Society has historically not taken a benign view of genetic disease. The laws permitting sterilization of the mentally re tarded~ and those proscribing consanguineous marriages are but two examples. Indeed as far back as the 5th-10th centuries, B.C.E., consanguineous unions were outlawed (Leviticus XVIII, 6). Case law has traditionally tended toward the conservative. It is reactive rather than directive, exerting its influence only after an individual or group has sustained injury and brought suit. In contrast, state legislatures have not been (...) inhibited in enacting statutes. Many of their products can be characterized as hasty, unnecessary, ill-conceived, and based on the heart rather than the head. Moreover the lack of expert consultation sought has also been remarkable. One state legislature, for example, has advocated immunization for sickle cell anemia! Many others have enacted laws for the screening of inborn errors of metabolism, e.g., phenylketon uria, but have poorly defined the lines of responsibility to secure compliance. A spate of specific disease-related bills has emerged in the u.S. Congress, each seeking recognition and appropriations. Sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, Cooley's anemia and Tay-Sachs disease have been among the front-runners for support. Finally, in 1975, Congress has begun to examine an omnibus bill concerning all forms of genetic disease. The bill, termed the National Genetic Diseases Act is, however, still far from being enacted. (shrink)

_Marriage and Morals_ is a compelling cross-cultural examination of individual, familial and societal attitudes towards sex and marriage. By exploring the codes by which we live our sexual lives and conventional morality, Russell daringly sets out a new morality, shaped and influenced by dramatic changes in society such as the emancipation of women and the wide-spread use of contraceptives. From the origin of marriage to the influence of religion, Russell explores the changing role of marriage and codes (...) of sexual ethics. The influence of this great work has turned it into a worthy classic. (shrink)

Marriages come in a very wide variety: if the reports of anthropologists and historians are to be believed, an extraordinarily wide variety. This includes some of the more unusual forms, including marriage to the dead; to the gods; and even to plants. This does suggest that few proposed marriage relationships would require 'redefining marriage': but on the other hand, it makes giving a general theory of marriage challenging. So one issue we should face is how accepting (...) we should be of the reports: to what extent reported 'marriages' really are marriages. This paper defends the view that almost all of these reported marriages are in fact marriages, and suggests some theoretical approaches that may be generous enough to account for this. (shrink)

_Marriage and Morals_ is a compelling cross-cultural examination of individual, familial and societal attitudes towards sex and marriage. By exploring the codes by which we live our sexual lives and conventional morality, Russell daringly sets out a new morality, shaped and influenced by dramatic changes in society such as the emancipation of women and the wide-spread use of contraceptives. From the origin of marriage to the influence of religion, Russell explores the changing role of marriage and codes (...) of sexual ethics. The influence of this great work has turned it into a worthy classic. (shrink)

Ten years after over half a million Christians signed their names to a statement of conscience clarifying where they stood, the three issues dealt with in the Manhattan Declaration are of more cultural importance than ever. The main difference now, as opposed to then, is the state has since claimed authority, not only over life, but also over marriage and religious liberty." -- Amazon.com.

This chapter expresses that radical feminist perspectives on marriage and motherhood are in danger of being lost in the quest for equal rights. For more than a decade, feminist philosophers and lesbian/gay activists have been optimistic about the potentialities of legal marriage and legitimated motherhood. Feminist philosophers are taking as valuable theoretical paradigms for ethics many kinds of caring relationships that have been salient in women's lives. "Family" is itself a family resemblance concept. Apart from the institution of (...) marriage and historical ideals of the family, it is uncertain what characteristics mother‐child relationships would have, for many alternatives are possible. Historically, motherhood has been a core element of patriarchy. Moral philosophy might also be transformed by greater attention to the fact that adult experience and its potentialities are significantly conditioned by the childhoods of adults and of those children's relationships to adults. (shrink)

Contemporary recognition theory has developed powerful tools for understanding a variety of social problems through the lens of misrecognition. It has, however, paid somewhat less attention to how to conceive of appropriate responses to misrecognition, usually making the tacit assumption that the proper societal response is adequate or proper affirmative recognition. In this paper I argue that, although affirmative recognition is one potential response to misrecognition, it is not the only such response. In particular, I would like to make the (...) case for derecognition in some cases: derecognition, in particular, through the systematic deinstitutionalization or uncoupling of various reinforcing components of social institutions, components whose tight combination in one social institution has led to the misrecognition in the first place. I make the case through the example of recent United States debates over marriage, especially but not only with respect to gay marriage. I argue that the proper response to the misrecognition of sexual minorities embodied in exclusively heterosexual marriage codes is not affirmative recognition of lesbian and gay marriages, but rather the systematic derecognition of legal marriage as currently understood. I also argue that the systematic misrecognition of women that occurs under the contemporary institution of marriage would likewise best be addressed through legal uncoupling of heterogeneous social components embodied in the contemporary social institution of marriage. (shrink)

