Study in the period of coronavirus disease 2019 lockdown and the effect of different exercise training programs on the quality of life dimension are limited. This randomized control study as a part of which the impact of an 8-week neuromuscular training program on the 90 healthy young individuals’ QoL after COVID-19 lockdown was assessed using a short form of the WHOQOL-BREF questionnaire comprising of four domains. The intervention group took part in a neuromuscular training program consisting of dynamic neuromuscular stabilization (...) and whole-body vibration training. In contrast, the control group did not participate in any programmed physical activity. From pre- to post-intervention test, the NT group significantly and substantially improved [mean change ] all the QoL domains, physical for 12.78 scores, psychological for 13.12 scores, social relationships for 20.57 scores, and environmental for 24.40 scores. These results suggest that the NT program could enhance QoL in young and healthy participants following COVID-19 lockdown. (shrink)

The article is a critical comment on the contemporary condition of the university and the reform of higher education introduced in Poland in 2018. The management culture imposed by the reform, focused on “scientific productivity” and bibliometrics, is in conflict with the university’s ethos of striving for truth and open discussion, constitutive for the community of learners and scientists. The author argues that attachment to these values is not only a matter of tradition, but a special task of the university (...) within the contemporary public sphere, torn by axiological conflicts, and disintegrating into a number of digital “tribes”. The university as an institution developed along with the culture of axiological pluralism and rational doubt, which is supported itself. However, these values cannot be maintained if the academic doxa adopts the assumptions of radical cognitive relativism. “Anti-relativistic cognitive minimum” and the assumption of relative translatability of languages are necessary if the university is to continue to play the socially important function of supporting critical dispositions and intellectual independence. (shrink)

Among ethical norms teleological and formal ones are distinguished. The former admit that a behaviour which tends to a realisation of a moral Good is ethical, and the latter determine an ethical behaviour as consonant to a norm. Teleological norms determine a behaviour showing its purpose, and the formal norms emphasize the relation to other people as their characteristics. The former determine a duty through the Good, the latter instead adopt the concept of duty as primordial. Therefore, the former may (...) be called axiological norms and the latter deontic ones. The deontic norms are either egalitarian, when they contain a postulate of equal rights: what I should have, under certain conditions, the same should have everybody when he fulfils these conditions, or elitarian, when they deny the postulate of egalitarism and grant larger rights to some chosen individuals or to some groups to a detriment of others. A possible third situation, when the rights of other people are considered to be above our owns can be connected with any of the two mentioned. A full system of norms should determine both a complex of Goods being aims of an ethical action and behaviour towards other individuals. It must contain, therefore, both axiological and deontic norms. In various ethics, in which only norms of one kind are specified, norms of the second kind are included in the former. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to confront normative pre-assumptions of Marx’s and Freud’s emancipatory projects. Considerations on axiological presuppositions of the projects under discussion come to the conclusion that an argument between psychoanalysis and Marxism has its source in the two mutually exclusive systems of values whereas the psychoanalytical critique of Marxism remains the legacy of a conflict dating back to the beginnings of the Enlightenment. The article claims that a confrontation of Freud’s emancipatory project with that of Marx’s (...) means a confrontation of two traditions: according to the first one — pessimistic and referring to Hobbes — man is bad by nature, whereas the other — optimistic and deriving from Locke — man is good by nature. The final conclusion, thus, is a statement that though both Marx and Freud were certain that their emancipatory projects were devoid of not only metaphysical presuppositions, but also metaphysical conclusions, a Freudian critique of Marxism refers to an axiological argument between Locke and Hobbes. Because both in psychoanalysis and Marxism a descriptive order is intricately intertwined with a normative one. The conflict between the two emancipatory projects must remain ilsolluble owing to the antagonistic axiological presuppositions. (shrink)

Debata bioetyczna w polskiej przestrzeni publicznej podporządkowana jest walce ideologicznej toczonej pomiędzy środowiskami konserwatywnymi, skupionymi wokół Kościoła katolickiego a środowiskami liberalnymi, domagającymi się wprowadzenia w Polsce regulacji i praw podobnych do tych, jakie obowiązują w Europie Zachodniej. W artykule dokonano przeglądu i analizy wypowiedzi publicystycznych i politycznych w przykładowych trzech obszarach: aborcji, obowiązkowych szczepień oraz prawa do strajku personelu medycznego. Uderzającą cechą publicznych sporów bioetycznych w Polsce jest prawie całkowity brak świadomości istnienia bioetyki jako dyscypliny akademickiej dostarczającej wiedzy i ekspertyzy (...) w tego rodzaju kwestiach. (shrink)

The article emphasizes axiological and moral foundations of national insurance system. The most fundamental values connected with the insurance system are presented. It is illustrated how the moral values can be realized with the economics solutions such as retirement insurance and health insurance systems. The final aim of insurance system is to protect human dignity.

