The axiology embedded in a constitution refers to a political community in its most and its developed, modern form, which we refer to as a constitutional state. The basis of such a state institutional and legal structure, recorded in the fundamental law, is comprised of fundamental values that gradually filter into the consciousness and are subsequently universally accepted during a long-lasting, historical process which has been completed in a given cultural milieu. In order to indicate the values on which a (...) constitutional state is founded and which it embodies, it is necessary to reach back to the very beginnings of not only a modern state before the epoch of a constitution, but also to those of the state as such. An axiological appraisal of a state must be based on the specific content of the ethical order at its foundations. There is a specific ‘axiology’ of exerting power as such, the basic yardstick for which is effectiveness. When we aim to appraise or draft a specific constitution, this pragmatic perspective must be taken into account. A well-organised system of the institutions of the state’s authority is, primarily, one which operates effectively.Axiologically, the most important part of a constitution, the one where the ethical foundations of the state are spelled out expressis verbis, is the catalogue of basic rights. At present, the main problem is the inflation of these rights, not only by rendering them too detailed, but also by placing political stipulations, social privileges or expectations regarded as generally right among them. All these superfluous appendages not only litter the constitution, but also contribute to the devaluation of real fundamental rights as their meaning, essential to the maintenance of an interpersonal order, is diluted in the flood of quasi rights which have been added on. (shrink)

The contemporary cultural trends that introduce regulations weakening parental rights have also come to Poland. Under the influence of utilitarian-statist ideology, which sees the state and its officials as the primary educators and guardians of children, powers naturally enjoyed by parents are being questioned under various pretexts. One of these is the use of violence against children. Due to actions taken by the state towards family, institutional violence used by the state – which is often much more severe for children (...) – often becomes a remedy for parental violence. This text attempts to solve the problem by referring to the basic Kantian distinction between justified and unjustified violence, and to the priority of family and parental rights over the powers of the state. In the same way that the state can use violence towards citizens, so parents can use violence towards their children, as long as its scope and form stems from what is most important for the parental relationship: the categorical imperative of responsible love, aimed at encouraging a child on his or her way of growing up into responsible freedom. A symbol of such parental action is the act of spanking, which – when properly understood and properly used – is sometimes a moral duty of parents. (shrink)

How can liberty be implemented through state institutions? And what kind of liberty are we thinking about in the contemporary world, since this concept is generally acknowledged as ambiguous? In order to understand the modern state as a rule of liberty, one must investigate the essence of liberty itself. It is widely known that liberty can be viewed in many ways, but what kind of liberty can govern the contemporary political order? Among the philosophers who have examined authority from the (...) point of view of liberty is Benjamin Constant, who has distinguished liberty understood as personal security from liberty recognized as participation in political life, and who has likewise stressed that these two understandings of liberty are complementary. Another widely known vision of freedom is the division of liberty into negative and positive; the latter, in Berlin’s original understanding of the term, remains unclear. Such doubts however do not apply to the negative concept of liberty, as Berlin called it, or its equivalent in Constant’s understanding of liberty understood as personal security. Both authors concur that this understanding of liberty is fundamental, and should above all find its expression in contemporary state institutions. In order to reveal the logic of liberty thus understood, we must turn to its very roots; that is, to Thomas Hobbes’s concept of liberty. For it is Hobbes who first precisely defined that understanding of liberty, and who first consciously engaged in designing a state based from start to finish on the liberty of the individual. (shrink)