The Article is concerned with the investigation of interpretation of the concept "pratyakṣa" in the first chapter of the first part of "Nyāya Sūtras", which became the determining ground for the entire subsequent history of the development of this concept in the teachings of the adherents of this philosophical school and their polemics with opponents. The methods of etymological and contextual analysis are applied, the key meaningful connotations of "pratyakṣa" are outlined, and the main issues of its interpretation (...) and translation are revealed. The first chapter of the first part of "Nyāya Sūtras" is the systemic core of the work as a whole, therefore its thorough study is of primary importance, both for the reconstruction of the teachings of Nyāya darshan, and for clarifying the specifics of the actualization of the lexemes presented in this part of the text and in the philosophical discourse of India as a whole. However, the brevity of the text chosen for analysis in this article opens a rather comprehensive perspective of different interpretations and creates a number of open questions. The duration of the tradition of comments dedicated to "Nyāya Sūtras" is an evidence of the importance of this work and the difficulty of reconstructing its content. The open questions actualized in the process of this study should not only become the basis for further investigations, but also reveal the specifics of the problematization of "pratyakṣa" in the philosophical discourse of India. The article reveals that the study of the concept of "pratyakṣa" in the teaching of Nyaya darshan, first of all, requires the analysis of the following concepts: prama̅ṇa, indriya, manas, artha, jñāna, buddhi. The article also suggests that "pramana pratyakṣa" is rather a "situation" of acquiring knowledge that meets the criteria of truth, rather than a simple "tool of knowledge" or "ability to know", so its simple translation as "perception" seems insufficiently substantiated. The article declares that the issue whether every contact between indriya and artha necessarily leads to the formation of a jñāna that meets the criteria of avyapadeśyam ("that which precedes definition and expression"), avyatirekavyabhicārin ("that which is clear, distinct, uncontroversial and steady'), vyavasāyātmaka ('that which is intense, bright and full of energy') is open and urgent for further research. It also states that the issues whether it is possible to talk about the contact of indriya, in the sense of a simple list of empirical senses (sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell), with artha without the mediation of manas; and how to interpret the possible role of the Western concept of "consciousness" in this process are also important. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to examine the indian theory of perception given best expression, According to the author, In the school of advaita vedanta. The peculiarity of the indian view is that it is quite unlike the representative theories current in the west. It can best be described as a "presentative" theory, Wherein the mind ("antahkarana") is presented directly with the object, Without the necessary mediation of sense-Organs. The "antahkarana" ('inner-Vehicle'), Unlike the 'mind' of locke, Is not a (...) passive recipient of "data", It is an active instrument ("pramana") in the process of perceiving. The advaita school maintains that the "antahkarana" 'goes out' through the respective sense-Organs (e.G., The eyes), Pervades the object of attention and transforms itself into the form of the object. The study also considers possible criticism of this theory in light of contemporary discussion of perception. (edited). (shrink)

