrays the councils as representing definitive catholic consensus not only for doctrine, but also ecclesiastical order and governance. For all three of these theologians, the manner in which the first four ecumenical councils were summoned and conducted, as (...) well as their enactments touching the Church’s life provided patristic norms for its rightful administration. Jewel, Hooker, and Carleton each argued that the English Protestant national Church as defined by the Elizabethan Settlement exemplified a faithful recovery of patristic conciliar ecclesiastical government as an essential component in England’s overall endeavor to return to the true Church Catholic. Jewel employed these councils in order to impeach the Council of Trent’s (1545-63) status as a general council, and to justify the transfer of the authority of general councils to national and regional synods under the direction of godly princes. Hooker proposes the recovery of general councils as a means of achieving Catholic consensus within a Christendom divided along national and confessional lines while at the same time employing the pronouncements of the first four general councils to uphold the authoritative patristic and catholic warrant for institutions and practices retained by the Elizabethan Church. Finally, amid the controversy surrounding the Oath of Allegiance during the reign of James VI/1 (r. 1603-25), George Carleton devoted his extensive examination of these councils to refute papal claims to coercive authority with which to depose monarchs as an extension of excommunication. In so doing, Carleton relocates this ‘coactive jurisdiction’ in the ecclesiastical authority divinely invested in the monarch, making the ruler the source of conciliar authority, and arguably of catholic consensus itself. (shrink)

Notre science ne saurait être qu’inachevable et infondable. Qu’implique cette situation du discours scientifique selon Pascal? Et quelles significations, existentielles et épistémologiques, accorder au recours inévitable à la « nature »? En quoi la nature est-elle en nous relais du discours?

La notion d’expérience transcendantale correspond dans l’œuvre de Husserl à une reprise radicalement nouvelle du projet classique d’une philosophie première, autre terme employé pour désigner la métaphysique en tant que recherche sur le sens de l’être et sur les principes premiers de sa connaissance. Une telle notion correspond très précisément à ce que Husserl appelle la réflexion phénoménologique transcendantale. Dans ses Méditations cartésiennes, il en livre à la fois le projet et la signi...

The abstract basis of modern computation is the formal description of a finite state machine, the Universal Turing Machine, based on manipulation of integers and logic symbols. In this contribution to the discourse on the computer-brain analogy, we discuss the extent to which analog computing, as performed by the mammalian brain, is like and unlike the digital computing of Universal Turing Machines. We begin with ordinary reality being a permanent dialog between continuous and discontinuous worlds. So it is with computing, (...) which can be analog or digital, and is often mixed. The theory behind computers is essentially digital, but efficient simulations of phenomena can be performed by analog devices; indeed, any physical calculation requires implementation in the physical world and is therefore analog to some extent, despite being based on abstract logic and arithmetic. The mammalian brain, comprised of neuronal networks, functions as an analog device and has given rise to artificial neural networks that are implemented as digital algorithms but function as analog models would. Analog constructs compute with the implementation of a variety of feedback and feedforward loops. In contrast, digital algorithms allow the implementation of recursive processes that enable them to generate unparalleled emergent properties. We briefly illustrate how the cortical organization of neurons can integrate signals and make predictions analogically. While we conclude that brains are not digital computers, we speculate on the recent implementation of human writing in the brain as a possible digital path that slowly evolves the brain into a genuine (slow) Turing machine. (shrink)

The effort to identify the neural substrate of episodic recall, though ambitious, lacks experimental support. By considering the data on c-fos activation by novel and familiar stimuli in recognition studies, we illustrate how inadequate experimental designs permit alternative interpretations. We stress that interpretation of c-fos expression changes should be supported by adequate recognition tests.

