L’Idée de phénoménologie pourrait bien se jouer dans le legs husserlien de deux ou trois formules et leur interprétation par les plus grands – Patočka est assurément l’un d’entre eux : le principe des principes, la merveille des merveilles et l’énigme des énigmes. Revenir au principe des principes est remonter à la source, mais aussi aux difficultés les plus grandes. Le temps d’une phrase, et de combien...

Every reader of Ricoeur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny (...) of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricoeurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap, and of a necessary return. Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricoeur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land. (shrink)

Every reader of Ricœur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny (...) of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricœurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap, and of a necessary return. Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricœur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricœur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of divine revelation as presented by Blaise Pascal, examining the fundamental dichotomy between the hidden and revealed aspects of God. Beginning with the premise of human existence as inherently obscure and lost in the universe without apparent reason, the study delves into Pascal’s inquiry into the origins of human existence and the role of God as both a part of and apart from this primordial darkness. Pascal’s reflections on the incomprehensibility of man before that of (...) God highlight a foundational obscurity, setting the stage for a deeper investigation into the nature of divine revelation. The article contrasts Pascal’s perspective with traditional theological and philosophical views, particularly in relation to the manifest nature of God as commonly interpreted through natural phenomena. It further delves into Pascal’s interpretation of scriptural passages, notably Isaiah 45:15, emphasizing the notion of Deus Absconditus (Hidden God) and its critical role in understanding the paradoxical nature of divine revelation. The article examines how Pascal perceives God’s manifestation through various historical and mystical dimensions, including nature, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist, each revealing God while simultaneously concealing Him. (shrink)

English summary: Kant described phenomenology as that which comes from us, and that which comes to us, a duality that leads towards the theological horizon. Kant opened a field of inquiry that historical phenomenology, born with Husserl and Heidegger, repeated. As with any repetition, criticisms of this do exist, but the dominant theme of its call is there, as well as the question: which voice do we hear? There are many shapes for this call, but each time there is the (...) law and the summons to be, the summons to change your life. Just as there is perhaps God. French description: La phenomenologie n'a pas a inventer les phenomenes - sinon comme on dit inventer un tresor - mais a les faire voir, ou entendre. Kant s'y emploie a sa maniere lorsqu'il fait entendre le ton de voix lie a l'imperatif categorique, celui d'une voix d'airain. C'est la reconduire la pensee a l'eclat d'un fait premier ou puiser ensuite ses ressources: il y a la loi. Kant le decrit comme un appel, a defaut de tout a fait le nommer ainsi, l'interpretant ensuite tout a la fois comme ce qui vient de nous (comme si le sujet ethique se donnait a lui-meme la loi) et ce qui vient a nous (comme si ce meme sujet repondait a la loi venue de Dieu). Prendre au serieux cette dualite suppose que le chantier kantien de l'ethique ouvre alors sur un horizon theologique. Kant ouvre un chantier que la phenomenologie historique, celle qui nait avec Husserl et Heidegger, repete. Comme toute vraie repetition, celle-ci ne va pas sans critique ni deplacement (Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, Jonas), mais le motif de l'appel est bel et bien la. Nous avons ete appeles - la trace laissee en nous par cet appel est trop forte pour que le moindre doute puisse encore s'elever a son propos, mais la question vient aussitot: quelle voix s'est fait entendre? Quel appel nous surprend et nous souleve? Appel de l'etre (Martin Heidegger), appel de l'Autre (Emmanuel Levinas) ou appel de la vie (Michel Henry)? Nous avons ete appeles, affectes, blesses - ce qui brise la vie lui appartient encore, mais qu'est-ce donc qui la brise et la releve? Multiples sont les figures de l'appel, mais a chaque fois il y a la loi et cette injonction d'etre - cette injonction silencieuse a laquelle le poete aura donne son exacte formule: Tu dois changer ta vie (Rilke). Comme il y a peut-etre Dieu. (shrink)

L'oeuvre d'Henri Maldiney (1912-2013) occupe aujourd'hui une place de premier ordre dans le paysage philosophique. Lors même qu'il n'a que tardivement publié son premier ouvrage, Regard Parole Espace, en 1973, le profond renouvellement qu'il a su introduire au sein de la phénoménologie a obligé philosophes, mais aussi psychiatres ou théoriciens de l'oeuvre d'art, à repenser leurs concepts comme leurs pratiques. C'est là ce que ces études, initialement issues d'un colloque interdisciplinaire, entendent méditer. Elles abordent aussi bien la place qui est (...) celle de Maldiney au sein de la tradition philosophique, qu'elles réfléchissent à l'impact de sa pensée sur le traitement des questions psychiatriques et esthétiques. (shrink)