This essay argues that current advocacy of lesbian and gay rights to legal marriage and parenthood insufficiently criticizes both marriage and motherhood as they are currently practiced and structured by Northern legal institutions. Instead we would do better not to let the State define our intimate unions and parenting would be improved if the power presently concentrated in the hands of one or two guardians were diluted and distributed through an appropriately concerned community.

Kant has famously argued that monogamous marriage is the only relationship where sexual use can take place "without degrading humanity and breaking the moral laws." Kantian marriage, however, has been the target of fierce criticisms by contemporary things: it has been regarded as flawed and paradoncal, as being deeply at odds with feminism, and, at best, as plainly uninteresting. In this paper, I argue that Kantian marriage can indeed survive these criticisms. Finally, the paper advances the discussion (...) beyond marriage. Drawing on Kant 's conception of friendship, I suggest that he might have overlooked the possibility of sex being morally permissible in yet another context. (shrink)

In this article I seek to address some misunderstandings in arguments about same sex-marriage. I do this by evaluating several views on homosexuality and marriage. My central aim is to show that a rejection of same-sex marriage does not depend upon the view that homosexual acts are immoral or disordered. Rather, one must examine sexual acts in light of public goods that are at stake. I also argue that the Christian understanding of marriage and sexuality offers (...) more than a set of prohibitions against certain sexual acts. Rather, it offers reasonable principles by which to evaluate the relationship between sexual acts and the public good. (shrink)

На підставі вивчення судових справ, селянських щоденників, матеріалів періодики, статистичних даних та інших історичних джерел простежуються зміни в сімейних відносинах селян кінця ХІХ - першої чверті ХХ ст. Аналізуються прояви нетрадиційної шлюбно-сімейної поведінки членів родин: дошлюбні стосунки, незареєстровані шлюби, подружні зради, самовільні розлучення, сімейні протиріччя, позашлюбні діти, подвійні шлюби і т. ін. Простежується активізація протесту всередині селянських родин проти домашнього насилля. Роз'яснюється, що трансформація поглядів на шлюб та сім'ю зумовлювала пошук сільськими жителями Південної України альтернативних шляхів самореалізації.

It appears that spouses have less reason to hold each other to a norm of monogamy than to reject the norm. The norm of monogamy involves a restriction of spouses' aeeess to two things of value: sex and erotic love. This restriction initially appears unwarranted but can be justified. There is reason for spouses to aeeept the norm of monogamy if their marriage satisfies three conditions. Otherwise, there is reason to permit non-monogamy. Some spouses have reason to accept the (...) norm of monogamy because this will avoid reasonable hurt and prevent diversion of resourees needed to sustain the marriage. Other spouses have reason to permit non-monogamy to allow the spouses access to aspects of a well-rounded life. The choice to be either monogamous or non-monogamous ean also be non-instrumentally valuable if chosen for the right reasons. (shrink)

This article qualifies and supplements the interpretation of Astell's Reflections on Marriage as an attack on contract theories of politics. Astell was undoubtedly a conservative critic of Locke, but also deserves her reputation as a feminist critic of marriage, since the primary purpose of her Reflections was to get women to reflect on whether to marry, and seriously to consider not marrying. The essay supports this interpretation by locating Astell's Reflections in the context of the querelle des femmes. (...) Viewed as a response to misogynist anti-marital satire, it is clear why Astell's work on marriage should have been received by her contemporaries as blowing the 'trumpet of rebellion' to women. The fact that Astell was both deeply conservative and recognizably feminist suggests that feminist political thought is not simply an outgrowth of Enlightenment radicalism, and reminds us that feminism is in part a defensive response to the hatred of women. (shrink)

First published in 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This article argues for separating the institutions of marriage and parenting, conceptually and legally. Marriage is neither necessary nor adequate for fostering cooperative and stable co-parenting. Because promoting marriage fails to protect all children, the state should develop a more suitable formal mechanism whereby co-parents can commit to cooperate in good faith in order to best serve the interests of their children. Like civil marriage, many of the terms of these contracts are aspirational and not enforceable, (...) though they can guide arrangements for custody and financial support. Co-parenting agreements need not be limited to two parents, nor need they be limited to legal parents, but can include de facto parents, such as stepparents, foster parents, and other support parents. One important aim of these agreements is to recognise and support the valuable work that married or unmarried co-parents perform, and to protect the parental rights of caregivers in different kinds of situations. (shrink)