Lifestyle refers to a set of personal and group behaviours related to normative and semantic aspects of social life. Any coherent set of behavioural patterns derived from religious teachings that exist in life can be considered a religious lifestyle. Considering that the dominant religion in Jordan is Islam, the present study focused on the Islamic lifestyle. In addition, given that the correct relationship between couples has been compared to life-giving blood in marriage, and since the quality of marital role plays (...) a determining role, the existence of communication skills in any of the couples can generate satisfaction and compatibility, whereas lack of awareness of these skills could cause misunderstandings and tension. Therefore, the current study aims to study the role of the Islamic lifestyle in communication skills of 250 Muslim couples of Jordan (Amman, Zarqa and Irbid) in 2022. Data were collected using questionnaires during four months, and the validity and reliability was confirmed. In addition, data analysis was performed in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and Linear Structural Relations (LISREL) using mean tests and structural equation modelling. According to the results, Islamic lifestyle had a positive, significant effect on the improvement of communication skills in Muslim couples in Jordan (P-value: 0.76; T-value: 7.92). Therefore, it is recommended that more attention should be paid to this issue by families, researchers and cultural authorities in the country.Contribution: Our findings revealed that Islamic lifestyle improved communication skills in Muslim couples, which demands special attention. By adhering to the Islamic lifestyle, couples can influence each other’s knowledge, emotions, education and growth, and try to have a realistic understanding of each other’s desires, needs, living environment and perceptions that each has in life issues. Furthermore, they can organise their role in the common life in appropriate ways to prevent problems and solve them in the event of problems. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

O contexto da educação básica brasileira caracteriza-se, de modo geral, na atuação de docentes com descompassos formativos, que ministram aulas de diversas disciplinas, no caso dos anos iniciais do ensino fundamental, ou que lecionam disciplinas diversas de sua área de formação, no caso das séries finais e ensino médio. Nessa linha, diversos estudos apontam para a evidência de lacunas e imprecisões conceituais no planejamento de intervenções didáticas, devido ao precário desenvolvimento profissional. Desse modo, o presente artigo traz uma revisão teórica (...) sistemática sobre o tema relacionado aos conhecimentos profissionais do magistério e busca contribuir com tal debate, trazendo como resultado a proposta de uma visão do processo de construção de saberes docentes com base em modelos do conhecimento pedagógico de conteúdo articulados com os processos de criação vigotskianos. Tal proposta possibilitou possíveis implicações das articulações apresentadas em associação com as pesquisas relacionadas à formação docente, bem como com propostas formativas, que levem em consideração o contexto cultural do professor, especificamente seus esquemas repertoriais, aqui representados pelo espectro criativo. Desse modo, pretende-se que os contextos formativos utilizem e incrementem o repertório professoral, repertório este fundamental para o desenvolvimento de novos Conhecimentos Pedagógicos de Conteúdo em um caráter transformativo, possibilitando práticas que permitam o desenvolvimento profissional docente. (shrink)

The central point of this essay is to demonstrate the incommensurability of ‘Darwinian fitness’ with the numeric values associated with reproductive rates used in population genetics. While sometimes both are called ‘fitness’, they are distinct concepts coming from distinct explanatory schemes. Further, we try to outline a possible answer to the following question: from the natural properties of organisms and a knowledge of their environment, can we construct an algorithm for a particular kind of organismic life-history pattern that itself will (...) allow us to predict whether a type in the population will increase or decrease relative to other types? Introduction Darwinian fitness Reproductive fitness and genetical models of evolution The models of reproductive fitness 4.1 The Standard Viability Model 4.2 Frequency-dependent selection 4.3 Fertility models 4.4 Overlapping generations Fitness as outcome 5.1 Fitness as actual increase in type 5.2 Fitness as expected increase in type 5.2.1 Expected increase within a generation 5.2.2 Expected increase between generations 5.2.3 Postponed reproductive fitness effects The book-keeping problem Conclusion. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

In 2016, following pandemic influenza threats and the 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease outbreaks, the WHO developed a guidance document for managing ethical issues in infectious disease outbreaks. In this article, we analyse some ethical issues that have had a predominant role in decision making in response to the current COVID-19 pandemic but were absent or not addressed in the same ways in the 2016 guidance document. A pandemic results in a health crisis and social and political crises both nationally and (...) globally. The ethical implications of these global effects should be properly identified so that appropriate actions can be taken globally and not just in national isolation. Our analysis, which is a starting point to test the broader relevance of the 2016 WHO document that remains the only available guidance document applicable globally, concludes that the WHO guidance should be updated to provide reasoned and thoughtful comprehensive ethics advice for the sound management of the current and future pandemics. (shrink)

Il ne faut pas sous-estimer la fonction heuristique de la notion de système dans la constitution du savoir moderne. La dénonciation du système comme clôture empêche de penser ce que contenait de théoriquement révolutionnaire la notion de dictionnaire, d'encyclopédie, de système des sciences considérée dans son rapport à l'idée problématique d'un système du présent historique et de ses tâches pratiques. La fin des systèmes laisse la pensée démunie.

