This article aims at answering the following questions: What is the influence of age structure on the spread of coronavirus disease 2019? What can be the impact of stringency policy on the spread of COVID-19? What might be the quantitative effect of development levelincome and number of hospital beds on the number of deaths due to the COVID-19 epidemic? By employing the methodologies of generalized linear model, generalized moments method, and quantile regression models, this article reveals that the shares of (...) median age, age 65, and age 70 and older population have significant positive impacts on the spread of COVID-19 and that the share of age 70 and older people in the population has a relatively greater influence on the spread of the pandemic. The second output of this research is the significant impact of stringency policy on diminishing COVID-19 total cases. The third finding of this paper reveals that the number of hospital beds appears to be vital in reducing the total number of COVID-19 deaths, while GDP per capita does not affect much the level of deaths of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this article suggests some governmental health policies to control and decrease the spread of COVID-19. (shrink)

Leo Strauss has generally been regarded as an historian of ideas, albeit a very unusual one. He wrote many very momentous commentaries on the major figures in the history of political thought; yet Strauss’ main intellectual quest was to take himself back in the history, to classical antiquity and to the fountainhead of political philosophy, Plato. In this paper, however, I am mostly interested in the philosophical nature of Strauss’s basic dissatisfaction with modernity and with the adequacy of his criticisms. (...) I shall focus attention on his well-known book On Tyranny, his claim that the politics in the modern age is inescapably defined by a tyrannical rule and his criticisms that the contemporary political science is unable to diagnose the symptoms of this present-day disease, and finally his attempt to revive political philosophy in its original sense. In addressing these issues, this paper raises a fundamental criticism: Strauss’s approach jeopardizes political philosophy-i.e. his very inquiry-by ultimately putting philosophy against politics, and politics against philosophy. I will begin with a few remarks about what Strauss understood as the problem of modernity. Then I will introduce the question of tyranny which stands as the key notion for grasping not only Strauss’s criticism of contemporary politics but also as the treatment for it. Finally, the discussion of On Tyranny, I hope, will shed light on Strauss’s conception of political philosophy and will open the stage for a critical discussion of his views. (shrink)

The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article identifies (...) two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to effectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have illiberal implications. (shrink)

Günümüz bilim felsefesi, sosyal ve etik değerlerin bilimsel akıl yürütmedeki kaçınılmaz rolünü vurgulamaktadır. Değerlerin bu rolü, toplumun bilime güveninin hangi temeller üzerine inşa edilmesi gerektiği sorusunu gündeme getirir. Bu makale, bu soruya cevap sunan üç yaklaşımı sunup değerlendirmektedir. Yüksek epistemik standartlar yaklaşımına göre, bilim insanları sadece oldukça kesin sonuçları halkla paylaşmalıdır. Bu makale, bu yaklaşımın sadece tümevarımsal riskler konusunda bize yardımcı olduğunu, diğer epistemik riskler konusunda aydınlatıcı olmadığını savunur. Bu yaklaşımın diğer bir eksiği ise bazı durumlarda bilimsel bulguların yetersiz kullanılmasına (...) yol açmasıdır. Demokratik değerler yaklaşımı, bilimsel araştırmaların demokratik süreçler ışığında belirlenen değerleri kullanması gerektiğini ileri sürer. Bu makale, bu yaklaşımın bilimin uluslararası ve zamanlar arası doğasıyla gerilim içinde olduğunu ve pratik açıdan eksikleri olduğunu savunur. Boulicault ve Schroeder’in önerdiği karma yaklaşım, ilk iki yaklaşımın unsurlarını ve Wilholt’un metodolojik konvansiyonların önemine dair gözlemlerini harmanlar. Bununla birlikte, bu yaklaşım üç yaklaşımın faydalarını bir araya getiremez. Bu yaklaşımın diğer bir sorunuysa üç farklı yaklaşımın aynı anda kullanılmasının güçlüğüdür. Makale, bu yaklaşımların hiçbirinin kapsamlı bir çözüm sunmadığı sonucuna varırken, etkili bir çözümün yerine getirmesi gereken temel kriterleri sunar. Bu kriterler arasında pratik uygulanabilirlik, bilimsel bilgiyi tam olarak kullanma, sadece tümevarımsal risklerin değil, genel olarak epistemik risklerin başarıyla yönetilmesi, bilimin sosyal organizasyonu ile uyum ve teşvik uyumluluğu bulunmaktadır. (shrink)

We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...) requires various societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. (shrink)

