Learning is fundamentally about action, enabling the successful navigation of a changing and uncertain environment. The experience of pain is central to this process, indicating the need for a change in action so as to mitigate potential threat to bodily integrity. This review considers the application of Bayesian models of learning in pain that inherently accommodate uncertainty and action, which, we shall propose are essential in understanding learning in both acute and persistent cases of pain.

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect (...) to the probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

We investigate the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where ``general Bayesian learning'' means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. States are linear functionals that encode probability measures by assigning expectation values to random variables via integrating them with respect (...) to the probability measure. If a state can be learned from another this way, then it is said to be Bayes accessible from the evidence. It is shown that the Bayes accessibility relation is reflexive, antisymmetric and non-transitive. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes' rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization. (shrink)

본 연구의 목적은 최근 20여 년 동안 진행되어 온 학습이론에 대한 피아제의 명제논리학적 학습이론과 베이즈주의의 확률론적 학습이론의 융합에 근거하는 새로운 융합교수학습모형을 개발하는 것이다. 연구자는 이 새로운 교수학습모델을 “베이지안 구조구성주의 교수학습모형”(Bayesian structure-constructivist Model of Teaching-learning: 이하 약칭 BMT)이라 명명한다. 본고는 역사-비판적 관점 및 형식화적 관점에서 피아제의 명제논리학적 학습모형에서 해석된 학습이론과 베이즈주의의 확률론적 추론모형에서 해석된 학습이론을 일차적으로 분석하고, 논문의 후반부에서는 이를 근거로 교수법의 관점에서 양자의 학습이론을 통합하는 새로운 교수학습모델, 즉 BMT의 중요한 특성들을 세부적으로 제시한다. 몇 가지 핵심만 언급하면, 첫째로, BMT는 (...) 개념 학습이든 이론 학습이든 모든 학습은 표상과 샘플링의 상호작용임을 강조한다. 매우 이른 나이에서부터 아동은 학습하기 이전에 자기에게 주어진 예시들이 약한 샘플링인지 강한 샘플링인지, 특히 교육학적 샘플링인지 비교육학적 샘플링인지를 구분한다. 둘째로, 따라서 학습을 촉진시킬 수 있는 샘플을 선택하기 위해서 교사는 교육학적 추론을 위한 베이지안 모델을 활용하면서 직접적인 강의식 수업과 발견학습 수업을 병행해야 한다. 셋째로, 아동은 때때로 구체적인 규칙들보다는 추상적인 규칙들을 먼저 학습하기도 하지만, 대부분의 영역에서 추상적인 지식의 학습은 구체적인 지식의 학습에 의존한다. 따라서 성공적인 학습을 위해서는 피아제가 강조한 보편적 언어로서 논리적 문법과 그들 사이의 위계성을 고려하는 샘플을 개발하고 제시해야 한다. (shrink)

본고는 딥러닝의 이미지 인식 원리와 유아의 이미지 인식 원리를 종합하면서, 이미지-개념 학습을 위한 새로운 교수학습모델, 즉 “베이지안 구조구성주의 교수학습모델”(Bayesian Structure-constructivist Teaching-learning Model: BSTM)을 제안한다. 달리 말하면, 기계학습 원리와 인간학습 원리를 비교함으로써 얻게 되는 시너지 효과를 바탕으로, 유아들의 이미지-개념 학습을 위한 새로운 교수 모델을 구성하는 것을 목표로 한다. 이런 맥락에서 본고는 전체적으로 3가지 차원에서 논의된다. 첫째, 아동의 이미지 학습에 대한 역사적 중요 이론인 “대상 전체론적 가설”, “분류학적 가설”, “배타적 가설”, “기본 수준 범주 가설” 등을 역사 비판적 관점에서 검토한다. 둘째, (...) 컴퓨터 공학에서 전개된 머신러닝의 이미지 학습 원리 및 그 구조의 역사적 변형들에 대해서 비판적으로 분석하면서, 특히 딥러닝의 교육 인식론적 의미를 도출한다. 셋째, 선행하는 논의들을 토대로 이미지와 개념을 연결시키는 학습, 즉 단어학습을 위한 필자의 고유한 이론인 구조구성주의 개념교수모델을 제안한다. 이때 필자는 피아제의 명제논리학적 학습 가설, 즉 논리-수학적 구조를 중시하는 기존의 피아제 학파의 학습 가설과 최근의 베이지안 학습 이론에서 강조된 확률론적 추론 가설, 특히 “교육학적 추론 가설”을 동시에 포함할 수 있는 교수학습모델의 구조 및 주요 지향점들을 제안한다. (shrink)