Shapiro and Sober claim that Walsh, Ariew, Lewens, and Matthen give a mistaken, a priori defense of natural selection and drift as epiphenomenal. Contrary to Shapiro and Sober’s claims, we first argue that WALM’s explanatory doctrine does not require a defense of epiphenomenalism. We then defend WALM’s explanatory doctrine by arguing that the explanations provided by the modern genetical theory of natural selection are ‘autonomous-statistical explanations’ analogous to Galton’s explanation of reversion to mediocrity and an explanation of the diffusion ofgases. (...) We then argue that whereas Sober’s theory of forces is an adequate description of Darwin’s theory, WALM’s explanatory doctrine is required to understand how themodern genetical theory of natural selection explains large-scale statistical regularities. 1 Introduction2 Shapiro and Sober’s ‘Epiphenomenalism Do’s and Don’ts’3 WALM’s Explanatory Doctrine4 Galton’s Autonomous-Statistical Explanation5 A Second Example: The Statistical Explanation of the Diffusion of Gases6 Distinguishing Two Theories of Evolution by Natural Selection7 A Possible Objection: Are Statistical Laws Sufficient for Explanation?8 Conclusion. (shrink)

DRACO.WOLFANDDOTCOM.INFO is an interactive proto-videogame installation that immerses users, personified as abstract dragons in a cathartic, stochastic, full-body immersive videogame experience, in cyberspace. The work attempts to playfully shift user consciousness towards non-human embodiment, by real-time 3D meshing the data from the human body into a mirrored abstract, ill-defined dragonic 3D shape. It gifts humans with special virtual powers, such as flying and cusping fireballs, as they fight for their progression in the game-space and facing annihilation, through invisible, interactional camera-based (...) technologies which will be exposed in this paper. Inside the piece’s virtual world, users play as endangered dragons in the XXIst century populated by companies, websites and humanoids eager to stop the mythological beasts. The dragons progress in the game-space by inflicting damage upon the city’s landscape. The stochastic game-space ascends in difficulty as the levels progress, slowly changing the joystick’s response into faster speeds and generating larger city-scapes, inducing the game’s ultimate goal of a cathartic ilinxian state of disruption and otherness in human perception. (shrink)

Cette étude entreprend dans une première partie l’essai de distinguer trois modalités du concept de «reprise» dans la Logique de la philosophie d’Eric Weil : la reprise «redon­dante», la reprise «confondante», et la reprise «innovante», en en donnant des exemples. Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur montre en quel sens la dialectique spéculative hégélienne comporte elle-même des processus de «reprises» spécifiques, en les comparant aux moda­lités weiliennes de la reprise. Enfin, la troisième partie s’attache à déterminer en quel sens la «dialectique (...) réflexive» mise en œuvre dans les propres recherches métaphysiques de l’auteur implique également des processus de «reprise», parents mais distincts des reprises au sens de Weil et de Hegel. La conclusion s’efforce de procéder de façon résumée à une confrontation en réciprocité de ces trois positions de la pensée. (shrink)

Tous les philosophes reconnaissent que tous les hommes aspirent au bonheur mais ils se divisent en deux groupes. Les premiers affirment le caractère illusoire ou accessoire du bonheur au regard de fins supérieures. Pour Pascal, l'homme est impuissant à atteindre le bonheur ; sa quête est la marque et la trace d'un vide que seul Dieu peut remplir. Selon Kant, le bonheur est un concept indéterminé et purement empirique, idéal de l'imagination ; s'il en fait son but, l'individu ne répond (...) pas à l'impératif moral qui est de prendre pour fin le bonheur d'autrui. Kant reconnaît qu'exiger de chacun le sacrifice de son propre bonheur est une maxime contradictoire. Il professe aussi que seule la vertu rend digne du bonheur, mais doit admettre que dans le monde il n'y a pas de lien nécessaire entre la moralité et le bonheur. Pour échapper à ces apories, la raison pratique doit postuler l'immortalité de l'âme et l'existence de Dieu. Les seconds récusent cette hypothèque religieuse et prônent l'acceptation de la vie et la confiance en la raison comme guide dans la conduite de l'existence et la recherche du bonheur. Ils invitent à aimer la vie telle qu'elle nous est donnée et à jouir de son être comme Montaigne le recommande au chapitre XIII du Livre III des Essais. L'indispensable corrélat est de recourir à «la raison vigilante qui recherche avec soin les motifs de ce qu'il faut choisir et de ce qu'il faut éviter et rejette les vaines opinions à cause desquelles le plus grand trouble s'empare des âmes» (Epicure, Lettre à Ménécée). Cet essai s'inscrit dans cette filiation et vise à esquisser une démarche possible. Tout bonheur ne peut être cherché qu'à travers la confrontation avec l'existence. Elle comporte de nombreuses épreuves : consentir aux limites qui enserrent notre condition, dépasser les figures obligées qui se répètent dans nos parcours, assumer les difficultés des relations avec autrui, écarter les illusions dont la dissipation est amère. A l'issue de ce cheminement, il incombe à chacun d'inventer ses propres règles, de tracer son itinéraire afin de saisir les promesses de la vie et de l'art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