In this article we develop an account of justice in the distribution of knowledge. We first argue that knowledge is a fundamental interest that grounds claims of justice due to its role in individuals’ deliberations about the common good, their personal good and the pursuit thereof. Second, we identify the epistemic basic structure of a society, namely, the institutions that determine individuals’ opportunities for acquiring knowledge and discuss what justice requires of them. Our main contention is that a systematic lack (...) of opportunity to acquire knowledge one needs as an individual and a citizen because of the way the epistemic basic structure of a society is organized is an injustice. Finally, we discuss how our account relates to John Rawls’s influential theory of justice. (shrink)

The news media is a critical source of information for the public. However, it neglects the interests of the poor. In this paper, we explore why this happens, why it matters, and what might be done about it. As to why this happens, we identify two main reasons: because of the way that media is funded and because of the composition of its journalists and its sources. As to why this matters, we argue that this neglect is problematic for three (...) main reasons: it deprives the poor of vital information; it contributes to public support for or acceptance of policies that harm the interests of the poor; and it undermines political equality. And as to what might be done about it, we suggest two proposals: proposals that change the composition of who makes the news and proposals that change how the media is funded. (shrink)

This article develops an account of distributive epistemic justice in the production of scientific knowledge. We identify four requirements: (a) science should produce the knowledge citizens need in order to reason about the common good, their individual good and pursuit thereof; (b) science should produce the knowledge those serving the public need to pursue justice effectively; (c) science should be organized in such a way that it does not aid the wilful manufacturing of ignorance; and (d) when making decisions about (...) epistemic risks, scientists should make sure that there aren’t social groups or weighty interests that are neglected. After discussing these requirements, we examine the relationship between discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice in science and argue that they often compound each other. (shrink)

The democratization of science entails the public having greater influence over science and that influence being shared more equally among members of the public. This chapter will present a thumbnail sketch of the arguments for the democratization of science based on the importance of collectively shaping science’s impact on society, the instrumental benefits of public participation in science, and the need to ensure that the use of science in politics does not undermine collective self-government. It will then outline worries about (...) citizen competence, the abuse of democratic ideals and the limits posed by the nation-state. (shrink)

Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how (...) his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)

Take a question like the safety and effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines. Whether an ordinary citizen or a public official can acquire the correct answer to this question depends on the functioning of the epistemic basic structure of their society. The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of “the institutions that have a crucial role in the distribution of knowledge, that is, in the production and dissemination of knowledge, and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate what is (...) disseminated by providing them with the necessary educational background and intellectual skills”. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. (shrink)

Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 3 Mart 1924’te, Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti’nin yerine kurulmuştur. Bu düzenleme ile dini konular, siyasal alanın dışına çıkarılıp idari bir işleve indirgenmek istenmiştir. Ancak bu tercihin aksine kurumun görev ve yetkilerinde ve teşkilatında artan ve büyüyen bir seyir ortaya çıkmıştır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’na kurulduğundan bu yana birçok misyon yüklenmiştir. Dinin devlet tarafından kontrol edilmesi, daha çok kurucu iradenin ve militan laiklik taraftarlarının beklentilerini yansıtırken, dini nitelikli hizmetlerin karşılanması ise daha çok muhafazakâr kesimin beklentisi olmuştur. Her iki taraf (...) da kurumu, Türkiye’nin sosyal, tarihsel ve siyasal dokusunun sui generis niteliğiyle meşrulaştırmaya çalışmıştır. Özellikle 633 Sayılı Kanun’dan (1965) sonra Başkanlık, sosyal hayatın daha çok içinde olmaya başlamış ve 1980 sonrası dönemde sosyal ve milli dayanışmanın sağlanması için bir araç olarak görülmüştür. Bu durum, 1982 Anayasası’nın korporatist ve solidarist özelliklerinin bir yansımasıdır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın bu şekilde araçsallaştırılması onun yıllar içinde bu derece büyümesinin temel itici gücü olmuştur. (shrink)

Η προετοιμασία του δεύτερου τόμου του Corpus des inscriptions grecques d'Illyrie méridionale et d'Épire, αφιερωμένου στο Βουθρωτό της νότιας Αλβανίας, οδήγησε τους συγγραφείς να αναζητήσουν, ανάμεσα σε χιλιάδες ονόματα ελεύθερων ανδρών (αρχόντων, ιερέων, ιδιοκτητών δούλων, μαρτύρων) που αναφέρονται σε επιγραφές αυτής της πόλης, το όνομα Άπποίτας 'Αντιγόνου. Το όνομα αυτό φέρει ο θεαροδόχος των Δελφών στο Βουθρωτό, στο σύντομο δελφικό κατάλογο που χρονολογείται γύρω στα μέσα του 2ου αι. π.Χ. Από τις 24 επιγραφές που αναφέρουν κάποιον Άπποίτα και λαμβάνοντας υπόψην (...) τις μαρτυρίες χωρίς πατρώνυμο ή εθνικό, είναι δυνατόν να ταυτιστούν τρία διαφορετικά άτομα, που προσδιορίζονται με τα εθνικά Έρμίατος, Όπάτας και Κύ8εστος. Μόνον οι δύο τελευταίοι είναι με βεβαιότητα γιοι του Αντίγονου. Ο δεύτερος, ο Κύδεστος, φαίνεται να ταυτίζεται καλύτερα με την ιδιότητα του θεαροδόχου, μετά το 150, εξαιτίας του ρόλου που έπαιξε η οικογένεια του στο νέο κράτος των Πρασαιβών. (shrink)

