Dennett elabora una concepción del “yo” entendido como un centro de gravedad narrativo. Uno de los obstáculos principales para valorar esta propuesta radica en que resulta dificultoso entender cuál es la naturaleza del concepto dennettiano de “yo”: concretamente, cuáles son los compromisos ontológicos y epistemológicos que cabe atribuir al fenómeno en cuestión. En este artículo defendemos que el mejor modo de realizar una reconstrucción interpretativa de su noción de “yo” es apelando a la distinción elaborada por Reichenbach entre tres (...) clases de entidades, Concreta,a e Illata, y entendiendo a los centros de gravedad narrativos como un caso de Abstracta reichenbachiano. Sostenemos que resulta pertinente e iluminador entender los centros de gravedad narrativos como Abstracta en el sentido de Reichenbach, apoyándonos en que: i) aunque no la aplica directamente al problema de la naturaleza del “yo”, Dennett sí emplea la distinción de Reichenbach en otras partes de su obra; ii) Dennett traza explícitamente una analogía del “yo” con los centros de gravedad que son, justamente, uno de sus ejemplos de Abstracta; iii) este modo de entender al “yo” permite dar sentido y entender mejor ciertos aspectos de la teoría narrativista dennettiana. Además de permitirnos clarificar las metáforas empleadas por Dennett en la elaboración de su teoría narrativa, dicha elucidación conceptual permite comprender mejor la distinción entre las tres clases de psicología intencional trazada por Dennett y es útil para sugerir a cuál de estos tres tipos pertenece el concepto de “yo”. Dennett's theory of personal identity argues that the “self” is no more than a center of narrative gravity. One of the main hurdles to assessing this proposal lies in the fact that it is difficult to understand what the nature of Dennett's concept of "self" is; specifically, what are the ontological and epistemological commitments that can be attributed to the phenomenon in question. In this article, we claim that the best way to make an interpretative reconstruction of his notion of "self" is appealing to the distinction elaborated by Reichenbach between three classes of entities, Concreta, Abstracta, and Illata, and understanding the narrative centers of gravity as a case of Reichenbachian Abstracta. We defend that understanding the narrative centers of gravity as Abstracta in the sense of Reichenbach is pertinent and illuminating given that: i) although he does not apply it directly to the problem of the nature of the "self", Dennett does use Reichenbach's distinction in other parts of his work; ii) Dennett explicitly draws an analogy of the "self" with the centers of gravity that are, precisely, one of his examples of Abstracta; iii) this way of understanding the "self" allows us to give sense and better understand certain aspects of Dennett’s narrative theory. Besides allowing us to clarify the metaphors used by Dennett in the elaboration of his narrative theory, such conceptual elucidation allows us to better understand the distinction between the three classes of intentional psychology drawn by Dennett (1987) and is useful in suggesting to which of these three types the concept of "self" belongs. (shrink)

This article presents a critical assesment of Dennett’s narrative self theory as a personal identity theory. First it is contextualized in regard to the debate on personal identity in the decade of 1980, then Dennett’s theory is presented in the light of Strawson’s analysis of Narrativity, the criticisms received by Dennett’s theory and by narrative theories in general are put in relationship, and finally it is shown how Dennett’s theory could help the actual supporters of narrative identity theories to reformulate (...) their arguments in defense to the received criticisms. Thus I hope to contribute to a better understanding of Dennett’s theory and to claim for its relevance in the actual debate about personal identity in analytic philosophy. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se tratará de reflexionar acerca del estatus ontológico del concepto de identidad personal a partir de las así denominadas propuestas «narrativistas» de los filósofos Daniel Dennett y Clément Rosset. No se pretende tanto abordar la pregunta sobre la existencia última de dicha identidad cuanto hacerse cargo de cómo se nos aparece, las similitudes que presenta el proceso de construcción identitaria con el proceso narrativo y el papel activo tanto de uno mismo como de los demás (...) en su edificación. (shrink)

According to Mednick’s (1962) theory of individual differences in creativity, creative individuals appear to have a richer and more flexible associative network than less creative individuals. Thus, creative individuals are characterized by “flat” (broader associations) instead of “steep” (few, common associations) associational hierarchies. To study these differences, we implement a novel computational approach to the study of semantic networks, through the analysis of free associations. The core notion of our method is that concepts in the network are related to each (...) other by their association correlations - overlap of similar associative responses (“association clouds”). We began by collecting a large sample of participants who underwent several creativity measurements and used a decision tree approach to divide the sample into low and high creative groups. Next, each group underwent a free association generation paradigm which allowed us to construct and analyze the semantic networks of both groups. Comparison of the semantic memory networks of persons with low creative ability and persons with high creative ability revealed differences between the two networks. The semantic memory network of persons with low creative ability seems to be more rigid, compared to the network of persons with high creative ability, in the sense that it is more spread out and breaks apart into more sub-parts. We discuss how our findings are in accord and extend Mednick’s (1962) theory and the feasibility of using network science paradigms to investigate high level cognition. (shrink)