Première partie : Trois chemins. Trois commencements -- Entre sans-nom et nom propre -- L'entre-deux -- Deuxieme partie : Dans ces jours qui sont incertains. Éloge de l'inquiétude : À propos de l'Éloge de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty -- La pensée sans autorité : À partir de Blanchot et Wittgenstein -- L'autorité en défaut : sur l'oeuvre de Kierkegaard -- Troisième partie: Vers le nom propre. L'arc herméneutique d'Emmanuel Falque -- Acheminement vers nom : À partir de Jean-Luc Nancy (...) -- Regards sur Celui que est : En marge de Romano Guardini -- Fin: Apologie du Judgment dernier. (shrink)

Au commencement de la vie religieuse, il pourrait y avoir un verbe humain fait de plus de doute que de savoir, de plus d’inévidence que d’évidence. Deux vers du poète Jules Supervielle portent jusqu’à une expression claire cette expérience encore obscure : Voilà que je me surprends à t’adresser la parole, Mon Dieu, moi qui ne sais encore si tu existes. Ces deux vers constituent l’incipit d’un poème intitulé « Prière à l’inconnu » publié dans le recueil La Fable du (...) monde, et sont cités surtout... (shrink)

C’est en philosophe que Jan Patočka entreprend de répondre à la crise de l’Europe et aux désastres de l’histoire auxquels il est confronté, en revenant à la naissance de la philosophie, non pas dans un simple souci d’histoire, mais en vue d’un nouveau commencement. Il s’appuiera pour cela sur Platon (« Le platonisme négatif », Platon et l’Europe) puis sur les présocratiques (notamment sur Héraclite, dans ses Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l’histoire). C’est alors qu’il peut montrer comment la (...) crise s’inscrit dans la physis et pas seulement dans l’histoire, mais aussi comment, dans l’histoire, des hommes peuvent se dresser pour atteindre un « plus-haut ». (shrink)

En 1972, Emmanuel Levinas ouvre l’article qu’il consacre à Paul Celan par une citation justement célèbre : « Je ne vois pas de différence entre une poignée de mains et un poème ». Ce que voit Paul Celan dans une poignée de mains mériterait assurément de longs commentaires, ce qu’entend Emmanuel Levinas dans ce poème élémentaire est et n’est pas plus simple. D’une certaine manière, la poignée de mains ne dit rien mais elle dit : simple signe lancé à l’autre, (...) elle se résume dans un dire sans di... (shrink)

In this article, the French philosopher Jérôme de Gramont evaluates the modes in which twentieth century philosophy and literature—from Heidegger and Derrida to Blanchot and Beckett—aim to think our being-in-the-world beyond the concept of “man” and without the genus of the human.

Benadering van enkele klassieke filosofische kwesties vanuit een door de Angelsaksische taalfilosofie geïnspireerde visie op de zingevende rede.

G. Deledalle is the author of a Histoire de la philosophie américaine, and of some excellent studies on Dewey, such as La pédagogie de Dewey, philosophie de la continuité, and "Durkheim et Dewey". These are all works that deserve full attention by students of the Golden Age of American philosophy. For a European, Deledalle has an unusual capacity to detect the vitality and freshness, but also the depth, of the growth of higher education in the U.S. in the first half (...) of this century. At the heart of this growth were philosophical ideas, and in particular those of Dewey. Philosophy did not have then dictatorial or competitive designs regarding education, the social and political sciences, psychology, or the natural sciences. It freely mingled with them, not just imparting methodological or epistemological rigor but also contributing some insights and giving the hypotheses and conclusions in these fields the character of "experiences." Experience is the guiding theme of this rich and complicated work, covering a multitude of subjects and positions. The treatment is divided into six parts dealing respectively with Dewey's leanings toward unitary experience, organic experience, dynamic experience, functional experience, instrumental experience, and transactional experience. In the study of the intellectual of Dewey's life practically all of his production is critically examined by Deledalle: a monumental task in itself, made possible by the critical bibliography of Milton Hasley Thomas. There is enough early biographical detail to make this work an effective and affectionate intellectual portrait. The best pages of this work are devoted to a thorough explication and comparative study of Dewey's final synthesis of experience. There are very helpful comparative references to Marx, Freud, Bergson, and Heidegger, and also indispensable parallels and contrasts with Peirce, James, and Whitehead. This is not a modest contribution from a regional point of view: Deledalle is, perhaps more than anybody else, aware of an ongoing international dialogue on Dewey, a dialogue that is preserving experience as a problem-complex at the front line of contemporary reflection.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

Conceived as a set of preliminary explorations to a future study of the problem of meaning and reference by the author, these "inquiries" clarify some questions raised by the specialists in linguistics, caution us about other questions that seem only too easily settled, and generally show, with great abundance of detail, the status of contemporary research on language. Much like Husserl's Logical Investigations, which pioneered the study of correspondences between grammar and logic-ontology, these explorations proceed in a zigzag sometimes emphasizing (...) semiotic issues ; other times tackling important syntactic and semantic problems ; and once coming close to an ontological characterization of language and of the human subject insofar as it uses language. Two features of this work are noteworthy. The first is the abundance of documentation as shown in the multitude of notes: the efforts of Ferrater Mora will spare many hours of work for those who need a guide in "the labyrinth of language." A second feature is the virtuoso performance by the author in the manipulation of, and exemplifications from, a variety of languages. Indagaciones sobre el Lenguaje certainly deserves publication in English.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