Two of the terms in the title are from Vidyānandin’s Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, which is his commentary on Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha-sūtra. Sūtra 6 of the TAS states the following: pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ, ‘knowledge—of the seven categories—is obtained through the pramāṇas and the nayas’). Vidyānandin’s commentary on this sūtra 6 entails a total of 56 ślokas, with his own prose vārttika on each of them in varying lengths. TAŚV 1, 6, 1–8 deal with particulars and universals, for which he uses the synonymous pairs aṃśa/aṃśin and (...) avayava/avayavin. That he is attacking the Buddhist position regarding this age old theme in Indian philosophy, is evident also in that he quotes Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa-vārttika. By the time he comes to his TAŚV 1, 6, 6, he establishes that an object as a whole is open to perception and that the Buddhist also accepts perception as a valid means of knowledge, but does not accept the perception of an object as a whole. From TAŚV 1, 6, 11 onwards Vidyānandin continues with the same theme, elaborating his attack of the Buddhist view even further, doing so in terms of svasaṃvedana, pratyakṣa and pramāṇa. The presentation will attempt to deal with these concepts in order to see how Vidyānandin vindicates the Jaina position vis-à-vis the Buddhist one. This presentation will continue from my previous study of Vidyānandin’s TAŚV 1, 6, 1–10. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic. The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking (...) that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha's own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception:A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka PratyakṣaStephen H. PhillipsIn the lead article of the fiftieth anniversary issue of Philosophy East and West (January 2000), Arindam Chakrabarti elaborates seven reasons why Nyāya should jettison "indeterminate perception" and view all perception as determinate, that is to say, as having an entity (a) as qualified by a qualifier (F) as object (Fa). In his notes, (...) Chakrabarti invites a reply "so that," as he says, "I may know why immaculate perception is needed by Nyāya after all." The following is a response that shows not so much why indeterminate perception is needed by Nyāya but why it is identified as a causal factor necessary to the arising of some (not all) determinate perception defined as "perception of an entity as qualified." Here I follow Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the fourteenth-century founder (with the help of a few less well known predecessors and contemporaries) of "New Logic," Navya Nyāya. Gaṅgeśa devotes an entire section (about one eighteenth) of the perception chapter of his monumental Tattvacintāmaṇi (Jewel of Reflection about Epistemology) to nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa,1 and he is a chief target of Chakrabarti's chastisement.2Now, first of all, I want to follow Gaṅgeśa's ground rules. The Naiyāyika is not concerned with strategies about how to look good in debates (with Buddhists or anyone else). His attitude is truth-seeking, not eristic, and thus no reply will be given to Chakrabarti's agonizing about how best to show ourselves in controversies with (in particular, Buddhist) adversaries (and Wilfrid Sellars). Gaṅgeśa's reflections are vāda—and the section is rightly titled nirvikalpaka-vāda, vāda being "inquiries among friends"—directed to uncovering real causal factors, not to winning a debate or countering sophisms. Deception, or counter-deception, is sometimes appropriate—for instance, to protect a student or other judge from fallacies advanced by people of bad character. But not here. So I will lay out Gaṅgeśa's argument for identifying nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa, and then run through Chakrabarti's list of reasons for rejecting it with an eye to the objection's salience to Gaṅgeśa's project. In other words, Chakrabarti's objections will be taken up with an eye to the truth as it appears to a Naiyāyika, not with an eye to how our team should best present itself to outsiders. I have little to say about Chakrabarti's complaints about appearances—in fact, I find them delightful. Don't let him fool you. There's no greater Naiyāyika enthusiast than Chakrabarti himself, and he knows how to distill a controversy to show the wisdom [End Page 104] of Nyāya in contrast to revealing a deficiency, as he appears to be doing here. He does this to make us think broadly about Nyāya in a contemporary context. And at the end I join him in making some very general comments about Nyāya's realism. First, Gaṅgeśa's argument and a rebuttal of Chakrabarti's seven reasons from Gaṅgeśa's point of view.There is no direct, apperceptive evidence for nirvikalpaka pratyaksṣa; rather, it is posited by force of the following inference as the first step of a two-step argument. "The perceptual cognition, 'A cow' (for example), is generated by a cognition of the qualifier, since it is a cognition of an entity as qualified (by that qualifier appearing), like an inference." The second step takes a person's first perception of an individual (Bessie, let us say) as a cow (i.e., as having some such property) as the perceptual cognition figuring as the inference's subject (or pakṣa) such that the cognizer's memory not informed by previous cow experience could not possibly provide the qualifier, cowhood. The qualifier has to be available, and the best candidate seems to be its perception in the raw, a qualifier (cowhood), that is to say, not (as some are wont to misinterpret the point... (shrink)

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of (...) epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)

I would like to thank the editors of Philosophy East and West for courteously asking me if I would like to respond to Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips' very thoughtful remarks about the review I wrote of Phillips' translation and commentary on the pratyakṣa chapter of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi, prepared in collaboration with N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya (Phillips and Tatacharya 2004). Let me begin by reaffirming what I said at the beginning of my review, that the book is "a monumental (...) and momentous achievement, one whose importance cannot be understated." I have indeed enormous admiration for the magnitude of their achievement and respect for the contribution they have made through this translation to the field of .. (shrink)

Deepak Sarma completes the first outline in more than fifty years of India's key philosophical traditions, inventively sourcing seminal texts and clarifying language, positions, and issues. Organized by tradition, the volume covers six schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy: Mimamsa (the study of the earlier Vedas, later incorporated into Vedanta), Vedanta (the study of the later Vedas, including the _Bhagavad Gita_ and the _Upanishads_), Sankhya (a form of self-nature dualism), Yoga (a practical outgrowth of Sankhya), and Nyaya and Vaisesika (two forms (...) of realism). It also discusses Jain philosophy and the Mahayana Buddhist schools of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Sarma maps theories of knowledge, perception, ontology, religion, and salvation, and he details central concepts, such as the _pramanas_ (means of knowledge), _pratyaksa_ (perception), _drayvas_ (types of being), _moksa_ (liberation), and _nirvana_. Selections and accompanying materials inspire a reassessment of long-held presuppositions and modes of thought, and accessible translations prove the modern relevance of these enduring works. (shrink)