"Identidad personal y donación. La configuración del yo en la acción dramática", de Ana Álvarez Garrido, relata como un deseo de verdad y una intuición genuina, unidos a la insatisfacción acerca de las corrientes dominantes en el estudio de la identidad personal, llevaron a su autora a iniciar este trabajo. Con una pregunta casi infantil, por su atrevimiento y por la esperanza que la anima de una respuesta justa, se abre esta aventura de la búsqueda del yo, a la que (...) es invitado el lector desde la primera página: ¿Quién soy yo? Este interrogante nos conduce, atravesando el fuego positivo de la duda, a veces de tintes narrativos, hasta un espacio y un tiempo capaces de vestir al yo, de darle una voz y un gesto únicos, capaces de regalarle un nombre. Un teatro será ese lugar donde Yo puedo ser y donde vengo a ser Yo, porque en él se puede representar una acción esencial. Ésta, como el yo, se revelará al final de nuestra aventura investigadora, sorprendente y deliberadamente dramática. Como la vida misma. (shrink)

Las Confesiones de San Agustín son una obra muy peculiar. Lectores e investigadores convienen en ello. No es fácil ‘definir’ ni comprender ese escrito. El presente estudio intenta una aproximación a su contenido mediante un examen de ciertos rasgos característicos de la obra que derivan de su propia singularidad. Y denunciamos también algunos impedimentos de comprensión y lectura. Confiemos en que esta mirada pueda ofrecer una guía inicial, pero orientadora, a la misma. Además, el estudio formal y temático revela una (...) dinámica interna, de su estructura misma, que va del relato autobiográfico a la reflexión , de lo narrativo al pensamiento. Este avance tendencial culmina al concluir el libro IX, donde la dimensión narrativa de la obra termina. Razón por la cual los libros X-XI alcanzan el vértice teorético de las Confesiones, con su investigación de la memoria y del tiempo. El presente estudio concluye con una breve exposición del problema agustiniano de la subjetividad o el yo, en la base de esos dos libros.t. Augustine’s Confessions is a very particular work. Readers and Scholarsagree upon it. Therefore, it’s ‘definition’ and understanding are not so easy. These paper tries to provide an approach to the contents of this difficult writing, by means of an examination of some main special traits, arising from the particular work’s kind. And we betray also some new difficulties for it’s reading and understanding. It is hoped that these brief look to the famous Augustinian writing could offer an initial but adviser guide to it. Moreover, the formal and thematic inquiry reveal an internal dynamics of it’s structure, which moves from the autobiographycal account to the reflection , from the story to the thinking. This aimed advance culminates at the end of the book IX, where the work’s narrative side concludes. That’s why the books X and XI reach the theoretical summit of the Confessions through their search for memory and time. Our paper ends with an exposition of the Augustinian inquiry on the human subiectivity, underlying both these books. (shrink)

Our reply to Fabian Freyenhagen’s article “Was ist orthodoxe Kritische Theorie?” (DZPhil 65.3 [2017], 456-469) raises the question whether his proposal that Critical Theory only “be adequately and appropriately critical” without a program of justification spares the search for any general criteria. Answering negatively we conversely want to recall, particularly with regard to Horkheimers’s and Adornos’s Dialectic of Enlightment as well as Habermas‘s concept of an emancipatory interest, that such a criterion as a normative foundation of critique is crucial not (...) only for systematical purposes, but also recognised as necessary in this respect by Adorno, who Freyenhagen wants to play off against programs of justification. Critical Theory needs to be clear in this respect. Against this background we are questioning Freyenhagen‘s recourse to an “interest in abolishing social injustice” as the “only criterion for Critical Theory.” Because Freyenhagen ignores the fact that Critical Theory has been understood by its representatives in a twofold manner – as a theoretical program of justification for one and secondly as a cultural diagnosis – his plea for an orthodox Critical Theory is endangered by decisionism. (shrink)

八代将軍吉宗の世、思想界に現れた二つの新興勢力・徂徠学と国学。当時の主流たる朱子学を否定した両「古学派」の進展を考察する。.

In their examination of elementary science classrooms, Amerine and Bilmes (1988) found that following instructions requires students to understand the relationship between the projected outcome and the corresponding course of actions. One of the most important resources for instructions is the lesson plan, which prescribes the sequence of teaching. However, there is often a gap between what is planned and what actually happens in the classroom. This raises the question of how teachers come to terms with contingent variants and unexpected (...) outcomes that real-time interactions occasion and how lesson plans are configured into these processes. This study examines a teacher education program that uses lesson plans as a central resource for teaching mathematics. The results suggest that classroom teachers use lesson plans as communicative resources to identify problems, specify assumptions about their teaching and act on the evolving contingency of classroom interaction. The interactional contingency is the locus of teaching practices, not an obstacle to the application of procedures in lesson plans. (shrink)