The structure of Chiodi's book is based on Vuillemin's important hermeneutical thesis that existentialism is one more step in the program of the romantics to give an absolute foundation to finite reality through the establishment of necessary relations between subjectivity and being. These relations, once revealed, would dispel the facticity and contingency in which the natural world is enshrouded. The role of Heidegger in this tradition involves one further dialectical twist, since Heidegger centers all Western Philosophy, including his own, around (...) the problem of ground in the manner proposed by the romantics. The suggested dialectical twist is then Heidegger's Kehre, a step beyond the radical contingency of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, this contingency, once reached, shows unequivocally the failure of the romantic program. The ground cannot be ontologically connected with any object nor with the subject; it is rather the necessary history of the ground that determines all categorial differentiations in the world, including the reflective differentiation of subject-objects. Thus it becomes important to distinguish Heidegger from Hegel since, in both, history and necessity are characteristics of the ground. Chiodi gets to the bottom of this matter by pointing to the transfer of negativity from the process of history to the end of history. For Heidegger what is necessary is the repeated withdrawal of the ground so that it may never be confused with that which is known in any revelation or through all of them. This move, though clear, would still leave a fundamental ambiguity in the later philosophy of Heidegger: language, which acts as messenger from the ground to the world, must reflect the superabundance of Being from the standpoint of the ground while it only reflects possibilities of being from the standpoint of the world. This is an ambiguity that Heidegger would want to maintain. Chiodi's interpretation of Heidegger as a neo-platonist totally destroys this ambiguity and with it the very delicate balance created by Heidegger between infinite meaning and the ability of finite words to dwell upon it.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

Intended as an introduction of the phenomenological writings of Pfänder to English-speaking readers, this work contains two major essays and two minor selections by Pfänder, plus an introduction and two appendixes by Spiegelberg. Because of its composition, this book should be classified as a Pfänder's anthology centered around a main essay titled "Motives and Motivation." As reasons for the translation and publishing of this main essay, Spiegelberg mentions first its influence on Ricoeur's phenomenology of the will, and secondly its topical (...) affinity with R. S. Peter's The Concept of Motivation, a work considered by Spiegelberg as capable of restoring the importance of the will in Anglo-American philosophy. The other major essay is, curiously enough, the introduction to a text-book in logic written by Pfänder in response to Husserl's own request. The two essays, though different, are not unrelated; they represent the theoretical and practical sides of the unique phenomenological method of constitution. The presence of these two essays, side by side, in this volume raises in fact the question of Pfänder's own understanding of the theoretical unity of thought and action that is the key to phenomenological subjectivity. A clarification of Pfänder's thought on this unity would certainly help us evaluate his contribution to phenomenology. Spiegelberg himself depicts Pfänder as a reasonable phenomenologist, accurate in analysis and moderate in speculative claims, a sober figure indeed in an environment sometimes seen as prone to intellectual excesses.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

El hombre crea su moral tomando en cuenta las aportaciones más íntimas de su espíritu. Así como la historia de la humanidad presenta una serie gradual y emocional de conquistas espirituales, así también la moral se ha logrado a través de la historia, pero siempre sobre el fundamento de la esencia humana, pues no cabe duda de que la jerarquía de los valores depende de cada ser humano. Ella orienta toda su conducta y señala sus grandes metas. El espíritu religioso (...) coloca, en primer término, a los valores de la religión, el moralista a los éticos, el pragmático a los útiles; el estético a las bellas artes, dando preferencia cada una a su valor favorito. (shrink)

Echte Freiheit läßt sich nach Leibniz nicht auf die Möglichkeit reduzieren, so zu handeln, wie man handeln will. Vielmehr muß echte Freiheit mit dem moralischen Verdienst in Verbindung gebracht werden. In diesem Zusammenhang erweist sich die Idee der logischen Kontingenz von besonderer Wichtigkeit. Eine Person hat kein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie blindlings durch das Gute geleitet wird. Sie hat allein dann ein moralisches Verdienst, wenn sie das Schlechte zurückweist und bewußt das Gute wählt, das sich vom Schlechten abhebt. Insofern ist (...) derjenige, der moralisch richtig handelt, sich anderer Möglichkeiten bewußt. Leibniz trägt dieser Erfahrungstatsache durch den Gedanken Rechnung, daß eine freie Handlung logisch kontingent ist. Diesem Gedanken verleiht Leibniz einen metaphysischen Status: die möglichen Welten haben einen objektiven Gehalt. (shrink)