Besides seeing a rabbit or seeing that the rabbit is grayish, do we also sometimes see barely just the particular animal (not as an animal or as anything) or the feature rabbitness or grayness? Such bare, nonverbalizable perception is called "indeterminate perception" (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) in Nyāya. Standard Nyāya postulates such pre-predicative bare perception in order to honor the rule that awareness of a qualified entity must be caused by awareness of the qualifier. After connecting this issue with the Western (...) debate concerning the "myth of the given," seven distinct arguments are presented showing that the very notion of such indeterminate perception is epistemically otiose and that the Nyāya theory of perception is better off without it. (shrink)

Sometimes seeing sandal from non-smellable distance we obtain cognition in the form ‘surabhi candanam’ (that sandal out there is fragrant). According to the Naiyāyikas, this cognition is a single qualified visual perception, where fragrance is grasped by visual sense-faculty. Normally visual sense cannot grasp fragrance. But here fragrance is grasped by visual sense through an extraordinary sense-connection. The Nyāya holds that the memory of fragrance, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), connects its object, fragrance, with visual sense. (...) The Naiyāyikas use this thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa to explain illusion. For a direct realist like the Naiyāyikas, it is always difficult to explain illusion. But jñānalakṣaṇa explains how an object, which is absent in front, can be accessed directly by the operating sense-organ through an extraordinary sensory connection. However, there is a possible threat to the thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa. In the mechanism of jñānalakṣaṇa, memory plays a vital role. If one is already acquainted with the fragrance of sandal in some previous occasion, then the memory of fragrance can work as an extraordinary sensory connection for her. But the question arises as to what happens when she acquires the knowledge of fragrant sandal for the first time? Is it also an instance of extraordinary jñānalakṣaṇa perception? It is obvious that in such case no memory is there to help her connect her visual sense to fragrance. However, this first acquaintance is a precondition for the possibility of the later acquaintances of fragrant sandal. Hence, it is necessary for the Naiyāyikas to explain the mechanism of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal. The Naiyāyikas will be able to save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa (and also their direct realism) if they can depict a moment-wise account of the whole process of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal remaining consistent with their own basic tenets. It would require moment-analysis (kṣaṇavicāra) of that cognitive situation. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, several attempts have been made to solve the problem. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī mentions that ‘madhura śarkarā’ or ‘sugandhi ketakī’ are cases of mental perception or mānasa pratyakṣa. He says that here manas functions as the means of perception being aided by external senses to produce such cognition. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains the other cases like illusion and recognition by the same model. On the other hand, Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyakandalī says that in the case of the first acquaintance, at first the fragrance is grasped by the olfactory sense. Then, the visual sense-faculty, taking the perception of the fragrance as an associate cause, produces a cognition of the qualificand. The paper constructs several versions of moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra) for both of these suggestions and evaluates them. It is observed that although Jayanta’s thesis may be accepted as an alternative Nyāya account of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandalwood, Śrīdhara’s account fails partially. On the other hand, Jayanta fails to explicate the inner psychological steps involved in the said cognition. This paper suggests that we can successfully construct moment examination of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal; hence, the Nyāya thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa suffers no threat of internal inconsistency. However, the relevant sensory connection working there is not an olfactory perception. Rather, it also is a memory cognition, which is generated out of the memory-trace of fragrance produced on the spot from the aforesaid olfactory perception. Thus, the Naiyāyikas may save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa as well as their direct realism. (shrink)