Im Blickpunkt dieses Bandes steht das Wechselverhältnis zweier prägender Traditionen moderner deutschsprachiger Philosophie: der Kritischen Theorie und der Philosophischen Anthropologie. Über das gesamte 20. Jahrhundert hinweg blieb der Austausch zwischen diesen Ansätzen, wo er überhaupt zu Stande kam, von Vorbehalten geprägt. Gegenwärtig allerdings lässt sich, jenseits überkommener schulpolitischer Gräben, ein neuartiges Interesse beider Strömungen füreinander wahrnehmen. Die Beiträge dieses Bandes treffen sich in dem Versuch, die jeweiligen Hauptanliegen und Gegenstandsfelder der Kritischen Theorie respektive der Philosophischen Anthropologie über deren direkten Dialog (...) produktiv zu aktualisieren: Inwiefern lassen sich die genuinen Themen der einen Tradition auf Seiten der je anderen rekonstruieren? Und worin bleiben sich beide Denkweisen letztlich doch fremd? Das vorliegende Buch stellt in der Forschung den ersten systematischen Versuch dar, diese Fragen für gesellschaftstheoretische und anthropologische Problemstellungen fruchtbar zu machen. (shrink)

We show that if κ is an inaccessible cardinal then P κ λ splits into $\lambda^{ many disjoint stationary subsets. We also show that if P κ λ carries a strongly saturated ideal then the nonstationary ideal cannot be λ + -saturated.

『三太郎の日記』による栄光の後に襲ってきた波乱。同時代の知識人との関係や教育制度から、大正教養派の代表者に迫る社会史的評伝。.

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 233-242.

We apply the technique of generic ultrapowers to study the splitting problem of stationary subsets of P K λ . We present some conditions which guarantee the splitting of stationary subsets of P K λ.

We prove that if λ is a strong limit singular cardinal and κ a regular uncountable cardinal < λ, then NSκλ, the non-stationary ideal over [Formula: see text], is nowhere precipitous. We also show that under the same hypothesis every stationary subset of [Formula: see text] can be partitioned into λκ disjoint stationary sets.

The associative theory of creativity states that creativity is associated with differences in the structure of semantic memory, whereas the executive theory of creativity emphasises the role of top-down control for creative thought. For a powerful test of these accounts, individual semantic memory structure was modelled with a novel method based on semantic relatedness judgements and different criteria for network filtering were compared. The executive account was supported by a correlation between creative ability and broad retrieval ability. The associative account (...) was independently supported, when network filtering was based on a relatedness threshold, but not when it was based on a fixed edge number or on the analysis of weighted networks. In the former case, creative ability was associated with shorter average path lengths and higher clustering of the network, suggesting that the semantic networks of creative people show higher small-worldness. (shrink)

In this paper we will present a simple condition for an ideal to be nowhere precipitous. Through this condition we show nowhere precipitousness of fundamental ideals onPkλ, in particular the non-stationary idealNSkλunder cardinal arithmetic assumptions.In this sectionIdenotes a non-principal ideal on an infinite setA. LetI+=PA/I(ordered by inclusion as a forcing notion) andI∣X= {Y⊂A:Y⋂X∈I}, which is also an ideal onAforX∈I+. We refer the reader to [8, Section 35] for the general theory of generic ultrapowers associated with an ideal. We recallIis said (...) to be precipitous if ⊨I+“Ult(V, Ġ) is well-founded” [9].The central notion of this paper is a strong negation of precipitousness [1]:Definition.Iis nowhere precipitous ifI∣Xis not precipitous for everyX∈ I+i.e., ⊨I+“Ult(V, Ġ) is ill-founded.”It is useful to characterize nowhere precipitousness in terms of infinite games (see [11, Section 27]). Consider the following gameG(I) between two players, Nonempty and Empty [5]. Nonempty and Empty alternately chooseXn∈I+andYn∈I+respectively so thatXn⊃Yn⊃n+1. After ω moves, Empty wins the game if⋂n<ωXn=⋂n<ωYn= Ø.See [5, Theorem 2] for a proof of the following characterization.Proposition.I is nowhere precipitous if and only if Empty has a winning strategy in G(I). (shrink)

We introduce the notion of skinniness for subsets of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ and its variants, namely skinnier and skinniest. We show that under some cardinal arithmetical assumptions, precipitousness or $2^\lambda$-saturation of $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$, where $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}$ denotes the non-stationary ideal over $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$, implies the existence of a skinny stationary subset of $X$. We also show that if $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, then there is no skinnier stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Furthermore, if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, there (...) is no skinny stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. Combining these results, we show that if $\lambda$ is a strong limit singular cardinal, then $\mathrm{NS}_{\kappa\lambda}\mid X$ can satisfy neither precipitousness nor $2^\lambda$-saturation for every stationary $X \subseteq \mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$. We also indicate that $\diamondsuit_\lambda(E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa})$, where $E^{\lambda}_{<\kappa} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \{\alpha < \lambda \mid \mathrm{cf}(\alpha) < \kappa\}$, is equivalent to the existence of a skinnier (or skinniest) stationary subset of $\mathcal{P}_\kappa \lambda$ under some cardinal arithmetical hypotheses. (shrink)