Two key research issues in the field of causal learning are how people acquire causal knowledge when observing data that are presented sequentially, and the level of abstraction at which learning takes place. Does sequential causal learning solely involve the acquisition of specific cause-effect links, or do learners also acquire knowledge about abstract causal constraints? Recent empirical studies have revealed that experience with one set of causal cues can dramatically alter subsequent learning and performance with entirely (...) different cues, suggesting that learning involves abstract transfer, and such transfer effects involve sequential presentation of distinct sets of causal cues. It has been demonstrated that pre-training can modulate classic causal learning phenomena such as forward and backward blocking. To account for these effects, we propose a Bayesian theory of sequential causal learning. The theory assumes that humans are able to consider and use several alternative causal generative models, each instantiating a different causal integration rule. Model selection is used to decide which integration rule to use in a given learning environment in order to infer causal knowledge from sequential data. Detailed computer simulations demonstrate that humans rely on the abstract characteristics of outcome variables to select a causal integration rule, which in turn alters causal learning in a variety of blocking and overshadowing paradigms. When the nature of the outcome variable is ambiguous, humans select the model that yields the best fit with the recent environment, and then apply it to subsequent learning tasks. Based on sequential patterns of cue-outcome co-occurrence, the theory can account for a range of phenomena in sequential causal learning, including various blocking effects, primacy effects in some experimental conditions, and apparently abstract transfer of causal knowledge. (shrink)

One of the open questions in Bayesian epistemology is how to rationally learn from indicative conditionals (Douven, 2016). Eva et al. (Mind 129(514):461–508, 2020) propose a strategy to resolve this question. They claim that their strategy provides a “uniquely rational response to any given learning scenario”. We show that their updating strategy is neither very general nor always rational. Even worse, we generalize their strategy and show that it still fails. Bad news for the Bayesians.

Bayesian paradigm has been widely acknowledged as a coherent approach to learning putative probability model structures from a finite class of candidate models. Bayesian learning is based on measuring the predictive ability of a model in terms of the corresponding marginal data distribution, which equals the expectation of the likelihood with respect to a prior distribution for model parameters. The main controversy related to this learning method stems from the necessity of specifying proper prior distributions (...) for all unknown parameters of a model, which ensures a complete determination of the marginal data distribution. Even for commonly used models, subjective priors may be difficult to specify precisely, and therefore, several automated learning procedures have been suggested in the literature. Here we introduce a novel Bayesian learning method based on the predictive entropy of a probability model, that can combine both subjective and objective probabilistic assessment of uncertain quantities in putative models. It is shown that our approach can avoid some of the limitations of the earlier suggested objective Bayesian methods. (shrink)

In this article, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian model of learning in a general type of artificial language‐learning experiment in which learners are exposed to a mixture of grammars representing the variation present in real learners’ input, particularly at times of language change. The modeling goal is to formalize and quantify hypothesized learning biases. The test case is an experiment (Culbertson, Smolensky, & Legendre, 2012) targeting the learning of word‐order patterns in the nominal domain. The (...) model identifies internal biases of the experimental participants, providing evidence that learners impose (possibly arbitrary) properties on the grammars they learn, potentially resulting in the cross‐linguistic regularities known as typological universals. Learners exposed to mixtures of artificial grammars tended to shift those mixtures in certain ways rather than others; the model reveals how learners’ inferences are systematically affected by specific prior biases. These biases are in line with a typological generalization—Greenberg's Universal 18—which bans a particular word‐order pattern relating nouns, adjectives, and numerals. (shrink)

La, V. P., & Vuong, Q. H. (2019). bayesvl: Visually learning the graphical structure of Bayesian networks and performing MCMC with ‘Stan’. The Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN).

