Results for 'propositions'

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  1. An algorithm for axiomatizing and theorem proving in finite many-valued propositional logics* Walter A. Carnielli.Proving in Finite Many-Valued Propositional - forthcoming - Logique Et Analyse.
     
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  2. Peter Caws.Propositions True - 2003 - In Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 99.
     
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    Lester Embree.Human Scientific Propositions - 1992 - In D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree & Jitendranath Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and Indian philosophy. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass Publishers.
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    Paolo Crivelli.I. Propositions - 2012 - In Christopher John Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 113.
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  5.  11
    Philosophical abstracts.Tensed Propositions as Predicates - 1969 - American Philosophical Quarterly 6 (4).
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  6. General Propositions and Causality.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - In The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 237-255.
    This article rebuts Ramsey's earlier theory, in 'Universals of Law and of Fact', of how laws of nature differ from other true generalisations. It argues that our laws are rules we use in judging 'if I meet an F I shall regard it as a G'. This temporal asymmetry is derived from that of cause and effect and used to distinguish what's past as what we can know about without knowing our present intentions.
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  7.  13
    The Norms of Reason, RICHARD W. MILLER.Are Some Propositions Empirically Necessary - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):183-184.
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  8. Another Side of Categorical Propositions: The Keynes–Johnson Octagon of Oppositions.Amirouche Moktefi & Fabien Schang - 2023 - History and Philosophy of Logic 44 (4):459-475.
    The aim of this paper is to make sense of the Keynes–Johnson octagon of oppositions. We will discuss Keynes' logical theory, and examine how his view is reflected on this octagon. Then we will show how this structure is to be handled by means of a semantics of partition, thus computing logical relations between matching formulas with a semantic method that combines model theory and Boolean algebra.
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  9. On propositions: What they are and how they mean.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2:1--43.
  10. Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Berit Brogaard.
    Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions provides the first book-length exposition and defense of semantic temporalism, the view that propositions are contents or semantic values that can change their truth-values across time.
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  11.  52
    On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems.Kurt Gödel - 1931 - New York, NY, USA: Basic Books.
    First English translation of revolutionary paper that established that even in elementary parts of arithmetic, there are propositions which cannot be proved or disproved within the system. Introduction by R. B. Braithwaite.
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  12. Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):409-430.
    Nondescriptivist views in many areas of philosophy have long been associated with the commitment that in contrast to other domains of discourse, there are no propositions in their particular domain. For example, the ‘no truth conditions’ theory of conditionals1 is understood as the view that conditionals don’t express propositions, noncognitivist expressivism in metaethics is understood as advocating the view that there are not really moral propositions,2 and expressivism about epistemic modals is thought of as the view that (...)
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  13.  41
    On Propositions: What They are and How They Mean.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2 (1):1-43.
  14. On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 2:1-43.
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  15. Empty names and `gappy' propositions.Anthony Everett - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):1-36.
    In recent years a number of authors sympathetic to Referentialistaccounts of proper names have argued that utterances containingempty names express `gappy,' or incomplete, propositions. In this paper I want to take issue with this suggestion.In particular, I argue versions of this approach developedby David Braun, Nathan Salmon, Ken Taylor, and by Fred Adams,Gary Fuller, and Robert Stecker.
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  16. Possible Worlds as Propositions.Daniel Deasy - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Realists about possible worlds typically identify possible worlds with abstract objects, such as propositions or properties. However, they face a significant objection due to Lewis (1986), to the effect that there is no way to explain how possible worlds-as-abstract objects represent possibilities. In this paper, I describe a response to this objection on behalf of realists. The response is to identify possible worlds with propositions, but to deny that propositions are abstract objects, or indeed objects at all. (...)
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  17.  73
    Propositions, Functions, and Analysis: Selected Essays on Russell's Philosophy.Peter Hylton - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    The work of Bertrand Russell had a decisive influence on the emergence of analytic philosophy, and on its subsequent development. The prize-winning Russell scholar Peter Hylton presents here some of his most celebrated essays from the last two decades, all of which strive to recapture and articulate Russell's monumental vision. Relating his work to that of other philosophers, particularly Frege and Wittgenstein, and featuring a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction, the volume will be essential for anyone engaged (...)
  18.  50
    If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?Marie Duží - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1249-1283.
    This paper deals with two issues. First, it identifies structured propositions with logical procedures. Second, it considers various rigorous definitions of the granularity of procedures, hence also of structured propositions, and comes out in favour of one of them. As for the first point, structured propositions are explicated as algorithmically structured procedures. I show that these procedures are structured wholes that are assigned to expressions as their meanings, and their constituents are sub-procedures occurring in executed mode. Moreover, (...)