In Jaina philosophy, pramāṇa is accepted as a definitive knowledge of an object and knowledge itself. There are many treatises on Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra which include epistemology and logic according to Jainism. Since Siddhasena’s Nyāyāvatra more than forty texts and commentaries are available on this subject. Five types of knowledge i.e. matijñāna (knowledge through sense organs and mind), śrutajñāna (scriptural of verbal knowledge), avadhijñāna (clairvoyance), manaḥparyayajñāna (knowing the modes of others’ minds) and kevaljñāna (knowledge of all substances and modes) as mentioned (...) in the canonical literature are the basis of the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. Contributions of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720–780), Vidyānanda (775–840), Ananatavirya (950–990), Vādiraj (1025), Abhayadevasuri (10th century), Prabhācandra (980–1065), Vādi devasśūri (1086–1169, Hemacandra (1088–1173), Dharmabushaṇa (15th century), Yaśovijaya (18th century) are very important in the development of Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra, the Tattvārthasūtra and its commentarial literature has also a significant role in developing the Jaina pramāṇa-śāstra. This development has three aspects-conceptual, analytical and logical. The Tattvārthasūtra is the first text which established the classification of knowledge as two types of pramāṇa – pratyakṣa (perception) and parokṣa (indirect pramāṇa). An intensive discussion on Jaina epistemology or pramāṇa-śāstra is seen in the commentarial literature of the Tattvārthasūtra. (shrink)

Some ten years ago an interesting discussion took place in the pages of this journal. It began with an article by Arindam Chakrabarti (2000) whose title betrays its intention: "Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvikalpaka Perception from Nyāya." There followed a response by Stephen H. Phillips (2001), "There's Nothing Wrong with Raw Perception: A Response to Chakrabarti's Attack on Nyāya's Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa," which in turn was commented upon in Chakrabarti's "Reply to Stephen Phillips" (2001).This discussion, as is (...) clear from the titles, concerns the need and even possibility of nirvikalpaka perception. What Chakrabarti tries to do is "to show why we can easily do without .. (shrink)

This paper is a study of Bhartṛhari's understanding of the pramāṇas, i.e. the means whereby knowledge is acquired, as can be evinced from his Vākyapadīya and the corresponding commentary (Vākyapadīya Vṛtti). Both Bhartṛhari's general attitude towards pramāṇas as well as his specific understanding of the individual means of knowledge are analyzed. In particular, it is established that Bhartṛhari accepts exactly three pramāṇas: perception (pratyakṣa), inferential reasoning (anumāna) and tradition (āgama). However, the status of the three is unequal: perception and (...) inferential reasoning are fallible and hence cannot provide reliable guidance with regard to Dharma. These two pramāṇas do have their place and according to Bhartṛhari should not be discarded entirely. As for āgama, it is clear that Bhartṛhari accords it primacy in matters related to Dharma. But again, Bhartṛhari does not discard anumāna and pratyakṣa entirely. Rather, he seems to suggest that they have to be supplemented by āgama, which is the unimpeacheable judge of tradition. (shrink)

Among the means of valid cognition, the one which appears first in every enumeration, which was considered as being the basis of all other means of knowledge and which was considered as a legitimate method of knowledge by all schools of Indian thought is perception (pratyakṣa). With regard to perception, we can naturally expect such questions as ‘what is it to perceive’ or ‘what do we mean when we say that something is perceived’. It is generally believed that the (...) philosophical theories of perceptions are really theories about what we mean by ordinary perceptual statements. In considering our knowledge about the external world, the philosopher tends to consider the way in which perception can and does provide us with the knowledge and the nature, extent and certainty of knowledge it provides us with. It is a well acknowledged fact that perception is the fundamental source of knowledge. In Buddhist epistemology, a systematic discussion on perception is found in the writings of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, who belongs to Yogācāra school of Buddhism of Mahayana tradition. An attempt has been made in this paper to explain and examine critically the first chapter of Pramāṇasamuccaya with vṛitti, i.e., perception with special reference to Non-Buddhist schools, namely Nyāyayikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyans and Mīmāṁsakas. To explain it, the paper has been divided into three sections. Section I deals with Dignāga’s theory of perception and examination of non-Buddhist school's theory of perception, section II deals with Dignāga’s examination of nature of Perception with reference to non-Buddhists schools and section III deals with conclusion. (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins recognize abhāva or anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge; but no other school of Indian philosophy agrees with them on this issue, and for that reason, arguments have been given by the latter schools for rejecting anupalabdhi as an independent means of knowledge. In this paper, I am going to evaluate only those arguments which have been given by the Vaiśeṣika thinkers, who admit only two pramāṇa-s, viz. pratyakṣa and (...) anumāna, and reject anupalabdhi as an independent pramāṇa. There have been many scholarly studies dealing with the arguments against the reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge that have been offered by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, but there is hardly any full-length work that deals with the Vaiśeṣika’s reduction of non-apprehension to some other source of knowledge. In the present paper, an attempt has been made at providing a clear and specific account of the same. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- relational (...) and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a veridical cognition (in an event of knowing). For just about all Indian thinkers, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the foundational pramāṇas, although they debated energetically over how to characterize the content of the resultant cognitions and how to explain the basis for the authority of these pramāṇas. Debate also includes the relationship of knowledge to religious liberation, the role of scripture in knowing, (...) and the possibility of omniscience. (shrink)