How does the publication of Confessions of the Flesh impact feminist critique of Foucault's History of Sexuality project? The paper addresses this question in two ways: by asking how reflection on continuities and ruptures has, and can, be productive for feminist critique; and by revisiting the role of women in all four volumes. The terms of their inclusion have been considered an omission, particularly because the project omits same-sex eros between women. Where women appear, they are framed as spouses, or (...) as subordinated to some form of authority. And yet, insofar as the project contains more than one genealogical dimension, Foucault's “marriages” also belong to proximate plurigenealogies. In Confession's focus on the conditions for a juridical and divided self's subjectivation by will and desire, even the limited parameters within which women appear in the project incite the following question. What are the implications of Confessions of the Flesh's juridical self for genealogies of female subjectivation? (shrink)

In 1991, new political discourses emerged in the Soviet republics that had to reinvent themselves as independent states, redefining their national identity on several dimensions. This process matured ambiguous attitudes toward the former imperial center and different visions over the scopes, perspectives, and claims of a ‘Russian World’ in the former Soviet space, where Moscow still asserted an exclusive political and cultural sphere of influence. In this article, we will review the cases of Armenia and Uzbekistan with peculiar national projects (...) and relationships with Moscow, reviewing their inclusion within the USSR, their path to independence, their post-Soviet relations with Moscow, and the changes during the turning points of 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. (shrink)

This article tries to understand the role of marriage in the religious lives of women during early Buddhism through the narrative of a relatively understudied text, Pāli Vimānavatthu. Marriage played a significant role in the lives of Buddhist laywomen as opposed to laymen since greater emphasis was placed on the third lay precept—prohibiting sexual misconduct—and the Buddhist ideology of patibbatā. However, complications arose when the ideal wives—in whose lives domesticity and family issues played an important role—were placed in (...) problematic marital situations. This article explores three such situations: the difficulties of marrying into a non-Buddhist family; the difficulties of being falsely accused of adultery; and the difficulties posed to merit-making by the state of pregnancy. In addition to all of the ordinary virtues that allowed a layperson to acquire merit, being an ideal wife and successfully resolving marital problems constituted a special category of merit-making virtue for Buddhist women. At the same time, whilst merit could be helpful to a woman in resolving marital difficulties, her commitment to Buddhism was finally meant to take precedence over any marital difficulties she might have. (shrink)

Marriage and family are obviously central to Confucian ethics. Perhaps the most oft‐repeated exhortation in the Analects is the duty of children to care for parents. There is little in the Daodejing or Zhuangzi on marriage and family. Relative silence suggests that Daoism does not place much importance on the formal institutionalization of interpersonal commitments. Male and female instinctually complement one another, and their pairing opens the way to reproduction, a major theme of the Daodejing. The Daodejing certainly (...) suggests that heterosexual unions are commonplace and potent. A modern Confucian perspective could be affirmative. If we take the most basic Confucian principles—humanity, ritual, and duty—shorn of any gender implications, it is by no means necessary that they would deny same‐sex marriage. Contemporary Confucians would have an initial presumption against divorce. Marriage, of any sort, is a solemnly declared commitment and, as such, it should be respected and preserved. (shrink)

Can or must political liberals recognize any form of legal marriage? If so, on what grounds and what type of marriage can they recognize? Elizabeth Brake argues that political liberals can and must support the social bases of adult caring relationships through the public recognition and support of minimal marriage. She thinks that political liberals cannot recognize a more robust form of marriage than her minimal marriage. Clare Chambers argues that the state should abolish legal (...) marriage and replace it with the marriage-free state, which endorses piecemeal practice-based personal relationship laws. In this thesis, I will argue that the marriage-free state is superior to minimal marriage even in an ideal society because the marriage-free state can secure the rights and entitlements that are important for minimal marriage and do so in a way that is more inclusive of vulnerable persons. (shrink)

This paper examines age patterns of first marriage and motherhood and covariates of early marriage, delayed consummation of marriage and early motherhood in Nepal using data from the 2000 Nepal Adolescent and Young Adult Survey (NAYA). Both unmarried and married male and female youths (age 14s education, region of residence and ethnicity. The main covariates of delayed consummation of marriage are age at first marriage, region of residence and ethnicity. The study highlights the need to (...) focus on less educated female youths in the Terai region in order to reduce the reproductive and child health risks associated with early marriage and early childbearing. (shrink)