Rescorla (Erkenntnis, 2020) has recently pointed out that the standard arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever I become certain of something, it is true. Most people would reject this assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this assumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate Rescorla’s new argument by giving a very general Dutch Book argument that applies to many cases of updating (...) beyond those covered by Conditionalization, and then showing how Rescorla’s version follows as a special case of that. Second, I want to show how to generalise R. A. Briggs and Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance argument to avoid the assumption that Rescorla has identified (Briggs and Pettigrew in Noûs, 2018). In both cases, these arguments proceed by first establishing a very general reflection principle. (shrink)

Models of category learning have been extensively studied in cognitive science and primarily tested on perceptual abstractions or artificial stimuli. In this paper, we focus on categories acquired from natural language stimuli, that is, words. We present a Bayesian model that, unlike previous work, learns both categories and their features in a single process. We model category induction as two interrelated subproblems: the acquisition of features that discriminate among categories, and the grouping of concepts into categories based on (...) those features. Our model learns categories incrementally using particle filters, a sequential Monte Carlo method commonly used for approximate probabilistic inference that sequentially integrates newly observed data and can be viewed as a plausible mechanism for human learning. Experimental results show that our incremental learner obtains meaningful categories which yield a closer fit to behavioral data compared to related models while at the same time acquiring features which characterize the learned categories. (shrink)

Languages are transmitted from person to person and generation to generation via a process of iterated learning: people learn a language from other people who once learned that language themselves. We analyze the consequences of iterated learning for learning algorithms based on the principles of Bayesian inference, assuming that learners compute a posterior distribution over languages by combining a prior (representing their inductive biases) with the evidence provided by linguistic data. We show that when learners sample (...) languages from this posterior distribution, iterated learning converges to a distribution over languages that is determined entirely by the prior. Under these conditions, iterated learning is a form of Gibbs sampling, a widely-used Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The consequences of iterated learning are more complicated when learners choose the language with maximum posterior probability, being affected by both the prior of the learners and the amount of information transmitted between generations. We show that in this case, iterated learning corresponds to another statistical inference algorithm, a variant of the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm. These results clarify the role of iterated learning in explanations of linguistic universals and provide a formal connection between constraints on language acquisition and the languages that come to be spoken, suggesting that information transmitted via iterated learning will ultimately come to mirror the minds of the learners. (shrink)

Infant language learners are faced with the difficult inductive problem of determining how new words map to novel or known objects in their environment. Bayesian inference models have been successful at using the sparse information available in natural child-directed speech to build candidate lexicons and infer speakers’ referential intentions. We begin by asking how a Bayesian model optimized for monolingual input generalizes to new monolingual or bilingual corpora and find that, especially in the case of the bilingual input, (...) the model shows a significant decrease in performance. In the next experiment, we propose the ME Model, a modified Bayesian model, which approximates infants’ mutual exclusivity bias to support the differential demands of monolingual and bilingual learning situations. The extended model is assessed using the same corpora of real child-directed speech, showing that its performance is more robust against varying input and less dependent than the Intentional Model on optimization of its parsimony parameter. We argue that both monolingual and bilingual demands on word learning are important considerations for a computational model, as they can yield significantly different results than when only one such context is considered. (shrink)

One of the most challenging tasks when adopting Bayesian networks is the one of learning their structure from data. This task is complicated by the huge search space of possible solutions and by the fact that the problem isNP-hard. Hence, a full enumeration of all the possible solutions is not always feasible and approximations are often required. However, to the best of our knowledge, a quantitative analysis of the performance and characteristics of the different heuristics to solve this (...) problem has never been done before. For this reason, in this work, we provide a detailed comparison of many different state-of-the-art methods for structural learning on simulated data considering both BNs with discrete and continuous variables and with different rates of noise in the data. In particular, we investigate the performance of different widespread scores and algorithmic approaches proposed for the inference and the statistical pitfalls within them. (shrink)

Conditional learning, where agents learn a conditional sentence ‘If A, then B,’ is difficult to incorporate into existing Bayesian models of learning. This is because conditional learning is not uniform: in some cases, learning a conditional requires decreasing the probability of the antecedent, while in other cases, the antecedent probability stays constant or increases. I argue that how one learns a conditional depends on the causal structure relating the antecedent and the consequent, leading to a (...) causal model of conditional learning. This model extends traditional Bayesian learning by incorporating causal models into agents’ epistemic states. On this theory, conditional learning proceeds in two steps. First, an agent learns a new causal model with the appropriate relationship between the antecedent and the consequent. Then, the agent narrows down the set of possible worlds to include only those which make the conditional proposition true. This model of learning can incorporate both standard cases of Bayesian learning and the non-uniform learning required to learn conditional information. (shrink)