André Gallois’s Occasions of Identity is a detailed, well-written presentation and defense of one attempt to solve many of the recently much discussed puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects. It is engaging not only for Gallois’s ingenious attempt to defend his view that objects can be “occasionally identical”—identical at one time but not another —but for his discussion throughout of the puzzles and of alternative solutions. Gallois does a fine job of keeping the motivations for a position, whether (...) his own or others’, in view while working out details and responding to objections. Even where one disagrees, there is excellent food for thought and discussion here. (shrink)

John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at all. But we (...) have strong reasons to think that 3-year-old children have empirical beliefs, or so I argue. If this is the case, McDowell and Brewer’s requirement for one to have empirical beliefs faces a strong challenge. After showing this, I propose an alternative requirement for one to have empirical beliefs, and argue that it should be favoured over McDowell and Brewer’s requirement. (shrink)

Both sides in the debate about scientific realism have argued that their view provides a better account of actual scientific practice. For example, it has been claimed that the practice of theory conjunction presupposes realism, and that scientists' use of multiple and incompatible models presupposes some form of instrumentalism. Assuming that the practices of science are rational, these conclusions cannot both be right. I argue that neither of them is right, and that, in fact, all scientific practices are compatible with (...) both realism and instrumentalism. I also repudiate van Fraassen's argument to the effect that the instrumentalist account of scientific practice is logically weaker, hence better, than the realist account. In the end, there are no scientific practice arguments on the table that support either side of the debate. It is also noted that the deficiencies of van Fraassen's argument are recapitulated in Putnam's miracle argument for realism. My pessimistic assessment of the state of the debate is reminiscent of Arthur Fine's. However, Fine's argument for the ‘natural ontological attitude’ once again repeats the problems of van Fraassen's and Putnam's arguments. (shrink)

My topic is extraterrestrial intelligence. Following current conventions, I use the abbreviation ‘ETI’ to stand for three related concepts: the abstract idea of extraterrestrial intelligence, individuals who are both extraterrestrial and intelligent, and the hypothesis that there are ETIs. SETI is the search for ETIs, and CETI is the attempt to communicate with ETIs. In this paper, I will try to answer the two most basic questions in extraterrestrial studies. First, what is the status of the ETI hypothesis? In the (...) light of what we know, how likely is it that there are ETIs? Secondly, what is the value of pursuing SETI? Are the expected epistemic and pragmatic payoffs sufficient to warrant an extensive search? The first, substantive question is discussed in Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4. The second, ‘program evaluation’ question is the subject of Section 5 and Section 6. But first we'll take a brief look at some of the early history of the topic. (shrink)

The problem of scientific disregard is the problem of accounting for why some putative theories that appear to be well-supported by empirical evidence nevertheless play no role in the scientific enterprise. Laudan and Leplin suggest (and Hoefer and Rosenberg concur) that at least some of these putative theories fail to be genuine theoretical rivals because they lack some non-empirical property of theoreticity. This solution also supports their repudiation of the thesis of underdetermination. I argue that the attempt to provide criteria (...) of theoreticity fails, that there is a Bayesian solution to the problem of scientific disregard that fares better, and that this successful solution supports a distinctively Bayesian version of the underdetermination thesis. (shrink)

To overcome the ‘expectation gap’ the auditor has to encourage the auditee to enter into a dialogue. The author is Professor of Accounting and Auditing at the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Vice‐President of the American Accounting Association.

In his Perception and Reason, Bill Brewer argues that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs. His argument for this idea relies on a premise according to which in order for the relations with perceptual experience to determine the contents of empirical beliefs, these relations must be reason-giving. He offers an argument for this premise, the so-called Switching Argument. In this paper, I show that the Switching Argument does not work, in (...) which case we have no reason to accept the premise the argument is supposed to establish, and hence no reason to accept Brewer’s argument in favour of the idea that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs. (shrink)