In this paper, I discuss features of the interaction between a user and digital technology and how this transforms our contemporary experience of space and place. Analyzing this interaction is important for understanding global processes of displacement and creation of what Marc Augé calls non-places and their relation to technology in general. Drawing from Heidegger’s tool-analysis, I show that displacement is a structural element of the usage of absolutely ready-to-hand, access-providing digital devices. My main argument runs as follows: a) the (...) use of digital devices bypasses place directly in our activities; b) because of that, places themselves become more and more obsolete; and c) that leads to changes in how we conceive places and placefulness of technology. Instead, we think of the latter as immaterial, without a location. The immateriality of technology that we experience is reinforcing processes of displacement, as it allows them to continue thriving without being noticed and adequately conceptualized. (shrink)

Digitalization of (higher) education has been an increasingly important subject in the recent years, spiking especially due to pandemic lockdowns. While many scholars and third parties consider this process to be an improvement or even an inevitability, I argue that there is much to understand about it beyond ‘attending to the materialities of digital education’. This paper aims to do two things: 1) to argue why digital materialities approach (‘attending to the materialities of digital education’) is not enough to grasp (...) the digitalization of the University (and thus, its stakes) and 2) to discuss how combining general organology and an educational-phenomenological outlook offers a more robust way of understanding digitalization of the University and its stakes. I conclude by pointing to the issue of place and placefulness that seems to be one of the most directly affected characteristics of the University and studying, which calls on to be reflected further upon. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to provide a new interpretation of Martha C. Nussbaum’s and Richard Rorty’s views on the ethical role of literature. I pursue this aim in a threefold manner. First of all, I shortly discuss and provide a critique of previous comparisons by other authors. Afterwards, based on the presented critique of other comparisons, I present concise summaries of their respective views. Finally, I propose a double context for interpreting and assessing their views together. The main claim of (...) the paper is the following: despite several differences in their philosophical underpinnings, Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views on literature can be interpreted together using the context of John Rawls and Jacques Rancière. This interpretation consists of showing how uncovering a shared Rawlsian characteristic of Nussbaum’s and Rorty’s views paves a way for explaining how literature actually does ethical work, using some concepts of Rancière. Such a contextual reading allows for both a more thorough understanding of their respective projects and assessing their shared shortcomings. (shrink)