Verbal learning and memory summaries of older adults have usually been used to describe neuropsychiatric complaints. Bayesian hierarchical models are modern and appropriate approaches for predicting repeated measures data where information exchangeability is considered and a violation of the independence assumption in classical statistics. Such models are complex models for clustered data that account for distributions of hyper-parameters for fixed-term parameters in Bayesian computations. Repeated measures are inherently clustered and typically occur in clinical trials, education, cognitive psychology, (...) and treatment follow-up. The Hopkins Verbal Learning Test is a general verbal knowledge and memory assessment administered repeatedly as part of a neurophysiological experiment to examine an individual’s performance outcomes at different time points. Multiple trial-based scores of verbal learning and memory tests were considered as an outcome measurement. In this article, we attempted to evaluate the predicting effect of individual characteristics in considering within and between-group variations by fitting various Bayesian hierarchical models via the hybrid Hamiltonian Monte Carlo under the Bayesian Regression Models using ‘Stan’ package of R. Comparisons of the fitted models were done using leave-one-out information criteria, Widely applicable information criterion, and K-fold cross-validation methods. The full hierarchical model with varying intercepts and slopes had the best predictive performance for verbal learning tests [from the Advanced Cognitive Training for Independent and Vital Elderly study dataset] using the hybrid Hamiltonian-Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach. (shrink)

According to the Bayesian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, the norms by which everyday human cognition is best evaluated are probabilistic rather than logical in character. Recently, the Bayesian paradigm has been applied to the domain of argumentation, where the fundamental norms are traditionally assumed to be logical. Here, we present a major generalisation of extant Bayesian approaches to argumentation that utilizes a new class of Bayesian learning methods that are better suited to modelling (...) dynamic and conditional inferences than standard Bayesian conditionalization, is able to characterise the special value of logically valid argument schemes in uncertain reasoning contexts, greatly extends the range of inferences and argumentative phenomena that can be adequately described in a Bayesian framework, and undermines some influential theoretical motivations for dual function models of human cognition. We conclude that the probabilistic norms given by the Bayesian approach to rationality are not necessarily at odds with the norms given by classical logic. Rather, the Bayesian theory of argumentation can be seen as justifying and enriching the argumentative norms of classical logic. (shrink)

While Tenenbaum and Griffiths impressively consolidate and extend Shepard's research in the areas of stimulus representation and generalization, there is a need for complexity measures to be developed to control the flexibility of their “hypothesis space” approach to representation. It may also be possible to extend their concept learning model to consider the fundamental issue of representational adaptation. [Tenenbaum & Griffiths].

15년 전부터 등장한 베이지안 확률론적 추론 모형은 통계학, 과학철학, 심리학, 인지과학, 컴퓨터과학, 신경과학 등에서 학계의 연구를 지배하는 강력한 핵심논제가 된 후로 이젠 교육학과 심지어는 논리학 분야에까지 큰 반향을 일으키고 있다. 이러한 다양화로 인해, 굿에 따르면, 베이즈주의 유형은 46,656 가지로 분류된다. 이러한 다양한 모형들 중에서 베이지안 확률모형을 학습이론에 적용하려는 학자들은 학습자의 학습 과정이 정확히 베이지안 확률추론 과정을 항상 따른다고 주장한다. 그런데 이러한 확률론적 모형은 피아제의 구성주의적 전망을 계승한 것은 분명하다. 왜냐하면, 이 모델을 지지하는 학자들 자신이 자신들의 학적 운동을 “새로운 합리적 구성주의”라고 (...) 명시적으로 명명하기 때문이다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 이러한 확률론적 학습모형은 “지식은 인과성을 중심으로 구조화된다.”라는 가설을 확고하게 지지하면서, 피아제의 명제 논리적 모형에 의한 학습이론을 강하게 비판한다. 그러나 베이지안 학습 이론가들은 경험을 통한 새로운 항들의 연결로서의 학습, 그리고 학습에서 모순 및 인과성의 역할 등에 대한 피아제의 세부적인 연구 성과들을 놓치고 있다. 다른 한편으로 베이지안 학습이론은 여러 가지 점에서 온전한 발달 이론을 제공하기에는 아직 미흡하다. 이런 점에서, 필자는 현상 없이는 구조를 이해할 수 없듯이, 구조 없이는 현상을 이해할 수 없다는 사실을 강조하면서, 인과성 추론을 핵심으로 하는 베이지안 학습 모델과 인과적 물리적 인식뿐만 아니라, 동시에 논리-수학적 인식 모델을 강조하는 피아제의 학습 모델은 새로이 종합되어야 한다는 것을 논증하고자 한다. (shrink)