In this article I seek to address some misunderstandings in arguments about same sex-marriage. I do this by evaluating several views on homosexuality and marriage. My central aim is to show that a rejection of same-sex marriage does not depend upon the view that homosexual acts are immoral or disordered. Rather, one must examine sexual acts in light of public goods that are at stake. I also argue that the Christian understanding of marriage and sexuality offers (...) more than a set of prohibitions against certain sexual acts. Rather, it offers reasonable principles by which to evaluate the relationship between sexual acts and the public good. (shrink)

One current line of argument against the legalization of same-sex marriage, advocated primarily by the New Natural Lawyers, is that marriage is a pre-political institution that has, as an essential element, a bodily union requirement. They argue that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union in their sexual activities and thus cannot meet the structural requirements of marriage. Accordingly, they argue that the same-sex marriage debate must be framed as a debate about what marriage is, and (...) not, as it was in the anti-miscegenation precedents, about who can get married. I argue that their position, which promulgates a set of pernicious stereotypes about same-sex couples, is, first of all, internally inconsistent. According to their own metaphysical principles about bodily union, they provide no rational basis for the claim that same-sex couples cannot realize bodily union and thus that same-sex couples cannot be married. Second, I argue for a deflationary account of the significance of bodily union. While same-sex couples, like heterosexual couples, can realize bodily union, this sort of union has no moral significance and thus cannot be the factor that distinguishes marriages from other sorts of relationships. Finally, I suggest that they have no basis for their claims about the inferiority of same-sex relationships. (shrink)

Taking into account the debate about the continuity or discontinuity in Heb 1-12 and Heb 13, with the implication of whether the hortatory material in chapter 13 is consistent with chapters 1-12 or it is a list of miscellaneous exhortations instead, this article seeks to discern connections between the concept of marriage in 13:4 with the ideas stated in 12:28–13:6. This endeavor is informed by a reading of 12:28-13:6 made in three steps. First, 12:28-29 is read as a transition (...) for the hortatory material in chapter 13. Second, 13:1-6 is traced as a conceptual structure for the understanding of marriage in 13:4. Third, the article identifies connections of the exhortation about marriage in 13:4 with ideas developed in 12:28-29 and 13:1-6. (shrink)

Epicurus strongly discouraged sex, marriage, and the rearing of children. This paper looks at some of the primary evidence for these claims, clears up a translation of one passage, and emends another passage. (The emendation has been accepted into Dorandi's new edition of Diogenes Laertius).

Originally published between 1926 and 1931 the titles in this mini-set discuss the role of women in both domestic and professional areas, contraception, sexual relationships and the changing nature of the family within society.

A recurring complaint in the highly polemical chronicles of the medieval Veneto is that elite families misused marital alliances as instruments of political violence. This concern appears, in particular, in the Cronica in factis et circa facta Marchie Trivixane , by Rolandino da Padova , the most rhetorically coherent and thorough medieval history of the region. Rolandino's interest in abuses of the betrothal system is evident in his account of the serial marriages of Cunizza da Romano. Over fifty years before (...) Cunizza's posthumous celebration in Dante's Divine Comedy, Rolandino's discussion of her amours forms part of a long denunciation of her brother, Ezzelino III da Romano . Cunizza's brother was an imperial vicar who, at the height of his power, controlled the entire mainland of the Veneto, called the Marca Trevigiana in the Middle Ages. The powerful Ezzelino is implied in the chronicle to have manipulated Cunizza's marital alliances, and the suggestion is that the resulting strategic connections enabled him to foment war and injustice. This tale is but one of many in which the chroniclers of the region condemn elite marital practices deemed transgressive in terms of political oppression. The main purpose of this article is to chart the chroniclers' accusations that link misconduct in marriage agreements to violence in factional politics and abuse of power. I contend that the chronicles of the medieval Veneto represent tyranny in terms of the manipulation of marital alliances. (shrink)

In the 1706 third edition of her Reflections upon Marriage, Mary Astell alludes to John Locke’s definition of slavery in her descriptions of marriage. She describes the state of married women as being ‘subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man’ (Locke, Two Treatises, II.22). Recent scholars maintain that Astell does not seriously regard marriage as a form of slavery in the Lockean sense. In this paper, I defend the contrary position: I argue that (...) Astell does seriously regard marriage as a form of slavery for women and that she condemns this state of affairs as morally wrong. I also show that, far from criticizing Locke, Astell draws on key passages in his Thoughts concerning Education to urge that women be educated to retain their liberty. (shrink)