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  19. Contingent Objects, Contingent Propositions, and Essentialism.Jonas Werner - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1283-1294.
    Trevor Teitel (2017) has recently argued that combining the assumption that modality reduces to essence with the assumption that possibly some objects contingently exist leads to problems if one wishes to uphold that the logic of metaphysical modality is S5. In this paper I will argue that there is a way for the essentialist to evade the problem described by Teitel. The proposed solution crucially involves the assumption that some propositions possibly fail to exist. I will show how this (...)
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  20. Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper discusses two distinct strategies that have been adopted to provide fine-grained propositions; that is, propositions individuated more finely than sets of possible worlds. One strategy takes propositions to have internal structure, while the other looks beyond possible worlds, and takes propositions to be sets of circumstances, where possible worlds do not exhaust the circumstances. The usual arguments for these positions turn on fineness-of-grain issues: just how finely should propositions be individuated? Here, I compare (...)
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  21. Judgements, facts and propositions: theories of truth in Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey.Colin Johnston & Peter Sullivan - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 150-192.
    In 'On the nature of truth and falsehood' Russell offers both a multiple relation theory of judgment and a correspondence theory of truth. It has been a prevailing understanding of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s multiple relation idea but endorses the correspondence theory. Ramsey took the opposite view. In his 'Facts and Propositions', Ramsey endorses Russell’s multiple relation idea, rejects the correspondence theory, and then asserts that these moves are both due to Wittgenstein. This chapter will argue that (...)
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  22.  74
    Dicisigns: Peirce’s semiotic doctrine of propositions.Frederik Stjernfelt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (4):1019-1054.
    The paper gives a detailed reconstruction and discussion of Peirce’s doctrine of propositions, so-called Dicisigns, developed in the years around 1900. The special features different from the logical mainstream are highlighted: the functional definition not dependent upon conscious stances nor human language, the semiotic characterization extending propositions and quasi-propositions to cover prelinguistic and prehuman occurrences of signs, the relations of Dicisigns to the conception of facts, of diagrammatical reasoning, of icons and indices, of meanings, of objects, of (...)
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  23. Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions.Lorraine Juliano Keller - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):929-946.
    In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
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  24.  22
    The Priority of Propositions. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Logic.María José Frápolli - 2023 - Springer Verlag.
    This monograph is a defence of the Fregean take on logic. The author argues that Frege ́s projects, in logic and philosophy of language, are essentially connected and that the formalist shift produced by the work of Peano, Boole and Schroeder and continued by Hilbert and Tarski is completely alien to Frege's approach in the Begriffsschrift. A central thesis of the book is that judgeable contents, i.e. propositions, are the primary bearers of logical properties, which makes logic embedded in (...)
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  25.  73
    Can Propositions Be Naturalistically Acceptable?Jeffrey C. King - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):53-75.
  26.  69
    Avicenna on the Primary Propositions.Seyed N. Mousavian & Mohammad Ardeshir - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (3):201-231.
    Avicenna introduces the primary propositions as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is, how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles, what their phenomenology is, what the cause (...)
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  27.  82
    Propositions as games as types.Aarne Ranta - 1988 - Synthese 76 (3):377 - 395.
    Without violating the spirit of Game-Theoretical semantics, its results can be re-worked in Martin-Löf''s Constructive Type Theory by interpreting games as types of Myself''s winning strategies. The philosophical ideas behind Game-Theoretical Semantics in fact highly recommend restricting strategies to effective ones, which is the only controversial step in our interpretation. What is gained, then, is a direct connection between linguistic semantics and computer programming.
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  28. Pretense, Cancellation, and the Act Theory of Propositions.Manuel García-Carpintero - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. (...)
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  29. Merely possible propositions.Robert Stalnaker - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. qnew York: Oxford University Press. pp. 21--32.
     
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  30. Singular Propositions.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - In Clark Kelly James & Rea Michael C. (eds.), Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press.
  31.  57
    Propositions without identity.Joseph Moore - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):1-29.
  32. Why 0-adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
    I formulate an account, in terms of essence and ground, that explains why atomic Russellian propositions have the truth conditions they do. The key ideas are that (i) atomic propositions are just 0-adic relations, (ii) truth is just the 1-adic version of the instantiation (or, as I will say, holding) relation (Menzel 1993: 86, note 27), and (iii) atomic propositions have the truth conditions they do for basically the same reasons that partially plugged relations, like being an (...)
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  33.  40
    Quantifying over propositions in relevance logic: nonaxiomatisability of primary interpretations of ∀ p_ and ∃ _p.Philip Kremer - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (1):334-349.