W artykule autor dowodzi, że u podstaw etyki Osho leżą indywidualizm i subiektywizm. Wraz z autonomicznym podmiotem, to znaczy człowiekiem postrzeganym jako twórca wartości, stanowią one najważniejsze źródła moralności tej koncepcji. Ponadto kluczową rolę odgrywają tutaj pojęta w sposób bliski Sartre’owi wolność, a także odpowiedzialność, świadomość i samorealizacja.

In mainstream economics the principle of freedom from value judgment (Wertfreiheit) is enforced. This principle has different interpretations. The aim of this paper is to present author's interpretations of the principle of Wertfreiheit. The basic ideas of axiology have been analysed: values, valua- tions, and value judgments, including their application to economic activities and economic researches. Two models of valuations have been presented – the taste model and perception model – as well as points of view of economic researches on (...) those models. The conclusion comprises the author’s interpretation of the principle of Wertfreiheit as that of impartiality and integrity in research activities. (shrink)

The main subject of the paper is to present the criteria which help us to establish whether a given ontological controversy (or even a whole dispute) is substantial or merely verbal. Metaphysics is often perceived as a discipline composed of endless disputes with no glimpse of hope for solution. This fact makes many philosophers claim that ontology is nothing more than matter of linguistic choice. In this paper, we argue that there exist certain methodological tools which enable us to establish (...) whether particular ontological disagreement is substantial or merely verbal. However, as we emphasize, the scope of application of these tools is limited to strictly defined cases. At first, we clarify the general background for an occurrence of ontological controversy. Assume that a controversy occurs between the person A and the person B iff. (shrink)

Pierwszorzędnym przedmiotem badań są przyjęte w Karcie, wprost lub domyślnie, rozstrzygnięcia typu aksjologicznego. Przez „aksjologiczne podstawy” rozumiane są rozstrzygnięcia dotyczące uznania takich, a nie innych, wartości czy dóbr za przedmiot ochrony; a ponieważ chodzi o „podstawy”, przedmiotem zainteresowania są rozstrzygnięcia fundamentalne w takim sensie, że stanowią one uzasadnienie dla bardziej szczegółowych rozstrzygnięć aksjologicznych i normatywnych. Pozwala to m.in. na formułowanie wniosków co do spójności rozstrzygnięć szczegółowych. Zagadnienie aksjologicznych podstaw obejmuje także problematykę relacji między wartościami a prawami podstawowymi oraz zagadnienie (...) ontologicznego statusu wartości i chronionych praw. Artykuł zawiera także wyniki badań nad wprowadzeniem do preambuły Karty w wersji niemieckojęzycznej zapisu o religijnym dziedzictwie, odbiegającego od brzmienia w innych językach mówiącego o dziedzictwie duchowym. (shrink)

Every professionally managed project is performed accordingly to precise defined principles, methods and a plan. As well, IT projects, which are major business ventures globally these days, are governed with similar approach. Defining objectives and project framework, selecting resources, drafting schedules are a fundamental skills, which can be taught at every basic business course. It seems to be that it is enough to acquire appropriate knowledge in area of project management to be successful IT manager in spite of the size (...) and the type of the venture. Still, only 16% ERP projects are successful, 84% projects do not meet deadlines and business goals and 78% projects overrun budgets. By paradox, to solve above presented business, economic problem it is necessary to address it by developing axiological research. It is based on the principle that empathy is the third perspective that is build in to the well know Game Theory model which consists of two perspectives: trust and loyalty (Deutsch). In this case, in the process of selecting an appropriate type of the game, between a customer and a vendor, we have to base on a better understanding of needs and axiological profiles on both sites. In other words, if the business goal of the partner is better defined and understood and if it is assumed that the success of one site depends on the other, the final effect, by definition, is almost guaranteed. To achieved that, it is a must for every IT manager to work on developing, the so called business empathy instead of just useless promoting the assertive business philosophy. (shrink)

