Digitalization of (higher) education has been an increasingly important subject in the recent years, spiking especially due to pandemic lockdowns. While many scholars and third parties consider this process to be an improvement or even an inevitability, I argue that there is much to understand about it beyond ‘attending to the materialities of digital education’. This paper aims to do two things: 1) to argue why digital materialities approach (‘attending to the materialities of digital education’) is not enough to grasp (...) the digitalization of the University (and thus, its stakes) and 2) to discuss how combining general organology and an educational-phenomenological outlook offers a more robust way of understanding digitalization of the University and its stakes. I conclude by pointing to the issue of place and placefulness that seems to be one of the most directly affected characteristics of the University and studying, which calls on to be reflected further upon. (shrink)

The article attempts to analyze Feliks Koneczny’s beliefs about paedocracy in the context of presently observed forms of youth political activity. For this purpose, the paper offers a discussion of selected texts on paedocracy published by Koneczny in the Słowo daily between September 16 and October 22, 1912. At that time, Koneczny wrote: “O pajdokracji” [On Paedocracy], “Partenogeneza pajdokracji” [Partenogenesis of Paedocracy], “Pajdokracja z prowokacji” [Provoked Paedocracy], “Młodzież jako środek reklamy” [Youth as a Means of Advertising], “Młodzież jako rzekoma (...) rękojmia przyszłości” [Youth as the Supposed Guarantor of the Future], “Pajdokracja i apatia” [Paedocracy and Apathy], “Stronnictwa a pajdokracja” [Parties and Paedocracy], “Brak pajdokracji w Wielkopolsce” [No Paedocracy in Greater Poland], “Patryjotyzm bez zajęcia” [Jobless Patriotism] and “Szacunku dla młodzieży” [Respect Youth]. Based on the analysis of source texts, the definition of paedocracy is presented on to of its causes and effects. This information is juxtaposed with other takes on paedocracy and its contemporary faces. Koneczny’s assessment of paedocracy was unequivocally negative. He believed it was socially harmful and resulted from a number of misconceptions. “Youth rule”, in the scholar’s view, is inspired solely by mature politicians who manipulate the young to achieve their own agendas. Such behavior stems from the lack of respect for youth that Koneczny clearly sought. The researcher saw many advantages of young Poles, but at the same time he was aware that some features of youth are not desirable in politics. He concluded that the only way to combat paedocracy might be to remove the young from politics altogether. At the same time, he realized that such a radical solution was not possible. In his argument, Koneczny not only described the flaws of paedocracy, but also showed how it can be combatted. (shrink)

This monograph by Prof. Karapetyan is an ambitious effort aiming at discovery of the concept of dual unionism as a universal element of the material world, human spirituality and philosophical consciousness, and therefore, of the mega-paradigmal principle of philosophy.

In this paper, I discuss features of the interaction between a user and digital technology and how this transforms our contemporary experience of space and place. Analyzing this interaction is important for understanding global processes of displacement and creation of what Marc Augé calls non-places and their relation to technology in general. Drawing from Heidegger’s tool-analysis, I show that displacement is a structural element of the usage of absolutely ready-to-hand, access-providing digital devices. My main argument runs as follows: a) the (...) use of digital devices bypasses place directly in our activities; b) because of that, places themselves become more and more obsolete; and c) that leads to changes in how we conceive places and placefulness of technology. Instead, we think of the latter as immaterial, without a location. The immateriality of technology that we experience is reinforcing processes of displacement, as it allows them to continue thriving without being noticed and adequately conceptualized. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide a new interpretation of Martha C. Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s views on the ethical role of literature. I pursue this aim in a threefold manner. First of all, I shortly discuss and provide a critique of previous comparisons by other authors. Afterwards, based on the presented critique of other comparisons, I present concise summaries of their respective views. Finally, I propose a double context for interpreting and assessing their views together. The main claim of (...) the paper is the following: despite several differences in their philosophical underpinnings, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on literature can be interpreted together using the context of John Rawls and Jacques Rancière. This interpretation consists of showing how uncovering a shared Rawlsian characteristic of Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views paves a way for explaining how literature actually does ethical work, using some concepts of Rancière. Such a contextual reading allows for both a more thorough understanding of their respective projects and assessing their shared shortcomings. (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to describe contemporary cultural problems in Europe using the category of historiosophy developed by Feliks Koneczny. The author discusses the division of civilisations in Europe as described by Koneczny and his ‘historical laws’ which concern mutual relations between these civilisations. Nowadays, Europe is an area where five civilisations mix. One of them has appeared in Europe due to the mass migration of the Muslim population. According to Koneczny, there can be no synthesis between (...) civilisations and only a mixture of civilisations can emerge which will lead to an anti-civilisational status or a war. The current situation in Europe requires serious correction. The paper refers to a multi-civilisational phenomenon that was the Polish‑Lithuanian Commonwealth. Its two main pillars were a strong identity of the state and respect for civilisational minorities. The model of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth seems to be the best solution for the present problems of the European Union. (shrink)

Эта книга - руководство к действию, которая может помочь читателю заново осмыслить важнейшие человеческие ценности.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] problem. They have proved that if [Formula: see text] holds then Axiom [Formula: see text] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [Formula: see text] and Axiom [Formula: see text]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] arguably persist in the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. (...) [Formula: see text]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom [Formula: see text] is equivalent to Axiom [Formula: see text], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [Formula: see text] fails in all the known models of [Formula: see text]. This suggests that [Formula: see text] actually refutes Axiom [Formula: see text]. Our second main theorem is that the [Formula: see text] Conjecture holds assuming [Formula: see text]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [Formula: see text]-theory and [Formula: see text]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [Formula: see text]-expressible and which implies [Formula: see text], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [Formula: see text]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [Formula: see text] for which some property involving only quantification over [Formula: see text] holds. (shrink)