Bayesian reverse-engineering is a research strategy for developing three-level explanations of behavior and cognition. Starting from a computational-level analysis of behavior and cognition as optimal probabilistic inference, Bayesian reverse-engineers apply numerous tweaks and heuristics to formulate testable hypotheses at the algorithmic and implementational levels. In so doing, they exploit recent technological advances in Bayesian artificial intelligence, machine learning, and statistics, but also consider established principles from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Although these tweaks and heuristics are highly (...) pragmatic in character and are often deployed unsystematically, Bayesian reverse-engineering avoids several important worries that have been raised about the explanatory credentials of Bayesian cognitive science: the worry that the lower levels of analysis are being ignored altogether; the challenge that the mathematical models being developed are unfalsifiable; and the charge that the terms ‘optimal’ and ‘rational’ have lost their customary normative force. But while Bayesian reverse-engineering is therefore a viable and productive research strategy, it is also no fool-proof recipe for explanatory success. (shrink)

We design a double-or-quits game to compare the speed of learning one’s specific ability with the speed of rising confidence as the task gets increasingly difficult. We find that people on average learn to be overconfident faster than they learn their true ability and we present an intuitive-Bayesian model of confidence which integrates confidence biases and learning. Uncertainty about one’s true ability to perform a task in isolation can be responsible for large and stable confidence biases, namely (...) limited discrimination, the hard–easy effect, the Dunning–Kruger effect, conservative learning from experience and the overprecision phenomenon if subjects act as Bayesian learners who rely only on sequentially perceived performance cues and contrarian illusory signals induced by doubt. Moreover, these biases are likely to persist since the Bayesian aggregation of past information consolidates the accumulation of errors and the perception of contrarian illusory signals generates conservatism and under-reaction to events. Taken together, these two features may explain why intuitive Bayesians make systematically wrong predictions of their own performance. (shrink)

Hinge epistemology and Bayesianism are two prominent approaches in contemporary epistemology, but the relationship between these approaches has not been systematically studied. This paper formalizes the central commitments of hinge epistemology in a Bayesian framework and argues for the following two theses: (1) many of the types of claims that are treated as paradigmatic hinges in the hinge epistemology literature, such as the claim that there exists an external world of physical objects, are not capable of enabling rational inquiry, (...) even though this is typically regarded as a central property of hinges; (2) the standard Bayesian story of how rational inquiry proceeds is incorrect or at best incomplete. (shrink)

The study tests the hypothesis that conditional probability judgments can be influenced by causal links between the target event and the evidence even when the statistical relations among variables are held constant. Three experiments varied the causal structure relating three variables and found that (a) the target event was perceived as more probable when it was linked to evidence by a causal chain than when both variables shared a common cause; (b) predictive chains in which evidence is a cause of (...) the hypothesis gave rise to higher judgments than diagnostic chains in which evidence is an effect of the hypothesis; and (c) direct chains gave rise to higher judgments than indirect chains. A Bayesian learning model was applied to our data but failed to explain them. An explanation-based hypothesis stating that statistical information will affect judgments only to the extent that it changes beliefs about causal structure is consistent with the results. (shrink)

The field of causal learning and reasoning (largely overlooked in the target article) provides an illuminating case study of how the modern Bayesian framework has deepened theoretical understanding, resolved long-standing controversies, and guided development of new and more principled algorithmic models. This progress was guided in large part by the systematic formulation and empirical comparison of multiple alternative Bayesian models.

Dogmatism is sometimes thought to be incompatible with Bayesian models of rational learning. I show that the best model for updating imprecise credences is compatible with dogmatism.