The axiology embedded in a constitution refers to a political community in its most and its developed, modern form, which we refer to as a constitutional state. The basis of such a state institutional and legal structure, recorded in the fundamental law, is comprised of fundamental values that gradually filter into the consciousness and are subsequently universally accepted during a long-lasting, historical process which has been completed in a given cultural milieu. In order to indicate the values on which a (...) constitutional state is founded and which it embodies, it is necessary to reach back to the very beginnings of not only a modern state before the epoch of a constitution, but also to those of the state as such. An axiological appraisal of a state must be based on the specific content of the ethical order at its foundations. There is a specific ‘axiology’ of exerting power as such, the basic yardstick for which is effectiveness. When we aim to appraise or draft a specific constitution, this pragmatic perspective must be taken into account. A well-organised system of the institutions of the state’s authority is, primarily, one which operates effectively.Axiologically, the most important part of a constitution, the one where the ethical foundations of the state are spelled out expressis verbis, is the catalogue of basic rights. At present, the main problem is the inflation of these rights, not only by rendering them too detailed, but also by placing political stipulations, social privileges or expectations regarded as generally right among them. All these superfluous appendages not only litter the constitution, but also contribute to the devaluation of real fundamental rights as their meaning, essential to the maintenance of an interpersonal order, is diluted in the flood of quasi rights which have been added on. (shrink)

An axiological analysis of the basis of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, determined mainly in the Preamble, makes it possible to put forward a thesis that this axiology is not, at least in reference to the principle, eclectic. In respect of the meta-axiological settlements, this is a tradition of natural-law type, recognizing the objective grounding of values and law. The accepted solutions are also convergent with the axiology typical of the international protection of human rights. -/- Résumé (...) L’analyse des fondements axiologiques de la Constitution polonaise de 1997, inscrits avant tout dans le préambule, permet de formuler la thèse selon laquelle cette axiologie n’est pas, en principe, éclectique. La réflexion sur les valeurs s’inscrit dans la vision classique des fondements du droit, remontant à l’antiquité. Partant de là, se dégage une tradition juridique appuyée sur le droit naturel, reconnaissant la force objective des valeurs et du droit. Ces conclusions rejoignent l’axiologie classique de la protection internationale des droits de l’Homme. -/- Zusammenfassung Die Analyse der vor allem durch die Präambel definierten axiologischen Grundlagen der Verfassung der Republik Polen von 1997 ermöglicht die Aufstellung der These, dass diese Axiologie nicht eklektisch ist, zumindest nicht prinzipiell. Hier enthüllt sich ein Denken von den Werten, das sich in die klassische, bis in die Antike zurückreichende Reflexion über die Grundlagen des Rechts einfügt. Wegen der metaaxiologischen Entscheidungen ist das eine Tradition naturrechtlichen Typs, die die objektive Begründung der Werte und des Rechts anerkennt. Die angenommenen Lösungen stimmen auch mit der für den internationalen Schutz der Menschenrechte typischen Axiologie überein. (shrink)

W artykule omówiono Tischnerowską koncepcję demokracji, skupiając się na jej podstawowych wartościach tego ustroju. Należą do nich: pokój społeczny, pluralizm, wolność i solidarność. U źródła tych wartości leży egzystencjalnie pojmowany dialog. Celem artykułu jest wskazanie aktualności filozofii Józefa Tischnera szczególnie w dobie burzliwych sporów politycznych o demokrację, które toczą się w ostatnich latach w Polsce.

The subject of the article is a description of a certain version of fanaticism represented by spokesmen of family planning. The author first presents some definitions of fanaticism. Next he discusses the world’s demographic problems linking demography with the question of good life. He calls the standpoints that do not notice the negative effect of the demographic explosion fanatical.