In his book, The Case Against Perfection, Michael J. Sandel has offered several arguments against biomedical human enhancements. However, his views have been forcefully criticized by Frances M. Kamm. This paper argues that while Kamm is correct in arguing that Sandel fails to establish the moral impermissibility of enhancements, he, nevertheless, offers resources for articulating our unease with enhancements. In particular, this paper argues that being willing to enhance oneself in any way is incompatible with having an identity as a (...) person. (shrink)

This article argues that the decision problem in the original position should be characterized as a decision problem under uncertainty even when it is assumed that the denizens of the original position know that they have an equal chance of ending up in any given individual’s place. It supports this claim by arguing that (a) the continuity axiom of decision theory does not hold between all of the outcomes the denizens of the original position face and that (b) neither us (...) nor the denizens of the original position can know the exact point at which discontinuity sets in, because the language we employ in comparing different outcomes is ineradicably vague. It is also argued that the account underlying (b) can help proponents of superiority in value theory defend their view against arguments offered by Norcross and Griffin. (shrink)

There are limits on the duty to tell the truth. Sometimes, because of the undesirable consequences of honesty, we are morally required not to reveal certain truths and can even be required to lie. In this article, we explore the implications of this uncontroversial claim for the practice of political philosophers. We argue that, given the consequences of misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might occur, political philosophers will sometimes be under a moral duty not to disseminate their research and, in highly (...) exceptional cases, have a moral duty to lie outright. (shrink)

The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article identifies (...) two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to effectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have illiberal implications. (shrink)

G. A. Cohen has recently argued for a thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. He claims that Rawls denies this thesis, and the truth of this thesis vitiates Rawls’s constructivist procedure. I argue against both claims by developing an account of Rawls’s justificatory strategy and the role of facts in this strategy, which I claim is similar to the role of facts in some defences of utilitarianism.

Due to the novel coronavirus pandemic, the lockdown engendered has had a vicious impact on the global economy. This analysis’ prime intention is to evaluate the impact of the United States’ economic and health crisis as a result of COVID-19 on its financial stability. Additionally, the investigation analyzed the spillover impact of the worldwide economic slowdown experienced by COVID-19 on the United States’ financial volatility. The study applied an autoregressive distributed lag model and discovered that the economic and health crises (...) that occurred in the United States portentously upset the future expectations of its investors. Conspicuously, the health crisis in Spain and Italy were ominous spillovers of the United States’ financial instability in the short-run. Likewise, an economic crisis ensued in the United Kingdom because of COVID-19 causing spillover for the United States markets’ financial instability. The examination evaluated that Asian and African nations’ economic crises perilously affects the United States’ financial stability. The study determined that financial instability occurred in the United States due to its own economic and health crises persisted for a longer period than financial disequilibrium that occurred in other nations. The analysis suggested some strategies of smart lockdown that the government of the United States and other nations should follow to restart the economic cycle through tighter controls to minimize losses by following the steps of preparing a lockdown checklist, monitoring completion of lockdown tasks, and complete a close-down stock take or count. (shrink)

This article offers two revisions to Dworkin’s ‘prudent insurance ideal’, which aims to account for justice in the distribution of healthcare so that (a) it can deal with market failures in healthcare and (b) when applied to unjust societies it addresses health problems caused by injustice in a fair manner.