    A typical approach to semantics for relevance (and other) logics: specify a class of algebraic structures and take amodelto be one of these structures, α, together with some function or relation which associates with every formulaAa subset ofα. (This is the approach of, among others, Urquhart, Routley and Meyer and Fine.) In some cases there are restrictions on the class of subsets of α with which a formula can be associated: for example, in the semantics of Routley and Meyer [1973], (...)
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  34. An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):534-557.
    Scott Soames has recently argued that traditional accounts of propositions as n-tuples or sets of objects and properties or functions from worlds to extensions cannot adequately explain how these abstract entities come to represent the world. Soames’ new cognitive theory solves this problem by taking propositions to be derived from agents representing the world to be a certain way. Agents represent the world to be a certain way, for example, when they engage in the cognitive act of predicating, (...)
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  35. Presentism and Times as Propositions.Luca Banfi & Daniel Deasy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):725-743.
    Some Presentists—according to whom everything is present—identify instants of time with propositions of a certain kind. However, the view that times are propositions seems to be at odds with Presentism: if there are times then there are past times, and therefore things that are past; but how could there be things that are past if everything is present? In this paper, we describe the Presentist view that times are propositions ; we set out the argument that Presentism (...)
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  36. Are there propositions?Andrea Iacona - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):325 - 351.
  37.  27
    Mathematical propositions as rules of grammar.Severin Schroeder - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):23-38.
  38.  61
    Indefinite Propositions and Anaphora in Stoic Logic.Paolo Crivelli - 1994 - Phronesis 39 (2):187 - 206.
  39. Propositions, Pictures and Practices.D. Z. Phillips - 2002 - Ars Disputandi 2:164-171.
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  40. Inexpressible properties and propositions.Thomas Hofweber - 2008 - In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 155-206.
    Everyone working on metaphysical questions about properties or propositions knows the reaction that many non-philosophers, even nonmetaphysicians, have to such questions. Even though they agree that Fido is a dog and thus has the property (or feature or characteristic) of being a dog, it seems weird, suspicious, or confused to them to now ask what that thing, the property of being a dog, is. The same reservations do not carry over to asking what this thing, Fido, is. There is (...)
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  41.  27
    Attitudes Without Propositions.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-826.
    This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing ‘that’-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form ‘x believes that p’ and ‘σ means that p’. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that ‘that’-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (...)
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  42. Act‐type theories of propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).
    Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act-type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act-type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to (...)
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  43.  34
    Defeasible propositions.George Molnar - 1967 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (2):185 – 197.
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  44. A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin & James Franklin - 2022 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (1):47-77.
    In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other nonmental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by (...)
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  45. The Constituents of the Propositions of Logic.Kevin C. Klement - 2015 - In Donovan Wishon & Bernard Linsky (eds.), Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Logic: New Essays on Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy. Stanford: CSLI Publications. pp. 189–229.
    In he Problems of Philosophy and other works of the same period, Russell claims that every proposition must contain at least one universal. Even fully general propositions of logic are claimed to contain “abstract logical universals”, and our knowledge of logical truths claimed to be a species of a priori knowledge of universals. However, these views are in considerable tension with Russell’s own philosophy of logic and mathematics as presented in Principia Mathematica. Universals generally are qualities and relations, but (...)
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  46.  39
    Embedding speech-act propositions.Jeremy Schwartz & Christopher Hom - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10959-10977.
    Hanks develops a theory of propositions as speech-act types. Because speech acts play a role in the contents themselves, the view overturns Frege’s force/content distinction, and as such, faces the challenge of explaining how propositions embed under logical operators like negation. The attempt to solve this problem has lead Hanks and his recent commentators to adopt theoretically exotic resources, none of which, we argue, is ultimately successful. The problem is that although there are three different ways of negating (...)
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  47. Concepts, abilities, and propositions.Hans-Johann Glock - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):115-134.
    This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly uniform explanation through a 'cognitivist' account, one that accepts that concepts exist independently of individual subjects, yet nonetheless invokes mental achievements and capacities. I consider various variants of such an account, which identify a concept, respectively, with a certain kind of abilitiy, rule and way of thinking. All of them are confronted with what I call the 'proposition problem', namely that unlike these explananda concepts are standardly (...)
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  48.  37
    Propositions and the imperative.Martin Huntley - 1980 - Synthese 45 (2):281 - 310.
  49.  51
    Propositions, Sentences, and the Semantic Definition of Truth.Arthur Pap - 1954 - Theoria 20 (1-3):23-35.
  50.  7
    Propositions, Sentences, and the Semantic Definition of Truth.Arthur Pap - 1956 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (4):381-382.
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