In the paper I consider the prospects of interpreting late Carnap view on ontology as being in part a sort of fictionalism. More precisely, I argue that the theses he maintained in the volume of The Library of Living Philosophers devoted to his philosophy , in which he concerned with semantics in general and the confirmation of existential claims, make his account of an ontologically uncommittal acceptance of existential claims, as presented in his Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology , unsatisfying. In (...) this work, he claimed that – to put it roughly – one can accept existential claims as true relatively to rules that constitue the linguistic framework in which these claims are formulated and that from the truth relative to these rules one can’t derive any conclusion about the objective truth of these existential claims. But in the volume of The Library of Living Philosophers he adopted a new view on the nature of semantic values and took them to be extralinguistic entities. This change forced him to redefine the notion of being true relative to rules of the liguistic framework in terms of being true in admissible models of this language, where a model is an ad-missible model of a given language, if all meaning postulates of this language are satisfied in that model. This change of the view calls for an explanation of how it is possible to take some existential claims to be true in a model without accepting the existence of entities in the domain of that model. Following S. Yablo’s view ex-pressed in his Does Ontology Rest on Mistake , I suggest that one can accept the thesis that existential claims are satisfied by some extralinguistic entities in some model in a spirit of make-believe in which one makes supposition that there are such enti-ties and that they satisfy these existential claims. I also argue against propositions of interpreting Carnap as a quasi-realist on the ground that this kind of interpretation doesn’t give a justice to the distinction between internal existential claims and prag-matic external existential claims, i.e. those claims that should be treated as claims about pragmatic values of a given linguistic framework. (shrink)

In the paper I consider the prospects of interpreting late Carnap views on ontology as being in part a sort of epistemism. More precisely, I argue that the theses that he maintained in the Empirism, Semantics, and Onotology and the volume of The Library of Living Philosophers devoted to his philosophy put him close to proponents of epistemicism, according to which ontological debates over truth-values of metaphysical theses need not to be verbal disputes, but the prospects of resolving them are (...) meager, since there are no evidences that could support either given metaphysical thesis or its negation. Most likely, Carnap should be read as a proponent of a more radical version of this view, since he maintained that in principle there are no such evidences. I find this view fit well with Carnap’s argumentative strategy against substantial character of metaphysical debates, since he stresses the lack of evidences in favour of or against metaphysical claims as the main reason for his deflationism in ontology. However, what is the most worrisome in taking this route of interpreting late Carnap views on ontology is that among the presuppositions of epistemicism is the thesis that one can make sense of the talk about truth-values of metaphysical claims, whereas Carnap maintained they lack truth-values due to lack of cognitive contents. But taking the change of his view on the nature of semantic values in the volume of The Library of Living Philosophers devoted to his philosophy, where he claimed that extralinguistic entities should serve a role of semantic values and the notion of truth should be defined relatively to a given interpretation in a given model, I find his opinion on metaphysical claims unjustified, since one can define the the notion of truth for these claims relatively to models and hence make a talk about their truth values (relatively to models) sensible. It doesn’t follow from that that one can also make a sense of a claim being absolutely true, since it would require to take one model to be special one in the sense that it fits the way reality is, which is something that the proponent of epistemicism deny on the ground that there are no evidences that could be taken to show that one of the models of a given language is special in this respect. I also discuss applications of the inference to the best explanation in argumentation in favour of various sorts of realism and argue that this kind of argumentation always leaves room for some ontological dispute between parties from which one deny the existence of entities that the other argued for through application of the inference to the best explanation and hence that no metaphysical debate can be resolved by application of the inference to the best explanation under the threat of circularity. The paper is the continuation of considerations made in my paper The Later Carnap and Contemporary Metaphysical Debates. Part I, in which I’ve argued that one can treat Carnap to be also a proponent of fictionalism. In effect, Carnap’s deflationism in ontology seems to be a combination of fictionalism and epistemicism. (shrink)

Artykuł składa się z trzech części. W pierwszej części pod uwagę brana jest możliwość, że ludzie, a być może także wszystkie inne skończone podmioty poznające, które dysponują zdolnością do formułowania ocen moralnych, podlegają uniwersalnemu złudzeniu co do hierarchizacji wartości moralnych, według których działają, a więc że mają odwrócone spektrum aksjologiczne. W części drugiej jest uzasadniana teza, że jedynym środkiem, pozwalającym wykluczyć możliwość podlegania radykalnej iluzji aksjologicznej przez skończone podmioty poznające, jest odwołanie się do metafizycznego pojęcia Boga, rozumianego jako pojęcie (...) istoty najdoskonalszej, i do Jego wiedzy na temat tego, co jest dobre, a co jest złe. Kwestia istnienia Boga oraz wskazanie, w jaki sposób należałoby religijnie konkretyzować pojęcie Boga, nie są podejmowane. Do przeprowadzenia prezentowanej w artykule argumentacji wystarczy, że Bóg będzie rozumiany jako osoba dysponująca atrybutem wszechwiedzy. Część trzecia jest poświęcona uwagom na temat relatywizmu moralnego, zagadnieniu tzw. dylematów moralnych oraz pojęciu istoty dobra moralnego. (shrink)