La pregunta acerca de qué es un humano tiene una respuesta trivial: cualquier individuo perteneciente a la especie Homo sapiens. Pero si nos interrogamos por el sentido de lo que es un ser humano, cuáles son los rasgos distintivos respecto de otras especies, cómo evolucionaron y por qué, en qué medida los antecesores nuestros disponían de ellos y dónde y cuándo vivieron esos ancestros, entonces entramos en un terreno de difícil recorrido. En los últimos siete millones de años existieron varias (...) especies a las que cabe llamar «humanas» o, por lo menos, «homínidas». Es éste un repaso breve y muy sintético de lo que supuso tal panorama diverso y dinámico que conduciría, a la postre, a los humanos actuales. Nuestras propias características adquieren una nueva luz cuando se contemplan a lo largo del proceso de su filogénesis. (shrink)

En el primer capítulo de su libro Duchesneau aborda la cuestión de lo que es una especie, algo de difícil solución porque el de especie es un concepto de una potencia heurística inmensa y, a la vez, está lleno de agujeros que se hacen patentes en cuanto se pretende hilar fino para definirlo. Las alternativas entre la especie como grupo reproductivo -la "especie biológica"- y como secuencia evolutiva -la "especie filogenética"-, con sus respectivas precisiones internas, están bien planteadas por el (...) autor. También lo está la más reciente "especie ecológica", de talante adaptacionista. Duchesneau no pretende argumentar en favor de uno u otro concepto, sino indicar que existen, y de su postura aséptica se deduce que, probablemente, es imposible reducir ninguno de esos conceptos al otro. Pero esa conclusión tropieza de inmediato con el asunto que aborda Duchesneau en el epígrafe siguiente de su libro: la taxonomía. Porque en algo coinciden al menos quienes emplean especies biológicas, filogenéticas y ecológicas: en darles un nombre. No es raro, pues, que la sistemática sea en estos momentos una de las disciplinas que tenga más interrogantes por resolver. (shrink)

Human Evolution provides a comprehensive overview of hominid evolution, synthesising data and approaches from fields as diverse as physical anthropology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, genetics, archaeology, psychology and philosophy. The book starts with chapters on evolution, population genetics, systematics, and the methods for constructing evolutionary trees. These are followed by a comprehensive review of the fossil history of human evolution since our divergence from the apes. Subsequent chapters cover more recent data, both fossil and molecular, relating to the evolution of (...) modern humans. A final section describes the evolution of culture, language, art, and morality. The authors are leading experts in two complementary fields of scholarship, physical anthropology and molecular evolution. Throughout the book they successfully integrate their expertise in evolutionary theory, phylogenetics, genomics, cultural evolution, language, aesthetics and morality to produce a cutting edge textbook, copiously illustrated and with an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. It will be suitable for both senior undergraduate and graduate level students taking courses on human evolution within departments of biology, anthropology, psychology and philosophy. The book will also appeal to a more general audience seeking a readable, up-to-date and inclusive treatment of human origins and evolution. (shrink)

Human Evolution provides a comprehensive overview of hominid evolution, synthesising data and approaches from fields as diverse as physical anthropology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, genetics, archaeology, psychology and philosophy. The book starts with chapters on evolution, population genetics, systematics, and the methods for constructing evolutionary trees. These are followed by a comprehensive review of the fossil history of human evolution since our divergence from the apes. Subsequent chapters cover more recent data, both fossil and molecular, relating to the evolution of (...) modern humans. A final section describes the evolution of culture, language, art, and morality.The authors are leading experts in two complementary fields of scholarship, physical anthropology and molecular evolution. Throughout the book they successfully integrate their expertise in evolutionary theory, phylogenetics, genomics, cultural evolution, language, aesthetics and morality to produce a cutting edge textbook, copiously illustrated and with an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. It will be suitable for both senior undergraduate and graduate level students taking courses on human evolution within departments of biology, anthropology, psychology and philosophy. The book will also appeal to a more general audience seeking a readable, up-to-date and inclusive treatment of human origins and evolution. (shrink)

With the discovery of Australopithecus, the concepts of bipedalism, the emergence of the open savannas, and the separation of pongids and hominids (bipedal-savanna-cladogeny; the BSC model) were integrated in an attempt to interpret the keys to the emergence of man. However, palæoclimatology, palaeoecology, and the morphology of A. ramidus and A. afarensis show that early hominids were better adapted to the tropical forest. Consequently, the BSC model is no longer valid, even though the relationship between open savannas and bipedalism can (...) still be invoked to explain cladogeny between Paranthropus and Homo. That the BSC model is still thriving could be due to preconceived ideas as to what constitutes a human being — ideas that are projected into the past to explain our origins. (shrink)

The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, (...) which is in general reductionist, but which retains the computer metaphor. This paper examines, in the first place, the concepts of mind architecture and brain architecture, in order to evaluate the syntheses which have recently been offered. It then moves on to show how modifications which have been made to classical functionalist mind architectures, with the aim of making them compatible with brain architectures, are unable to resolve some of the most serious problems of functionalism. Some suggestions are given as to why it is not possible to relate mind structures and brain structures by using neurocomputational approaches, and finally the question is raised of the validity of reductionism in a theory which sets out to unite mind and brain architectures. (shrink)