The Bhagavad-Gita, as a multivalent text, has been a source of inspiration for all areas of Indian thought. This paper identifies elements in the Bhagavad-Gita which may have influenced the formation of Nyaya philosophy in the centuries after it was written. Part one of the paper reviews Nyaya epistemology as a whole, focusing on aspects that play an important role in the Bhagavad-Gita: perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), ‘syllogism’, verbal utterance (sabda) and the practical orientation of knowledge. The second part shows (...) how those aspects appear in the text of the Bhagavad-Gita. In praticular, Krishna relies on a number of techniques in convincing Arjuna of his obligation as a ksatria which would later be formalized in Nyaya philosophy as pramana or methods of knowing. As a whole, the Bhagavad-Gita also emphasizes the Nyaya view that knowledge is only useful insofar as it helps the knower achieve a particular goal. This paper does not, and has no pretention to prove the existence of a direct line of influence connection the Bhagavad-Gita and Nyaya philosophy; readers will instead gain an appreciation of the shared cultural context which gave rise to both of these forms of Indian thought. Abstrak Bhagavad-Gita, sebagai teks yang multitafsir, telah menjadi sumber inspirasi bagi segala pemikiran India. Makalah ini mengidentifikasikan unsur-unsur dalam Bhagavad-Gita yang mungkin memengaruhi pembentukan filsafat Nyaya selama beberapa abad setelah Bhagavad-Gita ditulis. Bagian pertama makalah meringkas epistemologi Nyaya secara keseluruhan dengan berfokus pada aspek-aspek yang memainkan peran penting dalam Bhagavad-Gita: persepsi (pratyaksa), penyimpulan (anumana), ‘silogisme’, saksi verbal (sabda), dan orientasi praktis pengetahuan. Bagian kedua memperlihatkan bagaimana aspek-aspek tersebut muncul dalam teks Bhagavad-Gita. Secara khusus, Krishna mengandalkan berbagai teknik dalam meyakinkan Arjuna akan kewajibannya sebagai ksatria yang kemudian diformalkan dalam filsafat Nyaya sebagai pramana atau sarana pengetahuan. Secara keseluruhan, Bhagavad-Gita juga menekankan pandangan Nyaya bahwa pengetahuan hanya berguna sejauh dapat membantu si penahu mencapai tujuan tertentu. Makalah ini tidak dapat membuktikan adanya garis pengaruh langsung yang menghubungkan Bhagavad-Gita dengan filsafat Nyaya; namun, kita tetap dapat mengapresiasi suatu ‘kemiripan keluarga’ di antara keduanya yang menunjukkan kekayaan konteks kebudayaan yang menghasilkan kedua buah pemikiran peradaban India ini. (shrink)

One debate that occupied Pratyabhijñā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors was the question of the reality of _sambandha_, or relation. A central treaty on the topic is Utpaladeva’s (∼10th c.) _Sambandhasiddhi_ [SS] (‘_Proof of Relation_’), a response to Dharmakīrti’s (∼7th c.) _Sambandhaparīkṣā_ [SP] (‘_Analysis of Relation_’). As the contrasting titles suggest, Dharmakīrti held that relations are merely conceptual constructions (_kalpanā_), inferred _post hoc_ from discrete perceptual cognitions (_pratyakṣa_)—and thus ultimately _unreal_. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, attempted to ‘prove’ (_siddhi_) the (...) truth (_satya_) of relation as a genuine ‘division-non-division,’ or ‘unity-in-diversity’ (_bhedābheda_). In this article, I reconstruct Utpala’s ‘proof’ as a pragmatic argument to the effect that Dharmakīrti, in virtue of his nominalist metaphysics, mistakenly treats the general form of relation as an inferential _concept_, rather than the mode of ‘intentional’ _action_ (_śakti_) manifest in reflexive judgment (_vimarśa_). In doing so, Utpala suggests that Dharmakīrti inadvertently renders the relational conditions for the recognition of determinate intentional content unintelligible. (shrink)