This thesis defends John Rawls’s constructivist theory of justice against three distinct challenges. -/- Part one addresses G. A. Cohen’s claim that Rawls’s constructivism is committed to a mistaken thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. It argues that Rawls’s constructivist procedure embodies substantial moral commitments, and offers an intra-normative reduction rather than a metaethical account. Rawls’s claims about the role of facts in moral theorizing in A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as suggesting that some of our (...) moral beliefs, which we are inclined to hold without reference to facts, are, in fact, true, because certain facts obtain. This thesis and the acknowledgement of the moral assumptions of Rawls’s constructivism help to show that Rawls does not, and does not need to, deny Cohen’s thesis. -/- Part two defends the characterization of the decision problem in Rawls’s original position as a decision problem under uncertainty. Rawls stipulates that the denizens of the original position lack information that they could use to arrive at estimates of the likelihood of ending up in any given social position. It has been argued that Rawls does not have good grounds for this stipulation. I argue that given the nature of the value function we should attribute to the denizens of the original position and our cognitive limitations, which also apply to the denizens of the original position, their decision problem can be characterized as one under uncertainty even if we stipulate that they know that they have an equal chance of being in any individual’s place. -/- Part three assesses the claim that a true commitment to Rawls’s difference principle requires a further commitment to an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos is offered as a means to bring about equality and Pareto-optimality. Accordingly, I try to undermine the case for an egalitarian ethos by challenging the desirability of the ends it is supposed to further or by showing that it is redundant. I argue that if primary goods are the metric of justice, then Pareto optimality in the space of the metric of justice is undesirable. I then argue that if the metric of justice is welfare, depending on the theory of welfare we adopt, an egalitarian ethos will either be redundant or will have objectionably paternalistic consequences. (shrink)

Evidence proves that physician involvement in torture is widely practiced in society. Despite its status as an illegal act as established by multiple international organizations, mandates are routinely unheeded and feebly enforced. Philosophies condemning and condoning torture are examined as well as physicians’ professional responsibilities and the manner in which such varying allegiances can be persuasive. Physician involvement in torture has proven detrimental to the core values of medicine and has tainted the field’s commitment to individuals’ health and well-being. Only (...) when this complex issue is addressed using a multilevel approach will the moral rehabilitation of medicine begin. (shrink)

1835 yılında Manastır’da dünyaya gelen Sâlih Fâik Bey, Encümen-i Şuarâ şâirlerindendir. Memuriyeti nedeniyle İstanbul, Burdur, Gümüşhane gibi çeşitli illerde bulunmuştur. Biri matbû, üçü yazma olmak üzere dört eseri mevcuttur. Bunlar; Arûz-i Türkî, Elfiyye-i Seniyye fi’l-Âdâbi’l-Ahmediyye, Peymâne ve Dîvân’dır. Fâik Bey 1899 yıllında İstanbul’da vefat etmiştir. Eserleri yaşadığı dönemin dînî, siyâsî, edebî ve toplumsal özelliklerini yansıtması bakımından önemlidir. Bu çalışmada Manastırlı Sâlih Fâik Bey’in hayatı ve eserleri hakkında bilgi verildikten sonra, dîvânında rastladığımız dikkate değer hususlar ile devrinin mühim dergilerinden biri olan (...) Hazîne-i Fünûn Dergisi’nde şairin yayımlanan şiirlerine yer verilecektir. (shrink)

Faik Kurtulmuş’s exploration of the epistemic basic structure (EBS) invites us to think about the generation, dissemination, and absorption of knowledge in a society, emphasizing the role of institutions in determining epistemic outcomes. Moreover, Kurtulmuş—in joint work with Gürol Irzık—offers a normative take on the EBS from the viewpoint of the theory of justice and does not shy away from drawing specific policy recommendations. Thus, a powerful, innovative concept is used to extend an influential theory and draw out its (...) practical implications. What more is there to wish for? A project of such ambition inevitably faces serious challenges. I address the issue of the alignment between the ideal and non-ideal elements of Kurtulmuş’s theory with an eye toward the practicalities of social reform. My central claim is that the philosophers striving to promote distributive epistemic justice need to think carefully about whom they intend to address with their proposals and how to persuade such addressees. I also maintain that emphasis on a holistic approach to social reform represents a major hindrance to its pragmatic success. (shrink)

According to the Einstein-Mayer theory of the Riemanniann space-time with Einstein-Cartan teleparallelism, the local Lorentz invariance is broken by the gravitational field defining Machian reference systems. This breaking of symmetry implies the occurrence of “hidden matter” in the Einstein equations of gravity. The hidden matter is described by the non-Lorentz-invariant energy-momentum tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ satisfying the relation $\hat \Theta _{i;k}^k = 0$ . The tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ is formed from the Einstein-Cartan torsion field given by the anholonomy objects, (...) FAik=2hA[i,k], and appears together with Hilbert’s energy-momentum tensor T* ik and Poincaré’s pressure λgik on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equations so that one has $$R_{ik} - (1/2)g_{ik} R = - \kappa T*_{ik} - \lambda g_{ik} - \hat \Theta _{ik}$$ According to this theory, in the universe and in cosmic systems one must excep “invisible masses” described by the Poincaré and Einstein-Cartan terms to exist. The torsion field FAik makes the space-time a Machian universe; it is of the same nature as the “weak interacting matter” discussed in astrophysics. (shrink)