In this book, I present the results of an investigation which began with an extended stay at Oxford's Balliol College during the first half of 1995. My visit to Oxford was made possible by a grant from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. My sincere thanks go to Joseph Raz who served as my supervisor in Oxford. For several points of the present study, conversations with Timothy Endicott in Oxford were also of great help. The book is part of (...) a larger project of investigation, directed by Albert Calsami glia, which is a joint effort of a group of legal philosophers from the Universitat Pom peu Fabra and the Universitat de Girona, and which also receives financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. An earlier version of the manuscript was presented in June 1996 to the selection committee for a tenured professorship in Legal Philosophy at the Universitat de Girona. The members of the committee were Francisco Laporta, Albert Calsamiglia, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Francesca Puigpelat. I am grateful to all of them for their comments, which have been extremely useful in preparing the final ver sion of this book. (shrink)

For more than a century, Harlem has been the epicenter of black America, the celebrated heart of African American life and culture—but it has also been a byword for the problems that have long plagued inner-city neighborhoods: poverty, crime, violence, disinvestment, and decay. Photographer Camilo José Vergara has been chronicling the neighborhood for forty-three years, and Harlem: The Unmaking of a Ghetto is an unprecedented record of urban change. Vergara began his documentation of Harlem in the tradition of (...) such masters as Helen Levitt and Aaron Siskind, and he later turned his focus on the neighborhood’s urban fabric, both the buildings that compose it and the life and culture embedded in them. By repeatedly returning to the same locations over the course of decades, Vergara is able to show us a community that is constantly changing—some areas declining, as longtime businesses give way to empty storefronts, graffiti, and garbage, while other areas gentrify, with corporate chain stores coming in to compete with the mom-and-pops. He also captures the ever-present street life of this densely populated neighborhood, from stoop gatherings to graffiti murals memorializing dead rappers to impersonators honoring Michael Jackson in front of the Apollo, as well as the growth of tourism and racial integration. Woven throughout the images is Vergara’s own account of his project and his experience of living and working in Harlem. Taken together, his unforgettable words and images tell the story of how Harlem and its residents navigated the segregation, dereliction and slow recovery of the closing years of the twentieth century and the boom and racial integration of the twenty-first century. A deeply personal investigation, Harlem will take its place with the best portrayals of urban life. (shrink)

En este trabajo se hace un análisis hermenéutico de la obra Constitución Social de Honduras de Ramón Rosa con el fin de revelar rasgos de la identidad hondureña que subyacen en pensadores del siglo XIX en el contexto de la Reforma Liberal. Luego de introducir datos básicos del autor, de la obra y la época histórica de su redacción, se presenta y justifica el uso de un instrumento hermenéutico para analizar dicho texto. Este instrumento divide el análisis en tres ejes (...) temáticos: antropológicos, morales y políticos; posteriormente, aplicando categorías de análisis adecuadas al fenómeno de la nacionalidad en clave de modernidad, se interpretan los contenidos del texto desde los tres ejes temáticos mencionados, para extraer rasgos identitarios desde una postura filosófica. Es así como este artículo se presenta como un primer acercamiento a la conformación de la identidad hondureña a partir de un análisis hermenéutico. (shrink)

En este artículo se pretende poner de manifiesto las restricciones impuestas por el Estado español a la libertad de movimiento. Una vez descritas estas restricciones en las tres primeras olas de la pandemia de la Covid-19, se reflexiona sobre los posibles excesos del gobierno aumentando su control sobre una ciudadanía preocupada y con temor hacia la pandemia. Sin embargo, existe una consecuencia inesperada en las actitudes políticas de las personas: una reducción de las preferencias hacia la democracia, a favor del (...) autoritarismo. (shrink)

The notion of conceptual space, proposed by Gärdenfors as a framework for the representation of concepts and knowledge, has been highly influential over the last decade or so. One of the main theses involved in this approach is that the conceptual regions associated with properties, concepts, verbs, etc. are convex. The aim of this paper is to show that such a constraint—that of the convexity of the geometry of conceptual regions—is problematic; both from a theoretical perspective and with regard to (...) the inner workings of the theory itself. On the one hand, all the arguments provided in favor of the convexity of conceptual regions rest on controversial assumptions. Additionally, his argument in support of a Euclidean metric, based on the integral character of conceptual dimensions, is weak, and under non-Euclidean metrics the structure of regions may be non-convex. Furthermore, even if the metric were Euclidean, the convexity constraint could be not satisfied if concepts were differentially weighted. On the other hand, Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint is brought into question by the own inner workings of conceptual spaces because: some of the allegedly convex properties of concepts are not convex; the conceptual regions resulting from the combination of convex properties can be non-convex; convex regions may co-vary in non-convex ways; and his definition of verbs is incompatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex regions. Therefore, the mandatory character of the convexity requirement for regions in a conceptual space theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Recently, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have asserted that there are no context-independent concepts: all concepts are constructed ad hoc when they are instantiated. My aim is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by a similarity-based theory of concepts, and that two different notions of concept should be distinguished —which may be identified with two distinct stages of their life cycle (storage and instantiation). This approach brings together virtues from opposing views: (a) invariantist: stored concepts are (...) stable enough to collect new information; (b) contextualist: instantiated concepts are context-dependent, what explains our adaptive ability to changing environments. (shrink)

Recently, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have proposed an appealing and daring thesis: there are no context-independent concepts—that is, all concepts are ad hoc concepts. They argue that the seeming stability of concepts is merely due to commonalities across their different instantiations but that, in fact, there is nothing invariant in them. In their view, concepts only exist when they are instantiated for categorizing, communicating, drawing inferences, etc., and those instantiations are produced on the fly from a set of contextual cues. (...) However, the main weakness of Casasanto and Lupyan’s framework is that it lacks a proposal for articulating it within a theory on the structure of concepts. My aim is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by means of a prototype theory of concepts developed in terms of a conceptual similarity space. (shrink)